Croatia Rediviva

Mladen Klemencic
Taken from F. W. Carter and H. T. Norris, eds. The Changing Shape of the Balkans London: UCL Press, 1996, pp.97-117.
Introduction
In 1700 the Croatian scholar Pavao Ritter Vitezovic (1652-1713) published in Zagreb his work Croatia rediviva (Resurrected Croatia). He was encouraged by a recent anti-Ottoman campaign at the end of the seventeenth century, when large areas were liberated from the Turks and reincorporated into Croatia. The title of his study expressed then his vision of the integrity of the Croatian lands, but it can also be applied symbolically to present-day Croatia. In 1992 Croatia reappeared on the political map of Europe as a sovereign state; before that it existed as a country but not as a state. Throughout many centuries it survived always in a semi-independent status within larger empires, unions or states, but Croatian memories have to reach far back in history for the country’s real independence. “Croatia rediviva” is therefore an illustrative phrase for the new position and status of Croatia.
What makes the reappearance of Croatia more interesting from the perspective of political geography is the current problem of the country’s integrity. Starting in 1991, certain areas of Croatia became “de facto” beyond the control of legal authority. This came as a consequence of the aggression that followed the break-up of Yugoslavia. Moreover, UN peace forces have had to be deployed in those areas since 1992 in order to encourage the peace process, but after two and a half years there are still no signs of progress.
Historical foundations
The Croats are one of the Slavonic nations, who established themselves in the region between the Kupa, Sutla, Mura, Drava, Danube and Drina rivers and the Adriatic Sea during the complex ethnogenetic process lasting from the Middle Ages up to modern national integration in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Macan and Sentija 1992). The area inhabited by the Croats occupies a favourable communication position as a contact zone between the central Danubian basin and the Mediterranean. But from the perspective of stability, the location of Croatian territory within a zone of confrontation between central European Catholicism, East European Orthodoxy and Near East Islam appeared to be more important. Too often the area was a stage of confrontation and rivalry between neighbouring powers. Because of this, the Croats did not enjoy favourable conditions for the creation of their own state. Limited sovereignty or autonomy, as well as territorial disunity, are therefore frequent and frustrating elements of Croatian history.
The Croatian name was initially associated with territory in the hinterland of the Byzantine thema of Dalmatia. The region began to be called Regnum Chroatonun (“the state of the Croats”) in the mid-ninth century. It became strong, expanded its territory and even gained papal recognition. Its core area was the triangle formed by the towns of Knin, Sibenik and Nin. Since it was formed on the territory of the former Roman province of Dalmatia, it is usually known under the name of Dalmatian Croatia. The geographic borders of Dalmatian Croatia were on the Rasa and Cetina rivers in the coastal area, whereas inland the border followed the Sava and Una rivers towards the mouth of the Sana river and from there to the source of the Kupa river. North of it, on the territory of the former Roman province of Panonnia Savia, a northern Croatian principality was established. It was originally called Slovinje and later Slavonia. In the tenth centuries, with the unification of both principalities, a united Kingdom of Croatia wag established. Under its native dynasty until the end of the eleventh century, Croatia became an influential maritime power. According to monuments preserved from that time, it appeared to be a flourishing period of Croatian culture and history. Generally, it was also a rather stable period from a territorial viewpoint. Only the eastern border of the Croatian Kingdom was changeable, depending on its power. During favourable times, Croatian rulers controlled the area up to the Drina river in the east, which also encompassed the original territory of Bosnia around the spring of the river of the same name, so the surface area of Croatia totalled around 100,000km2. The Principality of Zahumlje in the southeast, which together with Travunia and Dukla (Doclea) was known under the name of Red Croatia, from time to time also acknowledged Croatian authority. The Principality of Neretva or Pagania had even closer ties with Croatia. At the time, the Byzantine thema of Dalmatia encompassed only a few islands and towns along the coast, which, from time to time, recognized Croatian authority and were annexed to the country in the twelfth century.
After the last king from the Trpimirovic dynasty died, the nobility recognized the Arpad dynasty as their rulers in 1102 and entered a personal union with Hungary. Croatia did not lose its state individuality by this union. The unity of the Croatian lands was manifested in the person of a ban (viceroy), as the king’s governor, and in a separate diet (sabor). But personal union with Hungary was the beginning of a long- lasting period in which Croatia was tied with either Hungary or later Austria. The constant struggle to keep sovereignty or at least certain autonomy throughout that period was an essential trait of Croatian history and a source of national awareness. One can argue about the degree of Croatian “de facto” individuality at certain stages of history, but cannot deny that Croatia always existed de jure. Real Croatian sovereignty was certainly as high and wide as the balance of power allowed, but the Croats have always been specially keen on the juridical foundation of their statehood. The territory gradually became smaller after personal union with Hungary was established in 1102. Some parts came under the influence of foreign authorities to a lesser or greater degree (battles with Venice for Dalmatia, Hungarian royal rule in Slavonia), thus breaking Croatia’s administrative integrity. From the twelfth to the fourteenth century, Bosnia became independent and extended to the former Croatian territory. Along the coast, Venetian authority and influence became stronger, whereas from 1358 in the southernmost part Dubrovnik started to develop as an independent republic.
Threatened by the Ottomans from the east, the Croatian diet elected the Habsburgs as Croatian rulers in 1527 in order to strengthen the country’s defence. On the one hand, that election ensured a powerful ally for Croatia, but on the other hand it faced Vienna’s tendencies for centralization. After the Ottoman Empire laid siege to the Balkan peninsula at the end of the sixteenth century, Croatia was reduced to its smallest territory in history (around 16,800 km2). Apart from Reliquiae reliquiarum (“remnants of the remnants”) of Croatia, only the Republic of Dubrovnik and some Venetian-controlled Adriatic islands and towns remained outside Ottoman authority. The whole of Bosnia and all other parts of Croatia fell under Ottoman rule. The Turks organized that territory in 1580 as the Bosnian pashelic .1 From that period the name of Croatia Turcica (Turkish Croatia) was preserved for the last conquered part of Croatia between the rivers Vrbas and Una (today part of Bosnia-Herzegovina) .2
The liberation of Croatian lands started at the end of the seventeenth century and was carried out gradually. By the Treaty of Karlowitz (Srijemski Karlovci) in 1699, the northern state territory, that is, the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia, regained regions of Baniya, larger parts of Lika and Slavonia as well as part of Srijem. The rest of Srijem was annexed to Croatia after the Treaty of Pozarevac in 1718 and the remaining part of Lika once again became part of Croatia after the Treaty of Svishtov in 1791. Along the boundary with the Ottoman Empire, Austrian authorities in the sixteenth century organized a defence system known as the Militargrenze or Vojna krajina (Military Frontier). Although the authority in the Military Frontier gradually came into the hands of the military command in Vienna, it was never formally accepted by the Croatian state. The far-reaching consequences of the new Military Frontier led to demographic changes (Kocsis 1993/94). The area was devastated and deserted. Many Croats were forced to leave it because of the instability and destruction of war, so that the military authorities settled a new population from the Balkan interior there, among whom were significant numbers of Vlachs of Orthodox religion. Later, in the ethnogenetic process under the influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church and propaganda, they became a part of the Serbian nation. On the basis of their existence within Croatia, and in fact manipulated by them, Serbia started in the nineteenth century to develop Greater Serbian pretensions on Croatian lands deep to the west.
Venetian Dalmatia to the south also started to extend gradually during the anti-Ottoman wars. With the territorial changes of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the characteristic shape of the Croatian lands was formed. Boundaries established then were later used as a basis for all future delineations. The area around the Bay of Kotor and Budva (today part of Montenegro) was also under the Venetian Republic. At that time it was known as Albania Veneta (Venetian Albania). National revival in the nineteenth century strengthened the awareness of Croatian togetherness and instigated a tendency towards the territorial unification of Croatian lands and independence. This is the origin of the name for the Triune Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia. In 1848 Josip Jelacic was ban of Croatia and Slavonia. He was also nominated governor of Dalmatia and Rijeka, as well as commander of the Military Frontier, and he regained Medimurje from the Hungarians. In this way, during his rule he gathered the Croatian lands formally together for a short time. But the problem of disintegration was still actual until the break-up of the Habsburg Empire. The Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia remained divided into civilian and military parts. In the mid-eighteenth century the Military Frontier was reorganized into regiments, whereas Civil Croatia was organized into zupanijas (counties). Finally, in 1881 the Military Frontier was completely reincorporated within Civil Croatia.
After the fall of the Venetian Republic (1797) and the Republic of Dubrovnik (1808), southern Croatia came into the possession of the Habsburgs. Austria united former Venetian Dalmatia, the Dubrovnik area and the former Venetian Albania into the Kingdom of Dalmatia in 1815. After the Berlin Congress in 1878, Dalmatia was extended to include the narrow coastal strip southeast of the Bay of Kotor. Istria and the Kvarner Islands, also predominantly Croatian areas in ethnic terms, were under Austrian rule too, but organized as an independently governed province. Therefore, during the nineteenth century all Croatian lands were under Habsburg rule, but administratively separated. Division was especially stressed after the reorganization of the Monarchy in 1867 and its division into Austrian and Hungarian parts. On the basis of the 1868 Compromise, the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia had special status within the Hungarian half, but Dalmatia and Istria remained in the Austrian part. After the demise of Austria-Hungary in the First World War, the South Slavonic provinces of the former monarchy proclaimed the independent state of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs on 29 October 1918. Representatives of the Triune Kingdom, along with representatives from Istria, the Slovene lands, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Vojvodina, participated in the National Council in Zagreb, which represented supreme state authority. This state entered into association with the Kingdom of Serbia, which had been joined earlier by the Kingdom of Montenegro as well as Vojvodina. Thus, establishment of a common state – the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – was proclaimed on 1 December 1918 and confirmed during the Paris Peace Conference. In 1929 it was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
For the Croats at that time Yugoslavia seemed a reasonable solution. They were happy to quit their long-lasting association with Hungary and Austria. Moreover, union with Serbia seemed promising as protection against Italian claims on the Adriatic coast (in 1915, by the secret Treaty of London, Italy was promised large parts of the Croatian coast if they entered the war on the Entente’s side).
For the first time in history a common Yugoslav state was formed, encompassing constituent parts that underwent completely separate politogenetic development. The nations that formed a common state had already been established as separate political and territorial entities, and therefore the union could exist only under tolerant government that would recognize the autonomy of its constituent parts. Serbian politicians were opposed to that conception and they attempted to enforce the idea of a unitarian state. From the very beginning they considered Yugoslavia as a Serbian war gain, that is, a Greater Serbia. Therefore, Yugoslavia was a great disappointment for the Croats, as well as for other non-Serbs .3 Instead of creating a federal state, Croatia lost its autonomous status, which it had enjoyed up to 1918. Nevertheless, on the eve of the Second World War an autonomous Croatian unit, the Banate (Banovina) of Croatia, was established in 1939 (Boban 1993). It was composed of two former banates: the Sava and Primorje banates, and Croat-dominated districts from neighbouring banates. The Banate of Croatia had an area of 65,465km2. It included former Croatia-Slavonia (excluding eastern Srijem) and Dalmatia (without the Bay of Kotor area) and also some parts of Bosnia- Herzegovina. The idea and intention was to reorganize the state into three federal units: Croatian, Slovenian and Serbian (other nations were not then recognized!). The Banate of Croatia was seen as the beginning of a process that was soon to be stopped by German aggression and the break-up of Yugoslavia. But even before the war broke out, Croatian autonomy was rejected by a vociferous and strong Serbian opposition; also it was not welcomed by Croatian Serbs.
After the fall of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1941, the Ustasha4 regime, under the tutorship of the Axis Forces, established an Independent State of Croatia, which apart from the Croatian lands also included Bosnia and Herzegovina. Territorial concessions were the price the regime was forced to pay. Since 1920 Italy already had the Istrian peninsula, some islands and the town of Zadar. Additionally, it annexed large parts of the Croatian coast. However, a strong anti-fascist movement developed within the territory of the Independent State of Croatia, which after capitulation to Italy in 1943 proclaimed annexation to all parts of Croatia that came under Italian occupation after the First World War and during the Second World War. After the fall of the Independent State of Croatia, two republics were established in its area: Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, both as federal units of the re- established Yugoslavia.
Delimitation between Yugoslav republics was carried out in 1945. Only a few details were discussed afterwards. The Croatian boundaries were mostly defined according to its historical lines, established during the anti-Ottoman wars. After the Trieste crises had been solved in 1954, Croatia was awarded an additional district in Istria, after which the surface area of the Croatian Republic within Yugoslavia totalled 56,538km2. Within the same territory, the Republic of Croatia declared its independence in 1991 and became an internationally recognized state and member of the UN in 1992.
Boundaries
The historical basis
The present-day boundaries of Croatia are for the most part defined by the lines of division established long before the formation of the Yugoslav state in 1918 (Klemencic 1991, Englefield 1992). Croatia’s boundaries have a long historical continuity that is the consequence of the fact that Croatia managed to maintain elements of statehood throughout its history. Only some 250 km out of the total length of Croatia’s land boundaries, extending for 2,028 km, were boundaries delimited for the first time within Yugoslavia. For most of its length the Croatia/Hungary boundary is one of the oldest in Europe. This is particularly true of the sections marked by the Drava river, which has always separated the Croatian and Hungarianstates. In the Medimurje region only, where it is defined naturally by the Mura river, the boundary is in a sense more recent. It was finally defined after the First World War, when Medimurje was transferred from Hungary to the State of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. Hungary’s possession of Medimurje was questionable, since the region formerly belonged to Croatia and was always settled by the Croats. The Baranya boundary is the most recent section of the Croatia/Hungary boundary. It was first established in 1920 without reference to any earlier line. In this way, the southern part of the former Hungarian province of Baranya was joined to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Ethnically it was a highly mixed area in which Hungarians lived side by side with considerable numbers of Croats, Germans and, to a lesser extent, Serbs, but functionally depended on the town of Osijek (Bognar 1991).
The Croatia/Slovenia boundary is also a very old one. Its sections are part of an historical line that had for centuries separated Croatia from the Slovene lands of Carniola (Kranjska) and Styria (Stajerska). The Medimurje boundary also largely coincides with the earlier boundary of that part of the Croatian region, except for a few villages in the Strigova municipality, which were joined to Slovenia in the twentieth century. In contrast to the greater long-established section, the western part of the Croatia/Slovenia boundary is recent. The Istrian boundary was drawn after the Second World War, and after the temporary Free Zone of Trieste was divided between Italy and Yugoslavia. The delimitation between Croatia and Slovenia was carried out along ethnic lines.
The boundary with Bosnia-Herzegovina is the longest. Its present-day course is the result of centuries of Ottoman rule over Bosnia. The boundary section marked by the rivers Sava and Una reflects the historical boundary of Croatia towards the Ottoman Empire. Sections of the Sava and the lower course of the Una river were fixed by the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699. The Treaty of Pozarevac in 1718 altered it by extending Croatian territory farther east, thus bringing the whole of Srijem under Croatian authority. The same line was confirmed by the Treaty of Svishtov in 1791, which was particularly important for establishing the boundary along the upper Una river. Having won back the greater part of the Lika region in 1699, Croatia then extended its sovereignty over Kordun and the rest of Lika. Thus, in 1791 that boundary section was fixed almost completely as it is today. The same line was confirmed as a boundary between Croatia and Bosnia after the Second World War, except for a couple of former Croatian villages near Bihac, which were transferred to Bosnia. The southern section of the boundary towards Bosnia-Herzegovina is inherited from delimitations between Venetian-controlled Dalmatia and the Ottoman Empire, carried out in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The present-day boundary is the same as the so-called Linea Mocenigo, which gave Venetian Dalmatia its final shape in 1718. In the extreme southeast, the frontier coincides with the boundary of the Republic of Dubrovnik. There, Croatian territory is interrupted at Neum, giving Bosnia- Herzegovina an outlet to the sea. That was part of a diplomatic scheme by Dubrovnik in 1700, which gave the Ottomans a small stretch of coast in order to avoid direct territorial contact with Venice’s Dalmatia territory. This historical boundary was respected by delimitation between the Yugoslav republics after the Second World War.
The short Croatia/Montenegro boundary corresponds to the boundary of the Republic of Dubrovnik, but not that of Austrian Dalmatia. The former Dalmatian coastal strip comprises the Bay of Kotor, Budva and Spic and was given to Montenegro after the Second World War, although it had never been part of it before. The former Bosnia- Herzegovinia exit to the sea in the Bay of Kotor, known as Sutorina, was also allocated to Montenegro. The origin of that outlet is the same as that of Neum. It was another buffer that separated the Republic of Dubrovnik from Venetian possessions, but contrary to Neum was not given to Bosnia-Herzegovina after the Second World War.
The oldest section of the Croatia/Serbia boundary is the central one on the river Danube, down stream of the Drava river mouth. This has been Croatia’s boundary since 1699, when the Ottomans were driven out of Slavonia. The northern section, also on the Danube, was defined in 1945 after a special boundary commission decided that Baranja should be part of Croatia. The southern section was also defined for the first time in 1945, splitting the historical Croatian province of Srijem. Eastern Srijem, with a predominantly Serbian population, was transferred to Serbia, whereas the western part, with its predominantly Croat population, stayed within Croatia.
Thus, it can be concluded that the greatest part of Croatia’s current boundaries is the legacy of earlier periods. Recent historical boundary revisions, carried out within Yugoslavia, are rather rare, but they were carried out at the expense of Croatia. Such revisions are to be found on the Croatia/ Montenegro and Croatia/Serbia boundaries. Generally, the northern and western boundaries are old and more stable. The eastern boundaries are the result of continuing contraction and loss of territory generating from Ottoman conquest in the Balkans, and ending with the interrepublican delimitation within Yugoslavia.
Legal basis
As was known in the late 1980s, the existing boundaries of the Yugoslav republics were questioned by Serbia. For Serbia, only the international Yugoslav boundaries were legitimate, whereas republican boundaries were referred to as “administrative” and “invented by the communist regime” and as such were subject to change. When Croatia and Slovenia proclaimed independence on the basis of referenda in which all citizens of the respective republics were invited to participate, Serbia accused the two republics of “secession”. Since “secession” was illegal, the boundaries of “secessionist” republics should have been proposed by the rest of Yugoslavia. As the basis for a “new” delimitation, the principle of self-determination of peoples who wished to remain in Yugoslavia had to be applied. Since the Serbs were the only people advocating the preservation of Yugoslavia, this meant in reality that they would fix all other boundaries.
The Croatian counter-thesis considered that boundaries were based on both the historical background and constitutional provisions. Croatia pointed out, calling on the historical background of delimitations, that boundaries had deep and long-standing roots. Moreover, according to provisions of the 1974 Federal Constitution, the republic boundaries were inviolable and since republics were defined as states in themselves, Croatia called for their international protection. Boundaries were the subject of Article 5 of the Federal Constitution: “The territory of a republic cannot be changed without the agreement of the republic, and the territory of an autonomous province without the agreement of the autonomous province … The boundary between republics can only be changed on the basis of their mutual agreement. . .” Similar provisions were included in the constitutions of all republics, including Serbia.
As boundary issues were not solved by negotiation, the international community tried to mediate in the conflict (Cvrtila 1993). At the peace conference on (former) Yugoslavia, which began in the autumn of 1991 under the auspices of the European Community (EC), a special arbitration commission of experts from EC countries was formed. On the basis of presented requests and documentation from all the republics, the appointed commissioners answered all questions through several (Degan 1992). Opinion 1 stated that “Yugoslavia is in the process of dissolution” because four out of its six republics expressed their desire for independence. The main principles for delimitation before the former republics were explained in Opinion 3. Four main principles were to be followed: all external boundaries of former Yugoslavia “must be respected” boundaries between republics “can only be changed on the basis of free and mutual agreement” in the absence of such an agreement “the former boundaries become boundaries protected by international law”, following the principle of uti possidetis iuris; the “alteration of existing boundaries by force is not capable of producing legal effects”.
Opinion 2 is also of importance, in which the arbitration commission answered the question put forward by Serbia about the status of the Serbian ethnic community in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The right to self-determination for Serbs outside Serbia “must not involve changes to existing boundaries”. Serbian communities in the two republics were therefore given directions on how to regulate their rights within them. In January 1992 as a result of the views and opinions made by the arbitration commission, all EC members, as well as other countries, recognized the republics of Slovenia and Croatia, and later Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia “within the boundaries that existed before the beginning of confrontation in June last year”.
National identity
Throughout history the Croats did not have many chances to establish their own state, but their national identity has deep and longstanding roots (Fernandez-Armesto 1994). Memories of their medieval kingdom were kept alive among Croats for centuries long after its fall, but an even stronger source of national self-awareness was the continuity of unbroken statehood that Croatia enjoyed within its unions with Hungary and Austria. Indeed, in both unions Croatia was nominally recognized as a separate unit. The Croatian diet (and parliament since 1848) always persistently insisted m that fact. The struggle put up by the Croats for their state and national individuality is therefore essential if one wants to understand Croatian identity (Macan and Sentija 1992). On the basis of that juridical tradition, one of the two strongest political parties formed by the Croats in the nineteenth century was significantly called the Party of (Croat State) Right. It stood firmly on the position of Croatian individuality and sovereignty. Even Croatian politicians who aspired to wider (South) Slavonic integration, saw an eventual common state as a union in which Croats would be able to keep their national and historic particularities. Therefore, when Croatia finally entered the South Slavonic common state in 1918, it was far too late to change or deny Croatian national identity. Moreover, Serbian attempts to impose the concept of “one nation consisting of three tribes” were too crude and violent to attract the Croats. Somewhat different was the concept promoted by the Yugoslav communist regime after the Second World War. Tito’s regime promoted “Yugoslavism”, but was also repressive towards the Croats. Croatian national expression was considered as a direct threat to “brotherhood and unity”. Steady persecution of Croats in both royalist and communist Yugoslavia caused deep distrust towards a South Slavonic union among Croats, strengthened Croatian national sentiments and deepened their desire to establish an independent state. Resurrection of Serbian imperialism in the late 1980s and aggression in the early 1990s were therefore only final impulses for Croatia’s striving for independence.
One of the most complex questions in the former Yugoslavia was a linguistic one .5 There are certainly close linguistic ties between Croats and Serbs as well as Montenegrins and Bosnian Muslims. Very often, the standard variants they speak are considered to be one language. However, reality is much more complex. Traditionally, Croats used dialects belonging to three distinct dialect groups (A concise atlas … 1993). The so-called Kajkavian and Cakavian dialects have always been used exceptionally by the Croats and there is a rich vernacular literature written in those dialects. Only dialects belonging to the third dialect group are spoken by both Croats and Serbs. In the nineteenth century a dialect belonging to that (Stokavian) group was accepted as the standard language variant, partly in order to bring Croats and Serbs closer together. Soon afterwards, the Serbs developed a theory by which all speakers of Stokavian were Serbs. That falsified theory became one of the footholds of Greater Serbian policy and territorial claims. On the other side it forced Croatian linguistic scholars into an arduous struggle for Croatian language individuality (Banac 1990). Now, as the Croats and Serbs have their own separate states, the language issue is no more. Each side will develop its own variant language freely and independently, and will be able to name it in accordance with national sentiment or any other heart’s desire.
Differences are greater concerning writing. Although the Serbs traditionally use the Cyrillic script, the Croats exclusively use the Latin alphabet (twenty-five consonants and five vowels). In the past the Croats also used the Glagolitic script and the Bosancica script, which had been a Croatian form of the Cyrillic script.
Catholicism is also an important element of Croatian national identity. It has played a significant role in Croatian history because of the outlying position of Croatia within a Catholic-dominated part of Europe. This position more often appears to have been a hindrance than fruitful, since contacts with Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam were often conflicting. Catholicism is therefore highly positioned in the national consciousness of the Croats as a mode of their defence, and can be compared with the Irish and the Polish experiences. The feelings of Croats towards the Holy See were transparently manifested during the visit of John Paul II to Croatia in September 1994. Almost a million Croatian citizens, and Croats from the diaspora, gathered in Zagreb and took part in public worship led by the Pope in the Croatian language.
Naturally, there are also Croats who are not Catholics. Some of them are Protestants too, and there are also Muslims by religion who consider themselves as Croats in both Croatia and Bosnia, although that combination of ethnic and religious identity was more frequent in the past (Banac 1984).
Since Croatia experienced all its trouble coming from the position on or beside historical dividing lines, the Croats are especially keen to consider themselves part of what is usually called the “West”. Most of them see themselves as “defenders of the eastern frontier of Western culture and values”. When Croatia claimed its independence from Yugoslavia, “return to Europe” was among its main slogans. Unfortunately for the Croats, they are rarely recognized by the West as such. Croatia is more often considered to be part of the Balkans, whereas Croats tend to see their own country as a part of central Europe or the Mediterranean. In the mental map of most Croats, the Balkans is an everlasting source of threats for Croatia’s bare existence. Deep frustration is the only consequence that can come out of that misunderstanding.
Croatia is quite often considered to be an old-fashioned and conservative country by the West. There is not much understanding of Croatia’s openly expressed national feelings and historicism, the Catholicism of substantial numbers of Croats, their insistence on language purity and other expressions of national feeling. All that is, in the eyes of Westerners, really old-fashioned, because the national state is not a favourite model in Europe any more. It must also be stressed that the poor image of Croats has been steadily mediated for the international public by the Serb-dominated diplomacy of former Yugoslavia. Quite often the Croats really appear to be living in the past, whereas modem Europe is orientated to the future. The problem is in the late politogenetic process. The fact that Croatia reached international recognition as late as the 1990s is not the fault of the Croats. They wanted a state in the nineteenth century and after both world wars when the map was changing, but at that time there was no understanding for a small Croatian nation among the Great Powers. Croatia now needs more understanding and patience. As soon as the problem of the country’s integrity is solved, national feelings will not be important any more, and Croats will turn from history to the present and the future.
In spite of the fact that present-day Croatia consists of several historic provinces that had been separated for a long time, national integration is not questioned. Regionalist tendencies are not strong, although there are many typical characteristics particularly for Dalmatia, Slavonia or other regions; most Croats, regardless of their regional origin, sincerely feel Croatia has a main political-territorial framework. The only exception is Istria, where regionalism surfaced in recent times on the basis of the region’s position, history and cultural heritage. Yet, even Istrian regionalism cannot be considered as a threat to the country’s integrity and national togetherness.
Ethnic structure6
The ethnic structural pattern of Croatia is similar to the patterns of the majority of states lying in the central European belt between the Baltic and the Adriatic. One ethnic group, in particular the Croats, represents the majority, whereas the rest of the population consists of ethnic communities or minorities that are represented on a much smaller scale. According to the 1991 census, which was carried out on the eve of the war and of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, the total population was 4,784,265 inhabitants, of whom 3,736,356 (78.1% were Croats. Among the republics of former Yugoslavia, Croatia was second according to the share of its titular nation to total population. Only Slovenia was ethnically more homogenous .7
The second largest ethnic community in Croatia are the Serbs. There were 581,663 Serbs (12.2%) registered in the 1991 census. Approximately one third of the Serbs lived within the regions of Baniya, Kordun, eastern Lika and around Knin in northern Dalmatia, and were a majority there. The Serbs in the eastern and western parts of Slavonia constituted an additional sixth of their total, whereas the rest of them (i.e. roughly a half of the total number) were dispersed throughout other parts of Croatia, mostly in large towns. In the context of the recent Croat/Serb conflict, it is important to stress that Serb-dominated areas lie along the Croatia/Bosnia boundary, hundreds of kilometres away from Serbia. Eastern Slavonia, or more precisely the regions of Baranya and Srijem, which since the 1991 war have been occupied by the Serbs, was not a Serb-dominated area due to its pre-war situation.
As a consequence of migration waves during Habsburg rule, there are several other ethnic communities that have been living within Croatia for at least a century or more. The most homogenous Hungarian community is in Baranya, the majority of Czechs live in western Slavonia, the majority of Italians inhabit the western part of Istria and Rijeka, whereas Slovaks and Ruthenians are concentrated in several villages in Slavonia. The Jews, who were more numerous before the Second World War, live mostly in Zagreb. All ethnic communities mentioned are small, but they are a very important part of society because they give Croatia a specific flavour of central European mixture.
Bosnian Muslims (43,469 or 0.9%) were the third largest community according to the 1991 census, but their relatively large number is a result of recent economic immigration from Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Generally, all non-Croat communities do accept Croatia as their homeland. They supported Croatia’s independence in 1991 and many their members were even part of the Croatian Army and fought for freedom together with Croats. Only the Serbs, and then not all of them, are either ambivalent or hostile towards Croatia.
Croat/Serb conflict
War between Croatia and the former Yugoslav Army ended more or less at the beginning of January 1992. During some five months of war operations the Yugoslav army together with volunteers from Serbia backed local Serb irregulars and they seized about one quarter of Croatian territory (Klemencic 1993). On that territory the so-called ‘Republic of Serbian Krajina” was self-proclaimed by rebelling Serbs (Vego 1993).
The occupied area of Croatia comprises the regions of Baranya, the eastern part of Slavonia including the Croatian part of Srijem, parts of western Slavonia, Baniya, Kordun, eastern Lika and part of northern Dalmatia. Before the hostilities, according to the 1991 census, 549,083 inhabitants lived within the presently occupied areas, among them 287,830 Serbs (52.4%), 203,656 Croats (37.1%) and 57,597 (10.5% of citizens) declaring other ethnic affiliation (Sterc and Pokos 1993). As a consequence of hostilities, the ethnic composition of those areas has changed drastically. Almost all the Croats were killed or have been forced to leave, and no one has returned.8 The same happened to most of the other non-Serbs living in the area. In March 1992, UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) were deployed in the occupied areas of Croatia in accordance with a plan usually known as the “Vance plan” after Cyrus Vance, the personal envoy of the UN Secretary General, who mediated in the conflict (Baletic 1993). After more than three years of UNPROFOR’S presence it can be said that the peace-keeping forces have effectively guaranteed Serbian gains, since the situation on the ground has not changed and no political resolution of the conflict has been reached.
The rebellion of the Serbs in Croatia effectively started in August 1990 with the so-called “tree-trunk revolution”, but it was part of a wider scenario conducted from Belgrade, in order to destabilize former Yugoslavia and to reorganize it according to Serbia’s desire. Moreover, the whole scenario was just one more attempt to realize the two- centuries old Greater Serbian expansionist program and territorial claims (Brandt et al. 1991; Klemencic 1993/4b).
The Serbs living in Croatia, or Croatian Serbs, protested against Croatia as early as 1988, when the communist regime was still in power. At that time there was no excuse for their anti-Croat feelings since the Croatian communist regime was more than generous towards Serbs and it enabled them to have privileged status (Cviic 1991: 73). After the free elections held in spring 1990, Croatian Serbs openly rejected the more independent status of Croatia and totally alienated themselves from the rest of Croatian society. They did not even try to accommodate themselves to a new multi-party situation. Under the influence of Greater Serbian propaganda from Belgrade they equated the newly elected Croatian government with the Ustasha regime. It is true that a Ustasha regime during the Second World War committed war crimes against the Serbs, but historical memories and fears could not be a reason for justifying Serbian armed rebellion and a move towards secession in the 1990s.
After heavy and brutal fighting and several years of total separation, there is an extremely deep division between ‘Krajina”9 10 and the rest of Croatia. Formally, integrity of Croatia is guaranteed by the UN, and its international boundaries should be protected by international law. Because of this the Serbs are not allowed to secede and join Serbia, which is their final aim. On the other hand, the situation on the ground is actually favourable for the Serbs. As long as they keep the territorial “status quo”, they consider themselves to be beyond the legal Croatian framework. Negotiations between the two sides have been started several times under the auspices of international mediators, but so far there has not been a single accord acceptable as a starting point for both sides. The only wish for peace can be pointed out as a joint one, but Croatia wants to reach peaceful reintegration and the Serbs want peaceful secession. From the Croatian viewpoint a resolution of the “Serbian question” should be reached within the framework of the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Liberties and the Rights of Ethnic and National Communities or Minorities, which was voted in the Croatian Parliament in 1991. A high degree of cultural autonomy for the Serbs is provided by the Constitutional Law, including territorial autonomy in two districts (Glina and Knin) covering most of the area that was Serb- dominated according to the 1991 and previous censuses. Due to personal judgment, it seems that the Croatian government would be ready to give more concessions to the Serbs. Effective partition of the country has caused deep divisions in society. The problem of displaced persons is getting deeper daily. There is steady international suspicion about Croatia’s stability and credibility The most important transportation corridors are out of use and alternative routes do not satisfy needs. Without resolution of the country’s integrity, the chances for economic recovery are poor. Therefore, resolution of the Serbian question appears to be of vital interest for Croatia, and that fact forces the Croatian side to open more doors to Serbian claims. The only thing that Croatia certainly could not negotiate is the secession of “Krajina”.
The Serbs are expected to recognize the sovereignty and integrity of Croatia and to abolish secessionistic claims. Within that framework they can probably negotiate more autonomy that they have been offered so far, especially if they get international backing for such a status. Apart from Baranya and eastern Slavonia, other Serb-occupied areas are traditionally underdeveloped and sparsely populated. Functionally, they depend on Croatia. They have always been economically integrated into Croatia. Moreover, being supplied directly from Serbia proper, self- proclaimed Krajina is not economically viable at all. A direct link is at present possible only across another Serbian “statelet” in Bosnia- Herzegovina. That fact explains why the Serbs so desperately need a land corridor in northern Bosnia. On the other hand, especially from a military viewpoint, the most effective impact on the Greater Serbian project would be to break that corridor.
The are two ways to resolve the Croat/Serb conflict. A military solution means a new war between Croats and Serbs, or more realistically between Croatia and Serbia. Croatia’s victory would resolve the question of the country’s integrity, but it would probably cause a huge emigration of the Serbs from presently occupied parts of Croatia. However, the military balance is not favourable for Croatia, since Serbia controls most of former Federal Army potential and still has an advantage, especially when considering aircraft and heavy artillery. Moreover, Croatia has been steadily warned by the international community that there would be no sympathy for eventual Croatian military actions. Eventual defeat of the Croatian army would probably mean a final loss of territory. It might also open the door for legalizing boundary changes at the expense of Croatia. The resolution of conflict without a new war is also possible, no matter how deep the conflict seems to be. But the political key for that resolution is not within Croatia. It is held by Serbia. If Serbia abolishes its expansionistic claims and recognizes Croatia within international boundaries, the rebelling Croatian Serbs have to negotiate its future status with the Croatian government. In spite of weaknesses demonstrated so far, international mediators can certainly influence that solution profoundly.
Relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina
Relations between Croatia and Serbia can be characterized as conflicting, but the most complex is the relationship between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is a special and outstanding interaction between the two countries concerning geographical complementarity (Klemencic 1993/4a). There are also many elements of mutually considering economic, historical and ethnic relations (Klemencic and Topalovic 1993).
Bosnia has traditionally been considered as one of the historic Croatian lands. An important part of that viewpoint has been a theory that Bosnian Muslims were of Croat ethnic origin. On the other hand, the Serbs from their perspective viewpoint claim the predominantly Serbian origin of Bosnian Muslims and they consider Bosnia to be one of Serbia’s lands. But there has always been an essential difference between Croatian and Serbian claims. The Croatian side was always likely to respect Islamic culture and be ready to accept Bosnian Muslims within its Croatian circle as “Croats of Muslim religion”. On the contrary, the Serbian approach has always been extremely exclusive. There was no understanding and no respect for the Islamic tradition of Bosnian Muslims. They have always been contemptuously considered as once Islamized Serbs who should be either re-Serbianized by whatever means or simply exterminated. Such a Serbian attitude has been widely demonstrated during the current war in Bosnia.
On the grounds of recent events in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatian policy needs new approaches and attitudes. It has become obvious that Bosnian Muslims should be treated as a separate cultural and political entity.11 Consequently, Bosnia-Herzegovina can no longer be treated as “Croatian land”. An old slogan of the Croatian nationalists, “Croatian boundary on the Drina river” has changed into “Serbian boundary must not extend over the Drina river”. That means support for a sovereign and integral Bosnia-Herzegovina, which should be a buffer state between Croatia and Serbia.
Naturally, Croatia will carry on its care for the Croatian community within Bosnia-Herzegovina but only to help them to ensure a satisfactory status. Such an approach provides fertile grounds for close relations between the two countries in future, not on the basis of nostalgic historical or consanguinic links but on the more promising basis of real interests. As soon as Croatia accepts that approach completely and integrates it into its strategy, it will also be better treated and more widely accepted on the international stage.
However, a much more complicated situation will develop if Bosnia- Herzegovina does not survive as an integral state. Eventual secession of the Serbs and partition of Bosnia are a real threat for Croatia because of a possible merger of Serb-dominated areas in both Croatia and Bosnia into one unit (so-called Western Serbia). When the spatial integrity of Bosnia is ever violated by the Serbs, it automatically lays claims for revision of the Croatian boundaries. Thus, Croatia will always be very much dependent on the situation in Bosnia, even without wishing that on its own. What is important for Croatia is to be unequivocal towards Bosnian integrity. Fortunately, the Washington agreement12 signed by the Croatian and Bosnian governments (in the latter case, this is more or less a euphemism for “leadership of the Bosnian Muslims”) in March 1994 has made the Croatian position towards Bosnia clearer.
Relations toward other neighbouring states
Apart from Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia’s other neighbouring states are Slovenia and Hungary, as well as Italy on the Adriatic Sea. Since the break-up of Yugoslavia there has been a demarcation dispute between Croatia and Slovenia. The two countries proclaimed mutual recognition “within existing boundaries” in 1991, but they have to demarcate the boundary line. A mutual state commission was formed. Several disputed points emerged, but any problems are small and they should be treated as technical. The greatest dispute is maritime delimitation in the Bay of Piran, where there was no dividing line during the Yugoslav period. In contrast with land boundaries, there are no maritime boundaries between republics in former Yugoslavia. Since Croatia is fortunate in terms of the length of its coastline13, Slovenia is probably a more interested partner in that maritime delimitation.
Apart from the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, a median line should be adopted as a fair solution, but Slovenia seems to be more ambitious in order to secure broader territorial waters and probably direct access to international waters. The problem is that such a claim encompasses changes of the land boundary at the expense of Croatia, which is advocated openly by some marginal groups in Slovenia. Moreover, the dispute over the Bay of Piran is sometimes overestimated by the media on both sides. Yet, it is a dispute likely to become more sever. Two young countries should finally manage to find a mutually acceptable solution.
With regard to its maritime boundary, Croatia is likely to continue to apply the delimitation agreements reached by Italy and the former Yugoslavia (Blake 1993/94). The way Italy and Yugoslavia settled their straight baselines, territorial sea limits and delimitation of the continental shelf in the Adriatic was widely accepted as reasonable, modest and mutually satisfactory. As a successor state of the former Yugoslavia, Croatia sees no reason to change already-existing solutions.
Apart from the dispute between Croatia and Slovenia, another maritime dispute is the delimitation of the Bay of Kotor between Croatia and Montenegro. First, it should be made clear who is Croatia’s partner: Montenegro or the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, proclaimed by Serbia and Montenegro after the break-up of former Yugoslavia. Secondly, that case is clear since the Prevlaka peninsula on the western side of the bay’s mouth belongs to Croatia and the rest of the bay is part of Montenegro. The dispute exists only because Montenegro (or FR Yugoslavia) claims a boundary revision in order to gain the whole bay. Apart from that unilateral claim, the maritime delimitation should be easy because the equidistant line provides a fair and only logical solution (Blake 1993/94).
There are no disputes at all concerning boundary lines between Hungary and Croatia. The old international boundary seems to be satisfactory for both sides, so they can renew their historic links under new circumstances and without boundary disputes.
Conclusion
Although Croatia finally reappeared on the political map of Europe, creation of the state has not yet been completed. The aspirations of the Croats over centuries became a reality, but the new state needs to consolidate its integrity and stability. Without the reintegration of currently Serb-controlled areas, Croatia’s unique shape would be seriously handicapped. Under the present circumstances of partial occupation, the country’s economic viability is endangered too. Croatia’s primary course of action is therefore to find a way to its integrity.
Theoretically, the approach Croatia had towards a territorial resolution of the post-Yugoslav crises was confirmed as a right and legitimate one. Former republican boundaries were recognized as international, which was exactly what Croatia advocated. Unfortunately, the country was faced with aggression and it was forced to defend its legal rights with arms. Since military imbalance was more than obvious, Croatia succeeded only partially. Now, there is a gap between the legal rights and effective occupation in reality. To resolve that frustrating situation, Croatia looks for efficient international support and help.
Once integrated within internationally recognized boundaries, Croatia will have to find a solution for the status of its Serbian minority in order to strengthen the country’s internal stability. Certainly, a solution, or modus vivendi as once interpreted by EC representatives, will not be easily reached, because Croat/Serb relations in Croatia and in general have reached their lowest level in history.
On attaining its current aims it can be concluded that Croatia’s territorial aspirations will be satisfied and it can soon become a place of stability and progress in a transitional part of the continent where central Europe, the Mediterranean and the Balkans are in contact. Croatia rediviva is therefore still a challenging project for the present generation of the Croats.
Notes
1 The only Ottoman province solely of countries populated with south Slavonic nations. Smaller units were sanjaks.
2 For simplicity, the formal title “Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” is reduced to “Bosnia-Herzegovina” or sometimes simply “Bosnia” throughout the text.
3 An excellent insight into the first few years of Yugoslavia is provided by 1. Banac (1984).
4 Ustasha – the Croatian Revolutionary Movement – founded in 1929 after dictatorship was introduced in Yugoslavia by the Serbian monarch. In 1941 the movement’s leader Ante Pavelic was sponsored by Italy and Germany to take a leading position in Croatia. The 1941-5 activity of the Ustasha regime compromised an idea of future Croatian independence, including the 1991 declaration of independence.
5 More about language can be found in Banac (1990).
6 A collection of more detailed studies on the ethnic structure of Croatia, and particularly of Serb-dominated areas, is provided by Croatian geographers in Geopolitical and demographical issues of Croatia (1991).
7 In 1991, according to respected censuses, the percentage of Slovenians in Slovenia was 87.8, Serbs in Serbia, 65.8, Macedonians in Macedonia, 64.6, and Montenegrins in Montenegro, 61.8. The participation of ethnic communities within Bosnia-Herzegovinia was: Muslims 43.7 per cent, Serbs 31.3 per cent and Croats 17.3 per cent.
8 In December 1993 there were in Croatia 250,396 displaced persons from occupied areas registered by the government office for displaced persons and refugees, and 59,959 refugees from Croatia in other countries. Also, Croatia provided accommodation for 282,728 refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina.
9 The term “Krajina” or “Serbian Krajina” has recently been used to determine the self-proclaimed Serbian “statelet” in Croatia. The word “Krajina” in the Croatian language has the same meaning as the word “frontier” in English. It used to be a general term, written with a lower case initial letter, usually to denote smaller regions that were historically borderlands. The Austrian defensive belt known as the Military Frontier (or Vojna krajina in Croatian) did not correspond fully to the territory of so-called Serbian Krajina. For example, the town of Knin was not within the Military Frontier. It is also important that the Military Frontier did not have special status because of the Serbs living there (totalling 40 per cent of the population), but for completely different reasons. The inhabitants of the Military Frontier enjoyed immunity from feudal obligations in return for military service guarding the frontier against the Turks, irrespective of their ethnic origin or religious affiliation. The continuity between the historic Military Frontier and present-day “Krajina”, which the Serbs claim, simply does not exist (Szajkovski 1993).
10 Since this chapter was written, Krajina has been reincorporated within Croatia, and few of its Serb population are in residence there.
11 In order to stress their identity, Bosnian Muslims in 1994 started to call themselves “Bosniaks”, which is a traditional term for citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially those spread among Muslims and Croats.
12 Agreement between Croats and Bosnian Muslims, which proposed a Croat-Bosnian federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition, a confederation between the Bosnian federation and Republic of Croatia is proposed for the future, but it is not a realistic project, at least until both countries have overcome problems of integrity.
13 Excluding the islands the coastline of Croatia is 1778km long, and that of Slovenia, 32km long.
References
A concise atlas of the Republic of Croatia (and of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina) 1993. Zagreb: Miroslav Krleza Lexicographic Institute.
Baletic, Z. 1993. “UNPROFOR in Croatia.” Politicka Misao (Croatian Political Science Review) vol. xxx, no. 2, 44-54.
Banac, I. 1990. “Main trends in the Croatian language question.” In Most/The Bridge , Collection of Croatian Literature, vol. I. Zagreb: Croatian Writers’ Association.
-1984. The national question in Yugoslavia. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
Blake, G. 1993/4. “Croatia’s maritime boundaries.” In Croatia – A new European state . Department for Geography and Spatial Planning.
Boban, LJ. 1993. Croatian borders 1918-1993 , Zagreb: Skolska knjiga/Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts.
Bognar, A. 1991. “Changes in ethnic composition in Baranja.” In Geopolitical and demographic issues of Croatia . Department of Geography, University of Zagreb.
Brandt, M. et al. 1991. lzvori velikosrpske agresije , Zagreb: Skolska knjiga/AugustCesarec.
Cviic, C. 1991. Remaking the Balkans . London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Crkvencic, I. and M. Klemencic 1993. Aggression against Croatia . Zagreb: Central Bureau of Statistics.
Cvrtila, V. 1993. “The boundaries of the Republic of Croatia.” Politicka Misao (Croatian Political Science Review) vol. xxx, no. 2, 35-43.
Degan, V. D. 1992. “Samoodredjenje naroda i teritorijalna cjelovitost drzava u uvjetima raspada Jugoslavije.” Zakonitost vol. XLVI, no. 4, 543-69.
Englefield, C. 1992. “Yugoslavia, Croatia, Slovenia: re-emerging boundaries.” Territory Briefing 3, International Boundaries Research Unit, University of Durham.
Fernandez-Armesto, F. (ed.) 1994. The Times guide to the peoples of Europe . London: Times Books.
Klemencic, M. 1991. “A recent historico-geographical basis of the Yugoslav outer and inner borders with special to Croatian borders.” In Geopolitical and demographical issues of Croatia . Department of Geography, University of Zagreb.
-1993. “Causes and dynamics of the war in Croatia.” Acta Geographica Croatica XXVIII, 187-94.
-1993/4a. “Four theses about Croatia and Bosnia.” In Croatia – A new European state . Department for Geography and Spatial Planning, University of Zagreb.
-1993/4b. “Greater Serbian territorial claims.” In Croatia – A new European state . Department for Geography and Spatial Planning, University of Zagreb.
-1994. “Territorial proposals for the settlement of the war in Bosnia- Hercegovina.” Boundary and Territory Briefing (vol. 1) 3, International Boundaries Research Unit, University of Durham.
Klemencic,M. and D.Topalovic 1993. “Geopolitische Verflechtungen von Kroatien und Bosnien-Hercegowina.” Sudosteuropa Mitteilungen XXXIII(l), 50-60.
Kocsis, K. 1993/4. “The changing of the Croatian ethnic territory during the last half of the millennium.” In Croatia – A new European state. Department for Geography and Spatial Planning, University of Zagreb.
Macan, T. and J. Sentija 1992. A short history of Croatia [The Bridge, special edition). Zagreb: Croatian Writers’ Association.
Szajkovski, B. (ed.) 1993. Encyclopedia of conflicts, disputes and flashpoints in eastern Europe, Russia and the successor states . Harlow, England: Longman.
Sterc, S. and N. Pokos 1993. “Demografski uzroci i posljedice rata protiv Hrvatske.” Drustvena Istrazivanja 4-5, 305-34.
Vego, M. 1992. “The army of Serbian Krajina.” Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. V, no. 10, 438-45. Coulsdon: Jane’s Information Group.

The History Of Boka Kotorska From Antiquity Until 1918

American Croatian Review, Year IV, No. 3 and 4, 1997, pp. 15-16.

     The sound of Boka Kotorska is the biggest and most beautiful bay in the Adriatic Sea, as well as the southernmost fjord in the world. Its important geographic position, favorable topography, plentiful water and sunlight, along with its pleasant climate, have been attracting people to settle there since prehistoric times.

     The oldest archeological findings in Boka date back to the late neolithic period, around 3500 B.C. Unique graveyards and cliff paintings can be traced back to the second millennium B.C. The Greeks are known to have built their colonies in Boka as early as the fourth century B.C. The Romans called the sound Sinus Rbisonicus. The present name of the sound is derived from the Roman word bocca, which means mouth, or opening. Thus, the name Boka Kotorska (Kotor being, of course, Boka’s most important town).

     The first recognizable long-term inhabitants of Boka were the Illyrians (intermingled with the Celts to a certain degree). By 250 B.C., Boka was part of the Illyrian state under King Agron, its capital was Skadar which is in modern-day Albania. The Illyrians were sea-pirates known to have attacked Greek shipping, providing a pretense for Roman invasion of the region. In the third and last Illyric-Roman war (168 B.C.) the Romans destroyed the Illyrian state and took control of Boka. Their rule lasted until the fall of the Western Roman Empire, around A. D. 476.

     During Roman rule, primarily due to Roman immigration and assimilation of the indigenous population, Latin influences in Boka became ingrained and have remained deeply rooted in the area even several centuries after the fall of Rome. (Indeed, one could argue that they can be easily found even today).

     Following the implosion of the great Western Roman Empire and 60 years of Gothic rule in the area, Boka came under the increasing influence of the Eastern Roman Empire, later known as Byzantium. The Early medieval period in Boka, as in the rest of Europe, is characterized by the mass migration of largely nomadic tribes, first the Goths, followed by the Avars, and then the Slavs.

     During the Slavic migration in the sixth and seventh centuries, Croats settled regions along the Adriatic coast from Istria to Albania, regions as far north as the Drava River, as far west as Sutla, and as far east as the Drina. The oldest historical account from those times, written by a priest of Duclea (Pop Dukljanin), mentions Red Croatia, or Upper Dalmatia, a region which included Boka. Red Croatia united with Western or White Croatia into a single Croatian state as early as the middle of the tenth century.

Map of Boka Kotorska

     From the mid-ninth until the end of the twelfth century, Boka was repeatedly under pressure, even periodic rule, from the Byzantine Empire on the one hand, and the states of Duklja-Zeta and Travunja on the other, states which had been formed in Boka’s hinterland. By mid-twelfth century, the town of Kotor started to thrive as a maritime trade center, establishing ties with nearby Dubrovnik. The Catholic cathedral of St. Triphon (Sv. Trifun) dates back to 1166 and was built with the help of maritime traders.

     From 1185 until 1371, Boka was part of a medieval Serbian state under the Nemanjic dynasty. Even during these times, however, Boka maintained broad autonomy and retained its overwhelmingly Catholic character. Many new towns were springing up along the shores of the sound. The town of Kotor continued to grow in size and influence, and it increasingly attracted various tradesmen like goldsmiths, blacksmiths, and tailors, among others. Kotor’s ship building industry was also well known.

     During this period, several guilds and fraternities were founded. The oldest and most famous of these fraternities, all of which had religious origins, was the fraternity of sea-farers from Boka or in Croatian, Bokeljska mornarica. It may have been founded as early as the beginning of the ninth century, but definitely existed by mid-twelfth century.

     After the death of the last of the Nemanjics, Kotor came (1371) under the protection of the Croatian-Hungarian king, Ljudevit the Great. Ljudevit was the most powerful ruler of the Adriatic region at the time, forcing out Venice from the eastern side of the Adriatic region. After his death, Bosnian king Stjepan Tvrtko I. Kotormanic attempted to impose his rule on Kotor. He succeeded to gain only parts of the bay including the town of Kotor. However, his rule did not leave a lasting impact in the town or the region. The Bosnian rulers are remembered mostly for founding the town of Herceg Novi on the western side of Boka. After Tvrtko’s death in 1391, and until 1420, Kotor was, like Dubrovnik, an independent city-state.Croatian medieval art - St.Tripun Church (Kotor)

     The period of Venetian rule over Kotor and Boka started in 1420 and lasted, with a few interruptions, until 1797. It was a period of numerous wars and permanent insecurity on both land and the sea. By the end of the fifteenth century, Turks had conquered the lands of Boka’s hinterland, including some lands on the north west side of Boka. For the ensuing 200 years, the sound was thus divided between the Venetians and the Turks. During that time, the population, power, and significance of Kotor decreased dramatically, turning Kotor into one of the most devastated and most pillaged cities in the bay. After the Austro-Venetian war against the Turkish Empire (1715-1718), Venice was able to expand its territories into Dalmatia even further. She took complete control over Boka sound once again, and her rule lasted until the fall of Venice in 1797.

     On August 24th, 1798 a Croatian from Lika, general Matija Rukavina, marched alongside Austrian troops into Kotor. Rukavina entered Kotor in the name of the Croatian-Hungarian king, convincing the citizens of Boka to accept the Habsburg rule.

     In the midst of the Napoleonic wars, after the Austrian defeat at Austerlitz, Austria was supposed to turn over Boka to the French. However, the Russians, who were not obliged to honor this agreement, in the vain hope of stopping Napoleon’s eastward advance, took possession of Boka in 1806. After the Russian defeat at Friedland and after little over a year of Russian rule, Russia was forced to accede Boka to the French. With the fall of Dubrovnik republic in 1808, Boka became territorially connected with the rest of Dalmatia.

     In their six years of rule, the French introduced an array of innovations. The most important of these probably being democratization and the abolishment of all aristocratic privileges.

     In 1807, the Croatian parliament (Sabor) again requested that Dalmatia, of which Boka was now a part, must be reunited with Croatia and Slavonia. This request would constantly resurface until unification in the latter part of the century.

     After the fall of Napoleon in 1813 and while awaiting the final peace settlement, Boka was temporarily united with Montenegro for several months. Two strong factions had emerged in Boka at this time. The pro-Austrian and pro-Montenegrin one favored a union of Boka with Montenegro. This faction was supported mostly by Orthodox villagers living in the hills above the sound who had settled there during Turkish rule. A numerically greater, pro-Austrian faction enjoyed support from predominantl
y Croatian Catholic coastal cities, as well as some villages. The final decision came at the all-important Vienna Congress of 1814, in which Austria was confirmed as the successor of all the territories of the Venetian and Dubrovnik republics. The Kingdom of Dalmatia was formed, with its capital in Zadar, and Boka became part of the Austrian state. The second Austrian rule was to last for 104 years, until 1918.

     In the 1830’s, the so called Illyrian Renewal, or the Croatian national revival movement, swept Boka as well. Long after the national homogenization of Boka’s minority Serbs, Boka’s Croats finally started to unite under their Croatian national identity. The appointment of count Josip Jelacic to the governorship of Dalmatia and the rest of Croatia had finally come. Many songs and poems were written in Jelacic’s honor. Croatian tricolors were displayed on all ships as well as in all of Boka’s towns alongside the official Austrian flag. However, unification was still some decades away.

     At the assembly in 1861, it had been decided that all citizens of Boka, Croats and Serbs alike, unconditionally support the unification of Boka and all of Dalmatia with Croatia proper. Representatives of Boka in Dalmatia’s Sabor at the time, three Croats and a Serb, and all members of the People’s Party, supported unification with Croatia. Responding to greater-Serbian tendencies, the People’s Party gradually shifted its ideological orientation from South-Slavism to Croatianism in the 1870’s, when it became the majority party in Dalmatia’s Sabor. The final break between the Croatians and the Serbs came after the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Austro-Hungarian empire in 1878. The Croatians supported occupation because it reunited Bosnian-Herzegovinian Croats with the rest of the Croatian nation, while the Serbs vehemently opposed it, because it ran counter to greater-Serbian claims to Bosnia.

     In the second half of the nineteenth century Boka experienced an economic revival. The number of affluent Croatian families increased quite dramatically. Maritime trade regained much of its former glory by 1870. However, the rapid development of the steam ship dealt a fatal blow to Boka’s trade – one from which it was never able to recover.

     Sharing the fate of the rest of Croatia, Boka became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes after World War I. Thus started the most difficult period in Boka’s history – the period in which the greater-Serbian politicians would attempt, and largely succeed, to assume full control of one of Croatia’s most beautiful regions.

Based on the text “Boka Kotorska od najstarijih vremena do 1918” by Ankica and Josip Pecaric. Summarized and translated by Ivica Kresic, University of Chicago.

Interesting, if sad, statistics:

In 1910, Catholics of mostly Croat nationality made up 69 percent of the total population of the town of Kotor, 70 percent in Herceg Novi, and 95 percent in Tivat. In 1991, Croat share in the total population in the same towns was only 7, 2, and 23 percent respectively.

The Future of America's Croatian Youth

The Need for Modernization of the National and Grassroots Infrastructure of the Croatian-American Community

     Luka Misetic

     The future of the Croatian-American community lies, obviously, in its youth. The concept of the term “Croatian-American Youth,” however, encompasses a broad range of people who come from diverse backgrounds. They come from all class levels, they range in different ages, they come from various educational backgrounds, and they come from different upbringings depending upon the strength of the Croatian community from which they come. Despite this diversity, however, the “Croatian-American Youth” are remarkably consistent in their answers and views of the Croatian American community, and their vision of our community in the 21st Century.

     In an informal, unscientific internet survey of Croatian-American youth, ten questions were posed. These questions were as follows:

     1. How do you see the present general situation among Croatians in the USA?

     2. How do you see the future of the Croatian American Community in the USA?

     3. How do you see the role of your generation in the present/future Croatian community in the USA?

     4. How much is your generation really interested in preserving the Croatian identity in this country?

     5. How did the independence of Croatia affect your generation?

     6. What forces have had the greatest impact upon your Croatianism?

     7. How do you perceive the leading figures among the Croatians in the USA at the present time?

     8. If you visited Croatia in recent times, how do you perceive the general situation in Croatia?

     9. Would you consider going to Croatia to live and work permanently?

     10. What do you think, as an American Croatian, are the greatest strengths and weaknesses of the Croatians in general?

     The results of this survey reveal that, in general, younger Croatian Americans have a strong attachment to their native land and wish to maintain as close a link as possible to their Croatian heritage. However, they also believe that our community is generally divided and lacks a sense of direction or purpose, especially with the achievement of Croatian independence and the end of the war. Almost all respondents felt that the community was filled with talented, educated and ambitious individuals who were dedicated to the strengthening of the Croatian American community, as well as to the development of an independent, democratic, free market Republic of Croatia. These resources, however, are being wasted because of the lack of organization within our community.

     This paper will provide an overview of the results of the unscientific Internet poll. We received 36 completed responses, ranging from each coast of the United States and points scattered in between. The following answers were provided to our questioning:

     What is the general state of the Croatian American Community?

     Respondents generally feel that the community is less proactive than it was in the early 1990’s. They describe the situation as “fragmented and unorganized,” “lacking unity,” and lacking leadership. Overall, there is a sense that the community is slowly deteriorating, and to make matters worse, this mood is combined with an overall sense of resignation that nothing much will change in the future. There is a consensus that our community lacks leadership and organization. Respondents describe a once vibrant community that is now experiencing a broad sense of apathy and malaise. On the positive side, some respondents believe that the community is vibrant, and that the future is bright because of the increasing numbers of educated professionals in our ranks.

     How does the youth see the future of the Croatian Community?

     The overall majority of respondents felt that the Croatian community would become (or would continue to remain) fragmented, unorganized, and assimilated. Others said that it was too difficult to tell, and a minority felt that the community would “remain strong and tight-knit.” The view of most was that there was a distinct lack of leadership and impetus to bring about long term unity and build a solid foundation for the Croatian-American community. A minority of respondents felt that the future of the Croatian-American community involved a return to Croatia, either on a permanent basis or through some other direct involvement with the home country.

     How do you see the role of your generation in the present/future Croatian community in the USA?

     Responses ranged from the positive: “we are the cross-roads generation that will transform our community as a result of our education and job opportunities;” to the negative: “the Croatian- American youth will assimilate into American culture, and it will be up to new immigrants to continue the Croatian culture in the United States.” Most responses were in between those two extremes. There is a certain level of anxiety among the respondents because most do not know what the future holds for the Croatian-American community. A level of frustration underlies their views of the future. This frustration appears to be born of a combination of factors, but mostly because there is a sense that there is interest and passion for Croatia and all things Croatian among the youth, but there is also a certain resignation to the notion that Croatian-Americans are too disorganized, too divergent, and lacking in leadership to capitalize on the interest and passion that certainly exists in their respective communities.

     How much is your generation really interested in preserving the Croatian identity in this country?

     A significant majority of respondents answered that there is a strong interest in preserving Croatian identity in this country. Our respondents, however, were unable to determine exactly which elements within the Croatian community were most interested in preserving culture, nor were they able to determine why this interest was prevalent. Nevertheless, almost all of the respondents felt that there is an interest within the younger Croatian generations for maintaining their cultural identity. It is interesting to note, however, the observations of some respondents who felt that this interest is developed on an individual by individual or family by family basis, and not as a result of the efforts of the Croatian community as a whole.

     How did the independence of Croatia affect your generation?

     This question evoked the most passionate answers among our respondents. All of the respondents felt that the achievement of Croatian independence was a turning point in their lives. A significant number, for example, recalled childhood days when classmates and others had no idea what Croatia or a Croatian was. Thus, these respondents felt that when Croatian independence was achieved, it was not only a national turning point, but a personal vindication which granted them co-equal standing with other ethnic groups and individuals. The essence of the responses was that Croatian independence increased their personal pride and self-esteem.

     Other positive views were that the drive for Croatia’s independence was a tremendous unifying force that served as a catalyst for social c
ohesion within our community. All of the respondents report with pride at the efforts of their own local Croatian community during 1991-95, when their communities provided material, financial and political support to Croatia in its struggle for independence.

     The negative, however, of this period of social cohesion is that the spirit of cohesion and progress deflated like a balloon after the struggle for independence was completed. The aftermath of the achievement of independence is that the community is left without a unifying goal. The energy of the early 90’s has dissipated.

     An interesting trend was the conclusion by some respondents that Croatian independence would have long term benefits for the maintenance of Croatian culture because more and more people would be traveling to or working in Croatia. The ties with the mother country will be stronger than in the pre-independence period, and as a result the Croatian-American community will be stronger and our culture more likely to be preserved.

      What forces have had the greatest impact upon your Croatianism?

     Our respondents offered both positive and negative influences on their “Croatianism.” Most, if not all, mentioned their parents as the primary source of their Croatian identity. The Church was a close second in terms of Croatian influence. Other positive influences on Croatian identity included: Croatian independence, the war for independence, more travel to Croatia, cultural/folklore groups.

     There were not many “negative influences” on our respondents’ Croatianism. Some negatives, however, included: disharmony with the Croatian community, too much politics associated with being Croatian, and disappointment with the Croatians in Croatia.

     How do you perceive the leading figures among the Croatians in the USA at the present time?

     Unfortunately, most of our respondents could not name a single leader within the Croatian- American community. Those that were mentioned included Melchior Masina, President of the Croatian Catholic Union; Anthony Peraica, former President of the Croatian American Association; Bernard Luketich, President of the Croatian Fraternal Union; and Dr. Ante Cuvalo, professor at Joliet Community College. Many respondents simply stated that the leadership of the Croatian-American community was comprised exclusively of older men, mostly first generation, and that there were no leaders within the younger generation.

     The inability to provide answers to this question reveals the fundamental frustration of the Croatian youth: the desire to capitalize on the passion for Croatia, but the lack of any recognizable leadership or institutions through which to organize.

     If you visited Croatia in recent times, how do you perceive the general situation in Croatia?

     Our respondents provided their answers in 1999, before the recent election and change in government in Croatia. Nevertheless, their answers provide insight into the perception of the Croatian-American youth regarding the situation in Croatia.

     All of our respondents feel that Croatia is a country of significant beauty and natural resources and that it has all the elements necessary to be a successful and prosperous nation. This includes the people, whom our respondents view as warm and friendly and the backbone of Croatia.

     Our respondents, however, view the overall situation in Croatia as bleak. Politically in 1999, our respondents felt that too much power had been concentrated in too few people and that this was not healthy for Croatia. The economic situation was viewed as depressing and bleak, and many commented that their relatives are struggling under these difficult economic conditions.

     Would you consider going to Croatia to live and work permanently?

     On the positive side, almost all of our respondents indicated that they would consider returning to Croatia to live and work permanently. The reason for this is summed up by one person: “When I am in Croatia, I just get the sense that this is where I belong.” Most indicated that they love Croatia, its natural beauty and the way of life.

     On the negative side, however, most respondents indicated that they would in fact not return to Croatia, even though they would consider it. The reason boils down to one reason only: the economy and the lack of opportunity. Our respondents reasoned that they did not believe that opportunities existed for them. They believed that even if they could obtain employment, they were not sure that they would receive paychecks. The standard of living is much lower than here in the United States, and our respondents were unwilling to lower their standard of living significantly.

     Most of the respondents perceived the situation in Croatia in 1999 as politically and economically bleak, and therefore did not believe that they would return permanently to Croatia in the near future.

     What do you think, as an American Croatian, are the greatest strengths and weaknesses of the Croatians in general?

     The greatest strengths of the Croatian community, according to our respondents, were: hard- working people, united, proud, strong family bonds, determined, intelligent, honest.

     The greatest weaknesses of Croatians in general were: disunited, unmotivated (due to the end of the war), stubborn, impatient, lack of professional role models and leaders, too political. Others complained that Croatians in Croatia had become too lazy as a result of the communist system.

     It is interesting to note that our respondents were divided almost evenly as to whether the trait of “unity” was a strength or a weakness of Croatians in general.

     Conclusion

     The informal internet survey reveals that the Croatian American youth generally is very interested in maintaining its cultural identity and in helping Croatia prosper. Nevertheless, there is an overall frustration with the lack of leadership and organization within the Croatian-American community. The younger generation is crying out for the establishment of a new “social infrastructure,” that will unite the younger generation and the community as a whole.

     Much of the social infrastructure established over the last 50 years was designed to cater to the needs of either the post-World War II generation or of the immigrant generations of the 50’s, 60’s and 70’s. Thus, churches, cultural centers and fraternal organizations were built for, and are currently dominated by, the over-40 age group. Needless to say, this has left many in the under- 40 crowd feeling left out, or alternatively feeling that the existing social infrastructure does not address the needs of a generation which is not blue collar, like their parents, but more likely employed in a profession. This younger generation feels that their talents are underutilized in the current social infrastructure. Furthermore, the current social infrastructure has built into it political and social divisiveness that is a remnant of earlier decades, and which often has nothing to do with the younger generation. The fact that these feuds continue serves to drive away a younger generation which wishes to help, but does not wish to immerse itself in the squabbles of the past.

     What is needed is a new, dynamic leadership that will capitalize on the energy, edu
cation and skill of the younger generation and provide new clubs or organizations (or new leadership in existing clubs or organizations) to modernize our community and take advantage of the tremendous resources that exist in the Croatian Youth, as well as the tremendous love for Croatia that our Croatian Youth possesses.

Miscellaneous Books

     Carmichael, Cathie, compiler. Croatia (Bibliography). World Bibliographical Series Volume 216. Oxford, England, Santa Barbara, California, Denver, Colorado: Clio Press, 1999. xxv 194 p.

     Cultural policy in Croatia . Strasburg: Counc. Cult. Coop., 1999. p. xiv, 275.

     The Donald W. Treadgold Papers

     A publication series The Donald W. Treadgold Papers in Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies, created in honor of Prof. D. W. Treadgold, is published by the School of International Studies at the University of Washington. Sabrina P. Ramet is the Editor. Twenty one issues have been published up to date, and three new issues are forthcoming soon. Several of them deal directly about Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the former Yugoslavia. Subscription for 10 issues is $45 US. Back issues can be ordered. For further information contact the editorial office: (206) 543-4852 Fax (206) 685-0668 e-mail: treadgld@u.washington.edu or visit the Treadgold Papers at: http://weber.u.washington.edu/~reecasf/treadgol/html

     You might be interested in the following issues: Cushman, Thomas. Critical Theory and the War in Croatia and Bosnia. 50p. (July 1997); Conversi, Daniele. German-Bashing and the Breakup of Yugoslavia . 81 p. (March 1998); Maimark, Norman M. Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe 54 p. (October 1998); Hodge, Carole. The Serb Lobby in the United Kingdom. 97 p. (September 1999).

     Krokar, James. Liberal Reform in Croatia, 1872-1875. New York: P. Lang, 1996.

     Kunovich, Robert.Conflict, Religious Identity, and Ethnic Intolerance in Croatia. Washington, D.C.: The National Council for Euroasian and East European Research, NCEER, 1999. p.21.

     Sonje, Velimir. Croatia in the Second Stage of Transition, 1994-1999. [?]: 1999. p. 62.

     Sunic, Tomislav. Cool Croatia . Glastonbury, England: Vineyard Books, 1999, 60 p.

     Tomizza, Fluvio. Materada . Evanston, Ill, London: North Western University Press; Turnaround, 2000. p. 168.

     Vego, Milan N. Austro-Hungarian Naval Policy: 1904-14. Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 1996. xviii, 213 pp. $ 47.50, hard bound. $22.50, paper. Reviewed in Slavic Review, vol. 58, no.4, Winter 1999, pp.900-901.

Zimmermann, Warren – Origins of a Catastrophe

Origins of a Catastrophe. Yugoslavia and its Destroyers. America’s Last Ambassador Tells What Happened and Why (New York: Time Books/Random House, 1996)

      In his introduction, America’s last ambassador to Yugoslavia says that he will tell the story of the “villains” who destroyed Yugoslavia those “nationalist leaders who coopted, intimidated, circumvented, or eliminated all opposition to their demagogic designs.” (vii) Instead, he weaves a disingenuous tale of anecdote and assertion that continually links Tudjman and Milosevic — the “Tweedledum and Tweedledee of destructive nationalism” — and inculpates them, as proponents of “communist” nationalism, for the slaughter that took place in the former Yugoslavia. (pp.40, 153). He exonerates the United States and NATO of all responsibility, noting that the mistakes he and his colleagues made “never seem(ed) like mistakes when we (made) them.”(viii) In effect, Zimmermann uses denial and demonology to preserve the myths of American innocence and Balkan perfidy. (p.142) In many ways, his is a classic example of what William Blanchard called “the cynical pretense of inadvertence,”(x) a tendency to self- deception that justifies unjustifiable actions by admitting their reality, but denying their significance and finding fault in the application of technique, not in its practitioners.

     Like Rebecca West, whose “beautifully written classic” he admires, Zimmermann approaches Yugoslavia as a tourist. Before 1991, rugs were a bargain and the atmosphere “enchanting.” (pp. 3-4, 9-10, 168) Yugoslavia “stood for civility and tolerance”and provided ex Soviet satellites a “model.” But it was “caught between the poles of Serbian and Croatian nationalist extremism,” so “dwarfs” could lead gullible masses “susceptible to ethnically based appeals” though “a landscape of monsters and midgets” into the slaughterhouse of ethnic cleansing. (pp.9-10, 42, 68-9, 78, 111) Zimmermann condemns the 1974 Constitution perhaps the most liberal in Yugoslavia’s sad history for having “stimulated nationalism.” (pp. 40-1) Zimmermann’s opinion of Yugoslavia’s leaders is low. (p.138) Kucan was “squat,” a “human AK-47 whose lack of responsibility triggered the crisis in 1991. (pp.30-32, 142) Janez Jansa was “ascetic” and “driven.”(p.144) Their party was an “extreme faction in a coalition that had itself won only 54 percent of the popular vote,” “provoked a war by stealth.” and then made a deal with Belgrade. (p.144-5)

     Sympathetic to Bosnians, Zimmermann was singularly unimpressed with their leaders. “Mild-mannered to a fault,” Izetbegovic, was overly deferential and perpetually anxious. Like Tudjman and Seselj, he was also a nationalist who had been “convicted of sowing ethnic hatred.” (pp.39, 114-115)

     

     Zimmermann disliked most Serbian leaders. Borislav Jovic was a “small man,” a “pit bull,” but better than Vojislav Seselj, a “psychopathic racist,” or Karadzic, a Serbian Himmler with a “friendly manner” who oversaw “the massacres in the Muslim villages.” (pp.97-9, 119, 175-6) The baby-faced Milosevic impressed Zimmermann with his “competent” English, forceful speech, “steady” eye contact, attentiveness, and “clubby” vices (small faults that would appeal to an Ivy Leaguer like Zimmermann). But despite his “cherubic” cheeks, the Serbian leader was a cold “master of media manipulation,” dominated by his “dark side” and vaguely “schizoid” — an opportunistic “bully on a grand scale,” but at least not an “ethnic exclusivist,” like Tudjman and Karadzic. (pp. 20-7)

     Yet Zimmermann’s book is essentially Serbo-centric. He was stationed in Belgrade, his driver was Serbian, and his circle of “Yugoslav” friends seems to have been largely Serbian. He was particularly fond of Serbian journalists Slobodan Pavlovic, “Borba’s first-rate DC correspondent”; the “western” Srdja Popovic, editor of Vreme, “the most distinguished” magazine in Yugoslavia; and Sasa Nenadovic of Politika (pp.18-19, 38, 108). His list of heroes and heroines included few Croats or Bosnians, but was replete with Serbians from Popovic and Vesna Pesic (a wise professor and peace activist) to Vuk Draskovic. (pp.105-6, 108)

     Zimmermann sees Serbs as a “normal people” — “a product of their history, as we all are.”(p.10) He depicts the Serbs as “heirs to a great medieval civilization” and the “only people I know who celebrate a defeat.”(pp.11-14) Like the U.S. media, he sees Croats and Bosnians as blindly following their leaders, while “many Serbs” opposed Milosevic. (p.108) He claims that “Serbs in Bosnia had an understandable grievance” in Bosnia, and feared a “Muslim-dominated” state. (p.196) He laments human rights violations in Kosovo, but he considers the region “the heartland of Serbian statehood and culture,” its Jerusalem, delivered to the Albanians by the 1974 constitution. (pp.8, 11-14, 130) So he criticizes both Albanians and Slovenes for shattering the League of Communists in 1990 by their rigid insistence on human rights in the region. (pp.54-6)

     Zimmermann implies that all South Slavs — not merely a handful of prewar politicians — wanted a Yugoslav state in 1918, and he insists that the JNA had “won” territory for the Slovenes in 1945. (pp.5-6, 28) So he did not think the Slovenes, as “an original party to the voluntary compact creating Yugoslavia,” had a right to leave and “bring a firestorm of violence down on the rest of Yugoslavia.”(p.146) He claimed that Yugoslavia’s constitution was first rewritten in 1991 by the Croats and Slovenes, even though he knows that the Serbians had earlier destroyed the constitution by their takeovers of Kosovo and Vojvodina. (p.70) Zimmermann had little use for most Croats. Budimir Loncar was “a canny Croatian veteran of the Tito era” with a “catlike tread” and a “feline smile.”(pp.15-16) Josip Manolic had links to the secret police, Gojko Susak (“a Darth- Vader-like individual”) to the Ustase, and Martin Spegelj to arms dealers. (pp.154, 181) Glavas was a Croatian Arkan.(p.152) Tudjman was intolerant, impulsive, and dim — an authoritarian “martinet” with the characteristics of “an inflexible schoolteacher” who could manage only “a nervous chuckle or a mirthless laugh.”(pp.71-5) Zimmermann chides Tudjman for ignoring his advice to apologize to the Serbs at Jasenovac, and he blames the war on the Croatian leader’s rejection of “any gesture that smacked of reconciliation, cooperation, or healing,” his “precipitate declaration of independence,” and his failure to “assure Croatia’s Serbian citizens that they would be safe in an independent Croatia.”(pp.71-7, 151-2)

     Zimmermann also dislikes Croatia “a republic of lackluster politicians” run by the “emigrant-financed HDZ.”(pp.44, 71-5) Listing firings, personal attacks, and an oath of loyalty, he concluded that in “Croatia, unlike Bosnia, Serbs were in fact being abused.” (pp.75, 139-40) By creating an army and defending itself from the JNA, Croatia had become a “national security state” with an armed force “larger than the armies of Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Portugal, Austria, or Sweden.” (pp.132,151, 154)

     Zimmermann uses the passive voice to describe the Serbian assault on Croatia, and ignores events before 1991, “a time of growing violence” in Croatia until 7 July, when “fighting broke out” in the Krajina, “a rebellion within a rebellion.” (pp.94-5,122, 148-9) Of course, he knows that the JNA and Milosevic had armed and incited the Serb “militants”there, but he focused on Tudjman’s efforts to “install Croatian police” as triggering the war. Yet he claims that it was “nearly impossible” to assign responsibility “for each instance of violence” in Croatia, because reports from Zagreb and Belgrade were diametrically opposed But “it didn’t matter,” becaus
e Tudjman and Milosevic wanted violence. (p.120)

     For Zimmermann, the war in Croatia was a tawdry affair, “a throwback to the ancient bandit tradition of the Balkans.” While the JNA “secured all areas in Croatia that had significant Serbian populations,” the “dregs of society…rose from the slime to become…national heroes, exalted by their respective propaganda machines.” (pp.160,152) Even-handed and fair — unlike the pro- Serbian UN commanders, Rose and MacKenzie — Zimmermann was careful to note that both Serbs and Croats suffered in Vukovar, and if the Serbs shelled Dubrovnik “both sides” “breached the rules of war.” (pp.154-8)

     Zimmermann disapproves of Croatia’s “blitzkrieg” in the Krajina, although it preceded NATO air strikes and effectively ended the war, because it was illegal and ruthless (pp.231-2), not comparable to the “master stroke” mounted in Bosnia by the JNA in 1992. (p.196) It says a good deal about Zimmermann that he criticized the JNA’s leaders, Veljko Kadijevic and Blagoje Adzic, but saw the Yugoslav army as a conflicted institution with a “proud” and “heroic military tradition that Croatians and Slovenes had tried to “humiliate” by adopting a “not very heroic tactic” of besieging the army in its barracks. (pp.85-9, 100-102, 142, 158- 60,186)

     Yet Zimmermann notes that the “Serbian strategy” in Croatia was repeated in Bosnia first the creation of Serbian “autonomous regions,” then the arming of local Serbs by the JNA, and finally JNA military action to “protect” the Serbs and secure their hold on towns throughout Croatia and Bosnia. (p.174) He also cites Izetbegovic on the Serbian strategy in Bosnia, “They’re creating a new situation by force, then they’re trying to negotiate on the basis of that situation.” (p.197) He even saw “a Croatian pattern emerging” in Bosnia. (p.198) But he ties none of this together, so his treatment of the war in Croatia is accusatory the Croats had it coming while his depiction of the war in Bosnia is sympathetic the Serbs were to blame. Zimmermann’s dislikes extend beyond Yugoslav leaders. He is not fond of intellectuals and their “crackpot” ideas, and censures Dobrisa Cosic for “a frequent failing of intellectuals” self-confident messianism. (pp.17, 93-4) He disliked TV, which, like Tito, was to blame for everything. (pp.120, 138) He dismissed EC monitors in 1991 as too “timid” and “pro-Croatian.” (pp.158-9) He disliked the CIA’s fatalist, 1990 report, and he was dismayed with ignorant US Congressmen, swayed by a “strong and active Croatian lobby” and oblivious to “the fate of the Serbian minority,” despite his efforts to convince them to pursue a “rational” policy. (pp.84,126-7, 130-1)

     Zimmermann also dislikes democratic elections that do not elect candidates he favors. He was particularly distressed at the lack of “curbs on the potentially nondemocratic behavior of those elected” in the 1990 elections, which swept nationalists to power. (pp.68, 130) In general, Zimmermann finds nationalism, self- determination, and sovereignty dangerous concepts. (pp.277-78) Not even “bestial crimes” justify secessions for Chechnyans or Kurds, because that would break up existing states. So Zimmermann insists that self-determination be allowed only when it “won’t adversely affect the interests of other states [sic] or peoples.” (p.278) He praises Spain, whose confederal system he confuses with democracy, the US, Switzerland, Holland, Belgium, Austria, and Malaysia as models of ethnic “power- sharing.”.(p.240)

     Although he seemed to embrace sovereignty in his rejection of self-determination, Zimmermann dismisses it as “the last refuge of dictators.”(pp.238- 9) He ridicules Yugoslavia’s successor states as “unstable ministates”and advocates using human rights “more intrusively” to promote democracy, preferably by an “international enforcer” that can only be the United States, because we are a repository of virtue, owing to our optimistic striving toward the future and our ability to put the past behind us. (pp.4, 241-2, 229) Zimmermann does have heroes. Ante Markovic the most ineffectual of all Yugoslav politicians struck the ambassador as “admirable,” if “too liberal and Western” for his undeserving countrymen, who gave him high approval ratings, but hated his policies and dumped him in 1991. (pp.42-4, 66, 112- 113) He also liked Markovic’s economic adviser, Kilo Gligorov, “a wise old communist.”(p.116) Milovan Djilas impressed him as a saint, and Vuk Draskovic as “an electrifying speaker” whose comments were “perceptive and interesting.”(pp.104-105, 119, 171) Stipe Mesic and Janez Drnovsek were good tennis partners (pp.33, 123-4), and Vasil Tupurkovski and Ibrahim Rugova “came through the Yugoslav crisis with honor.”(pp.81, 126) Zimmermann even liked Croatia’s Chief of Staff, Antun Tus, “an outstanding officer with democratic views.”(p.141) In short, Zimmermann liked those “courtly, articulate, generous, and wise” Yugoslavs who represented “the best of the Central European tradition.” (p.33) Zimmermann insists that the U.S. made honest mistakes, but its goals were noble “unity, independence, and territorial integrity,” with “progress toward democracy” and “a straight line toward capitalism.” (pp.8, 51) But peace, unity, and democracy were merely instrumental the real goal was a “straight line toward capitalism.” Markovic’s economic reforms, not the man, counted, and Zimmermann favored “shock therapy” that would force the spoiled Yugoslavs to take that “straight line to capitalism.” (pp.17, 50-51) Unity and democracy were tactics to avoid violence during a tricky transition. What really counted was converting the dinar and finding “reasonable solutions short of war.” (pp.41-2, 46-9, 62, 64-5, 111) Washington was indifferent to the form a Yugoslav state might adopt (centralized or confederated), although it insisted that Serbia maintain control of Kosovo. (pp.64-5, 78-81).

     But Washington did not act, ostensibly because policymakers feared repeating the mistakes of Vietnam and Lebanon and were paralyzed by Powell’s cautious doctrine. (pp.214-215, 219) Instead, Americans talked. Bush twice told Markovic he wanted democracy and reforms, Zimmermann told Kadijevic not to use of force, and Eagleburger promoted “reconciliation,” as Washington took a “clear public line” blaming the JNA for events in Croatia and urging the JNA and Tudjman “to settle their differences.” (pp.164, 122-3) Baker’s mistake was not to “deal with the irascible and complex protagonists of the Yugoslav drama” before 21 June 1991. But only Izetbegovic and Gligorov were “sensible” then, and the American’s warnings to Milosevic in March 1992 were ineffectual. So, at worst, Baker was six months too late. (pp.133-7, 193)

     A year later, Washington informed Belgrade that it would only work for Serbia’s “political and economic isolation,” urged Karadzic to be democratic, and warned both Milosevic and Tudjman not to interfere in Bosnia. (pp.174-6, 194, 198) But Clinton lacked resolve, determination, and consistency, so Washington merely recalled Zimmermann after Serbia’s attack on Bosnia, a “modest” action, but “the right thing to do.”(pp.204, 223)

     While generally exonerating American diplomacy, Zimmermann condemns European diplomacy as “cynical theater, a pretense of useful activity…disguising a lack of will.” He thought the Germans rushed recognition and the EC encouraged partition, and he regretted the arms embargo in Bosnia. But he praises Cyrus Vance for his success in securing a cease-fire in Croatia, even though it benefitted the Serbs, and he thought the Vance-Owen plan “acceptable,” even though it gave 43% of Bosnia to the Serbs. He credits NATO with ending the war; and he effectively exonerates the West of all blame, because Yugoslavia’s “congenital effects” (it was a state, not a nation), its Orthodox and Catholic churches, its selfis
h Slovenes, insensitive Croats, greedy Serbs, ideologically rigid army, and nationalists condemned it to death. (pp.xii, 155, 161-2, 177, 181, 184, 189-90, 192, 209-212, 222, 231-3)

     Unhappy with Rose and MacKenzie for not condemning all sides for the atrocities they committed, Zimmermann admires Carrington’s defense of Serbian rights. (pp.161-2, 224) He considers humanitarian relief a “triumph,” especially since lifting the arms embargo and Western military intervention were not options. (pp.140, 219-20,225) He defends Eagleburger against charges of conflict of interest, and blames the Slovenes for misunderstanding him when he said that Washington could live with a fragmented Yugoslavia. (pp.5, 58, 219). He praises all Foreign Service Officers, especially Charles Redman, who created the Croat-Bosnian federation in 1994 (pp.49,165-6, 231).

     Zimmermann is a bit upset with Dayton, not because the Serbs in Bosnia, who made up 30% of the population, got 49% of the territory, but because Tudjman was the “big winner.” He saw the inequitable distribution of territory as a Western success, because the Serbs did not get the 64% they had demanded. (pp.232- 3) He claims, rather disingenuously, that sanctions on Serbia were intended to “Saddamize” Milosevic and serve as a bargaining chip at Dayton. (pp.213-4) Zimmermann’s views reflect his reading and his admiration for George Kennan, the father of containment. (p.53) His list of basic sources includes West’s travelogue; the journalistic, Serbo-centric account by Laura Silber and Allen Little (and its BBC adaptation); the book by the Serbian diplomat, Mihailo Crnobrnja; the tendentious work by Susan Woodward, one-time adviser to Akashi, dubbed the Mitsubishi Chetnik by the Bosnians; and the outdated and poorly researched study by Lenard J. Cohen. (pp.255-7) Zimmermann completed his memoirs at RAND, with help from Dennison Rusinow, whose writing is marked by sympathy for Serbia and hostility to Croatia, and David Calleo of Johns Hopkins. So this is not an insider’s memoir; it is a work by an insider whose circle has repeatedly rationalized the West’s failures, excused Serbian excesses, condemned Croat and Slovene actions, and preferred humanitarian aid to military action. Perhaps it is not surprising that so many people in Yugoslavia hated Zimmermann. What is surprising is that this made him proud. (p.110) JAMES SADKOVICH

     NOTES

1 William H. Blanchard, Aggression American Style (Santa Monica, CA: Goodyear Publishing Cpy., 1978), pp. x, 1-11, dubbed this tendency “aggression American style” and saw a trend toward the use of such methods of coercion and persuasion in Europe and the USSR.

Vrhbosna

Pastoral Letters, Statements and Appeals of the Catholic Bishops of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1990-1997. Edited by Msgr. Dr. Mato Zovkic, assisted by Andrew Michaels III. Translated by Dr. Ante Cuvalo, assisted by Theresa Zdunic-Conway, Ivana Cuvalo, John Prcela and Dusko Condic. Sarajevo: Biskupska konferencija Bosne i Hercegovine, 1998. (186 pages)

     

     This is a compilation of Pastoral Letters and Statements made by the Catholic Bishops of Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1990 and 1997. These Messages were addressed to both the Catholic faithful of our Dioceses and to the larger world audience from the eve of first democratic elections in 1990 to the visit of Pope John Paul II to Sarajevo in April 1997. These Letters echo the turbulent events which occurred before and during the war in Bosnia between 1991 and 1995 which followed the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. We feltVrhbosna that a summary of these significant events would be useful to the reader unfamiliar with the history of our region.

     For thirteen centuries the Catholic Church has lived and flourished in the hearts of our Croatian ethnic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Through these many centuries, empires, kingdoms, democracies and socialist systems of government rose and fell. This region witnessed first hand the painful and future consequences of the Christian church’s division of the east from the west. This is a country where neighbors of the Muslim and Orthodox traditions lived side by side with Catholic neighbors and fellow citizens. Our region is the cross-roads of cultures, beliefs, ancient pathways and philosophies. Following the independence and international recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in January 1992, the democratically elected Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina organized a referendum on March 1, 1992 which gave citizens a choice between a continued life within a truncated Yugoslavia or within a fully independent country. The choice was for independence. Soon the sovereignty of our country was acknowledged by the United Nations and other international institutions. In the previous October, armed forces of Bosnian-Serbs, assisted by the professional army of Yugoslavia had destroyed several Croatian localities in eastern Herzegovina and in one month after the March 1992 referendum they started the war for their ethnic territories in this country. In the time from October 1991 to November 1995 one half of the Catholic population, about 400,000 faithful were evicted from their homes and parishes and forced to flee to the safety of other lands. Hundreds of churches and other ecclesiastical buildings were damaged or destroyed and lie in rubble awaiting the return of parishioners. In the Banja Luka Diocese, for example, only one quarter of the original 120,000 parishioners remain. This is “ethnic cleansing”, this is the tragedy.

     The war ended in November 1995 by the Dayton Accords. By that time Serbian forces had occupied 72 percent of Bosnia and Herzegovina while the Accords granted this ethnic community political control of 49 percent of our country’s territory despite the fact that it comprised only 31 percent of the total population according to the census of April 1991. Bosnia was divided into two entities, the Federation of Bosniaks and Croats at one side and on the other, the Serbian Republic. While the Dayton Accords have split the country into two entities the ecclesiastical administration remains a united whole as it was established in 1881, after 400 years of Turkish rule in Bosnia. The Archdiocese of Sarajevo stretches within the territory of the Federation and of the Serbian Republic, the Mostar-Duvno Diocese is primarily in the territory controlled by ethnic Croats within the Federation, the Trebinje-Mrkan Diocese is under the control of the Serbian Republic, Banja Luka Diocese in its largest part is in the Serbian Republic with a small territory of the Livno Deanery in the Federation. In spite of these divisions of control in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the three ethnic communities and two political entities, the Church in this territory remains as one unified structure giving the clearest example of the advantages of a unified homeland. This unity was strengthened when in December 1995, the Holy See established an independent Bishops’ Conference of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We Catholics traveled not alone on this painful period of our history, for our Shepherd in Rome walked with us. He knew our pains and heard our hearts crying for help. He supported us constantly with his prayers, his encouragement and finally with his presence. He reminded all of us “to forgive and ask forgiveness”, the true act of charity.

     Bosnia is a proof case for a multi-ethnic, pluralistic and tolerant Europe. If we fail, Europe fails. Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot rebuild on its own. But Bosnia and Herzegovina can fail on its own. After two years of more a cease fire than a real peace, we begin to see healing, rebuilding and a limited return of exiles and refugees. We call upon all people of good will to become involved in our work of love, in our mission of service and in our country’s destiny. You can make a difference, you do make a difference.

     As Europeans, we are tied together by culture, commerce and history. And so, we look first to Europe for help. As members of the human family we also call upon the friends of Bosnia in the United States and Canada to contribute towards re-making this country profoundly multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi- religious. May God, “whose power now at work in us do immeasurably more than we ask or imagine,” (Eph 3:20), grant us all His Peace and Blessing.

     Sarajevo, March 1, 1998

     Cardinal Vinko Puljic, Archbishop of Sarajevo and President of the Bishops Conference of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Vekaric, Nenad – Peljeski Rodovi

Peljeski rodovi (Family Names of the Peljesac Peninsula). Dubrovnik: Zavod za povijesne znanosti HAZU, Vol I (A-K) 1995, and Vol. II (L-Zh) 1996.

     The first part of the book deals with the first names of the inhabitants of the Peljesac peninsula from the 13th to the 20th centuries. The author explains changes in the assortment of first names after the incorporation of Peljesac into the Republic of Dubrovnik. The clash of the old folk Slavonic and the new Catholic-Dubrovnik onomastic systems resulted in the formation of a new system with the predominance of the Dubrovnik and Christian tradition, but with an element of Slavonic evident. Despite the fact that the base for the variety of first names consisted of Christian saints’ names, quite a few Slav names remained in use, though less frequently. The impossibility of a total takeover by one of the systems resulted in the formation of defense mechanisms on both sides. In Dubrovnik, the remains of folk names were adapted to Christian forms by the formation of equivalents (Djivan-Ivan (John), Vuk-Luka (Luke), etc.), while the new Christian names were adapted to folk forms (Miho (Michael)-Mihoje, Vlaho (Blaise)-Vlahusa, etc.). Until the mid-15th century, folk Slavonic names generally predominated in the Peljesac peninsula. From the middle until the end of the 15th century, folk and Christina names were approximately equally represented. But from the 16th century onwards, Christian names predominated so that 90 percent of the inhabitants were named in accordance with the Christian tradition. New changes in the onomastic system took place in the second half of the 19th century. New names appeared in a wide range from foreign folk names to new foreign names. This process started in the seafaring areas of Trstenice, while in the inland of the peninsula it appeared as late as the 20th century, with much less intensity. Family names began to stabilize on the Peljesac peninsula in the 14th century, after it became a part of the Dubrovnik Republic. At that time Dubrovnik’s already diversified and detailed administration required a precise identification of the people who were summoned or those who were engaged in any kind of legal activity. However, family names in the Dubrovnik Republic were not created suddenly or by decree. They have been formed over centuries, determined not only by administrative requirements (especially in legal matters such as inheritance, which required both the identity of the claimer and the proofs of his blood relations), but also by the needs of the people who, looking for a successful and appropriate means of communications, created an entire onomastic system. This process lasted until the late 18th century, when the last family on the Peljesac peninsula acquired its family name.

     The author also deals with certain specific features of the Peljesac family name system, with the Italianization of Croatian names and the Croatization of Italian family names, with the formation of folk-founded names, and specifically with the adoption of foreign family names. According to a Dubrovnik custom, a family name was given to a household, not to an individual. Newcomers would accept the name of their new household. This custom was frequent in villages, but less so in the seafaring towns and settlements. It was specifically widespread in regions with strong elements of a communal way of life.

     The third and the longest part of the book contains a lexicographic survey of the history of particular lineage names of families of Peljesac. Along with the basic genealogical data (origin, family tradition, time of immigration, first mention in the archives, migration, emigration, extinction, changes of family names and nicknames), the author quotes different legal cases, testaments and data from other sources deemed interesting from the point of view of language, customs, environment, life-style, outstanding people, and so on. Each family has its own number under which it can be found in the graph representing the duration of Peljesac lineages in an earlier Vekaric’s book, The Inhabitants of the Peljesac Peninsula. Dubrovnik: Zavod za povijesne znanosti HAZU, 1993.

     Stjepan Cosic – Dubrovnik

Tanner, Marcus – Croatia, A Nation Forged in War

Croatia, A Nation Forged in War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997 (338 p.)

     This book clearly deserves attention: It is the first by this Anglo-Saxon author about Croatian history and is also the first presentation of its kind about Croatia’s rising from the ashes of communism. Marcus Tanner worked as a reporter for London’s Independent newspaper from 1988 to 1994 and was honored by the Queen of Britain herself for his contributions to the development of journalism and reporting. In the introduction of the book, published by the U.S. publisher Yale University Press, the author writes that this book is a result of his desire to fill in some gaps in understanding the former Yugoslavia and his opinion that Croatia deserves to be studied separately. Tanner finds that everyone, especially western liberals, was more attracted to “the sufferings of Bosnia’s Muslims than Croatia’s Catholics, who were marked with the Ustasha tag.” Tanner concludes that it is almost impossible to write about the war of the nineties without first referring to the events of World War II, first Yugoslavia or political Croatia, A Nation Forged in Waratmosphere of the twenties and thirties. He then decided to start from scratch — going back to the time of the first Croatian kings. The result of this is a book that breathes with an understanding of the Croatian idea of independence. This is a rarity because newborn Croatia has many times been “unwelcome” in the western world as an unwanted newborn. Tanner describes in detail the break- up of the former Yugoslavia as well as the Serbian skims in the former Yugoslavia Presidency. For a change, he is an author who does not blame Croatia or Slavonia, but Serbia, for the aggression.

     Reviews of the recently published book are still few. One of the first reviews was written by Branko Franolic, Ph.D., the correspondent for the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences who lives in London. In his review for the Croatian Times (English edition in London), Franolic, an expert of Croatian literature and history, states that Tanner “correctly and objectively” writes about all periods in Croatian history. Franolic says that: “This kind of understanding about what was happening in Croatia was possible because Tanner is well-versed in Croatian history, language, and society. Tanner’s vision of the events that occurred during the 1990’s will definitely provoke many controversial opinions and much bitterness. But we have to know that this is our recent past and it is still too early to cast some sort of judgement. But at least the facts have correctly been transferred to the page.” Franolic adds that Tanner’s presents a basic book for people who want to find out more about the breakaway of Yugoslavia, the liberation of enslaved Croatia, nationalism of small European nations and the imperialism of the opposition party involved in the conflict.

     Another review was conducted by Professor Norman Stone, a former Oxford University faculty member and a member on former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s advising team. Stone, currently a professor of international relations at the University of Ankara, was one of the people defending the Croats’ will to become an independent country. He reviewed the book: Serbs: History, Peace, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia by author Tim Judah in the British newspaper Sunday Times, where he says Judah focuses on Serbia’s tragic present and is therefore saying that the Serbs were infected by some sort of collective mania after the eighties. “Serbs are a thorn in the side of Germany, the Vatican, Islamic countries and finally, America” and this is the source of their psychotic madness that gave rise to Slobodan Milosevic. Far from hating the Serbs, Judah asks himself the question: what went wrong with the Serbs? In writing about Tanner’s book, Stone notices Croatia could soon become “another Spain and the most successful European economic source.” He also talks about Croatia’s stormy history, stating that Croatia had a fascist state during World War II but that this type of regime was “generally not well accepted by the majority of Croats.” Stone comments that some countries think the Croats caused the break-up of Yugoslavia, and that the Germans shouldn’t have recognized Croatia. He also claims that the British Foreign Office didn’t mind these types of comments because some of the misinformation even came from its own office. He concludes that most books on the subject have a pro-Yugoslavian tone or orientation, like books by Fitzroy Maclean, R.W. Seton Watson or A.P.J. Taylor. Marcus Tanner’s book, therefore, is most definitely interesting. Jasna Jazic. Vjesnik, Zagreb, April 25, 1997

Slavica, Stojan – U Salonu Marije Giorgi Bona

U Salonu Marije Giorgi Bona (In the Salon of Maria Giorgi Bona). Dubrovnik: Zavod za povijesne znanosti HAZU, 1996. (197 pages)

     During the late 18th and 19th centuries, the home of Maria Giorgi Bona was a gathering place of numerous Dubrovnik’s and European distinguished people engaged in literary and cultural issues. She entertained both domestic and foreign celebrities, her learned Dubrovnik friends and relatives, most outstanding intellectuals of her time, including the renowned Abbot and travel writer Alberto Fortis. Moreover, she encircled herself with like-minded ladies of the society forming a distinctive women’s cultural circle. They engaged in science, philosophy, literature, music, and handicrafts.

     Maria Giorgi Bona amassed a considerable library that attests to her broad and diverse interests in many fields of knowledge, including natural sciences and the classics. Besides many major treatises by Greeks and Romans, the private library contained most of the 18th century representative editions from the period of English Enlightenment to the French encyclopedists with equal interest shown for domestic sciences and contemporary Latinists. She ordered books from her friends abroad and read their original versions in Latin, French, Italian, and English. Marija’s library also contained several epistles and biographies of great women. Besides Nouvelle Heloise by Rousseau, we come across Letters by Madame de Sevigne, Anecdotes by M. La Contesse du Barru, etc.

     The only existing written record by this extraordinary woman are letters addressed to her daughter Marija (Marieta). They unveil the tender, profoundly touching character of their writer, casting light on a subtle mother-daughter relationship uncommon in the literature of the time. This correspondence is a valuable record of culture and life in Dubrovnik and Giorgi Bona family, and it offers information on various subjects. Her interests focused on politics, war, the French, teachers, fashion and servants, voyages across the Adriatic, convents, relationships between the sexes, affectation as a social trend, theater, music, handcraft, books and leisure, family relations and inheritance, greediness and avarice, sickness and health, etc. These letters display her strong will and sensibility, intimacy and discontent of an unhappily married woman, as well as confidence in her own judgments proven in the case of the marriage of her younger daughter to a commoner and alien. Essentially a learned woman, Maria Giorgi Bona left an imprint of her sophisticated scholarliness in 18th century Dubrovnik for her drawing room was a genuine meeting place of the most outstanding men and women of the time. She has been characterized as “candelabro lucente” of the Dubrovnik cultural life at the sunset of the Republic.

Sosic, Stipo – The Road to Hell and Back

The Road to Hell and Back (Chicago: Croatian Franciscan Press, 1999), 137 pp., photos, appendix.

     Father Sosic’s account of his internment in the Serbian camps of Keraterm, Omarska, and Manjaca is a valuable contribution to the literature on suffering and the human spirit. Like Viktor Frankl, Sosic discusses life in a death camp, and like Frankl, he draws conclusions that stress our need for meaning and faith in hopeless situations.1 Frankl lived through Auschwitz as a Viennese Jew and a psychoanalyst; Sosic experienced the Serbian camps as a parish priest from Ljubija, a small town in an ethnically mixed area in Bosnia. But the conditions in the camps, the brutality, the efforts to destroy the human spirit, and the faith in human dignity and a greater Good which saw both men through were similar. For Frankl, meaning was crucial, for Sosic, prayer was “a cure for all wounds” and faith in God and the actions of good men his salvation. (pp. 117, 122-3)

     Frankl was interned The Road to Hell and Backbecause he was Jewish, Sosic because he was Croatian. Both men describe extreme crowding and vicious brutality. Keraterm had no running water and only one toilet for 600 inmates. (pp. 43-4) Sosic estimated that over 3,000 men were killed in Omarska, “a factory of crimes” and “the most horrible of all the concentration camps.” (p. 51) He lost 20 kilograms and was tortured to the point of welcoming death as a release. (pp. 61-2, 71) During the transfer from Omarska to Manjaca, prisoners were stuffed 98 to a bus and left for two days with windows closed and no water. (pp. 94-5) At Manjaca, 4,500 men were crammed into seven stables, with little food, no running water, and poor sanitation. Those who rebelled ended in the “confinement cell,” a dank, flooded cell. (pp. 102, 108) Like most personal accounts, Sosic’s story is anecdotal, not analytic. Yet his experiences fit into a larger literature and a larger human experience. Brutalized, he was grateful to a Serbian officer who treated him as a human being. (p. 103) With little hope of release or survival, he and other inmates expected too much from journalists, the Red Cross, and Orthodox prelates. But none of the visitors witnessed the tortures and murders nor did they do much more than register the suffering of the inmates, who were too frightened to speak to them. (pp. 84-5, 111, 113-115)

     Sosic and his parishioners tried to hold on to their human dignity. But those who fought back, were killed. Others despaired, because although intellectuals and community leaders were marked for death, violence and death were largely random. So some took their own lives, others betrayed those dearest to them a father his son, a brother his brother simply to survive. (pp. 130-1) After his release, Sosic even saw a Serbian nurse abuse a wounded Croatian soldier.2 Through it all, he remained a priest who prayed for deliverance and forgiveness for both victim and tormenter. (p. 89-90) He concluded that only good and evil exist, “there is no in-between,” and if evil triumphs, good disappears. (p. 127)

     We tend to view such accounts as descriptions of tragic and extraordinary experiences with no relationship to our lives. But this is an illusion. Frankl noted that camp life intensified our appreciation of our own past lives, and Sosic observed that in camp prayer had a special intensity. In effect, the camps push our human propensities toward good or evil to logical conclusions. Our tendency to look the other way when our fellows suffer was evident in the failure of journalists and Orthodox prelates to risk themselves to help those in the camps. Our tendency to give in to mob behavior was clear in the attack on a prisoner by Serbian women and children, who “tore the poor man apart like a scalded hen.”3 The use of children and youths to torture and kill prisoners shocked Sosic, who pitied “those middle aged men who used these innocent children for their evil ends” and condemned “this kind of war, in which young men are forced to kill and commit heinous crimes” as more evil than conventional wars. (pp. 49, 121) Yet children have been taught to kill in many places, and in our own ghettoes we have created a culture in which children are so brutalized that they kill as a matter of course. We blame them for their acts of violence, but Father Sosic pitied his tormentors and his fellow who invented crimes to explain their own internment and torture just as the victims of society’s failures are held personally responsible for sufferings inflicted by social and political systems.4

     Although Father Sosic believes we all can choose good or evil, the atrocious behavior of Serbian guards and civilians was not a manifestation of extraordinary evil, but of what Hannah Arendt called the banality of evil. When a culture accepts unethical patterns of behavior and rationalizes immoral actions because they serve a goal, then evil wins. In Bosnia, virulent Serbian nationalism led to war and atrocities. “For fifty years Serbs have been preparing themselves for Greater Serbia,” Father Sosic writes. To realize their goal, they would “stoop to the most heinous actions that would leave any normal man dumbfounded.” (pp. 126-7) This book will leave some dumbfounded, unable to believe that our fellows could behave so badly. But it should be read as a lesson, not a tale of unique moral evil. Father Sosic has done all of us a great service, no matter our nationality. By sharing his experiences with us, he reminds us how fragile is our civilization and how precious our humanity. James J. Sadkovich
NOTES

     1 Viktor E. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning (New York: Washington Square Press, 1946/1984), passim, esp. 136-8. If suffering and death have no meaning, Frankl concluded, there is no meaning to survival, “for a life whose meaning depends upon such a happenstance as whether one escapes or not ultimately would not be worth living at all.” People must be allowed to suffer nobly, something modern society does not allow, and something that those in places like Auschwitz or Omarska would not allow. Like Sosic, Frankl implies that only by finding meaning in suffering one can overcome it.

     2 Sosic, p. 125. Brutalizing patients occurred elsewhere in Bosnia, e.g., Maurizio Cucci’s interviews, in Bosnia. Le vittime senza nome (Milan: Mursia, 1994), pp.13-32.

     3 Sosic, p. 98. The incident was not unique. Jean Bethke Elshtain, Women and War (New York: Basic Books, 1987), pp. 167-8, describes an attack on two Indian prisoners by the women of Marblehead on a July Sunday in 1677. “Then with stones, billets of wood, and what else they might, they made an end of these Indians…we found them with their heads off and gone, and their flesh in a manner pulled from their bones.”

     4 Sosic, p. 129. “When a man ascertains that there is nothing he could charge himself with [to explain why he was in camp], he feels even more miserable.” In effect, lack of meaning created misery, which Frankl, pp. 128- 30, labeled an “existential vacuum.” For our tendency to blame victims, see Alexander Werth,Russia: Hopes and Fears (New York, 1970), pp. 80-5, and Jiri Pelikan, ed.., The Czechoslovak Political Trials, 1940-1954 (Stanford UP, 1971), pp. 28-9.

     

     The book can be ordered from Ante Cuvalo, 19121 Wildwood Ave., Lansing, Il 60438; Tel/Fax 708-895-5531; E-mail:cuv@netzero.com Price: $10.00