Vitmomir Miles Raguž

Da nije bilo Oluje i drugi eseji/Who Saved Bosnia and other Essays.

Zagreb: Stih, 2005. pages 363.

FOREWORD

By Dr. Ante Čuvalo – Professor of History

For over thirty years, Walter Cronkite, celebrated former anchor of CBS Evening News, calmly, clearly, and with authority ended his news reports with the sign-off line, “And that’s the way it is.”  As a news anchor, he was voted by Americans among the top 10 “most influential decision-makers in America” in the 1970s.  His audience accepted his word that the world was the way he presented it.  This willingness to accept the world as others portray it is not unusual.  People around the world accept reality “the way it is” instead of making an effort to see it in all its complexity.
It is much simpler, easier, and quite often safer to accept the assumptions that various Cronkites and would-be Cronkites of the world select, package, and present to us, rather than to accept Kant’s invitation to “dare to know” the perplexing realities of our world.  By Kant’s standard, those in the mass media, social sciences, and public life are doing a great disservice to humanity by claiming to possess the final word because by doing so they forestall our efforts to seek a better grasp of the world, that should, in turn, contribute to helping us to change it for the better.
This collection of essays by Vitomir Miles Raguz does not reflect the mainstream thinking among those who claim to be expert interpreters of the events that accompanied the collapse of Socialist Yugoslavia.  But one does not have to agree with the author to realize that this collection is a significant contribution to understanding recent events in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and the region.  He challenges the conventional wisdom regarding the tragic events of the period and he questions those that have repeatedly told us “that’s the way it is.”  Mr. Raguz bases his discourse on facts, not on politically correct assumptions and popular myths.  But he also distinguishes “visible” facts (who did what for various reasons on the local level) from beyond the scene policy-making processes and particulars, and he urges the experts to do the same if they wish to grasp the full meaning of events.  He is optimistic that future historians will probe more deeply, and by getting to the “bottom of things” contribute to regional reconciliation more than the ICTY or the “committed” experts of today.
Ambassador Raguz served in several Bosnian- Herzegovene and Croatian diplomatic posts (1992 to 2000), where he had a front-row seat to the historic drama that unfolded during that decade.  He was able to observe the protagonists of this drama and sometimes was on stage with them.  His close proximity to the participants who shaped events gave him significant insights regarding, for example, the role of Western powers in the withdrawal of Croatian military forces from Posavina (1992), the meeting between Alija Izetbegovic and Croatian diplomats in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (1992), the intentions and the role of the United States in the Croatian military operation “Storm” (1995), and the various efforts to end the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The details Mr. Raguz reveals and the events he discusses were not state secrets nor were they unknown to foreign observers of the region at the time.  But many of these “details” were not made public and discussed because the standard paradigms then in use excluded them.  In other words, they would have forced radical changes in the realities constructed by experts on the region.  Probably the most popular paradigm was that of moral equivalence, which attributed equal blame for Yugoslavia’s violent dissolution to Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman.  But based on the policy-making processes that he witnessed, Raguz argues that “Croatia was not the problem but the solution” to the conflict caused by Serbian expansionism.  This was nowhere more evident than in the case of Bosnia- Herzegovina.
He does not lay the blame for the popularity of distorted images of Croatia and Croats on foreign image-makers, but places it with local and international politicos who bend the reality for short term policy gains, as well as with some intellectuals in Croatia.  The latter had a need to prove themselves to be on a par with what they believed to be the intellectually progressive elements in Europe.  At times this was also the case because of their ideological activism, and for some with non-democratic pasts, a way to personal rehabilitation through an external imprimatur.
This was not so for Ambassador Raguz, who was not trapped within idealistic nor ideological models.  When he accepted his first posting as a diplomat Mr. Raguz was a young banker, not a diplomat.  Nevertheless, he quickly grasped the basic rules of international politics that interest and realism prevail over idealism, internationalism, and humanitarianism.  He therefore writes about what happened, not what should have happened had the world been an ideal place.
A number of articles in this collection appeared in influential publications in the West, including the largest circulation English language policy daily The Wall Street Journal, The Jerusalem Post, European Voice, and The Harvard International Review, as well as in Croatian newspapers and magazines.  In each of these essays, Ambassador Raguz gives not only valuable eyewitness testimonies, but he also proves himself to be a first-rate analyst of events in the region.  He also offers suggestions for resolving what seem to be complex issues that continue to threaten peace and stability in south-eastern Europe.
Although Mr. Raguz is a realist, he is also an optimist.  He believes that well-intentioned people in that troubled part of Europe outnumber those with evil intentions “by a wide margin”. But he concludes that before the region can embark on its road to a better future, we must have a “balanced picture” of its recent wars.  For that reason he has repeatedly urged all those who were involved, both within and outside of the region, to question existing accounts which are popular but often inaccurate assessments of events, and to seek the truth in its full complexity- for the sake of a better future.
Chicago, Illinois
May, 2005

Vitmomir Miles Raguž

Da nije bilo Oluje i drugi eseji/Who Saved Bosnia and other Essays.

Zagreb: Stih, 2005. pages 363.

PREDGOVOR

Ante Čuvalo – profesor povijesti

Više od trideset godina je Walter Cronkite, negdašnji znameniti glavni izvjestitelj CBS-ovih večernjih vijesti, smireno, jasno i uvjereno završavao svoja izvješća rečenicom: “I tako je to”.  Kao uvaženog novinara, Amerikanci su ga u sedamdesetim godinama prošlog stoljeća uvrstili među desetoricu ljudi “koji najviše utječu na donošenje odluka u Americi”.  Gledatelji su prihvaćali njegovu tvrdnju da je svijet uistinu onakav kakvim ga je on prikazivao.  Ta spremnost da se prihvati nečije viđenje svijeta nije neuobičajena.  Ljudi diljem svijeta prihvaćaju “tako je to” stvarnost, umjesto da se potrude sagledati je u svoj njenoj složenosti.
Jednostavnije je, lakše, a najčešće i manje opasno prihvatiti pretpostavke što ih razni Cronkitei i nazovi Cronkitei na svijetu odabiru, pakiraju i prikazuju, nego prihvatiti Kantov poziv da se “odvažimo spoznati” začudnu stvarnost svijeta.  Po Kantovim mjerilima ljudi iz masovnih medija, društvenih znanosti i javnog života nanose veliku štetu čovječanstvu, tvrdnjom da posjeduju konačnu istinu, jer tako čini izlišnim naše nastojanje da što bolje spoznamo svijet, što bi nam, sa svoje strane, pomoglo da ga izmijenimo nabolje.
U ovoj knjizi skupljeni eseji Vitomira Milesa Raguža nisu odraz glavne struje onih što za sebe tvrde da su najpozvaniji tumačiti događaje koji su pratili slom socijalističke Jugoslavije.  Ne moramo se slagati s autorom da bismo shvatili da su ovdje skupljeni tekstovi značajan doprinos razumijevanju nedavnih zbivanja u Hrvatskoj, Bosni i Hercegovini i u regiji.  On se suprotstavlja uvriježenim shvaćanjima o tragičnim zbivanjima iz toga vremena i dovodi u pitanje one koji su nam neprestance tvrdili “tako je to”.  Raguž svoja razmatranja temelji na činjenicama, a ne na politički prihvatljivim pretpostavkama i uvriježenim mitovima.
Ali on, isto tako, razlikuje “vidljive” činjenice (tko je što učinio iz ovih ili onih razloga na lokalnoj razini) od procesa i pojedinosti koje su u pozadini donošenja političkih odluka, čime i stručnjake prisiljava da učine isto, ukoliko žele spoznati puno značenje pojedinih zbivanja.  On iskazuje optimističko očekivanje da će budući povjesničari doći do dubljih sagledavanja, te da će takvim prodorom u “srž stvari” doprinijeti regionalnoj pomirbi više nego Međunarodni krivični su u Haagu ili današnji “posvećeni” stručnjaci.
Veleposlanik Raguž obnašao je više dužnosti u hrvatskoj i bosansko-hercegovačkoj diplomaciji (od 1992. do 2000. godine), te je mogao izbliza promatrati povijesnu dramu koja se odvijala u tome desetljeću.  Bio je u prilici promatrati protagoniste te drame, a ponekad je s njima bio i na pozornici.  Bliskost sudionicima koji su oblikovali zbivanja omogućila mu je dublji uvid u, primjerice,ulogu zapadnih sila u povlačenju hrvatskih vojnih snaga iz Posavine (1992.), sastanak Izetbegovića i hrvatskih diplomata u Jedi, u Saudijskoj Arabiji (1992.), namjere i ulogu Sjedinjenih Država u hrvatskoj vojnoj operaciji Oluja (1995.), te raznorazne pokušaje za okončanje rata u Bosni i Hercegovini.
Pojedinosti koje Raguž iznosi i događaji okojima piše nisu predstavljali državne tajne, niti su u ono vrijeme bile nepoznate inozemnim promatračima.  Ali mnoge od tih “pojedinosti” nisu objavljene i o njima se nije raspravljalo, jer su se protivili tada prihvaćenu načinu sagledavanja stvarnosti.  Drugim riječima, oni bi doveli do korjenitih promjena u stvarnosti kakvu su stvorili stručnjaci za regiju.
Možda najraširenija paradigma bila je ona o podjednakoj moralnoj odgovornosti, koja je jednaku krivicu za krvavi raspad Jugoslavije pripisala Slobodanu Miloševiću i Franji Tuđmanu.  No na osnovi procesa donošenja političkih odluka kojima je svjedočio, Raguž dokazuje da “Hrvatska nije bila proble, nego rješenje” sukoba što ga je izazvao srpski ekspanzioinizam.  To je bilo najočitije u slučaju Bosne i Hercegovine.
Za iskrivljenu sliku o Hrvatskoj i o Hrvatima on, međutim, ne krivi inozemne stvaratelje imidža, nego domaće i inozemne političare koji zbog kratkoročnih političkih probitaka izokreću stvarnost, kao i neke hrvatske intelektualce.  Potonji osjećaju potrebu da dokažu da su ravni onima koje smatraju intelektualno naprednim elementima u Europi.  Ponekad to čine i zbog vlastitog političkog aktivizma, a za neke koji su imali nedemokratsku prošlost to je put za osobnu rehabilitaciju posredstvom vjerodajnice dobivene iz inozemstva.
Kod veleposlanika Raguža to nije slučaj.  On se ne da uhvatiti u zamku idealističkih ili ideologijskih modela.  Premda je u vrijeme kad je prihvatio prvo postavljenje na diplomatski položaj Raguž bio mladi bankar, a ne diplomat, ubrzo je shvatio osnovna pravila međunarodne politike, prema kojima interes i realizam imaju prevagu nad idealizmom, internacionalizmom i humanizmom.  On stoga piše o onome što se uistinu dogodilo, a ne o onome što se trebalo dogoditi kad bi svijet bio savršeno mjesto.
Veći broj članaka u ovoj knjizi objavljen je u izdanjima koja su na Zapadu utjecajna, uključujući najčitanije dnevne političke novine na engleskom jeziku The Wall Street Journal, a zatim The Jerusalem Post, European Voice i The Harvard International Review, kao i u hrvatskim novinama i časopisima.  U svim tim esejima veleposlanik Raguž iznosi ne samo vrijedna svjedočanstva izravnog promatrača, nego dokazuje da je prvorazredni analitičar zbivanja u regiji.  On, također, nudi i prijedloge za rješenje onoga što se doima kao niz složenih problema koji prijete ugroziti mir i stabilnost u jugoistočnoj Europi.
Premda je Raguž realist, on je i optimist.  Uvjeren je da su dobronamjerni ljudi u tom napaćenom europskom području daleko brojniji od onih sa zlim namjerama.  Ali zaključuje da prije nego što regija krene na putovanje u bolju budućnost, moramo stvoriti “uravnoteženu sliku” o nedavnim ratovima.  Iz toga razloga višekratno je pozivao sve koji su bili uključeni u zbivanja, kako one u regiji tako i one izvan nje,da preispitaju postojeće verzije događaja koje su se uvriježile, ali često ne odgovaraju činjenicama, i da potraže istinu u svoj njenoj složenosti – radi bolje budućnosti sviju.
Chicago, Illinois
Svibnja 2005.

Hrvatsko slovo

27. kolovoza 2010.

HRVATSKE ŠKOLSKE POČETNICE

U NEDAVNOJ PROŠLOSTI I DANAS

Od domoljublja do nacionalne samozataje

Piše: Ante Čuvalo

Stara izreka veli da je knjiga najbolji prijatelj. Ali ima svakovrsnih knjiga. One mogu biti što god čovjek od njih želi napraviti — mogu biti izvor znanja, kulture, lijepog odgoja i nadahnuća ili, s druge strane, mogu biti oruđe za pranja mozga, zaglupljivanje i manipulaciju; mogu biti izvor mržnje i drugih zala; mogu biti otrov…. Shvaćajući važnost knjige i školstva, razne ideologije, vlastodršci i svi oni koji su željeli i žele nametnuti svoje svjetonazore i premoć nad drugima nastojali su čim prije i što čvršće zavladati školstvom i osvojiti tvrđave znanja.

Ima već podulje godina otkako se u mojoj kućnoj knjižnici nalaze dvije hrvatske pučkoškolske početnice iz dva različita doba. Obje sam sa sobom donio iz Amerike. Prva je stigla u Ameriku poslije Drugog svjetskog rata, a druga je prodavana u nekadasnjoj (srpskoj) knjižari „Palandich“ u Chicagu, koja je, dakle, širena i među Hrvatima u svijetu, odnosno iz koje su učila (neka) hrvatska djeca u Americi.

Prva knjiga je Moj dom – Početnica i čitanka za I. godište pučkih škola u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj. Zagreb: Nakladni odjel Hrvatske državne tiskare, 1942. , 122 str. Druga je Početnica i čitanka za I. razred osnovne škole. Sastavio radni odbor; (za rad. odbor Ante Blaženčić). Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Hrvatske, 1949., 128 str. Udžbenici nam, pa čak i oni za najmlađe, mogu poslužiti kao prozorčići u tadašnja vremena i zato sam pregledao i analizirao ove dvije početnice te ovdje dijelim s vama što mi je zapelo za oko. Ali ove dvije početnice zaslužuju i dodatak. Naime, ne će biti na odmet ako malo zavirimo u udžbenike kojima se danas služe đaci prvog razreda u Republici Hrvatskoj i prvaši u djelovima Bosne i Hercegovine (Federaciji) gdje dobrim dijelom žive Hrvati. Dakle, pođimo redom.

Početnica iz 1942.

Ova početnica je tvrdo uvezana, prednja korica je u veselim bojama; na njoj su narisana djeca u različitim hrvatskim narodnim nošnjama, veseli su, uzbuđeni, bezbrižni, beru cvijeće…. Htjelo se naglasiti da djeca s veseljem idu u školu, ali zasigurno i činjenicu da su sada u svojoj hrvatskoj državi. Na naslovnoj stranici piše ne samo da je to početnica i čitanka za I. godište pučkih škola, nego se naglašuje da je to „u Nezavisnoj državi Hrvatskoj.“ Tu su i mali hrvatski grb i troplet, ali i ideološki znak: sićušno slovo „U“ iznad grba. Na prvih 33 stranice na svakoj stranici ima jedan ili više crteža, svi su uglavnom iz života na selu, djeca i odrasli su u narodnim nošnjama, u veselim su bojama i veselu zanosu. Poslije 33. stranice manje je crteža i crno-bijeli su. U Početnici, to jest prvom dijelu knjige, sva su štiva tipično dječja, bez ideoloških primjesa. Jedino na stranici 26 nacrtana je skupina djece kako koracaju pod hrvatskim barjakom i kratak tekst koji govori kako će se i oni boriti za domovinu Hrvtsku, te završava „Živjela Hrvatska!“

Drugi dio knjige, to jest „Čitanka“, ima sljedeće podnaslove: Zima odlazi, Proljeće, Ljeto, Dom i škola, Bog i domovina, Čovjek i rad te Priroda i stvari. Dio „Bog i domovina“ sadrži sljedeća štiva: „U selu“, „Gorsko selo“, „Grad“, „Zavičaj“ i „Domovina“, te pjesme: „Molitva“, „Uskrs“, „Večernja zvona“, „Hrvatsko selo“, „Željeznica“, „Domovini“ i „Mali Hrvat“.

Početnica iz 1942. je zasigurno domoljubna i to, moglo bi se reći, veselo domoljubna. Uz znanje, ona nastoji u djeci potaknuti ljubav za njihovo selo, kraj i domovinu. U njoj nema nikakvih oblika mržnje protiv ikoga ili ičega. Bosna i Hercegovina je uključena kao dio domovine i u knjizi se govori o Bajramu kao i o Božiću, te o Džaferu i Salki kao i o Mari, Đuki i Stipi. Na koncu štiva „Domovina“ uskliče se „Živjela Hrvatska!“ i uz to se ipak dodaje „Živio Poglavnik!“ (st. 94.)

Početnica iz 1949.

Ova početnica je mekih korica u tmurnim bojama. Dečko i curica, koji idu u školu, također su u potištenim bojama, preozbiljni su i u manje ili više, „nedefiniranim“ seljačkim narodnim odorama. Svi crteži u knjizi su crno-bijeli. Drugi dio, „Čitanka“, nije podijeljen na podnaslove nego su štiva i pjesme razbacani bez kakva tematskog reda, ali između uobičajenih dječjih štiva stalno se ubacuju i ona s ideološkim nabojem. Već na stranici 16 je crtež dečka Mome s „partizankom“ kapom na glavi i u „pionirskoj“ odori, a onda slijede i druga djeca u takvim odorama. Na stranici 20 djeca (koja tek uče slova!) raduju se zidnim novinama izvješenim na ploči s dvije petokrake. Na str. 26 predstavljeno je slovo „T“, ali nije teško pogoditi kako se najbolje pamti slovo „T“! Tu je nacrtana skupina ljudi koji nose Titovu sliku i natpise: „Tito, Tito, Tito; Svi smo Titovi, Tito nas vodi“. Ispod slike je tekst:

Sav je narod veseo:

Ti-to, Ti-to, Ti-to!

Tito nas voli.

Mi smo Titovi.

Tito je sin domovine.

S Titom je sav narod.

Svi smo Titovi.

Slovo „P“ se vježbalo uz tekst kako pioniri stupaju i pjevaju, u pionirskim su odorama i s „partizanakom“ na glavi, te s jugo-zastavama i natpisom „Tito“ (str. 30).

A na strani 31 tata Pajo iz Armije piše pismo sinu Peri i u pismu naglašava kako pioniri „vole Tita i armiju“. „O“ – otac se vraća iz rata. Naravno s „partizankom“ na glavi, u od Nijemaca popaljeno selo. „Š“ – u šumi su partizani, „Narod je poslušao Šimuna. Šuma je štitila narod.“ „B“ – „Bila je borba“ (uz crtež partizana na fronti). Švabe su palile sela i ubijali narod. „Sa Švabama su išli ustaše“. „Borba nam je donijela pobjedu“. „Danas više nema rata. Mi smo pobijedili. Nema više ustaša ni Švaba. Borba nas je spasila. Mi smo slobodni.“ Zanimljivo je da nema više ustaša, al’ se ne kaže da nema četnika!

Kako bi se moglo učiti slovo „Z“ a ne govoriti o zvijezdi, odnosno zvijezdi petokraki. Tu je i Zoran koji je crtao zvijezde za „vrijeme Švaba“, bio zatvoren, partizani ga oslobodili, i on postao partizan. Na crtežu su zgrade s nacrtanim zvijzdama po zidu i imenom Tito, latinicom i ćirilicom. „Zvijezda je znak slobode. Svi, koji se bore za slobodu, nose crvenu zvijezdu…. Zato i mi nosimo zvijezdu na kapama. I mi smo nosili borcima jelo i poštu.“ „Borbom su protjerali Švabe i izdajice.“ A zna se, izdajice su bili svi koji nisu bili za Tita i partizane!

„F“ se najbolje uči uz riječ fašisti! Tako su fašisiti odveli postolara Franu i mučili ga da izda svoje drugove, osudili ga na smrt a on, „Pod vješalima je uskliknuo: Smrt fašizmu – Sloboda narodu!“ (str. 47)

Riječi Hrvoje i Hrvat pomažu kod učenja slova „H“, ali ne daj Bože da se to ne bi „uravnotežilo“ s „J“ i „S“! Tekst glasi: „Hrvoje i Jovo dva su dobra druga. Hrvoje je Hrvat, a Jovo je Srbin. Hrvati i Srbi zajedno su oslobodili Hrvatsku od fašista.“ (str. 49)

„Ž“ se najlakše uči uz riječi Žarko, Živko i živjeli, posebice sljedećim uzvicima:

Živjeli pioniri!

Živio Maršal Jugoslavije drug Tito!

Živjela hrabra jugoslavenska armija!

Živjela Narodna Republika Hrvatska! (str. 53).

„Lj“ se uči uz priču o ljubavi, ali ne o svakakvoj, nego o „Bratskoj ljubavi“(str. 59). Tu je crtež dječaka u srpskoj i vršnjaka mu u hrvatskoj (zagorskoj) narodnoj nošnji. Stevo i Ivo pjevaju „Druže Tito, naš rođeni brate, što sjedini Srbe i Hrvate.“ A zatim Smilja i Ljerka pjevaju onu poznatu „ Druže Tito, ljubičice bijela….“, a ispod pjesme je usklik: „Za domovinu – Za Tita Naprijed!“ (str. 60)

Slijedi „Čitanka“, koja je prepuna revolucije, Tita, partizana, petogodišnjeg plana, tvornica, pionira udarnika, te fašista i narodnih neprijatelja…. „Čitanka“ ima 65 stranica i na njima nabrojih spominjanje pionira 20 puta, a jedan od njih obećaje: „Ljubit ću svoje roditelje i braću, sav radni narod, svoju domovinu i druga Tita, a mrziti sve one, koji bi htjeli da nam otmu slobodu.“ Drugi pionir odmah poslije prvog razreda odlazi „na prugu“. Djeca marširaju, igraju se rata protiv fašista koji se spominje 11 puta. Titovo ime se spominje 20 puta; partizani (spasioci) 7 puta, čak i Acu Rankovića jednom. Pri koncu se slavi „narodna armija“, „narodni heroji“, a kako bi knjiga mogla proći bez pjesmice „Titovo kolo – koga ne bi vo’lo!“ Tito je „Bosi dječak“ kojeg „od škole nije mogao odvratiti ni studeni vjetar, ni kiša.“ „Taj negdašnji dječak današnji je heroj, maršal Jugoslavije, naš Josip Broz-Tito.“ Na kraju je i najveća radost mladih pionira, susret i slika s drugom Titom! A knjiga završava poklikom „Za domovinu – Za Tita – Naprijed!“

O bratstvu Srba i Hrvata trabalo je iz malena pjevati:

Dva rođena brata:

Srbin uz Hrvata.

Srca složno biju,

Oči radost siju.

Ruka ruku steže

I bratstvo ih veže. (str. 77).

Plodove takvog odgoja i bratstva najbolje smo vidjeli unatrag nekoliko godina u Vukovaru, Gospiću, Škabrinji, Dubrovniku….

Početnice ovodobne

Sad zavirimo i u udžbenike prvog razreda naših dana. U ruci su mi dva udžbenika i radne bilježnice koje idu uz njih: Ante Bežen i Vesna Budinski. Prvi koraci: Početnica za prvi razred osnove škole. Zagreb, Profil, 2007., (148 str.) i Radna bilježnica (100 str.). Dr. sc. Ivan De Zan et al. Naš svijet 1: Udžbenik prirode i društva s CD-om za 1. razred osnovne škole. Zagreb,Školska knjiga, 2008., (94 str.) i Radna bilježnica (68 str.).

Pri prvom pogledu lako je zamijetiti da su ovi udžbenici ljepši, moderniji, pedagoški suvremeniji i djeci „prijateljskiji“ od onih iz „bivših“ vremena. Usput zamijetih, premda se u njima govori o modernom životu, oni ni ne spominju kompjutere/računala, a znamo da današnja djeca u tim godinama, u najviše slučajeva, počinju „kljucati“ po tim modernim „mozgovima“. Ali ovdje ne ćemo o tome, nego je riječ o ideološkim „crtama“ u pučkoškolskim početnicama.

Nije teško uočiti da su ovo „gradske“ knjige, pripremljene za gradsku djecu. Dvije knjige pod naslovom Prvi koraci nemaju ništa o selu, kao da i ne postoji. U Radnoj bilježnici ima četiri crteža indijanskih „šatora“ (tipee) iza koji poviruju dva mališana u indijanskim tradicionalnim nošnjama (str. 21), ali nema ništa o hrvatskim selima ili koji crtež iz tolikog bogatstva hrvatskih narodnih nošnji. U udžbeniku Naš svijet ima poglavlje „Selo – mjesto u kojem živim“, ali nema tu ništa o seljacima ili životu na selu, nego nešto malo kako kuće na selu imaju okućnice.

Kad je riječ o domoljublju, stvari stoje ovako: U udžbeniku Prvi koraci, na stranici koja govori o slovu „H“ nacrtana je karta Republike Hrvatske „obučena“ u crveno-bijele kockice. Tu je i velikm slovima ime „Hrvatska“ i rečenica „Hrvatska je moja domovina“. (str. 54.) Kod učenja pisanog slova „N“ uvrštena je pjesma „Naš put“ koja na dva mjesta spominje „Lijepu našu.“ Nadat se je da učitelji ipak tumače djeci o kojoj se zemlji radi. Radna bilježnica koja ide uz gore spomenutu početnicu spominje Hrvatsku opet samo kod vježbanja slova „H“. Tekst glasi: „Hrvatska je moja domovina. Volim Hrvatsku. Tu sam se rodio. Hrvatska je lijepa.“ (str. 68)

Udžbenik Naš svijet je ipak nešto slikovitiji kad se tiče Hrvatske. Tu je crtež škole, a pred školom visi hrvatski barjak (str. 10.), a u razredu iznad ploče visi hrvatski grb (str. 18.). U poglavlju o blagdanima govori se i o „Danu neovisnosti“ (str. 81.). Uz sliku s nekoliko hrvatskih zastavica, tekst poučava: „Domovina je država u kojoj živimo. Naša se domovina zove Republika Hrvatska. Dan neovisnosti slavimo 8. listopada. Mi volimo svoju domovinu.“ Djeca trebaju odgovoriti kako su proslavili Dan neovisnosti i opisati hrvatsku zastavu. Na str. 57. Radne bilježnice djeca uvježbavaju ono što je rečeno i zadano u udžbeniku uz „Dan neovisnosti“.

Zamijetiti je da se u ovim udžbenicima dobro pazi da ne bi „pretjerali“ u „hrvatovanju“. Domoljublje je ograničeno na Republiku Hrvatsku i za one koji su rođeni u njoj. Ali nema nikakve poruke malim Hrvatićima koji su rođeni izvan RH, negdje u svijetu, a koji se budu služili ovim početnicama. Ima li potrebe i njima natuknuti što bi Hrvatska za njih trebala znači i tko su Hrvati, premda nisu rođeni u Republici Hrvatskoj?

Udžbenici kojima se služe prvaši u županijma Bosne i Hercegovine (Federacije) u kojima obitavaju Hrvati su slijedeći: Terezija Zokić, Jadranka Bralić i Marija Musa. Početnica – Tajna slova – za 1. razred osmogodišnje osnovne škole. Mostar, Školska naklada, 2007., (202 str.), Terezija Zokić i Jadranka Bralić. Radna bilježnica B za hrvatski jezik u 1. razredu osnovne škole – Tajna slova 1. Zagreb, Školska knjiga, 2007., (122str.), Dr. sc. Ivan DeZan i dr. sc. Mario Vasilj. Priroda i društvo – Udžbenik za prvi razred osnovne škole, Mostar: Školska naklada, 2006., (72str.).

Čim se otvore knjige tiskane u Mostaru vidi se da su morale proći kroz pet različitih „imprimatura“! Kako je u Bosni i Hercegovini sve „zapuntano u drači i kupini“, tako je i s udžbenicima. U tom metežu, Hrvati posebice moraju biti oprezni da ih se ne okrivi za razbijanje države (jer takvima su oduvijek bili!). Ta se opreznost i samozataja očituje i u ovim početnicama. Tako se sramežljivo provukla riječ „Hrvat“ u Početnici na str. 84. i u Radnoj bilježnici na str 60 kao primjer riječi koje počinju slovom „H“. Isto tako „Hercegovina“ u Početnici na str. 149. Na 183. str. počinje dio knjige „Ljepote našeg jezika“ i srećom ispod naslova je slika na kojoj piše „hrvatski“. Dakle, ipak učimo hrvatski, a ne „naški“. U udžbeniku Priroda i društvo zmijetiti je (str. 18) da na slici vise miniaturni crven-bijeli-plavi barjačići i to je sve što se tiče nacionalnog identiteta hrvatske djece. Ovo je samo sićušni uzorak prilika u BiH. Treba već od malih nogu nametnuti ne „ideologiju“ zdrave ljubavi za ono tko smo i što smo, te u isto vrijeme prihvaćanje i poštivanje drugih i drugačijih, nego „ideologiju“ samozataje (barem kod Hrvata) i prešućivanja drugih.

Zaključne misli

Analizirane početnice tek su mali uzorci vremena u kojima su pisane. Prve dvije (iz 1942. i 1949.) pisane su u razmaku od samo sedam godina, obje za hrvatsku djecu (ili ova druga za djecu Hrvatske!), ali između njih je ogroman jaz. Ona iz 1942. nastoji promicati hrvatsko domoljublje i radost da Hrvati imaju državu. U njoj nema nekih ideoloških, ustaških, natruha osim na dva mjesta. Druga (ona iz 1949.) je puna revolucije, Tita, partizana i pionira koji bi već u tim godinama trebali znati sto je fašizam, petogodišnji plan, ići „na prugu“, biti udarnici i mrziti druge koji su protivnici režima. To je početnica za mlade revolucionare!

Stječe se dojam da su današnje početnice iz RH oprezne u domoljublju, posebice Prvi koraci, a o onima iz BiH, kojima se služe uglavnom hrvatska djeca, da i ne govorim. I jedne i druge, čini se, „lakše“ govore o vjerskim blagdanima, nego o domoljublju. Dok, recimo, u Americi od najmlađih školskih dana djeci se ulijeva ljubav za Ameriku, nacionalni ponos, a vjersko je ostavljeno za privatne škole, Crkvu i obitelj. Udžbenici pokazuju da kod nas u ova vremena njegovanje i jačanje domoljublja ipak nije politički korektno ili probitačno.

Uspoređujući spomenute početnice, zaključiti nam je da je jedino ona iz 1949. (i slične koje su slijedile u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji) bila puna ideološkog nasilja, u prvom redu nad sićušnom djecom, a zatim nad roditeljima i učiteljima koji su morali to s djecom čitati, gledati i slušati. Ali posljedice ovog i ovakih udžbenika osjećaju se i danas. Svjedoci smo da jedan broj ljudi koji su učili iz ovakvih početnica još uvijek živi u svjetonazoru kojim su bili zadojeni kao „pioniri“. Oni i dalje vode borbu koju je u šumi „započeo drug Tito.“ Premda su „potjerali Švabe i izdajice“, naprijatelji im se, kao fatamorgana, stalno pojavljuju pred očima. Vidimo ih i danas u kapama „partizankama“, pioniriskim maramama i sa slikom njima nezaboravnog i dragog diktatora. Jednostavno se ne mogu osloboditi prošloti; ostali su i dalje na rubu „šume.“ Bilo bi ipak vrijeme da takvi, i svi koji žive u ideološkim bunkerima bilo koje vrste, iziđu iz njih i osjete što znači biti stvarno slobodan čovjek. Ali „zub vremena“ će i dalje mljeti sve ideološke zablude, a u tim svim mijenama važno je da hrvatski pedagozi priređuju početnice koje će prvaši s radošću čitati, koje će biti zanimljivi izvori znanja i radosti, koje će zacrtavati temelje dobrog karaktera, samopouzdanja, samosvijesti i zdrava ponosa na ono tko su i što su, poštivanje svih ljudi, kao i ljubav za svoj hrvatski narod, kulturu i domovinu.

Zagreb-Dubrovnik: HAZU, Zavod za povijesne znanosti u Dubrovniku: 2008, 248p.

ISBN 978-953-154-760-4

(Conclusion, pp. 199-201)

Dubrovnik Renaissance gardens and villas were, as a rule, designed and built by local craftsmen with the full participation of their owners, so they reflect the potentials, wishes, philosophy and creative capabilities of local residents.
Through comparison of Dubrovnik Renaissance gardens with the authentic models of their Italian counterparts, it can be concluded that Dubrovnik gardens are characterised by certain features related to the size, landscaping and articulation of their garden space. This results from natural and social differences and is consequently reflected in the quantity of particular natural and compositional elements, as well as differences in garden patterns. Dubrovnik Renaissance gardens were created in a dry, karst region, which results in the dominance of two compositional elements: stone and verdure. In Italian gardens, established on mild, fertile slopes on a hilly terrain, spring water has an equally significant role as stone and verdure.
Both Italian and Dubrovnik Renaissance gardens are geometrically shaped, but there are differences in this respect too. While the geometrical shaping in Italian gardens was carried out with consistent precision, in Dubrovnik gardens it is done more flexibly, with less insistence on the preciseness of geometrical shapes and symmetry.
The difference in design of the systems of principal garden paths or walkways is great. While in Italian gardens the principal paths were most often bordered by hedges and clipped verdure, in Dubrovnik gardens they were bordered by low stone walls carrying stone columns which supported pergolas.
This is the reason why in Dubrovnik Renaissance gardens verdure did not need to be artificially trimmed. Nor was its tectonic (constructional) function in the creation and articulation of the garden area significant to the same extent and in the same manner.
In each Dubrovnik Renaissance garden the pergola is a delightfully significant element. It is supported by colonnades made of slender carved stone monolith columns. In gardens characterised by a more complex landscaping design, pergolas comprise entire systems of green porches which articulate the garden spaces into open quadrangular shapes of garden verdure and intersecting walkways canopied by grapevines.
Generally speaking, Dubrovnik gardens were designed more modestly compared to Italian ones, which abounded in sculptures and sculpted water features. Dubrovnik gardens are littoral gardens, both with regard to their natural properties and the fact that, as a rule, they overlook the sea. Moreover, many of them were in immediate contact with it. This contact resulted in specific landscaping solutions, which resulted in the appearance of garden terraces, belvederes or organs (boathouses) attached to the house, garden and sea.
All of the previously stated had an impact on the distinctive and distinguished iconographic expression of Dubrovnik Renaissance gardens.
An investigation into the formal properties of Dubrovnik Renaissance gardens and the study of the factors which brought about their historical genesis leads us to the realisation that developments in agriculture, planning, utilitarian gardens and, in particular, gardens of leisure considerably contributed to their distinctiveness. All of this took place before Renaissance times in Dubrovnik and paved the way towards the authentic expression of Dubrovnik Renaissance gardens.
It can be inferred from everything stated above that Dubrovnik Renaissance gardens are characterised by numerous common features regarding their design and function. At the same time, these make them quite special and recognisably distinctive, both in comparison to the original model of the Renaissance garden – the Italian garden, and when viewing them within the framework of overall achievements in Renaissance garden art.
The fact that Dubrovnik gardens possess a number of common features with the distinctive mark of the region categorises them as a separate group with a typological uniqueness within the framework of Renaissance garden art, which can be named with the common term Dubrovnik Renaissance gardens.

     Carmichael, Cathie, compiler. Croatia (Bibliography). World Bibliographical Series Volume 216. Oxford, England, Santa Barbara, California, Denver, Colorado: Clio Press, 1999. xxv 194 p.

     Cultural policy in Croatia . Strasburg: Counc. Cult. Coop., 1999. p. xiv, 275.

     The Donald W. Treadgold Papers

     A publication series The Donald W. Treadgold Papers in Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies, created in honor of Prof. D. W. Treadgold, is published by the School of International Studies at the University of Washington. Sabrina P. Ramet is the Editor. Twenty one issues have been published up to date, and three new issues are forthcoming soon. Several of them deal directly about Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the former Yugoslavia. Subscription for 10 issues is $45 US. Back issues can be ordered. For further information contact the editorial office: (206) 543-4852 Fax (206) 685-0668 e-mail: treadgld@u.washington.edu or visit the Treadgold Papers at: http://weber.u.washington.edu/~reecasf/treadgol/html

     You might be interested in the following issues: Cushman, Thomas. Critical Theory and the War in Croatia and Bosnia. 50p. (July 1997); Conversi, Daniele. German-Bashing and the Breakup of Yugoslavia . 81 p. (March 1998); Maimark, Norman M. Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe 54 p. (October 1998); Hodge, Carole. The Serb Lobby in the United Kingdom. 97 p. (September 1999).

     Krokar, James. Liberal Reform in Croatia, 1872-1875. New York: P. Lang, 1996.

     Kunovich, Robert.Conflict, Religious Identity, and Ethnic Intolerance in Croatia. Washington, D.C.: The National Council for Euroasian and East European Research, NCEER, 1999. p.21.

     Sonje, Velimir. Croatia in the Second Stage of Transition, 1994-1999. [?]: 1999. p. 62.

     Sunic, Tomislav. Cool Croatia . Glastonbury, England: Vineyard Books, 1999, 60 p.

     Tomizza, Fluvio. Materada . Evanston, Ill, London: North Western University Press; Turnaround, 2000. p. 168.

     Vego, Milan N. Austro-Hungarian Naval Policy: 1904-14. Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 1996. xviii, 213 pp. $ 47.50, hard bound. $22.50, paper. Reviewed in Slavic Review, vol. 58, no.4, Winter 1999, pp.900-901.

Origins of a Catastrophe. Yugoslavia and its Destroyers. America’s Last Ambassador Tells What Happened and Why (New York: Time Books/Random House, 1996)

      In his introduction, America’s last ambassador to Yugoslavia says that he will tell the story of the “villains” who destroyed Yugoslavia those “nationalist leaders who coopted, intimidated, circumvented, or eliminated all opposition to their demagogic designs.” (vii) Instead, he weaves a disingenuous tale of anecdote and assertion that continually links Tudjman and Milosevic — the “Tweedledum and Tweedledee of destructive nationalism” — and inculpates them, as proponents of “communist” nationalism, for the slaughter that took place in the former Yugoslavia. (pp.40, 153). He exonerates the United States and NATO of all responsibility, noting that the mistakes he and his colleagues made “never seem(ed) like mistakes when we (made) them.”(viii) In effect, Zimmermann uses denial and demonology to preserve the myths of American innocence and Balkan perfidy. (p.142) In many ways, his is a classic example of what William Blanchard called “the cynical pretense of inadvertence,”(x) a tendency to self- deception that justifies unjustifiable actions by admitting their reality, but denying their significance and finding fault in the application of technique, not in its practitioners.

     Like Rebecca West, whose “beautifully written classic” he admires, Zimmermann approaches Yugoslavia as a tourist. Before 1991, rugs were a bargain and the atmosphere “enchanting.” (pp. 3-4, 9-10, 168) Yugoslavia “stood for civility and tolerance”and provided ex Soviet satellites a “model.” But it was “caught between the poles of Serbian and Croatian nationalist extremism,” so “dwarfs” could lead gullible masses “susceptible to ethnically based appeals” though “a landscape of monsters and midgets” into the slaughterhouse of ethnic cleansing. (pp.9-10, 42, 68-9, 78, 111) Zimmermann condemns the 1974 Constitution perhaps the most liberal in Yugoslavia’s sad history for having “stimulated nationalism.” (pp. 40-1) Zimmermann’s opinion of Yugoslavia’s leaders is low. (p.138) Kucan was “squat,” a “human AK-47 whose lack of responsibility triggered the crisis in 1991. (pp.30-32, 142) Janez Jansa was “ascetic” and “driven.”(p.144) Their party was an “extreme faction in a coalition that had itself won only 54 percent of the popular vote,” “provoked a war by stealth.” and then made a deal with Belgrade. (p.144-5)

     Sympathetic to Bosnians, Zimmermann was singularly unimpressed with their leaders. “Mild-mannered to a fault,” Izetbegovic, was overly deferential and perpetually anxious. Like Tudjman and Seselj, he was also a nationalist who had been “convicted of sowing ethnic hatred.” (pp.39, 114-115)

     Zimmermann disliked most Serbian leaders. Borislav Jovic was a “small man,” a “pit bull,” but better than Vojislav Seselj, a “psychopathic racist,” or Karadzic, a Serbian Himmler with a “friendly manner” who oversaw “the massacres in the Muslim villages.” (pp.97-9, 119, 175-6) The baby-faced Milosevic impressed Zimmermann with his “competent” English, forceful speech, “steady” eye contact, attentiveness, and “clubby” vices (small faults that would appeal to an Ivy Leaguer like Zimmermann). But despite his “cherubic” cheeks, the Serbian leader was a cold “master of media manipulation,” dominated by his “dark side” and vaguely “schizoid” — an opportunistic “bully on a grand scale,” but at least not an “ethnic exclusivist,” like Tudjman and Karadzic. (pp. 20-7)

     Yet Zimmermann’s book is essentially Serbo-centric. He was stationed in Belgrade, his driver was Serbian, and his circle of “Yugoslav” friends seems to have been largely Serbian. He was particularly fond of Serbian journalists Slobodan Pavlovic, “Borba’s first-rate DC correspondent”; the “western” Srdja Popovic, editor of Vreme, “the most distinguished” magazine in Yugoslavia; and Sasa Nenadovic of Politika (pp.18-19, 38, 108). His list of heroes and heroines included few Croats or Bosnians, but was replete with Serbians from Popovic and Vesna Pesic (a wise professor and peace activist) to Vuk Draskovic. (pp.105-6, 108)

     Zimmermann sees Serbs as a “normal people” — “a product of their history, as we all are.”(p.10) He depicts the Serbs as “heirs to a great medieval civilization” and the “only people I know who celebrate a defeat.”(pp.11-14) Like the U.S. media, he sees Croats and Bosnians as blindly following their leaders, while “many Serbs” opposed Milosevic. (p.108) He claims that “Serbs in Bosnia had an understandable grievance” in Bosnia, and feared a “Muslim-dominated” state. (p.196) He laments human rights violations in Kosovo, but he considers the region “the heartland of Serbian statehood and culture,” its Jerusalem, delivered to the Albanians by the 1974 constitution. (pp.8, 11-14, 130) So he criticizes both Albanians and Slovenes for shattering the League of Communists in 1990 by their rigid insistence on human rights in the region. (pp.54-6)

     Zimmermann implies that all South Slavs — not merely a handful of prewar politicians — wanted a Yugoslav state in 1918, and he insists that the JNA had “won” territory for the Slovenes in 1945. (pp.5-6, 28) So he did not think the Slovenes, as “an original party to the voluntary compact creating Yugoslavia,” had a right to leave and “bring a firestorm of violence down on the rest of Yugoslavia.”(p.146) He claimed that Yugoslavia’s constitution was first rewritten in 1991 by the Croats and Slovenes, even though he knows that the Serbians had earlier destroyed the constitution by their takeovers of Kosovo and Vojvodina. (p.70) Zimmermann had little use for most Croats. Budimir Loncar was “a canny Croatian veteran of the Tito era” with a “catlike tread” and a “feline smile.”(pp.15-16) Josip Manolic had links to the secret police, Gojko Susak (“a Darth- Vader-like individual”) to the Ustase, and Martin Spegelj to arms dealers. (pp.154, 181) Glavas was a Croatian Arkan.(p.152) Tudjman was intolerant, impulsive, and dim — an authoritarian “martinet” with the characteristics of “an inflexible schoolteacher” who could manage only “a nervous chuckle or a mirthless laugh.”(pp.71-5) Zimmermann chides Tudjman for ignoring his advice to apologize to the Serbs at Jasenovac, and he blames the war on the Croatian leader’s rejection of “any gesture that smacked of reconciliation, cooperation, or healing,” his “precipitate declaration of independence,” and his failure to “assure Croatia’s Serbian citizens that they would be safe in an independent Croatia.”(pp.71-7, 151-2)

     Zimmermann also dislikes Croatia “a republic of lackluster politicians” run by the “emigrant-financed HDZ.”(pp.44, 71-5) Listing firings, personal attacks, and an oath of loyalty, he concluded that in “Croatia, unlike Bosnia, Serbs were in fact being abused.” (pp.75, 139-40) By creating an army and defending itself from the JNA, Croatia had become a “national security state” with an armed force “larger than the armies of Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Portugal, Austria, or Sweden.” (pp.132,151, 154)

     Zimmermann uses the passive voice to describe the Serbian assault on Croatia, and ignores events before 1991, “a time of growing violence” in Croatia until 7 July, when “fighting broke out” in the Krajina, “a rebellion within a rebellion.” (pp.94-5,122, 148-9) Of course, he knows that the JNA and Milosevic had armed and incited the Serb “militants”there, but he focused on Tudjman’s efforts to “install Croatian police” as triggering the war. Yet he claims that it was “nearly impossible” to assign responsibility “for each instance of violence” in Croatia, because reports from Zagreb and Belgrade were diametrically opposed But “it didn’t matter,” becaus
e Tudjman and Milosevic wanted violence. (p.120)

     For Zimmermann, the war in Croatia was a tawdry affair, “a throwback to the ancient bandit tradition of the Balkans.” While the JNA “secured all areas in Croatia that had significant Serbian populations,” the “dregs of society…rose from the slime to become…national heroes, exalted by their respective propaganda machines.” (pp.160,152) Even-handed and fair — unlike the pro- Serbian UN commanders, Rose and MacKenzie — Zimmermann was careful to note that both Serbs and Croats suffered in Vukovar, and if the Serbs shelled Dubrovnik “both sides” “breached the rules of war.” (pp.154-8)

     Zimmermann disapproves of Croatia’s “blitzkrieg” in the Krajina, although it preceded NATO air strikes and effectively ended the war, because it was illegal and ruthless (pp.231-2), not comparable to the “master stroke” mounted in Bosnia by the JNA in 1992. (p.196) It says a good deal about Zimmermann that he criticized the JNA’s leaders, Veljko Kadijevic and Blagoje Adzic, but saw the Yugoslav army as a conflicted institution with a “proud” and “heroic military tradition that Croatians and Slovenes had tried to “humiliate” by adopting a “not very heroic tactic” of besieging the army in its barracks. (pp.85-9, 100-102, 142, 158- 60,186)

     Yet Zimmermann notes that the “Serbian strategy” in Croatia was repeated in Bosnia first the creation of Serbian “autonomous regions,” then the arming of local Serbs by the JNA, and finally JNA military action to “protect” the Serbs and secure their hold on towns throughout Croatia and Bosnia. (p.174) He also cites Izetbegovic on the Serbian strategy in Bosnia, “They’re creating a new situation by force, then they’re trying to negotiate on the basis of that situation.” (p.197) He even saw “a Croatian pattern emerging” in Bosnia. (p.198) But he ties none of this together, so his treatment of the war in Croatia is accusatory the Croats had it coming while his depiction of the war in Bosnia is sympathetic the Serbs were to blame. Zimmermann’s dislikes extend beyond Yugoslav leaders. He is not fond of intellectuals and their “crackpot” ideas, and censures Dobrisa Cosic for “a frequent failing of intellectuals” self-confident messianism. (pp.17, 93-4) He disliked TV, which, like Tito, was to blame for everything. (pp.120, 138) He dismissed EC monitors in 1991 as too “timid” and “pro-Croatian.” (pp.158-9) He disliked the CIA’s fatalist, 1990 report, and he was dismayed with ignorant US Congressmen, swayed by a “strong and active Croatian lobby” and oblivious to “the fate of the Serbian minority,” despite his efforts to convince them to pursue a “rational” policy. (pp.84,126-7, 130-1)

     Zimmermann also dislikes democratic elections that do not elect candidates he favors. He was particularly distressed at the lack of “curbs on the potentially nondemocratic behavior of those elected” in the 1990 elections, which swept nationalists to power. (pp.68, 130) In general, Zimmermann finds nationalism, self- determination, and sovereignty dangerous concepts. (pp.277-78) Not even “bestial crimes” justify secessions for Chechnyans or Kurds, because that would break up existing states. So Zimmermann insists that self-determination be allowed only when it “won’t adversely affect the interests of other states [sic] or peoples.” (p.278) He praises Spain, whose confederal system he confuses with democracy, the US, Switzerland, Holland, Belgium, Austria, and Malaysia as models of ethnic “power- sharing.”.(p.240)

     Although he seemed to embrace sovereignty in his rejection of self-determination, Zimmermann dismisses it as “the last refuge of dictators.”(pp.238- 9) He ridicules Yugoslavia’s successor states as “unstable ministates”and advocates using human rights “more intrusively” to promote democracy, preferably by an “international enforcer” that can only be the United States, because we are a repository of virtue, owing to our optimistic striving toward the future and our ability to put the past behind us. (pp.4, 241-2, 229) Zimmermann does have heroes. Ante Markovic the most ineffectual of all Yugoslav politicians struck the ambassador as “admirable,” if “too liberal and Western” for his undeserving countrymen, who gave him high approval ratings, but hated his policies and dumped him in 1991. (pp.42-4, 66, 112- 113) He also liked Markovic’s economic adviser, Kilo Gligorov, “a wise old communist.”(p.116) Milovan Djilas impressed him as a saint, and Vuk Draskovic as “an electrifying speaker” whose comments were “perceptive and interesting.”(pp.104-105, 119, 171) Stipe Mesic and Janez Drnovsek were good tennis partners (pp.33, 123-4), and Vasil Tupurkovski and Ibrahim Rugova “came through the Yugoslav crisis with honor.”(pp.81, 126) Zimmermann even liked Croatia’s Chief of Staff, Antun Tus, “an outstanding officer with democratic views.”(p.141) In short, Zimmermann liked those “courtly, articulate, generous, and wise” Yugoslavs who represented “the best of the Central European tradition.” (p.33) Zimmermann insists that the U.S. made honest mistakes, but its goals were noble “unity, independence, and territorial integrity,” with “progress toward democracy” and “a straight line toward capitalism.” (pp.8, 51) But peace, unity, and democracy were merely instrumental the real goal was a “straight line toward capitalism.” Markovic’s economic reforms, not the man, counted, and Zimmermann favored “shock therapy” that would force the spoiled Yugoslavs to take that “straight line to capitalism.” (pp.17, 50-51) Unity and democracy were tactics to avoid violence during a tricky transition. What really counted was converting the dinar and finding “reasonable solutions short of war.” (pp.41-2, 46-9, 62, 64-5, 111) Washington was indifferent to the form a Yugoslav state might adopt (centralized or confederated), although it insisted that Serbia maintain control of Kosovo. (pp.64-5, 78-81).

     But Washington did not act, ostensibly because policymakers feared repeating the mistakes of Vietnam and Lebanon and were paralyzed by Powell’s cautious doctrine. (pp.214-215, 219) Instead, Americans talked. Bush twice told Markovic he wanted democracy and reforms, Zimmermann told Kadijevic not to use of force, and Eagleburger promoted “reconciliation,” as Washington took a “clear public line” blaming the JNA for events in Croatia and urging the JNA and Tudjman “to settle their differences.” (pp.164, 122-3) Baker’s mistake was not to “deal with the irascible and complex protagonists of the Yugoslav drama” before 21 June 1991. But only Izetbegovic and Gligorov were “sensible” then, and the American’s warnings to Milosevic in March 1992 were ineffectual. So, at worst, Baker was six months too late. (pp.133-7, 193)

     A year later, Washington informed Belgrade that it would only work for Serbia’s “political and economic isolation,” urged Karadzic to be democratic, and warned both Milosevic and Tudjman not to interfere in Bosnia. (pp.174-6, 194, 198) But Clinton lacked resolve, determination, and consistency, so Washington merely recalled Zimmermann after Serbia’s attack on Bosnia, a “modest” action, but “the right thing to do.”(pp.204, 223)

     While generally exonerating American diplomacy, Zimmermann condemns European diplomacy as “cynical theater, a pretense of useful activity…disguising a lack of will.” He thought the Germans rushed recognition and the EC encouraged partition, and he regretted the arms embargo in Bosnia. But he praises Cyrus Vance for his success in securing a cease-fire in Croatia, even though it benefitted the Serbs, and he thought the Vance-Owen plan “acceptable,” even though it gave 43% of Bosnia to the Serbs. He credits NATO with ending the war; and he effectively exonerates the West of all blame, because Yugoslavia’s “congenital effects” (it was a state, not a nation), its Orthodox and Catholic churches, its selfis
h Slovenes, insensitive Croats, greedy Serbs, ideologically rigid army, and nationalists condemned it to death. (pp.xii, 155, 161-2, 177, 181, 184, 189-90, 192, 209-212, 222, 231-3)

     Unhappy with Rose and MacKenzie for not condemning all sides for the atrocities they committed, Zimmermann admires Carrington’s defense of Serbian rights. (pp.161-2, 224) He considers humanitarian relief a “triumph,” especially since lifting the arms embargo and Western military intervention were not options. (pp.140, 219-20,225) He defends Eagleburger against charges of conflict of interest, and blames the Slovenes for misunderstanding him when he said that Washington could live with a fragmented Yugoslavia. (pp.5, 58, 219). He praises all Foreign Service Officers, especially Charles Redman, who created the Croat-Bosnian federation in 1994 (pp.49,165-6, 231).

     Zimmermann is a bit upset with Dayton, not because the Serbs in Bosnia, who made up 30% of the population, got 49% of the territory, but because Tudjman was the “big winner.” He saw the inequitable distribution of territory as a Western success, because the Serbs did not get the 64% they had demanded. (pp.232- 3) He claims, rather disingenuously, that sanctions on Serbia were intended to “Saddamize” Milosevic and serve as a bargaining chip at Dayton. (pp.213-4) Zimmermann’s views reflect his reading and his admiration for George Kennan, the father of containment. (p.53) His list of basic sources includes West’s travelogue; the journalistic, Serbo-centric account by Laura Silber and Allen Little (and its BBC adaptation); the book by the Serbian diplomat, Mihailo Crnobrnja; the tendentious work by Susan Woodward, one-time adviser to Akashi, dubbed the Mitsubishi Chetnik by the Bosnians; and the outdated and poorly researched study by Lenard J. Cohen. (pp.255-7) Zimmermann completed his memoirs at RAND, with help from Dennison Rusinow, whose writing is marked by sympathy for Serbia and hostility to Croatia, and David Calleo of Johns Hopkins. So this is not an insider’s memoir; it is a work by an insider whose circle has repeatedly rationalized the West’s failures, excused Serbian excesses, condemned Croat and Slovene actions, and preferred humanitarian aid to military action. Perhaps it is not surprising that so many people in Yugoslavia hated Zimmermann. What is surprising is that this made him proud. (p.110) JAMES SADKOVICH

     NOTES

¹ William H. Blanchard, Aggression American Style (Santa Monica, CA: Goodyear Publishing Cpy., 1978), pp. x, 1-11, dubbed this tendency “aggression American style” and saw a trend toward the use of such methods of coercion and persuasion in Europe and the USSR.

Pastoral Letters, Statements and Appeals of the Catholic Bishops of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1990-1997. Edited by Msgr. Dr. Mato Zovkic, assisted by Andrew Michaels III. Translated by Dr. Ante Cuvalo, assisted by Theresa Zdunic-Conway, Ivana Cuvalo, John Prcela and Dusko Condic. Sarajevo: Biskupska konferencija Bosne i Hercegovine, 1998. (186 pages)

     This is a compilation of Pastoral Letters and Statements made by the Catholic Bishops of Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1990 and 1997. These Messages were addressed to both the Catholic faithful of our Dioceses and to the larger world audience from the eve of first democratic elections in 1990 to the visit of Pope John Paul II to Sarajevo in April 1997. These Letters echo the turbulent events which occurred before and during the war in Bosnia between 1991 and 1995 which followed the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. We felt that a summary of these significant events would be useful to the reader unfamiliar with the history of our region.

     For thirteen centuries the Catholic Church has lived and flourished in the hearts of our Croatian ethnic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Through these many centuries, empires, kingdoms, democracies and socialist systems of government rose and fell. This region witnessed first hand the painful and future consequences of the Christian church’s division of the east from the west. This is a country where neighbors of the Muslim and Orthodox traditions lived side by side with Catholic neighbors and fellow citizens. Our region is the cross-roads of cultures, beliefs, ancient pathways and philosophies. Following the independence and international recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in January 1992, the democratically elected Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina organized a referendum on March 1, 1992 which gave citizens a choice between a continued life within a truncated Yugoslavia or within a fully independent country. The choice was for independence. Soon the sovereignty of our country was acknowledged by the United Nations and other international institutions. In the previous October, armed forces of Bosnian-Serbs, assisted by the professional army of Yugoslavia had destroyed several Croatian localities in eastern Herzegovina and in one month after the March 1992 referendum they started the war for their ethnic territories in this country. In the time from October 1991 to November 1995 one half of the Catholic population, about 400,000 faithful were evicted from their homes and parishes and forced to flee to the safety of other lands. Hundreds of churches and other ecclesiastical buildings were damaged or destroyed and lie in rubble awaiting the return of parishioners. In the Banja Luka Diocese, for example, only one quarter of the original 120,000 parishioners remain. This is “ethnic cleansing”, this is the tragedy.

     The war ended in November 1995 by the Dayton Accords. By that time Serbian forces had occupied 72 percent of Bosnia and Herzegovina while the Accords granted this ethnic community political control of 49 percent of our country’s territory despite the fact that it comprised only 31 percent of the total population according to the census of April 1991. Bosnia was divided into two entities, the Federation of Bosniaks and Croats at one side and on the other, the Serbian Republic. While the Dayton Accords have split the country into two entities the ecclesiastical administration remains a united whole as it was established in 1881, after 400 years of Turkish rule in Bosnia. The Archdiocese of Sarajevo stretches within the territory of the Federation and of the Serbian Republic, the Mostar-Duvno Diocese is primarily in the territory controlled by ethnic Croats within the Federation, the Trebinje-Mrkan Diocese is under the control of the Serbian Republic, Banja Luka Diocese in its largest part is in the Serbian Republic with a small territory of the Livno Deanery in the Federation. In spite of these divisions of control in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the three ethnic communities and two political entities, the Church in this territory remains as one unified structure giving the clearest example of the advantages of a unified homeland. This unity was strengthened when in December 1995, the Holy See established an independent Bishops’ Conference of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We Catholics traveled not alone on this painful period of our history, for our Shepherd in Rome walked with us. He knew our pains and heard our hearts crying for help. He supported us constantly with his prayers, his encouragement and finally with his presence. He reminded all of us “to forgive and ask forgiveness”, the true act of charity.

     Bosnia is a proof case for a multi-ethnic, pluralistic and tolerant Europe. If we fail, Europe fails. Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot rebuild on its own. But Bosnia and Herzegovina can fail on its own. After two years of more a cease fire than a real peace, we begin to see healing, rebuilding and a limited return of exiles and refugees. We call upon all people of good will to become involved in our work of love, in our mission of service and in our country’s destiny. You can make a difference, you do make a difference.

     As Europeans, we are tied together by culture, commerce and history. And so, we look first to Europe for help. As members of the human family we also call upon the friends of Bosnia in the United States and Canada to contribute towards re-making this country profoundly multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi- religious. May God, “whose power now at work in us do immeasurably more than we ask or imagine,” (Eph 3:20), grant us all His Peace and Blessing.

     Sarajevo, March 1, 1998

     Cardinal Vinko Puljic, Archbishop of Sarajevo and President of the Bishops Conference of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Peljeski rodovi (Family Names of the Peljesac Peninsula). Dubrovnik: Zavod za povijesne znanosti HAZU, Vol I (A-K) 1995, and Vol. II (L-Zh) 1996.

     The first part of the book deals with the first names of the inhabitants of the Peljesac peninsula from the 13th to the 20th centuries. The author explains changes in the assortment of first names after the incorporation of Peljesac into the Republic of Dubrovnik. The clash of the old folk Slavonic and the new Catholic-Dubrovnik onomastic systems resulted in the formation of a new system with the predominance of the Dubrovnik and Christian tradition, but with an element of Slavonic evident. Despite the fact that the base for the variety of first names consisted of Christian saints’ names, quite a few Slav names remained in use, though less frequently. The impossibility of a total takeover by one of the systems resulted in the formation of defense mechanisms on both sides. In Dubrovnik, the remains of folk names were adapted to Christian forms by the formation of equivalents (Djivan-Ivan (John), Vuk-Luka (Luke), etc.), while the new Christian names were adapted to folk forms (Miho (Michael)-Mihoje, Vlaho (Blaise)-Vlahusa, etc.). Until the mid-15th century, folk Slavonic names generally predominated in the Peljesac peninsula. From the middle until the end of the 15th century, folk and Christina names were approximately equally represented. But from the 16th century onwards, Christian names predominated so that 90 percent of the inhabitants were named in accordance with the Christian tradition. New changes in the onomastic system took place in the second half of the 19th century. New names appeared in a wide range from foreign folk names to new foreign names. This process started in the seafaring areas of Trstenice, while in the inland of the peninsula it appeared as late as the 20th century, with much less intensity. Family names began to stabilize on the Peljesac peninsula in the 14th century, after it became a part of the Dubrovnik Republic. At that time Dubrovnik’s already diversified and detailed administration required a precise identification of the people who were summoned or those who were engaged in any kind of legal activity. However, family names in the Dubrovnik Republic were not created suddenly or by decree. They have been formed over centuries, determined not only by administrative requirements (especially in legal matters such as inheritance, which required both the identity of the claimer and the proofs of his blood relations), but also by the needs of the people who, looking for a successful and appropriate means of communications, created an entire onomastic system. This process lasted until the late 18th century, when the last family on the Peljesac peninsula acquired its family name.

     The author also deals with certain specific features of the Peljesac family name system, with the Italianization of Croatian names and the Croatization of Italian family names, with the formation of folk-founded names, and specifically with the adoption of foreign family names. According to a Dubrovnik custom, a family name was given to a household, not to an individual. Newcomers would accept the name of their new household. This custom was frequent in villages, but less so in the seafaring towns and settlements. It was specifically widespread in regions with strong elements of a communal way of life.

     The third and the longest part of the book contains a lexicographic survey of the history of particular lineage names of families of Peljesac. Along with the basic genealogical data (origin, family tradition, time of immigration, first mention in the archives, migration, emigration, extinction, changes of family names and nicknames), the author quotes different legal cases, testaments and data from other sources deemed interesting from the point of view of language, customs, environment, life-style, outstanding people, and so on. Each family has its own number under which it can be found in the graph representing the duration of Peljesac lineages in an earlier Vekaric’s book, The Inhabitants of the Peljesac Peninsula. Dubrovnik: Zavod za povijesne znanosti HAZU, 1993.

     Stjepan Cosic – Dubrovnik

Croatia, A Nation Forged in War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997 (338 p.)

     This book clearly deserves attention: It is the first by this Anglo-Saxon author about Croatian history and is also the first presentation of its kind about Croatia’s rising from the ashes of communism. Marcus Tanner worked as a reporter for London’s Independent newspaper from 1988 to 1994 and was honored by the Queen of Britain herself for his contributions to the development of journalism and reporting. In the introduction of the book, published by the U.S. publisher Yale University Press, the author writes that this book is a result of his desire to fill in some gaps in understanding the former Yugoslavia and his opinion that Croatia deserves to be studied separately. Tanner finds that everyone, especially western liberals, was more attracted to “the sufferings of Bosnia’s Muslims than Croatia’s Catholics, who were marked with the Ustasha tag.” Tanner concludes that it is almost impossible to write about the war of the nineties without first referring to the events of World War II, first Yugoslavia or political atmosphere of the twenties and thirties. He then decided to start from scratch — going back to the time of the first Croatian kings. The result of this is a book that breathes with an understanding of the Croatian idea of independence. This is a rarity because newborn Croatia has many times been “unwelcome” in the western world as an unwanted newborn. Tanner describes in detail the break- up of the former Yugoslavia as well as the Serbian skims in the former Yugoslavia Presidency. For a change, he is an author who does not blame Croatia or Slavonia, but Serbia, for the aggression.

     Reviews of the recently published book are still few. One of the first reviews was written by Branko Franolic, Ph.D., the correspondent for the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences who lives in London. In his review for the Croatian Times (English edition in London), Franolic, an expert of Croatian literature and history, states that Tanner “correctly and objectively” writes about all periods in Croatian history. Franolic says that: “This kind of understanding about what was happening in Croatia was possible because Tanner is well-versed in Croatian history, language, and society. Tanner’s vision of the events that occurred during the 1990’s will definitely provoke many controversial opinions and much bitterness. But we have to know that this is our recent past and it is still too early to cast some sort of judgement. But at least the facts have correctly been transferred to the page.” Franolic adds that Tanner’s presents a basic book for people who want to find out more about the breakaway of Yugoslavia, the liberation of enslaved Croatia, nationalism of small European nations and the imperialism of the opposition party involved in the conflict.

     Another review was conducted by Professor Norman Stone, a former Oxford University faculty member and a member on former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s advising team. Stone, currently a professor of international relations at the University of Ankara, was one of the people defending the Croats’ will to become an independent country. He reviewed the book: Serbs: History, Peace, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia by author Tim Judah in the British newspaper Sunday Times, where he says Judah focuses on Serbia’s tragic present and is therefore saying that the Serbs were infected by some sort of collective mania after the eighties. “Serbs are a thorn in the side of Germany, the Vatican, Islamic countries and finally, America” and this is the source of their psychotic madness that gave rise to Slobodan Milosevic. Far from hating the Serbs, Judah asks himself the question: what went wrong with the Serbs? In writing about Tanner’s book, Stone notices Croatia could soon become “another Spain and the most successful European economic source.” He also talks about Croatia’s stormy history, stating that Croatia had a fascist state during World War II but that this type of regime was “generally not well accepted by the majority of Croats.” Stone comments that some countries think the Croats caused the break-up of Yugoslavia, and that the Germans shouldn’t have recognized Croatia. He also claims that the British Foreign Office didn’t mind these types of comments because some of the misinformation even came from its own office. He concludes that most books on the subject have a pro-Yugoslavian tone or orientation, like books by Fitzroy Maclean, R.W. Seton Watson or A.P.J. Taylor. Marcus Tanner’s book, therefore, is most definitely interesting. Jasna Jazic. Vjesnik, Zagreb, April 25, 1997