Croatian Catholic Priests, Theology Students and Religious Brothers Killed by Communists and Serbian Chetniks in the Former Yugoslavia During and After World War II
Ante Cuvalo
Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac’s mock trial, imprisonment, and death came to symbolize the sufferings of both the Catholic Church and the Croatian people in the former Yugoslav state. The following list, although incomplete, of murdered Catholic clergymen bears a horrid witness to the persecutions of the clergy and of the Croatian people.
1. Adamcik, Bruno (1908-1945)
2. Adzamic, Ante (killed 1945)
3. Adzija, Antun (1880-1944)
4. Andacic, Bono (Brother, killed 1945)
5. Astalos, Josip (1897-1945) – Assistant pastor in the town of Brod. Tortured and hang in the village of Dalj
6. Babic, Franjo (r. 1901-1942)- His sister and 200 parishioners killed together with him.
7. Bacic, Ante – Tortured, received multiple knife stabs, and then thrown into the “Vranine” cave 1944
8. Badurina, Gabrijel (killed 1942)
9. Bajic, Leonard (killed 1947)
10. Bakula, Ante (1884-1942) – Pastor in the village of Gornje Hrasno. Tortured for five days. Among other tortures, his tongue was cut off, as his torturers said so they can give him the “last communion.”
11. Baldo, Beato (Student of theology, killed in 1943)
12. Baltic, Viktor (1903-1943)
13. Bandic, Drago (killed 1945)
14. Barac, Dominik (killed 1945)
15. Barbaric, Marko (1865-1945)
16. Barbir, Gerard (1911-1944)
17. Baricevic, Josip (killed 1946)
18. Barisic, Stjepan (killed 1945)
19. Barisic, Stjepan (1882-1945)
20. Barisic, Kresimir (1907-1941) – While he was still alive his ears, nose and hands were cut off, and his eyes were dug out. Still alive and bound, thrown into his burning church.
21. Barisic, Jakov (1890-1941) – Pastor in the town of Gradacac. Skinned alive.
22. Basic, Miroslav (1895-1942)
23. Beato, Baltazar (killed in 1943)
24. Bebek, Kazimir (1901-1945)
25. Becker, Ivan (killed 1945)
26. Bedenik, Pavao (killed 1945)
27. Bencun, Jozo (1869-1945)
28. Benutic, Ante (1887-1944)
29. Berkovic, Petar (killed 1945)
30. Bezina, Ivan (killed 1948)
31. Bilic, Pasko (1914-1944)
32. Biljeskovic, Anton – Theology student. Had tuberculosis. A few days before Christmas 1941, forced to walk from the town of Prijedor to Kozara where he was crucified on May 17, 1942.
33. Bilogrivic, Nikola (killed 1943)
34. Binicki, Fran (1875 – 1945)- Pastor in the town of Licki Osik. Killed while in jail.
35. Biskupovic, Ante – Taken by the communist Partisans in May 1943 and disappeared.
36. Blazevic, Srecko (poisoned while in a hospital 1946)
37. Blazic, Marijan (1897-1944) – Killed on the island of Daksa near Dubrovnik with 6 more priests and 32 laymen. All of them had to strip naked while facing the firing squad. They were shot, while singing “Te Deum.”
38. Bocak, Valentin (1913-1945)
39. Bockmann, Josip (1910-1945)
40. Bogurovac, Stjepan (killed 1943)
41. Borac, Dominik (1912-1945) – Killed because communists did not like his Ph.D. dissertation.
42. Boric, Franjo (1889-1944)
43. Borkovic, Josip (killed 1942)
44. Borkovic, Anton (killed 1942)
45. Bortas, Franjo (1903 -1946) – Killed in Stara Gradiska prison.
46. Bosnjak, Nikola (1909-1945)
47. Bozic, Bono (1903-1945)
48. Bozina, Ivan (killed in the city of Triest 1948)
49. Bradaric, Stanko (killed 1943)
50. Bradic, Mirko (1885-1947) – Killed while in prison.
51. Brajkovic, Slavko (killed 1945)
52. Brajnovic, Josip (1902-1942) – Skinned alive. Killed together with 80 of his parishioners.
53. Brajnovic, Ivan (1914-1944) – Pastor in the village of Skaljari. When he entered into the church to say Mass, a Partisan attacked him and stabbed him many times. After he recovered, he was taken to the island of Daksa, near Dubrovnik, and killed with other priests and laymen.
54. Bralo, Bozidar (1907-1945)
55. Brandic, Mirko (killed 1947)
56. Braskic, Ante (1891-1946)(died under torture)
57. Brisevac, Dane (1890-1944)
58. Brkovic, Augustin (killed 1945)
59. Bubanj, Martin (1898-1945) – Pastor in the town of Susak (Rijeka). Thrown into a cave in Gornja Kostrena.
60. Bucko, Nikola (killed in 1948)
61. Buconjic, Ante (1909-1945)
62. Buerger, Julije (1885-1944)
63. Bujlovic, Anton (killed in 1943)
64. Bukinac, Beato (1912-1945)
65. Bulesic, Miroslav (killed in 1947)
66. Buljan, Nikola (1895-1946) (Poisoned in the Sarajevo jail)
67. Burger, Julije (killed in 1944)
68. Buric, Mato (killed in 1945)
69. Butorac, Ivan (1899-1944)
70. Buzuk, Mirko (killed in 1945)
71. Canjuga, Anselmo (1894 – 1944) – Killed in Stara Gradiska jail.
72. Carev, Zarko (1889-19440)
73. Carevic, Josip (Bishop) (1883-1945)
74. Casic, Emerik (killed in 1947)
75. Cecina, Martin (1902-1944)
76. Ciga, Benedikt (1915-1945)
77. Clujic, Jozo (1888-1944)
78. Colak, Dane (1916-1945)
79. Condic, Ivan (1886-1942)
80. Condic, Alojz (killed 1945)
81. Condic, I. (killed 1947)
82. Condric, Petar (killed 1945)
83. Condric, Ivan (1918-1946)
84. Cosic, Ivo (killed in 1945)
85. Cosic, Efrem (killed 1946)
86. Crnkovic, Matija (1890-1945)
87. Cubelic, Domogoj (theology student – killed 1945)
88. Cubranic, Jerko (1908-1942)
89. Culin, Josip (1916-1942) – Visiting his native parish in Vojnici. The local pastor bagged the Partisans not to kill Culin, but him instead. Culin was executed on the spot. The pastor, however, was executed six months later also by the Partisans.
90. Culum, Karlo (killed 1943)
91. Curic, Andjelko (1914-1945)
92. Cvitanovic, Ante (1889-1944)
93. Delic, Nikola (1889-1944)
94. Delija, Drago (killed 1945)
95. Devcic, Marko (1887-1944)
96. Didovic, Mirko (killed 1945 – together with 14 Croatian families)
97. Djanic, Ivan (1910-1944)
98. Djukovic, August (killed 1948)
99. Djulovic, Ante (killed 1943)
100. Djuric, Anton (killed 1945)
101. Dobud, Mato (1882-1944)
102. Dragicevic, Marko (1902-1945)
103. Dragicevic, Ivo (Tito’s Partisans took him away in 1945 and he disappeared).
104. Dragosevic, Ante (1870-1944)
105. Drzaic, Antun (1890-1943)
106. Dujlovic, Anton (killed 1943)
107. Dujmusic, Drago (1899-1944)
108. Dukovic, August (killed 1948)
109. Dumandzic, Nikola (killed 1945)
110. Dunaj, Antun (1911-1944)
111. Duvancic, Nikola (killed 1945-theology student)
112. Dzamic, Ante (killed 1945)
113. Elez, Ante (killed 1945)
114. Erceg, Jozo (killed 1945)
115. Erceg, Ivan (killed 1945)
116. Fantela, Nikola (1880-1944) – Tortured and drowned in the Adriatic sea.
117. Fanzoni, Ivan (1909-1945)
118. Ficic, Ivan (1908-1943)
119. Fifka, Karlo (1890-1944)
120. Flajs, Adalbert (killed 1944 – theology student)
121. Fustos, Adam (1884-1945)
122. Gabric, Ilija (killed 1945)
123. Galic, Tomo (killed 1944)
124. Galic, Krizan (1870-1944)
125. Gasic, Emerik (killed 1947)
126. Gaspar, Filip (1893-1945)
127. Gassmann, Ferdinand-Vendelin (1914-1946) – Franciscan guardian in Bjelovar. While in jail, publically hang as a criminal.
128. Gavrilovic, Nenad (killed 1944)
129. Gecina, Martin (killed 1944)
130. Gelic, Tomo (killed 1944)
131. Gimlesa, Bozo (1892-1945)
132. Gjuric, Anton (1912-1945)
133. Glavadanovic, Berislav (1912-1945)
134. Glavas, Petar (killed 1945)
135. Glavas, Radoslav (1909-1945)
136. Glavas, Petar (1885-1945)
137. Glavas, Ivan (killed 1945)
138. Gospodnetic, Juraj(1910-1941) – Pastor in Bosansko Grahovo. Impaled and roasted alive on the mountain plateau Jelic-polje. Partisans also killed his mother.
139. Grabovickic, Karlo (killed 1945)
140. Grdjan, Miroslav (1915-1945)
141. Grebenarevic, Bono (1884-1943)
142. Grkovic, Nikola (killed 1944)
143. Grubisic, Zvonko (killed 1945)
144. Gruicic, Karlo (1882-1945)
145. Grzanic, Vjekoslav (1902-1943) – His father and mother were killed with him.
146. Gubernia, Ivo (killed 1945)
147. Gugic, Milivoj (killed 1945-theology student)
148. Gujic, Tvrtko (1907-1945)
149. Guncevic, Josip (killed 1945)
150. Gvozdanovic, Pero (1889-1944)
151. Gvozdanovic, Pavao (killed 1943) – Pastor in village of Berkasovo near the town of Sid. Impaled and roasted alive by the Partisans.
152. Habjanovic, Boris Stjepan (killed 1945)
153. Hitrec, Bozidar (1906-1945)
154. Hlobnik, Franjo (killed 1945)
155. Horzic, Stjepan (1917-1945)
156. Hrenic, Hadrian (1913-1945)
157. Idzotic, Ignacije (1903-1945)
158. Igolic, Antun (killed 1943)
159. Ilijic, Nikola (1913-1945)
160. Irgolic, Antun (1877-1943)
161. Ivakic, Pavao (1909-1943)
162. Ivancevic, Karlo (killed 1945)
163. Ivandic, Marijan (1902-1945)
164. Ivandic, Mato (killed 1945)
165. Ivankovic, Milan (killed 1945-theology student)
166. Ivankovic, Ladislav (killed 1942)
167. Ivankovic, Nikola (killed 1946)
168. Ivankovic, Ciril (1878-1945)
169. Ivankovic, Ladislav (1897-1942)
170. Ivankovic, Jure (killed 1945)
171. Ivanovic, Jure (killed 1945)
172. Ivanovic, Ivan (killed 1945)
173. Janes, Ivan (1913-1945)
174. Jelavic, Bono (1898-1945)
175. Jelcic, Andrija (1904-1945)
176. Jelinovic, Ivan (killed 1944)
177. Jerkovic, Radoslav (1901-1950) – Killed while in jail in Split.
178. Jerkovic, Jozo (1911-1944) – Killed while in jail . 179. Josic, Ljudevit (killed 1946)
180. Jurajic, Ivan (1884-1942)
181. Jurcev, Ivan (1912-1944) – He was terribly tortured by the Chetniks. His yes were plucked out before he died.
182. Jurcev, Antun (killed 1944) – Stabbed many times. Tied in a bag and thrown into the sea.
183. Jurcev, Dionizije (killed 1943)
184. Jurcic, Makso (1913-1945)
185. Juric, Rudo (killed 1945-theology student)
186. Juric, Drago (killed 1945 – thrown into a deep cavern)
187. Jurkovic, Julijan(1899-1942) – Guardian in Franciscan monastery in Rama. He was butchered, the church burned down, and the monastery plundered and raised.
188. Jus, Petar (killed 1944)
189. Kalafatovic-Milic, Mato (1911-1945)
190. Kalajdzic, Josip (1909-1945)
191. Kalinic, Rafo (killed 1943)
192. Kamber, Anzelmo (killed 1945)
193. Karaman, Sime (1896-1942) – Executed after the Good Friday church ceremonies.
194. Karamarko, Albert (killed 1945)
195. Kargacin, Vladimir (1906-1945)
196. Kargacin, Vladimir (killed 1945)
197. Karlovic, Velimir (1904-1945)
198. Karlovic, Velimir (killed 1945)
199. Katavic, Anto (1902-1945) – Executed along with 23 other people.
200. Katavic, Mato (killed (“disappeared”) 1945)
201. Katavic, Alfons (killed 1945-theology student)
202. Kaurinovic, Josip (killed 1943)
203. Kaurinovic, Josip (1873-1942)
204. Kis, Karlo (1906-1943)
205. Klaric, Antun (killed 1945)
206. Klasic, Antun (1914-1945)
207. Kljucevic, Vlado (killed 1945)
208. Knezevic, Marijan (1908-1943)
209. Kolaric, Mihovil (1880-1945) – killed in the Stara Gradiska jail.
210. Kolaric, Ladislav (killed 1943)
211. Konjevod, Lovro (killed 1945)
212. Kontij, Mihajlo (killed 1945)
213. Kordic, Fabijan (killed 1945 – religious brother)
214. Kosir, Viktor (killed 1945 – theology student)
215. Kovac, Petar (1908-1945) Taken by the Partisans and disappeared.
216. Kovacic, Stjepan (1870-1945) Killed in the prison camp of Stara Gradiska.
217. Kovacic, Petar (killed 1945)
218. Kozul, Tadija (1910-1945)
219. Kozul, Julije (1906-1945)
220. Kraljevic, Stanko (1871-1945)
221. Kraljevic, Krato (1895-1945)
222. Kramar, Stjepan (1883-1945)
223. Kranjc, Ivan (killed 1944)
224. Kranjcic, Mato (1902-1945)
225. Kranjcic, dr. Andrija (killed 1945)
226. Kranje, Ivan ?
227. Kranjic, Ivan (killed 1942)
228. Krecak, Gjuro (1893-1944)
229. Kresic, Martin (killed 1945)
230. Kresic, Ivan (1870-1945)
231. Kristan, Zvonko (killed 1946)
232. Krizic, Jakov (1895-1945)
233. Kroder, Henrik (1877-1945)
234. Krusic, Bogomil (1910-1945)
235. Krusilic, Vlado (killed 1945)
236. Kucmanic, Stjepan (1886-1945)
237. Kuhar, Ivan-Julije (killed 1944)
238. Kukalj, Dragutin (1899-1945)
239. Kukina, Eugen (killed 1945)
240. Kulisic, Stjepan (1886-1945)
241. Kuljevic, Dragutin (1877-1945)
242. Kulundzic, Mato (1912-1945)
243. Kupek, Oton (killed 1945 in the city of Triest – theology student)
244. Ladic, Jakov (killed 1945)
245. Lakajner, Ivan (1873-1945)
246. Lapic, Milan (killed 1943)
247. Lazicki, Ivan (1913-1945)
248. Lesjak, Josip (1889-1944)
249. Letinic, Ante (1899-1945)
250. Leventic, Zarko (1919-1945)
251. Lezatovic, Ante (1913-1943)
252. Liko, Zelimir (1914-1948)
253. Lipovac, Zvonko (1914-1945)
254. Lizatovic, Ante (killed 1943)
255. Ljubas, Eugen (killed 1945 – theology student)
256. Ljubicic, Tihomir (killed 1945)
257. Ljubicic, Mirko (killed 1945)
258. Loncar, Slobodan (1914-1945)
259. Lousin, Andrija (killed by communist party members 1940)
260. Lovretic, Srecko (1911-1945) – Pastor in Luka (Dugi otok). Tied up and thrown alive into the sea.
261. Magas, Ljubomir (1915-1945)
262. Majic, Bonifacije (1883-1945)
263. Majic, Stjepan (killed 1945-theology student)
264. Majic, Ante (killed 1945 in Lepoglava prison – student of theology)
265. Majic, Andrija (1910-1945)
266. Malic, Eugen (killed 1945)
267. Mandaric, Filip (1911-1944)
268. Mandic, Nevinko (1908-1945) – Taken from the altar while celebrating Sunday Mass. Killed together with 2 more Franciscans in the village of Izbicno and thrown into a cave.
269. Manzoni, Ivan (killed 1944)
270. Maretic, Ivan Ferdo (1875-1945)
271. Marjanovic, Jakov (1913-1945)
272. Markotic, Svetislav (killed 1945)
273. Maroevic, Bernard (1884-1944)
274. Martinac, Pasko (1882-1945)
275. Martinac, Josip (1905-1943)
276. Marvinac, Andrija (tortured and killed 1943)
277. Matijevic, Juraj (1900-1943)
278. Matijevic, Josip (1879-1945)
279. Mihic, Juraj (killed 1945)
280. Mikec, Rudolf (1912-1943)
281. Mikulic, Darko (killed 1945)
282. Milanovic, Stanko (1911-1944) Died under torture.
283. Miletic, Ivan (1913-1943)
284. Milicevic, Lujo (killed 1945)
285. Milinovic, Zvonko (1914-1943)
286. Mimica, Filip (1912-1945)
287. Mioc, Borivoj (1907-1944) – Among other tortures he suffered before being killed, horseshoes were nailed to his hands and feet.
288. Miolin, Bernard (1870-1944)
289. Mirkovic, Josip (killed 1945)
290. Misic, Vitomir (killed 1945)
291. Mitrovic, Adam (killed 1945)
292. Mladina, Jure (1912-1941) – Crucified on a tree and left hanging for 3 days.
293. Mravinac, Andrija (killed 1943)
294. Mueller, Josip (1883-1945)
295. Mueller, Viktor (1906-1945)
296. Muljevic, Dragutin (killed 1945)
297. Naletilic, Stjepan (1907-1942)
298. Niksic, Ivan (killed 1945)
299. Novak, Ceslav (killed 1946)
300. Nuic, Jerko (1915-1945)
301. Nuic, Andjelko (1908-1945)
302. Nuic, Arkandjeo (1896-1945)
303. Olujic, Jozo (killed 1944)
304. Oros, Nikola (killed in prison 1947)
305. Paljug, Mato (1893-1945)
306. Pandzic, Kresimir (1891-1945)
307. Pandzic, Borislav (killed 1945)
308. Papac, Mitar (killed 1951 while serving a prison sentence)
309. Paponja, Fabijan (1897-1945)
310. Pavic, Vladimir (1913-1945)
311. Pavisa, Petar (killed 1943)
312. Pavlov, Vladimir (1900-1944)
313. Pavlov, Anto (1905-1943)
314. Pavosevic, Djuro (killed 1945)
315. Pavunic, Stjepan (killed 1945)
316. Pehar, Nenad (1910-1945)
317. Peitler, Petronije (1912-1945)
318. Percic, Josip (killed 1945)
319. Percinlic, Jozo (1909-1945)
320. Perhac, Ivan (1885-1945)
321. Perica, Petar (1881-1944)
322. Perkan, Viktor (killed 1945)
323. Perkovic, Petar (killed 1945)
324. Perusina, Jure (1879-1944)
325. Petranovic, Stjepan (1878-1944)
326. Petrovic, Nenad (killed 1945 – theology student)
327. Petrovic, Ljudevit (killed 1945)
328. Petrovic, Leon (1883-1945) – Provincial of the Herzegovina Franciscan province. Killed together with several other Franciscans and thrown into the Neretva river.
329. Petrovic, Julijan (killed 1945-theology student)
330. Petrovic, Jure (killed 1945-taken by the Partisans and “disappeared”)
331. Podrug, Stjepan (1888-1943)
332. Poljak, Josip (1908-1946)
333. Posavac, Kerubin (1906-1945)
334. Povoljnjak, Stjepan (killed 1946)
335. Pretner, Josip (1886-1943)
336. Prlic, Melkior (killed 1945)
337. Prusina, Rafo (1884-1945)
338. Puljic, Metod (1912-1945)
339. Putica, Vid (1859-1942) – Pastor in Prenj-Dubrava. He was soaked in gasoline and burned alive in “honor” of King Peter Karadjordjevic’s birthday.
340. Racic, Jakov (1908-1943)
341. Radojkovic, Marijan (1889-1942)
342. Radonic, Bono (1888-1945)
343. Rados, Pavao (killed 1945)
344. Rados, Ljubo (killed 1945)
345. Rados, Mirko (1910-1945)
346. Radovic, Franjo (1891-1945)
347. Raguz, Ivan (1877-1944)
348. Rajic, Serafin (1913-1945) Executed along with 33 more people.
349. Ribic, Rikard (1909-1945)
350. Roje, Ljubomir (1898-1945)
351. Romac, Ante (1900-1944)
352. Romac, Ivan (killed 1943-taken from the altar while celebrating Mass)
353. Romac, Ivan (1900-1944)
354. Roncevic, Tihomir (killed 1945)
355. Rupcic, Leonardo (1907-1945)
356. Sablic, Gracija (killed 1944)
357. Sabulja, Augustin (killed 1945)
358. Sajlb, Ilija (killed-theology student)
359. Salovac, Ivan (1900-1945).
360. Sandrik, Alojzije (killed 1945)
361. Sandrik, Alojzije (killed 1945)
362. Santalab, Sebastijan (killed 1946)
363. Saric, Ivan (tortured and massacred)
364. Scuric, Josip (killed 1945)
365. Segvic, Kerubin (1867-1945)
366. Sesar, Petar (1895-1945)
367. Seuric, Josip (1912-1945)
368. Severovic, Tomo (tortured to the point of insanity-died 1951)
369. Silov, Pavao (1905-1942)
370. Simic, Andjelko (killed 1945)
371. Simic, Vjekoslav (killed 1945)
372. Simic, Bozidar (killed 1943)
373. Simlesa, Bozo(killed 1945)
374. Simovic, Dobroslav (1907-1945)
375. Simrak, Ivan (killed 1944)
376. Simrak, Janko (1883-1946) Bishop of Krizevci-poisoned while in jail)
377. Simunovic, Ivan (1892-1945)
378. Sivjanovic, Petar (1893-1946)
379.Sivric, Mariofil (killed 1945)
380. Slafhauser, Franjo (killed 1946)
381. Sliskovic, Ivo (1877-1945)
382. Sliskvic, Viktor (1891-1945)
383. Smit, Josip (killed 1944)
384. Smoljan, Bernardin (1884-1945)
385. Sokol, Bernardin (1888-1944) – Killed and throne into the sea.
386. Solc, Sidonije (killed 1942)
387. Sopta, Martin (1901-1945)
388. Spika, Petar (1880-1943)
389. Sporer, Ladislav (1893-1941) – His killer, Ivo Vojvoda, became later Yugoslav ambassador to the Vatican and received an award from the papal state on the occasion of the death of Pope John XXIII.
390. Stanic, Ivan (1870-1943) Died after going through some of the most terrible tortures.
391. Stankovic, Ivan (1886-1945)
392. Stepinac, dr. Alojzije (1898-1960) – Died as a prisoner of the Yugoslav regime. He had been slowly poisoned while a prisoner.
393. Stimac, Karlo (killed 1943)
394. Stipic, Emil (1912-1945)
395. Strasek, Josip (killed 1947-executed on Palm Sunday after celebrating the holy mass.
396. Stromar, Stjepan (killed 1944)
397. Strukar, Franjo (killed 1945)
398. Stuban, Ladislav (killed 1945)
399. Stuparic, Vladimir (1886-1943)
400. Subasic, Ivan (killed 1945)
401. Sulenta, Dominik (1900-1944)
402. Sumic, Ivan (killed 1945-taken by the Partisans and “disappeared”)
403. Susac, Kornelije (killed 1945)
404. Susak, Branko (killed 1945)
405. Sutrin, Eugen (killed and thrown into the sea 1948)
406. Szita, Jaroslav (killed 1945)
407. Teklic, Celestin (killed 1945)
408. Tepeluk-Klaric, Ante (killed near Sabac, Serbia, 1945)
409. Terzic, Vjekoslav (killed 1945)
410. Tesic, Luka (1893-1944)
411. Ticic, Ivan(1906-1943) Executed because he would not renounce his belief in God.
412. Timko, Inokentije (killed 1945)
413. Tomas, Ilija (1901-1942) – Pastor in the village of Klepci, Herzegovina. Stabbed many times in the shape of a cross, killed and his body thrown into the Neretva river.
414. Tomasic, Tomo (killed 1944)
415. Tomljenovic, Blaz (1888 – 1942) – Pastor in Hrvatski Blagaj. Taken to the village of Sic near Slunj where he was chopped up to pieces.
416. Topic, Andrija (1918-1945) – Butchered together with his uncle, Fr. Vale Zovko, in the presence of his mother, Zovko’s sister.
417. Torticchio, Nikola (killed 1947)
418. Tumban, Adalbert (1911-1945)
419. Turalija, Karlo (killed 1945-theology student)
420. Turkalj, Pero (1891 – 1947) Killed in the Stara Gradiska jail.
421. Vasilj, Janko (1914-1945)
422. Vasilj, Grga (1886-1945)
423. Vedrina, Stjepan (stoned to death 1949)
424. Velic, Paskal (killed 1944)
425. Venko, Alojzije (1885-1946)
426. Vernaca, Bruno (killed 1945)
427. Vezelic, Metod (1883-1945)
428. Vicic, Rudo (killed in Triest 1945-theology student)
429. Vidovic, Pasko (killed 1945-religious lay brother)
430. Vinic, Vlado (killed 1945)
431. Violoni, Ilija (1879-1945)
432. Vlahovic, Ante (1908-1945)
433. Vlasov, Aleksandar (killed 1942)
434. Vodanovic, Mate (1885-1947)
435. Vrancic, Antun (killed 1946)
436. Vucic, Rudo (killed 1945)
437. Vugdelija, Bozo (killed 1945)
438. Vujnovic, Marijan (1872-1944)
439. Vukovic, Vladimir (killed in a concentration camp 1945-theology student)
440. Vuksic, Rade (1894-1945)
441. Waldemar, Nestor (1899-1941)
442. Weiss, Rikard (1916-1944)
443. Weiss, Antun (killed 1943)
444. Zaguestar, Petar (1899-1945)
445. Zajcic, Andrija (1907-1943)
446. Zekic, Vitomir (1906-1945)
447. Zigrovicm Matija (1886-1943)
448. Zilovec, Antun (1915-1945)
449. Zivkovic, Antun (killed 1945)
450. Zjacic, Andrija (killed 1944)
451. Zlopasa, Roland (1912-1945)
452. Zovko, Vale (1889-1945)
453. Zrno, Ante (1909-1945)
454. Zubac, Zdenko (1911-1945)
455. Zubac, Tihomir (killed 1945)
456. Zubac, Augustin (1890-1945)
What Was the Name of the Glagolitic Seminary in Priko?
Benedikta Zelic-Bucan
According to information dealing with Glagolitic clergy in Chapter 24 of the constitution of the Split diocesan synod of 1688, there were thirty-six outlying parishes in the diocese. Of these thirty-six parishes, only eight held services in Latin, while the remainder were “Croatian parishes” (“kuratije arvaske”).1 According to records collected from 1688 to 1700 by Ivan Pastric, forty-two parishes were cited in the Split diocese, seventeen of which were located on the territory of Poljica. The Poljica parishes were: Podstrana, Jesenice, Duce, Zakucac, Kucice, Gornje Polje, Donje Polje, Tugare, Kosatanje, Zvecanje, Ostrvica, Gata, Dubrava, Trnbusi, Srijane, Srinjine and Sitno.2 All of these were Glagolitic parishes; however, the number of Poljica clergy greatly exceeded the actual number of parishes they served in. The Glagolites from Poljica served as parish priests throughout the entire diocese. There were also many who were without their own parish and lived with their families. In his 1713 report to Rome, Archbishop Stefano Cupilli indicated that the urban clergy numbered sixty priests and fifteen seminarians, while priests from outlying areas numbered around 125 .3
The archbishops or vicars general exercised authority over these priests through the outer vicar, whom they appointed from nominations submitted by the Glagolites themselves.4 The outer vicar held ecclesiastic authority over the territories of Poljica, Radobilje, the outskirts and districts of Split, and the regions of Omis and Klis.5 While Gian Battista Laghi served as archbishop, a confraternity for Glagolitic priests was founded and ratified. Members of the confraternity were to pray and celebrate requiem masses for the repose of their deceased brethren .6
Right up to the mid-18th century, there were neither colleges nor seminaries where these Glagolites could receive a basic education or instruction in the Old Church Slavic language. Rather, individual pastors provided personal training to seminarians according to the apprenticeship system. Individual parish priests recruited gifted youngsters who served as their attendants and students. Through this process, they taught these young men what they themselves knew. However, these novices would often change teachers, especially if the priest was strict. This situation prompted Archbishop Stefano Cosmi to write to the outer vicar on 20 October 1703. In the letter, he made it clear that novices were not to move from teacher to teacher, but were to dutifully and obediently remain with the initial priest; otherwise, they would not be permitted to take their exams .7
As far as the training of Glagolitic priests was concerned, not only were there no cultivated colleges for them, but they did not even have the necessary books for their language, which was the only one they understood. For this reason, Bishop Antun Kadcic’s initiative to write the work Moral theology (Bogoslovje diloredno) represented a significant step in their education. In 1714, Archbishop Stefano Cupilli began to build a seminary for them beside the church of St. Peter on Lucac in Split; however, he passed away before the project was completed. His objective was only realized by Archbishop Pacific Bizza in 1750, when he established a seminary in the former Franciscan hospice beside the old Croatian church of St. Peter in Priko, near Omis. This seminary lacked a prebend (stipend) or a steady source of revenue and the seminarians were required to support themselves and their instructors, while the upkeep and maintenance of the church and seminary building was left to providence and the charity of the faithful .8
During Venetian rule (1699-1797), numerous attempts were made to obtain government support to provide a modest salary for the instructors; however, this never succeeded. Only in 1803, during the first Austrian rule (1797-1805), did the government set a monthly salary of twenty florins for the director of the seminary and fifteen florins for instructors at the seminary.9 However, even this minimal pay was discontinued during French rule (1805- 1813), when the seminary was closed for a time. During the second period of Austrian rule (1813-1918), the government again introduced the salary, but only for a brief time. Already in 1821, the seminary was closed and a central seminary established in Zadar for the entire province of Dalmatia. In this new seminary, the Glagolitic alphabet and the Old Church Slavic language were taught from the outset. However, in 1827, even this central Croatian seminary was closed and a new central Latin seminary established in its place, again in Zadar .10
When the seminary in Priko first opened, there was one lone instructor. Later, when the number of seminarians began to rise, there were three. One of them was called the director (vladavac), the second the instructor (mestar) and the third the prefect (izvrsitelj). However, all three lectured and instructed the seminarians. The first director of the seminary was Rev. Stjepan Pivcevic, the second Rev. Ivan Bozic and the third and last one Rev. Petar Kruzicevic .11
In the archival section of the Archaeological Museum of Split, there is kept a bundle of forty-eight documents labelled “Poljica Documents” (signature 49 h 6/I). Some of these documents were published without any accompanying notes at the beginning of the 20th century in the Split journal Bullettino di archeologia e storia dalmata.12 Among this group of documents, twenty-two reports dealt with the Glagolitic seminary in Priko for the period from 1760 to 1821.13 Included are the minutes of Archbishop Nikola Dinaricic’s 1760 visit to the seminary; two letters of Archbishop Lelio Cipico from 1793; and two letters from Venetian governors Francesco Falier and Alvise Marin, from 1784 and 1794, respectively. Most of the documents are from the 19th century. These include the correspondence of the last director of the seminary, Rev. Petar Kruzicevic, to the vicars general and Split canons: Oracijo Bergelic, Nikola Didos, Josip Koic and Nikola Koic. Also included are his letters to Makarska Bishop Fabijan Blaskovic. The majority of these letters originated during the last few years of the seminary, when its closure was imminent, and the closure was even discussed in some of them; therefore, these letters represent a significant source for the history of this important Croatian college .14
Besides providing significant material on the seminary, this small collection of documents also offers important information for the history of the Croatian language. In these documents, we encounter the old Croatian national name (hrvatski) for the language along with the more recent bookish term Slavonic (slovinski), as well as the Italian term Illyrian (illirico). More specifically, in Italian texts, the term Illyrian (illirico) was always used, while in Croatian texts the alternate use of the terms Croatian (hrvatski) and Slavonic (slovinski) appeared, sometimes even with the same author. Thus, the Split vicars and canons regularly addressed Rev. Petar Kruzicevic as the instructor or director of the Slavonic seminary, 15 while in the text of the letters both Croatian and Slavonic are used. For example, in a letter from 16 January 1815, Split Canon Nikola Didos explains that it is the intention of the future central seminary in Zadar to offer education to the “Slavonic clergy of Priko” (“crikovnakom slovinskim od Prika”).16 In a letter from 23 August 1816, the bishop’s secretary, Josip Koic, wrote that following an outbrea
k of the plague, there were now: “Latin and Croatian priests…in total, thirty-six” (“latinski misnika i Arvatah…usve trideset i sest”).17 Makarska Bishop Fabijan Blaskovic used two terms for the seminary. In the address of a letter from 28 December 1816, Bishop Blaskovic called Rev. Petar Kruzicevic the “main educator of the Croatian seminary” (“mestar od semenaria arvaskoga”) 18 and the “main educator of the Slavonic seminary” (“mestar od seminarija slovinskoga”) in a letter from 15 July 1818 .19
In documents that were written by Poljica or other Glagolitic priests, I have never come across the expression Slavonic for their language. They always called their language Croatian and when translating from Italian texts, the term Illyrian (illirco) was translated into Croatian (hrvatski). Thus, in the Croatian translation of Archbishop Lelio Cipico’s letter of 26 June 1793 to Omis church administrator Rev. Jakov Ognjutovic the term “chierizi illirici” is translated into “Croatian priests” (“zakni arvacki”) .20
The above examples show that by the beginning of the 19th century, the use of the term Slavonic (slovinski) for the Croatian language and institutions of the Croatian language was still inconsistently applied, even among learned individuals. Here and there, these learned individuals continued to use the original Croatian national name alongside this “learned” expression.
Not only did the Glagolitic clergy of Poljica call their language Croatian, but they also went out of their way to set themselves apart from their Latin colleagues who used the Latin liturgical language.21 They did this by appending to their names the term Harvacanin. In Split baptismal and marriage registries from the 17th and 18th century, which were usually completed in the administrative Italian language, there are close to 200 notes entered by Poljica Glagolites in the vernacular language. These notes were entered when they performed christenings and marriages in Split. The majority of these entries were completed in old Croatian Cyrillic (bosancica). Four of these Glagolitic priests (Mihovil Dagelic, Jakov Suturcic, Stipan Jurevic, Barisa Krcatovic) often added the attribute Harvacanin to their surnames or only to their given names when they added their entries. In using this attribute, they wished to emphasize that they were priests of the Croatian language as opposed to Latin clergy, whose liturgical language was Latin and whose language of public communication was Italian.
In the same manner, the Croatian version of Chapter 24 of the constitution of the diocesan synod of Split from 1688, distinguishes Glagolitic clergy (“harvaski kler”) and Glagolitic parishes (“kuratije arvaske”) from the clergy and parishes using the Latin liturgy.22 In the Latin version of that chapter of the constitution, Croatian clergy are called “clerus illyricus” and Croatian parishes “parochiae Illyricorum”.23 In Article XII of the same chapter, it is specified that educated priests are to teach the seminarians the Croatian pronunciation in which their missals and breviaries are written; otherwise, the seminarians will not be ordained. In the Latin version of the constitution, the term Illyrian (illyricum) is used for the Croatian language and script.24 It is interesting to note that two years after this synod on Glagolitic clergy was held, Makarska Bishop Nikola Bjankovic translated and printed the constitution in Croatian. However, already in the very title of his version, he stated that the decisions “were translated in the Slavonic language”.25 As we can see, when writing in the Italian and Latin languages, the term Illyrian (illyricus, illirico) was used for the Croatian language, while learned Croats used the expression Slavonic (slovinski), and the simple commoner Glagolites spoke and wrote in the “Croatian” language (jezik “arvacki”), just as the people.
The Glagolites could not even acquire the habit of using the “learned” terms for the Croatian language (Illyrian and Slavonic) because they not only lacked Croatian books, but some of them did not even know how to read all that well. This can be concluded from the previously mentioned Article XII of Chapter 24 of the synodal constitution. It should also be remembered that they did not even understand Latin or Italian. I have come across two instances in the documents of the Makarska diocese from 1769, in which parish priests expressly state that they do not understand Italian or Latin, and request their bishop to write to them in Croatian so that they can understand him .26
As we can see from preserved documents written in Croatian Cyrillic (“arvacki”), right up to the end of the 17th century, only the Croatian national name served as the name of the Croatian language for commoners and their Glagolitic pastors. At that time, the Glagolites were the closest intelligentsia to everyday folk. The use of the term “Slavonic” (“slovinski”) as a “learned” name, as was previously characterized by Vatroslav Jagic,27 only began to penetrate later, at the turn of the 18th to 19th century. In part under the sway of learned books and foreign influences, this understanding spread widely in the first half of the 19th century. For this reason, those in Dalmatia who were followers of the Croatian National Revival under the leadership of Mihovil Pavlinovic struggled not only for the affirmation of the Croatian language in public life, but also for the affirmation of its national name among the alienated native intelligentsia and middle class.
Taking all of this into account, it would seem necessary to return the original name to the old Croatian seminary in Priko. When writing and discussing this seminary, we should identify it in the way in which its former students and teachers identified it; that is, the Croatian Seminary (Sjemeniste hrvatsko). To continue using the old term Illyrian (ilirisko), which was used in documents of the Italian and Latin languages, as well as the vague term Slavonic (slovinski) from Croatian documents of the learned class of past centuries, would only show that to this very day we have not overcome the biased belief that everything foreign is better and more learned than our Croatian national name. To continue to support these non-national and inadequate terms (Illyrian and Slavonic) would signify in our time not learnedness, but a petite bourgeoise mentality.
Translated by Stan Granic
*The original reads “Kako se zvalo glagoljasko sjemeniste u Priku?” and first appeared in Marulic, 3, no. 3 (Zagreb, 1970), 17-21. It was later included in Benedikta Zelic-Bucan, Jezik i pisma Hrvata. Rasprave i clanci (Split: Matica hrvatska, 1997), 19-24. The translator thanks the author for clarifying certain parts of the essay; Dr. Vinko Grubisic of the University of Waterloo for his assistance during the translation process; and Matthew Pavelich for reading the manuscript and providing his editorial comments.
NOTES
1 Vladimir Mosin, “Poljicke konstitucije iz 1620. i 1688. godine,”Radovi staroslavenskog instituta, 1 (Zagreb, 1952), 194.
2 Fontes historici liturgiae glagolito-romanae a XIII ad XIX saeculum, ed. Luka Jelic (Veglae [Krk]: Sumptibus Academiae Palaeoslavicae Veglensis, 1906), XVII, 61-63.
3 Fontes, XVIII, 9.
 
; 4 M…c, “Njekoji prilozi o glagoljici,” Narod, no. 10 (Split, 1894).
5 Fontes, XIX, 75.
6 M…c, “Njekoji,” Narod, no. 6. In the Historical Archives of Split (Historijski arhiv u Splitu HAS), in a small collection entitled “Poljica Documents” (“Poljicki spomenici“), there is a document that lists all the requiem masses said for members of this confraternity from 1790 to 1820 (signature 3KA/PS-15). From the list one can see that membership in the confraternity was composed of Glagolites of the archdiocese, many respected members of the higher urban clergy and even some eminent laymen.
7 Miroslav Vulic, “Pravila glagoljaskog sjemenista u Priku,” Croatia sacra, 15-16 (Zagreb, 1938), 74.
8 Ivan Pivcevic, “Sjemeniste u Priku,” in Program c. k. Velike gimnazije u Splitu za sk. god. 1911-12, 47 (Split, 1912), 7.
9 Pivcevic, p. 9.
10 Pivcevic, p. 11.
11 Pivcevic, p. 8.
12 See the supplemental sections in: Bullettino di archeologia e storia dalmata, 22 (Split, 1900) and 24 (Split, 1901).
13 Having worked on these documents some ten years ago while preparing my work Bosancica u srednjoj Dalmaciji, Prilog 3. svesku Izdanja Historijskiog arhiva – Split (Split: Historijskog arhiva, 1961), I classified these Poljica documents according to contents. With the approval of the administration of the Museum, I classified them into series I to III, with each individual document assigned a number. Documents dealing with the seminary in Priko were arranged in the first series and marked with numbers 1-20, plus 1a, 2a and 3a. Documents I/1-20 formed part of the archives of the actual seminary, while document I/2a is the Croatian transcription of document I/2 and documents I/1a and I/3a were subsequently taken from series II (“Pisma providura i drugi spisi koji se odnose na polji ku republiku”) because their contents dealt with the seminary in Priko.
14 As far as I could ascertain, to date these documents on the Croatian seminary in Priko, which are housed in the Archeological Museum of Split, have never been published. Concise information on the contents of these letters are provided in my article: “Upotreba bosancice u Splitu i okolici,” Mogucnosti, 3, no. 11 (Split, 1956), 869-875.
15 Archaeological Museum of Split (hereafter AMS), “Poljicke isprave,” signature 49 h 6/I, documents 6, 7, 8, 11, 12 and 13.
16 AMS, “Poljicke isprave,” sign. 49 h 6/I, document 7.
17 AMS, “Poljicke isprave,” sign. 49 h 6/I, document 13.
18 AMS, “Poljicke isprave,” sign. 49 h 6/I, document 12.
19 AMS, “Poljicke isprave,” sign. 49 h 6/I, document 13.
20 AMS, “Poljicke isprave,” sign. 49 h 6/I, document 2a.
21 The language of Croatian Glagolitic religious books to the 17th century was completely under the influence of the vernacular speech. For this reason, Modrus Bishop Simun Kozicic could legitimately title his missal, which was printed in Rijeka in 1531, the Croatian Missal (Misal hruacki). The Poljica Glagolites who largely lived as peasants, had a very difficult time in obtaining church books. This is testified to in Chapter 24 (Article XII) of the constitution of the Split synod from 1688 and in articles LX and CIX of Archbishop Sforza Ponzon’s ruling from 1620. It is also likely that they could not have immediately obtained the new missal prepared by friar Rafael Levakovic (Rome, 1631) which had been completely russified. To deal with the shortage of books, Archbishop Dinaricic was still advising the clergy of the seminary at Priko, in the latter half of the 18th century, to transcribe from old books and manuscripts in their possession. Based on this, it can be presumed that their liturgical language differed very little from the existing Croatian vernacular. For this reason, it is understandable that they called themselves Croatian clergy and used Harvacanin to identify themselves.
22 Mosin, p. 194.
23 Mosin, p. 194.
24 “Zasto osobito s(veta) m(ater) c(rkva) dopusti ovoj ruci privilej harvackoga izgovora u misi, zato ima se nastojati da se dobro uce i nauce razumiti slovi…kako u knjigah uzdarze. Zakni imaju se nauciti bukvicu i juciniti se nauciti se od redovnikov naucni izgovor arvacki slovi nasi, kako izgovara misal i barvija; inako nece biti urdinani buduci tako zapovijeno, i kako nasi po knjizi imaju govoriti se… razumiti tako harvaski na nihov zakon barvarija.”/”Quoniam peculiari, et speciosissimo Sanctae Matris Ecclesiae privilegio in idiomate Illyrico sacra habetur liturgia, maxima habenda est ratio eiusdem idiomatis probe ediscendi, et dicendi. Clerici noverint azbuquidarium, atque a pertis Sacerdotibus erudiantur, qui in eam precipue curam, incubeant, ut illyricum literale, quo Missale et Breviarium conscripta sunt, perfecte calleant alioquin sciant, se ad Ordines non promovendos, cum apud Illyricos eadem sit ratio illyrici idiomatis litdteralis, quae apud nostros Latini. Mosin, p. 196. [In English it would read: “Since the Holy Mother Church especially allows to this hand the privilege of using the Croatian language in the mass, they must endeavor to learn well and master the script…which is contained in the books. The priests must learn the alphabet and be instructed by the monks on the correct pronunciation of our Croatian letters as they are contained in our missals and breviaries. Otherwise, as it is proclaimed, they shall not be ordained. It was ordered so and now our priests must conform themselves to our books…to understand Croatian in order to follow their duties according to their breviaries.” trans.]
25 Mosin, p. 178.
26 Archives of the Diocese of Makarska, volume 74. Letter of Rev. Jakov Piunovic, pastor of Rascani, 22 September 1769 and letter of Rev. Pavao Ursic, pastor of Brela, 23 October 1769. Fascicle 74 contains the correspondence of Bishop Stjepan Blaskovic to his parish priests from 1768 to 1769. There are 376 letters in total. Of these, three are written in the Croatian language using the Roman script, one in the Italian language and the remainder were written in the Croatian language using the Croatian Cyrillic script.
27 Vatroslav Jagic, Historija knjizevnosti naroda hrvatskoga i srpskoga (Zagreb: Vatroslav Jagic, 1867), p. 3.
Appendix to 'Persecution of Croats in the First . . . '
A Partial List of Persecutions
Ante Cuvalo
Also see the article related to this appendix
Also see: Letters of Protest
1918
Sep. 9 About 100 Serbian soldiers arrived for the first time at the town of Vukovar and, among other misdeeds, confiscated boats loaded with grain on the Danube river.
Oct. 29 Croatian Sabor (Parliament) broke off all ties with the Habsburg Monarchy (Austria-Hungary).
November A number of leading Croatian intellectuals in Zagreb receive letters threatening to hang them on light poles. Many people were afraid to walk the streets at night. Among the arrested in Zagreb were: Ivica dr. Frank (people’s representative), Aleksandar Horvat (people’s representative),Ante Matasic (general), Mirko dr. Puk (lawyer), Pavao Rauch (former ban/viceroy of Croatia), and Drago dr. Safar (lawyer).
Among the arrested and then forced to retire were the High Court Judges: Milan Accuti, Mirko dr. Kosutic, and Josip Tarabochia.
Among those forced from Zagreb into hiding were Ljudevit dr. Ivancic (priest in Zagreb) and Lovro dr. Radicevic (priest in Zagreb)
Nov.8 Franjo Sarkotic (general in Sarajevo) arrested.
Nov.9 Zvonimir Vukelic (newsman in Zagreb) arrested.
Nov.16 Mihovil Mihaljevic (field Marshall) forced to retire.
Nov. 17 Izidor dr. Krsnjavi (univ. prof. in Zagreb) forced to retire. Ivan Malus (school supervisor in Zagreb) forced to retire. Milan dr. Sufflay (a leading intellectual and univ. professor in Zagreb) forced to retire. ? Heim (judge in Zagreb) forced to retire.
Nov. 21 Lacko Labas (provincial governor in Bjelovar) forced to retire.
Nov. 22 Antun Liposcak (general) arrested.
Dec. 1 Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes formed (renamed Yugoslavia in 1929).
Dec. 4 Zagreb newspaper “Hrvatska” banned.
Dec. 5 The gov. officials in Zagreb were ordered to declare this day a holiday with public celebrations in honor of the Serbian king Peter’s “krsna slava.” After the morning parade in honor of the king, Croatian soldiers stationed in Zagreb began a parade of their own, with their marching band. They protested unification with Serbia and demanded a democratic republic of Croatia. The marchers were met by force. On that day 9 Croatian civilians and 5 soldiers were killed, and 7 civilians and 10 soldiers were wounded. (It is estimated that over 100 people were hurt or killed but the newspaper were forbidden to write the truth.)
Among the killed were: Mato Gasparovic, Nikola Ivsa, Stjepan Juresa, Viktor Kolombar, Dragutin Kostelac, Josip Lupinski, Andro Martinko, Milos Mrse, Slavko Scukanac, ? Sentmartoni, Mijo Stanicer, Miroslav Svoboda, Antun Tasner-Juricic, and Ferdo Versec.
Among the arrested was the general Ante Matasic. Jailed over two months and then retired. Arrested again in 1929. After his release, his movements were restricted to the city of Zagreb.
1919
Gendarme forces maltreated large number of peasants in Zdala, Severin, Raca, Popovaca, Grubisno polje, and other places. Many of them were striped naked and beaten.
Jan. 6 The following Croatians were sentenced in Zagreb because of the Dec. 5, 1918 demonstrations: Ivica Percic (soldier) to 10 years,Rudolf Cecelja (soldier) to 7 years, Josip Simatovic (soldier) to 7 years, Ivan Babic (soldier) to 3 and a half years, Janko Herceg (soldier) to 3 and a half years, Franjo Kovacic (soldier) to 3 and a half years, Dragutin Mort (soldier) 3 and a half years, Adolf Schwartz (soldier) to 3 and a half years, Blaz Barac (soldier) to 1 and a half years, Stjepan Crncec (soldier) to 1 and a half years, Franjo Gasparac (soldier) 1 and half years, Marko Koren (soldier) 1 and a half years, Marko Majsl (soldier) 1 and a half years, Mirko Milosak (soldier) to 1 and a half years, Janko Pomjan (soldier) to 1 and a half years, Tomo Potlacek (soldier) to 1 and a half years, Josip Ruklic (soldier)to 1 and a half years, Konrad Skrebin (soldier) to 1 and a half years, Stjepan Tresoglavac (soldier) to 1 and half years, Mirko Vragovic (soldier) to 1 and a half years, Mustafa Basagic (soldier) ?, Mirko Drobac (soldier) ?, and Andrija Fijan (soldier) ?.
March Two elected parliamentary representatives from the Croatian Party of [State] Rights/HSP, dr. Prebeg (lawyer) and dr. Pazman (university professor) arrested.
Military censorship of the press imposed in Croatia.
Mar. 8Croatian Republican Peasant Party/HRSS/ sent memorandum to the U.S. President Wilson and to members of the Peace Conference in Paris asking for self-determination of the Croatian people.
Mar. 25 President of the Croatian Republican Peasant Party (HRSS), Stjepan Radic, and two of its board members arrested. Although no charges were filed against him, Radic was held in jail without a trial untill Feb. 19, 1920. He was arrested again on March 22, 1920 and finally, he was released on Nov. 28, 1920, the day general elections, in which he and his party won an overwhelming majority of votes in Croatia.
May Josip Zrnek (worker) died in jail under torture.
July 13 Three people (a restaurant owner in Zagreb, his wife and a waitress) arrested by military authorities and badly beaten because the man said “This is not a Greater Serbia.”
July 22 Spontaneous rebellion of soldiers in Varazdin.
August Army confiscated all the goods that Croat emigrants had brought with them returning from the USA.
Bartol Vukovic (peasant from Brodska Varos) killed by gendarmes.
September A Croat police officer in Zagreb beaten and maltreated by military authorities.
A “prominent citizen” in Zagreb 70 years old beaten, maltreated, and his dog killed on his own property by a military captain.
1920
A group of “well-respected citizens” in Sisak arrested while eating in a restaurant, kept overnight in the local jail and maltreated because gendarme Lolic was drunk and he felt like doing it.
“Many peasants” beaten in the name of king Peter and forced to genuflect three times and give homage to the Serbian traditional military cap, known as “sajkaca.”
A veterinarian in Petrinja, after being asked to come to the office of the local commanding army officer, was maltreated and beaten by the officer. After escaping, the veterinarian was beaten again the next day by the same officer.
February A man was killed by soldiers in Sisak. While his wife was crying over his dead body, the commanding colonel swore at her and gave her two hard blows.
Feb. 20 Nine peasants in Delnice badly beaten by soldiers. Their money was also taken.
Mar. 22 ? Teslic, a Serb and a former Austrian Colonel, attempted to kill Stjepan Radic during a public gathering of the Croatian Peasant Party in Sisak. When Radic was about to begin his speech, Teslic fired four shots at him. After escaping the assassination, Radic was arrested and finally released on Nov. 28, 1920, the day of general elections.
Apr. 16 All public meetings banned in Croatia.
July A military colonel took a boat from a Croat citizen in Petrinja. After his complaint, four soldiers were sent to bring the man to the military compound. They were unsuccessful. But the next day, the citizen was found, beaten, and maltreated.
August Soldiers attack a number of civilians in Zagreb.
September A “large number” of peasants were killed during the attempts of the gendarmes and the military to put down peasant rebellions in northern Croatia. “Many peasants” were killed in Kutina county. Two peasants killed in Ivanjska.
Sep. 5 Forced branding of large domestic animals.
Peasants rebel in Veliki Grdjavac.
Josip Sulicek (peasant) killed by gendarmes.
Sep. 6 A peasant from Sveti Ivan Zeleni killed by gendarmes.
Sep. 8 Ivan Likoder (peasant from Repusnica) killed by gendarmes.? Pintaric (peasant from Repusnica) wounded by gendarmes. Ivan Vraznic (peasant from Repusnica) wounded by gendarmes. Gabor Uroic (peasant from Repusnica) wounded by gendarmes. ? Alapic (peasant from Gracanica) wounded by gendarmes.
Sep. 9 ? Gunjak (peasant) arrested and on the road from Osekova to Kutina killed by gendarmes. ? Pokaz (peasant) arrested and on the road from Osekova to Kutina killed by gendarmes.
Sep. 10 30 peasants in Petrinja badly beaten by the gendarmes in front of other citizens.
Sep. 16 3 peasant huts with all possessions burnt by gendarmes in Novoselce near Zagreb.
Filip Halic (79-year old peasant from Novoselce near Zagreb) killed by gendarmes in front of a hut in his vineyard.
Oct. 4 City Mayor of Vinkovci publically attacked by Serb military officer.
Nov. 28 Elections for the Constitutional Assembly. Croatian Republican Pleasant Party/HRSS/ received majority of votes in Croatia. Its leader, Stjepan Radic, released from jail on the election day.
Dec. 5 Croatian youth organization “Sokol” banned.
Dec. 12 Anti-Croatian demonstrations in Ruma/Srijem. Croatian businesses and homes attacked. All public signs written in Latin script demolished. Military authorities in the town were protecting the attackers.
Dec. 15 Mirko Marcinko arrested and severely tortured.
Dec. 20 Vinko Zugcic (peasant from Novoselce near. Zagreb) arrested and killed by gendarmes.
Vid Zavolic (peasant from Novoselce near Zagreb) wounded by gendarmes.
Dec. 22 A major strike by miners in Husino near Tuzla, Orasje, Breza, and other mining places in Bosnia. Gendarmes, “People’s Guards” (Serbian volunteers), and army unites put down the strike. 32 miners and peasants were killed and many more seriously wounded. Robbery, rape, and expulsion from homes followed. Croatian settlements were special targets because the desire was to portray the Croats as Communist sympathizers.
Dec. 29Government in Belgrade issued a document, “Obznana”, by which the Communist Party was banned in the country. Persecutions intensified.
Dec. 30 Stjepan Supanc (worker) killed in Vukovar.
1921
Jan. 4 Anka N. (Postal clerk in Vukovar) attacked by soldiers, maltreated, and arrested.
Jan. 26 The following Croats arrested in Zagreb. Trial began on June 12, 1921. On August 6, 1921 sentenced to:Pavao See 12 years, Rudolf Vidak 4 years, Milan dr. Sufflay to 3 and a half years, Jakov Petric to 3 years, Franjo Skvorc to 3 years, Dragutin Taborsak to 3 years, Josip Spoljarec-Drenski to 2 years and 4 months, Ivan Havelka to 8 months, Milan Galovic to 6 months,Ivan Kovacic to 6 months, Gabrijel Kruhak to 6 months, Ivo dr. Pilar 2 months, Andrija Medar freed, Antun Pavicic freed, and Florijan Stromar ?. Feb. 16 18 mineworkers in Tuzla condemned to death by hanging.. One of the condemned miners was Jure Kerosevic.
June Vladimir Copic arrested and sentenced on Feb. 2, 1922 to 2 years.
June 29 Unsucccesful attempt to assassinate king Aleksandar in Belgrade. Excuse to attack sympathizers of the Left and other opponents of the regime. It is estimated that about 10.000 people were arrested in the country and maltreated.
June 28 Centralist Constitution for the newly unified country approved by 233 votes; 35 delegates voted against, and 161 representatives were absent in Belgrade Parliament. July 2 150 workers arrested and maltreated in Split and sentenced from 3 to 8 months.
July 21 ORJUNA (Organizacija Jugoslavenskih Nacionalista/ Organization of Yugoslav Nationalits) attacked and seriously injured four “communists” in Split.
ORJUNA attacked and damaged the house of Mr. Jelaska in Split. ORJUNA demolished the house of Mr. Pinto in Split.
ORJUNA attaked and demolished the house of dr. Vrankovic in Split. July 22 ORJUNA attacked offices of Zagreb papers “Obzor,” “Hrvat,” and “Jutarnji list.” It led violent anti-Croatian demonstration in Zagreb.
ORJUNA attaked “Radnicki dom” (Workers’ Hall) in Osijek.
July 24 Rudolf Horvatic (civil servant in Zagreb) wounded by a railroad police, Dusan Kruzica, while riding a train from Sesvete to Zagreb.
Ivan Kosanda wounded togather with Rudolf Horvatic.
Zlatko Arnold (bank clerk) killed by a railroad policeman, Dusan Kruzica, while riding on Sesvete-Zagreb train.
August Catholic religious congress in Split attacked by ORJUNA.
A Catholic religious procession in Sinj attacked by gendarmes.
Aug. 2The Law for the Protection of the State was approved by Belgrade Parliament. Persecutions intensified.
Aug. 9 Drago Gizdic (worker in Dubrovnik) killed by ORJUNA.
Aug. 16 King Peter died. Because the Zagreb’s city council did not send a special delegation to the funeral, it was dissolved.
Dec. 11 The “Croatian block” won the municipal elections in Zagreb. But the elected representatives were not allowed to govern. A special city Commissar was appointed be Belgrade.
1922
Newspaper “Hrvatski Glas” banned.
Equipment belonging to youth organization “Croatian Sokol” in Ogulin confiscated and given to the “Yugoslav Sokol.” During a public gathering of the “Yugoslav Sokol” that followed in the same town, several leading Croats jailed.
About 400 Croat teachers and professors were dismissed from their jobs.
Jun. 8 King Aleksandar married Romanian princess Mariola. Croatians not welcomed at the wedding. The wedding costs were over 65 million dinars.
Jan. 29 A large number of peasants, including women and children, were attacked and mercilessly beaten by 14 gendarmes in the village near Topusko. Many were incapacitated for a long time because of the harsh beatings.
Feb. 21 ORJUNA attacked members of “Croatian workers union.” Army intervened on the side of ORJUNA.
Feb. 23 Ivan Colovic arrested and sentenced to 2 years. Spent 7 months in jail before the trial.
Djuro Salaj arrested and sentenced to 2 years. Spent 7 months in jail before the trial.
March A number of Croatians were attacked by ORJUNA members who were armed by pistols given to them by the military authorities.
? Snidarsic (Zagreb lawyer) shot by ORJUNA members. There was no investigation.
ORJUNA members attacked the house in Zagreb where retired Croatian military officers were having a private party.
June ORJUNA undertook major attacks throughout Zagreb.
June 4 A large number of the “Croatian Sokol” children and their escorts, mostly women, from Karlovac, Jastrebarsko, Ogulin and other towns attacked by local Serbs during the Sokol’s field trip to Plitvice Lakes. A number of people injured, investigation was not permitted and no one was punished.
June 14 All chapters of the organization “Croatian Woman” banned and its property comfiscated because they participated in organizing a pilgrimage to the tomb of Ante Starcevic three days earlier.
Women’s organization “Katarina Zrinski” also banned because of the pilgrimage to the grave of Ante Starcevic.
Zagreb chapter of the “Croatian Sokol” banned and posessions confiscated because they made a pilgrimage to the tomb of Ante Starcevic three days earlier.
July ? Rozic killed in Zagreb.
Dec. 9 Franjo Vrtat (Novigrad near Koprivnica) jailed for organizing HRSS meetings.
1923
At an ORJUNA meeting attended by the Minister of the Interior an open discussion on assassinating Stjepan Radic (the leader of the Croats) too place.
January During the pre-election campaign, a young man in the village of Kras (Dobrinjstina) was killed after a HRSS public meeting. During the same period, a man was killed in each of the following places: Crikvenica, Otocac, and Vrginmost .
Three HRSS representatives from the region of Sibenik were jailed.
Four members of the HRSS Main Board were jailed.
Three HRSS representatives from Cepin (Osijek) were jailed.
ORJUNA attacked Croatian Sokol members in their hall in Gospic. Because of the attack, the local Sokol organization was deprived of the hall.
Armed ORJUNA members clashed with Croatian youth in a coffee shop in downtown Zagreb. Eight people were wounded.
Jan. 28 ORJUNA members broke up a Croatian Republican Peasant Party (HRSS) gathering in Vinkovci.
February ORJUNA attacked political gatherings organized by Prof. Kerubin Segvic in Split.
ORJUNA attacked two followers of the HRSS in Drnis.
ORJUNA assaulted Dr. Vandekar, son in law of Stjepan Radic, in the town of Metkovic.
ORJUNA attacked a public meeting of the HRSS in Tuzla.
Feb. 3 Public meeting of the HRSS in Kostajnica broken up by ORJUNA members and their simpatizers. Those attending were attacked and more than 30 of homes were damaged.
Feb. 4 Six people seriously, and 18 lightly wounded by ORJUNA members in Crikvenica. One of the wounded died next day.
Feb. 5 Offices of the “Hrvatski list,” newspaper in Osijek, raided and vandalized by ORJUNA. A bomb was thrown into the main office.
Feb. 8 ORJUNA members placed a bomb in the hall of the Croatian workers union in Dubrovnik. Local government officials in the region of Dubrovnik banned public gatherings of Croatian political parties.
March Marko Grsic Filipovic wounded by a bullet in the head in the town of Senj.
A Zagreb Croat who stated that he would vote for Radic was forced by a gendarme to kiss the picture of Nikola Pasic, the leading Serbian politician at the time and a symbol of Greater Serbianism.
In Koprivnica, gendarmes opened gun fire on Croatian peasants.
In Split, any one who cried out “Long live Radic” received a 30- day jail sentence.
Gendarmes attacked a peasant from Cerje Tuzno and robbed him of his possessions.
Mar. 4 Peasants from the village of Cukovac (Ludbreg) were fired upon because they prepared a welcoming celebration for the HRSS leaders, including Stjepan Radic. Those who fired on the peasants were not punished. Instead, a peasant from Cukovac, a sympathizer of Radic, was sentenced to a one day jail term for not voting “properly.”
ORJUNA and its sympathizers attacked a public meeting of the HRSS in Otocac. Two peasants were wounded and a 14 year old boy was killed.
Mar. 18 After police attacked and dispersed a crowd gathered in Zagreb, OJUNA members opened fire on those running from police. A 16-year old boy was seriously wounded and a 20- year old man and a woman received lesser injuries.
Mar. 18 Second general elections held in the KSHS. The HRSS received an overwhelimg vote among the Croatians (420,000 votes and 69 Deputies).
April Jurije Soce (Sarajevo) killed by ORJUNA members.
June Kerubin Segvic on trial. He wrote in an article that ORJUNA was helped by the government.
Jul. 21 Stjepan Radic, President of the HRSS left the country and visited London, Vienna and Moscow looking for international understanding of the Croatian cause.
1924
Mime Rosandic (forestry engineer) arrested and maltreated.
April ORJUNA member attacked Jewish properties in Zagreb.
Aug. 1 Stjepan Radic, leader of the HRSS returned from abroad to Zagreb. It became clear that the outside world did not want to hear about “the Croatian question.”
November A gendarme attempted to assassinate August Kosutic, a leading politician in Croatia in Kastel Stari. Treated for head wounds in gendarme station. Jailed right after his return to Zagreb. Soon after, he took a long trip to the USA in order to avoid physical attacks or even assassination.
The Minister of education, S. Pribicevic, retired 3 leading professors (supporters of HRSS) at the Zagreb University. One of the three was Dr. Ladislav Polic. Dec. 23 Declaration to ban the Croatian Republican Peasant Party/HRSS because it joined the Socialist International. Its public meeting and all its publications were banned. The law of public order and protection of state to be implemented against the HRSS, all its archives to be confiscated, and its leadership arrested.
1925
January Police harassed leading Croatian politicians, among them Dr. Josip Lorkovic, Dr. Albert Bazala, Dr. Stjepan Skrulj, Dr. Stjepan Buc, Dr. Krajac, and others.
Seven peasants from Kustosija (near Zagreb) arrested because they displayed a Croatian flag.
The HRSS and Communist representatives in the Osijek city council were stripped off their political positions.
Jan. 1 The Law for the Protection of State, originally passed against the Communists, extended to the Croatian Republican Peasant Party/HRSS/. Criminal procedures were undertaken against its leadership.
Jan. 2 Police searched apartments and offices of all leading HRSS politicians in Zagreb and throughout the country. Many of them were arrested and released after a short detention. But the following were arrested and kept in jail for 6 months: Dr. Vladko Macek, Dr. Juraj Krnjevic, Dr. Stjepan Kosutic, Augustin Kosutic, Josip Predavec. A few days later, the secretary of the HRSS, Serif Kuzmic, was also arrested.
Offices of Osijek newspaper “Hrvatski list” raided and editors maltreated.
The house of Ivan dr. Loncarevic (lawyer in Mitrovica) raided and vandalized.
Jan. 3 600 peasants from Sibenik region arrested, taken to Sibenik, and about a half of them were jailed.
A number of Croats in Sibenik jailed. Among them were: Marko Berovic, Augustin Bujan (priest), Josip Drezga, Dr. Miho Jernic (dentists), Mate Kalmeta, Sime Zenic, Ivan dr. Krnic (former gov. high official). Next day, he was taken to Ogulin. Three Croatian homes in Susak/Rijeka raided.
Jan. 4 Ten members of the HSS in Imotski arrested.
Prof. Pavao Brkic arrested.Dr. ? Cuzzi (Split) arrested. Josip Paf (Sinj) arrested.Prof. Kerubin Segvic (editor of “Croatian Review” in Zagreb) arrested.Dr. ? Sokol (Split) arrested. Pavao Vucic (Sinj) arrested.Dr. Mile Vukovic (Imotski) arrested.
Jan. 5 Stjepan Radic, President of HRSS, arrested. Rudolf Bicanic (economist in Zagreb) – his apartment raided. Dragan Devcic (merchant in Djakovo) jailed for 14 days. Stjepan dr. Hefer (lawyer) jailed for 14 days. Ivo dr. Majcan (lawyer) arrested. ? Mirtejic (in Djakovo) jailed for 14 days.
Pavle Radic (leading man in the HRSS and Croatian representative in Belgrade parliament)- his apartment in Belgrade raided.
Viktor Tomlinovic (priest in Nasice) jailed.Djuro Turkalj (in Djakovo) jailed for 14 days.
All school teachers members of the Croatian Peasant Party dismissed from their jobs.
Jan. 6 Gendarmes opened fire on a crowd of Croats in Ozelj near Karlovac. One peasant killed and two wounded.
Jan. 7 “Croatian Sokol” youth organizations in Velika, Mihaljevac, and Brestovac near Pozega banned.
Jan. 8 Offices of the “Srijemski Hrvat,” Vukovar paper, raided and vandalized.
Seven peasants in Ceric near Vukovar arrested.
Dr. Ivan Majcen (Donji Miholjac) jailed for 6 days.Matijevic (president of the HSS in Bogdanovici) jailed with a number of other HSS members.
All HSS representatives and their secretaries in Donji Miholjac jailed for 5 days.
Jan. 9 In the village of Ladjevac, a local priest (Rev. Mikan) was arrested.
Jan. 13 “Hrvatski List,” Osijek newspaper, banned. After changing the name into “Hrvatska Zora” it was banned also. Jan. 13Rude Bacinic, a leading HRSS representative from Dalmatia, arrested in Belgrade.
Jan. (mid)The president of the local election committee and a member of the HRSS, Prof. Josip Hager, was arrested. He was accused of insulting the king and the regime. Besides being suspended from teaching, he was arrested again at the end of the month and sentenced to a 10 day jail term.
Jan. 25“Hrvatski Branik,” Vinkovci newspaper, banned.
Jan. 31 Djuro Zivic, a HRSS sympathizer, from Novo selo (Varazdin) was arrested, kept in jail till Feb. 8, 1925, and the case against him dragged on till 1927.
Jan. (end) Dr. Milovan Zanic was arrested.
The secretary of the HRSS Zagreb branch arrested
Police in Varazdin attempted to prevent the HRSS from handing to the local court the election lists and harassed the leading HRSS officials in the city, Dr. Ursic and others.
Nikola Separovic, a baker from Vela Luka living near Delnice, arrested. Accused of insulting the Belgrade regime. Feb. (beg.) Gendarmes beat up four peasants in the village of Lukavac. Two of them were seriously hurt.
Feb. 8 The day of elections, police, gendarmes, and even military forces were employed throughout Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to intimidate the non-Serb electorate. Many members of local election committees were harassed and/or arrested. There were numerous clashes between the voters and the gendarmes, and a number of people were injured and even killed.
In a clash between the gendarmes and the voters in Veliko Trgovisce a peasant was killed, and two gendarmes were wounded. Next day, 20 peasants were arrested and, after long tortures, 11 were released and 9 put on trial.
In the village of Stajnica (Lika) four peasants were killed (including an 80 year old woman) and many were wounded by the gendarmes. Stajnica was a stronghold of the HRSS party.
The mayor of the town of Susak (near Rijeka) was suspended from his functions and deprived of his salary because he was not supporting the Serbian Radical party.
In the village of Straznjevac (Varazdin) gendarmes arrested more than 10 peasants accused of displaying a flag with a slogan: “Faith in God and Peasant Solidarity” and of preventing the gendarmes from arresting the HRSS committee-men. After being maltreated and kept in jail for a while, they received from one to four months prison terms.
After the election results were announced, the HRSS supporters were prevented by police, gendarmes, and the military throughout Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina from celebrating the victory.
Feb. 8 General elections – HRSS gained total victory among the Croats.
Feb. 11 “Hrvatski List,” Osijek daily newspaper, banned again.
Feb. 17 “Hrvatski Glas,” Osijek daily newspaper and successor to “Hrvatski list” banned.
Mar. 22 Dr. Albert Bazala (leading intellectual and people’s representative) physically attacked by Serbian members of parliament.
May 25 “Novi List,” daily newspaper in Susak/Rijeka, banned.
July 18 Stjepan Radic was released from jail. He and his party joined the government in Belgrade. His party’s name from now on is simply Croatian Peasant Party /HSS/; the adjective Republican is abandoned.
1926
May Attempt to assassinate Stjepan Radic (leader of the HSS) in Srijemska Mitrovica
1927
January On the island of Krk, displaying of the Croatian flag was banned and civil servants and school teacher came under special pressure because the local elections were coming up. (Jan. 23, 1927). In Varazdin, the city council and the city mayor were removed, and a government official (a gendarme officer) took control of the city.
In Osijek, a communist election leaflet stating “Long live the Republic” was banned.
On the island of Korcula, the HSS candidates were arrested.
In the provinces of Backa and Baranja, the HSS candidates and supporters were under great pressure to abandon their loyalty to their political party. Jan. 4 The ban against the HSS activities (imposed at the end of 1924) was abolished.
Jan. 23 On the day of local elections, about 2000 HSS members were coming to greet Radic at his home in Zagreb. Police dispersed the crowd and injured a number of people.
Aug. A regional representative of the Serbian Democratic Party from Vrelo near Korenica was arrested and sentenced to a 14 day jail term. The Serbian Democratic Party in Croatia came under pressure because its leader, S. Pribicevic, abandoned his policy of Serbian unitarism and became a federalist.
Aug. 28 In Sv. Jakov (near Crikvenica) gendarmes dispersed a HSS meeting and arrested one participant.
Sep. (beg.) In the village Krivi Put (Lika) the president of the local HSS was arrested and sentenced to 14 days of prison.
In Ludbreg, two HSS members were sentenced to a 14 day jail term each. Spt. 11Parliamentary elections. During these election there were no major eruptions of violence but voting manipulation by the regime was worse than in previous elections.
1928
June 20 Serbian Parliament representative, Punisa Racic, opened fire in Belgrade Parliament on Croatian deputies. Stjepan Radic mortally wounded (died on Aug. 8,1928), Dr. Djuro Basaricek killed, Pavle Radic killed, Dr. Ivan Pernar wounded, and Ivan Grandja wounded.
June 20-22 Massive demonstrations in Zagreb. 5 people killed; 50 wounded, more than a hundred arrested.
Dec. 4 Zagreb students demonstrated. Several killed and wounded by the gendarmes. 1929
Jan. 6 King Aleksandar assumed all power in the country, dismissed Parliament, suspended Constitutions, and banned all political parties.
April 30 Djuro Djakovic and Nikola Hecimovic, after being arrested and tortured, were led to the country border and shot.
May Dr. Milovan Zanic (lawyer and a former representative in parliament from Nova Gradiska) sentenced to 6 months for suggesting that king Aleksandar should be asked to return civil rights to the citizens. He had been arrested also in previous years.
June 28 The leader of the Serbs in Croatia, Svetozar Pribicevic, once right-hand man of the Belgrade regime, was confined to a small village in Serbia for his cooperation with the Croat political leaders. From 1931 till his death in 1936, he lived in exile.
July 17 Dr. Ante Pavelic (Zagreb lawyer and representative in Belgrade parliament) condemned to death in absence and his property is confiscated.
Gustav Percec condemned to death in absence and his property is confiscated.
Oct. 3 Displaying of Croatian flag is banned. Oct. 31 The following Croats were arrested and sentenced on June 30, 1931. Marko Hranilovic (student, 20 years old) condemned to death by hanging plus 20 years jail term!! Matija Soldin condemned to death by hanging plus 20 years jail term. Hung on November 25, 1931..
Stipe Javor (from Brinje/Zagreb merchant ) to 20 years. Because of beastly tortures he died in jail on March 27, 1936. Stipe Javor’s wife and two daughters were also arrested and maltreated in order to force him to talk. Antun Herceg (newsman) to 20 years. Dragutin Kriznjak (peasant) to 18 years. Stjepan Horvatek (merchant’s helper) to 15 years. Pavao Glad (hospital clerk) to 15 years. Milan Siladi (blacksmith from Busevac) to 6 years. Antun Vezmarovic (forest guard) to 5 years. Luka Markulin (peasant from Odra) to three years. Mijo Bizik (craftsman) to 18 months. Marija Hranilovic (Marko’s sister; secretary) to 18 months. Gabrijel Kruhak (office clerk in Zagreb) to 18 months. Janko Kruhak (craftsman) to 18 months. Mirko Kruhak (office clerk in Zagreb) to 18 months. Stjepan Markulin (peasant from Odra) to 18 months. Mile Starcevic (office clerk) to 18 months. Luka Cordasic freed. Josip Knoblehar freed. Stjepan Kopcinovic freed. Stjepan Novacic freed. Cvjetko Stahan freed. Mijo Babic escaped the country and condemned in absence. Zvonimir Pospisil condemned in absence. Mladen Lorkovic (Zagreb lawyer) avoided the arrest by escaping the country .
Dec. Blaz Djogic (peasant from Siroki Brijeg) killed by gendarmes
Dec. 5 King Aleksandar banned the “Croatian Sokol” that had over 40,000 members.
Dec. 19 Vilko Begic (military colonel) arrested. Freed on June 14, 1930.
Jaksa Jelasic (professor in Zagreb) arrested and sentenced to 3 years plus the loss of civil rights for 4 years.
52 Zagreb students arrested together with Begic and Jelasic.
Dec. 29 The following Croats were arrested, tried in Belgrade, and on June 14, 1930 sentenced: Ivan Bernardic (merchant’s assistant from Barilovic) to 15 years, expulsion from Zagreb for 3 years, and the loss of civil rights for life. Stjepan Matekovic (craftsman from Kostajnica) to 10 years. Filip Paver (state clerk in Zagreb) to 10 years. Martin Franekic to 8 years the loss of civil rights for life.Ivan Skrtak to 6 years and permanent loss of civil rights. Cvjetko Hadzija to 5 years and the loss of civil rights for 5 years. Ante Stefanac to 4 years and the loss of civil rights for 4 years. Velimir Mocnaj (book store owner in Karlovac) to 3 years and the loss of civil rights for 3 years. Ivan Prpic (lawyer from Jastrebarsko) to 2 years. Ivan Ban (merchant’s assistant from Kresevo) to 1 year and loss of civil rights for 3 years. Franjo Veselic to 1 year. Ljubomir Kremzir to 6 months. Pavao Margetic to 6 months. Bozo Arnsek freed. Mirko Debanic freed. Albin Gasparac freed. Franjo Kuntic (restaurant owner) freed. Ivan dr. Lebovic (lawyer) freed. Milan Levnajic freed. Antun Stefanic freed.
1930
Ivan Rosic jailed 14 days for placing a wreath on the grave of Stjepan Radic. Jan. 4 Dr. Vladko Macek (leader of the HSS) arrested, tried in Belgrade and freed on June 14, 1930. Seven Croatian prisoners that were acquitted together with Macek at the trial in Belgrade and four of their lawyers were celebrating their release. That was considered a crime and all were sentenced to a 30 days prison term.
May Over 100 Croats arrested. Accused of planning to place an explosive under the train taking a delegation to see the king in Belgrade. Among them were: Antun Budrovac – later sentenced to a jail term. Franjo Canic – later sentenced to a jail term. Franjo Carevic – later sentenced to a jail term. Antun Herman (shoemaker in Djakovo) – later sentenced to a jail term. Zeljko Klemen – later sentenced to a jail term. Karlo Kovacevic – later sentenced to a jail term. Sime Mikic – later sentenced to a jail term. Ivan Ruskan – later sentenced to a jail term. Luka Stjevic – later sentenced to a jail term. Anka Sultajs (woman) – later sentenced to a jail term. Andrija Tilman (postal clerk in Djakovo) – later sentenced to a jail term.
June Josip Predavec (Vice President of the HSS) condemned to 2 and a half years of prison.
1931
During the year “a number of Croats” killed by Chetniks and/or gendarme forces.
Zvonimir Topilnik (bank clerk in Livno) died in jail under torture.
Dr. Dragutin Toth arrested and tried with 13 more members of the HSS.
Ivan Jedlicka tortured and died in Virovitica prison.
Jan. 14 Obrad Pavlovic (Croat from Backa) killed near Italian border.
Feb. ? Bosnjakovic (craftsman in Djakovo) died in jail under gendarmes’ torture.
Josip Poropat (young man from Zagreb) killed by gendarmes and his body was thrown from the 3rd floor into the courtyard.
174 Croats arrested in Zagreb
Feb. 17Djuka Ilijanic (peasant) died in Zagreb under torture.
Feb. 18Dr. Milan Sufflaj (a leading Croat intellectual) assassinated.
April Ante Pavelic (peasant from Bosanski Brod) arrested and severely tortured. After his release, escaped to Austria and soon died of complications caused by tortures.
May Josip Nadj (merchant from Ferdinandovac) died in jail under torture
May 4 Trial of 22 Croats began in Zagreb. Among the 22 volunteer defending counsels was Dr. Vladko Macek, leader of the Croatian Peasant Party who a year earlier was himself tried and acquitted in Belgrade. (See Oct. 31, 1929)
May 23 In Belgrade, 3 Croats were sentenced to death, one of them in absence. 11 others received a total of 126 years jail terms. Two were sentenced to 20 and 15 years, but they escaped the country. One of the accused was acquitted.
June Milka Hranilovic (a woman) jailed because of her son’s activities.
June 31 Ante Crvic, Ignac Domitrovic, and Mijo Seletkovic were condemned in absence.
July 12About 12,000 people attending the Eucharistic Congress in Omis. Gendarmes opened fire on the masses. Two people killed and many wounded.
July 23 Six months after their arrests, a group of Croats tried in Belgrade and sentenced. Among them, Ivan Rosic (shoemaker’s assistant) to death by hanging (hung).
Aug. 1 man (peasant from Lencak near Lasinja) killed by gendarmes. Aug. 10Ilija Petrovic (Nova Gradiska) died under prison torture in Zagreb.
Aug. 11The following Croats were sentenced: Ivan Ljevakovic (father’s name Matin from Lipak; streetcar controller in Zagreb) to death. Later commuted to life imprisonment. Ivan Ljevakovic (father’s name Franjo; peasant from Lipak) to 15 years. Adolf Miler sentenced in Belgrade to 15 years. Ivan Saub to 10 years. Petar Nozaric to 2 years. Stjepan Papac to 2 years. Ignac Terihaj to 10 months. Milan Lukac (from Nova Gradiska) freed. Josip Miklausic – cooperated with prosecution. Martin Nagy – cooperated with prosecution. Hung himself in jail. Supposedly suicide.
Dec. 8 Chetniks in the country of Benkovac terrorized Croats who did not participate in the elections. Five peasants killed and many wounded. 1932
Villages in Lika region were terrorized and possessions confiscated after the Lika rebellion.
129 Croats were tried for verbal “insult of the king’s name” in the regions of Petrinja, Bjelovar, Zagreb, Ogulin, and Varazdin alone.
Pastor of the Catholic parish in Krasna/Lika arrested because of his “provocative” sermon. A number of Croats in Pazariste/Lika were severely beaten by gendarmes. Among them were: Joso Alivojdic, Petar Dasovic (75 years),
Ilka Hodak (24 year woman), Tomo Marinkovic (beaten daily for 10 days), Jerko Rukavina (70 year), ? Smiljcic (14 years), Manda Stimac (older woman), Jure Zivkovic – his skull was broken and the gendarmes left him for dead.
23 people (from 23 to 92 years of age) severely beaten by gendarmes force in Brusani/Lika. Among them were: Sule Devcic (92 years old) and Mican Lisac (73 year old)
Ivan Domitrovic (peasant from near Imotski) killed by the Chetniks in his home.
Jozo Olujic (Opanci/Imotski) killed by the Chetniks.
Towards the end of the year, a group of Croats were arrested and sentenced in Jan. 1933. Among them: Franjo Furlan to 7 years, Stjepan Tomljenovic 7 years, Sime Balen to 4 years, Nikola Busljeta to 2 years, Mile Sikic 6 months, Antun Balen freed, and Jakov Kubretovic freed.
Five Croats killed on the border to Italy and to Hungary.
Towards the end of the year, 121 people (mostly peasants from Prijedor region) brought to trial in Banja Luka.
Feb. 18 Ive Dusevic (20 years old man from Ljubac/Zadar) killed by Chetniks.
Feb. 20 A peasant in Bosanski Brod killed by gendarmes.
March Blaz Savic (peasant in Benkovac region) deprived of any assistance because of his nationality and political beliefs- died of hunger.
Mara Troskat (a woman in Banjevac/Benkovac) deprived of any assistance because of her nationality and political beliefs – died of hunger.
Nikola Zrilic (Sopoti/Benkovac) deprived of job and social assistance because of his nationality and political stands – died of hunger.
Mar. 4 Many peasants from Lisani/Tinja arrested and held in jail for a long time while their children had no food.
Mar. 6 Students at the University in Zagreb display 3 Croatian flags; many of them arrested and maltreated. Branko Buzjak (student in Zagreb) seriously wounded by police.
Mar. 25 ? Aljinovic (truck driver in Ston/Peljesac) killed by Chetniks
April 4 The Government led by General Petar Zivkovic, known for his harsh rule, forced to resign. Hops were high that the new Government would be less oppressive, but such hopes did not materialize.
April 24 About 200 peasants expressed their disatisfaction by marching to the city of Ludbreg. March crushed by gendarmes, leaders arrested and punished.
Apr. 30 Jakov Peraic (peasant in Polaca/Zadar) killed and robbed by a Serb border guard.
May A large number of people maletreated, beaten, arrested or punished by other means in Suska/Rijeka, Bjelovar, Ogulin and other places.
May 12-14 About 600 peasants peacefully demonstrated demanding removal of the local administration in Kosinj/Lika. Gendarmes crushed the protest in blood.
May 15 Gendarmes crushed spontaneous political demonstrations in Senj. Many people were injured, arrested, and punished.
May 26 Gendarmes used a brutal force to crash demonstrations in Split. A large number of people arrested and maltreated.
June Tomislav Corak (peasant from Brdari/Sanski Most) killed by gendarmes.
Ivan Eres (peasant) killed by gendarmes near Hungarian border.
June 7 An attempt to assassinated Dr. Mile Budak, a well known Croatian writer, takes place in Zagreb.
June 14 Attempted murder of two men in Zagreb by members of Young Yugoslavia.
June 20 Commemorations for the Croatian victims shot in Belgrade parliament in June 1928. Arrests, beatings, and shootings by gendarmes take place in many parts of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Secretary of HSS in Bosanski Brod arrested. Gendarmes open fire on the crowd gathered in front of the local jail.Twenty people wounded and many more arrested.
Stjepan Matkovic (Bosanski Brod) killed by gendarmes. A peasant (Bosanski Brod) killed by gendarmes. A peasant woman (Bosanski Brod) killed by gendarmes.
June 20-21 A large number of peasants from Draganic/Karlovac arrested and maltreated.
June 29Gendarmes opened fire on a Catholic religious procession in Stubica/Zagorje. One man and one woman were killed. Numerous people wounded. Many were maltreated and jailed after the event.
July Ivan Kajda and Pavao Lukac (peasants from Virovitica) killed by gendarmes. Aug. Two peasants in Donja Stubica/Zagorje killed by gendarmes.
Aug. 16 Gendarmes attacked the village of Braslovlje/Samobora. A few peasants were killed and several wounded.
Sept. After the “Lika Rebellion” many Croatians jailed and most of them, after being beaten and tortured, where released. Twelve of them taken to Glavnjaca jail near Belgrade where they were maltreated and spent 9 months before they were tried. Andrija Artukovic, Marko Dosen, Josip Tomljenovic, Ivan Saric, and Nikola Oreskovic escaped from the country.
“A few dead and several wounded peasants” (in Oroslavlje/Zagreb region). Gendarmes used violence because Croatian flag was hoisted.
Pasko Kaliterna (merchant in Split) and Fabijan Plazinic (Split) jailed, tried in Belgrade, and freed on March 14, 1933.
Sept. 14 Stipe Devcic (peasant in Jadovno, Lika) killed by gendarmes.
Sept. 21 Djuro Kemfelja (peasant from Stubica Gornja) jailed and sentenced to 18 months in Belgrade on March 14, 1933.
Petar Posaric jailed and sentenced to 8 months in Belgrade on March 14, 1933.
Oct. Viktor Kosutic jailed; sentenced to 10 months in Belgrade on March 14, 1933.
? Pecnikar (railroad official in Zagreb) died as a consequence of police tortures.
Oct. 5 Dr. Ivan Pernar (leading Croat politician) jailed and sentenced on March 14, 1933 to 1 year of jail term.
Oct. 17 Dr. Vladko Macek, leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, arrested on account of an interview printed in an English newspaper.
Nov. Luka Devcic (peasant from Lika) died in jail under gendarmes’ torture.
Nov. 20-28 Three peasants from Nin county killed by gendarmes.
Dec. ? Frkovic (craftsman in Benkovac) died under gendarmes’ torture. Sime Grgic (Nin) died in jail under gendarmes’ torture.
Mile Kordun (peasnat from Mumici/Nin) killed by gendarmes.
? Misura (tavern owner in Benkovac) died as a consequence of gendarmes’ tortures.
Dec. 5 “About 100 students and city people” arrested and tortured because of an explosion that took place in Zagreb on Dec. 1, 1932. Dec. 9 Miro Perkovic (peasant from Ljubac/Nin) killed by gendarmes.
1933
98 people were tried for verbal “insult of the king’s name” in the regions of Petrinja, Bjelovar, Zagreb, Ogulin, and Varazdin alone.
“At the beginning of the year,” 8 people were jailed from 10 to 14 days in Podravina.
Ivan Borac (peasant from Razanci/Zemunik) mortally wounded by a Chetnik in front of the church right after the church service.
Ante Dobrila (post-office clerk in Senj) sentenceed to 14 years.
Marko Dosen (merchant from Lika) escaped from the country because of persecutions. His family was also persecuted and their business license suspended in May of 1933.
Sime Dusevic (peasant from Asin near Nin) killed by gendarmes Milivoj Cumic. He also killed P. Grgic and was decorated with the “Medal of St. Sava” for special merits.
Ivan Gabaj (peasant from Hlebine) is arrested, severely tortured and then shot to death by gendarmes.
Franjo Mraz (peasant from Hlebine) tortured and killed by gendarmes.
Pavle Perkovic (peasant from Perkovici near Sl. Brod) killed by Chetnik Rusic.
? Rasic (peasant from the region of Sl. Brod) killed at a public meeting by Chetniks.
? Rupcic (from Senj) sentenced to 3 years of jail.
Vladimir Secko (merchant’s helper in Senj) sentenced to 18 years of jail.
About 600 large animals were confiscated by gendarmes and 48 houses and barns were torched in northern Dalmatia and Lika, especially in Podgorje and Devcici.
? Stojilovic (peasant from Oreskovica) killed on the day of local elections by Zivot Radivojevic. Drago Vlahovic (clerk in Senj) sentenced to 8 years of jail.
Blaz Vukutin (peasant from Pakostani) died because of tortures suffered in jail.
Jan. 60 peasants from Djelkovac, Koprivnica, and other villages in the area were led barefoot to Prlog jail where they were maltreated and tortured.
The following peasants were jailed and gravely tortured: Antun Babat, ? Dretar, Josip Havajic (Tortured to the point of death. Last minute medical intervention kept him alive.), Josip Jurasin, Franjo Makar, ? Petkovic, ? Stancin, Pavao Turek, and Ignac Zlatar. Sandor Trajber killed by gendarmes near Donja Lendava.
Jan 21 Dr. Valdko Macek (Leader of the Croatian Peasant Party/HSS) jailed. Charges filed against him in March. He is transferred to state security jail in Belgrade. Sentenced to 3 years of jail term on April 29, 1933.
Feb. Vilko Begic jailed.
Vladimir Bogovic (clerk in Karlovac) commited suicide because of persecutions.
Feb. 15 Josip Silobrcic (pharmacist in Biograd near Zadar) jailed and tortured.
40 peasants from the region of Sibenik arrested and taken to the city. All accused of anti-state activities. After 185 days of solitary confinement, Silobrcic and 10 others were taken to Belgrade and declared innocent on December 20, 1933 because the charges were brought against them “arbitrarily.”
Mar. 11 Antun Ivanov (peasant from Preko/Zadar) tortured to death while in jail.
Mar. 14 Cvjetko Nizic (from Preko/Zadar) tortured to death while in jail.
April Ruzica Knezevic (peasant woman from Perusic) died because of the beatings she suffered at the hands of gendarmes.
April 18 A group of peasants from Recice were taken to Karlovac jail and tortured. One of them, Andrija Pavlic suffered terrible tortures.
April 24 Gendarmes used force to suppress students’ demonstrations in Zagreb.
April 29 Gendarmes used force to stop student demonstrations in Zagreb. May About 200 students in Zagreb jailed and terrorized for displaying Croatian flag.
Josip Kostelac (student in Zagreb) jailed and greatly tortured. Sentenced in December 1933.
? Bekavac (peasant from Prolozac/Benkovac) killed by a Serb member of the Sokol organization.
Sime Dijan (Lika) sentenced to 6 months because he did not report suspected nationalists to gendarmes.
Petar Grgic (Murvice/Zadar) killed by gendarme Milivoj Cumica.
Andrija Nadnicic (Lika) sentenced to life imprisonment.
Five others tried with Nadnicic received sentences from 3 to 8 years.
May 20 The following peasants and former HSS parliamentary representatives from the region of Garasnica were jailed: Tomo Madjeric, Misko Racan, TomoVojkovic, At the same time, many peasants from the region were terrorized by gendarmes and taken to Zagreb prison in order to reveal a presumed “great plot” against the state.
July A woman killed in an attack on a Catholic religious procession in Split.
More than 50 Croats accused of belonging to Ustasha movement were tried in three groups in Lika. Among them the following were sentenced: Josip Cacic to life imprisonment, Stjepan Mabasa to life imprisonment, Milan Silhovic 10 months, and others in the group received jail terms from 6 to 15 years.
July 10 After spending 9 months in the notorious Glavnjaca jail near Belgrade, the following Croats were sentenced: Jure Rukavina (forcefully retired officer) condemned to death. Tortured so much that he had to be carried on a stretcher to the court. It was expected that he would succumb to the tortures and die, the king commuted the sentence to life imprisonment. After the king’s assassination the sentence was commuted to 20 years. Jerko Sudar to “eternal servitude” (after king’s assassination the sentence was commuted to 20 years). Leopold Super (peasant from Brusani) to 20 years. Ivan Abramovic (a young craftsman) to 15 years. Jure Gazic to 15 years. Antun Super (shoemaker from Brusani) to 15 years. Josip Baric (peasant from Brusani) to 12 years. Josip Vukic (merchant’s helper from Tribalj/Crikvenica) 10 years. Ivan Rukavina (peasant from Pazariste Donje) to 3 years. Dane Babic (peasant from Brusani) to 9 months. Josip Super (from Brusani) freed. Pavao Baric (peasant from Brusani) freed. A week later, the third group of suspected “Ustashe” was tried in Lika.
July 14 J. Predavec murdered.
July 24 Mirko Neudorfer (former gov. minister and HSS representative) murdered at Ladislavac/Zlatara.
Aug. Augustin Franic (peasant from Sukosani/Dalmatia) killed by Chetniks.
Sept. 9 Ivo dr. Pilar (59 year old well known intellectual and opponent of the regime) officially committed suicide but it is believed that he was murdered.
Sept. 27-28 A large number of students in Zagreb jailed and/or terrorized.
Oct. A terrorizing expedition into the village of Vinice and the surrounding area takes place. This resulted into: Josip Krobot (peasant from Gornje Ladanje/Varazdin) killed. A few hundreds of peasants severely beaten and terrorized.
Dec. 1 Post-office clerk (Selska cesta) killed for singing Croatian patriotic songs.
Dec. 16 King Aleksander in Zagreb. Failed plot to assassinate him discovered.
Dec. Massive arrests (more than 1000 people) and maltreatments in Zagreb. Many of them highschool students. Others expelled from the city.
1934
“Many peasants” arrested in Koprivnica region. Among them the following were sentenced to life inprisonment, later commuted to 15 years: ? Horvatinovic (from Gola), ? Novak (from Gola), ? Posezi (from Gola), ? Suboticanec (from Gola), Janko Varga (from Novacka Gola), ? Pavlic (from Djelkovac), ? Petak (from Djelkovac), ? Sabol (from Djelkovac), ? Vuljak 1 (from Djelkovac), ? Vuljak 2 (from Djelkovac), ? Vuljak 3 (from Djelkovac), ? Sijak (from Grbasevac), and ? Vutuc (from Grbasevac).
“About 100 peasants, workers and students” in Zagreb arrested and maltreated. About 20 people severely tortured.
Ivan Saric (peasant from Zemunik) beaten so badly by gendarmes that he died of the injuries received.
Jan. 11 Ivan Varga (peasant from Dubrave/Medjimurje) killed by gendarmes. In July 1934, his son received a bill to pay 13.15 dinars for the five bullets by which his father was killed.
Mar. 13 Trial of eight Croats begins in Belgrade. They are sentenced on March 21, 1934: Stjepan Pizeta (peasant from Gornje Ladanje/Varazdin) condemned to death. Franjo Zrinski (peasant from Gornje Ladanje/Varazdin) condemmned to death. Tomo Kelemen (mason from Gornje Ladanje/Varazdin) “perpetual servitude.” Mijo Kalaman 1 (mason from Gornje Ladanje/ Varazdina) to 1 year. Mijo Kelemen 2 (peasant from Gornje Ladanje/ Varazdina) to 1 year. Marko Krobot (peasant from Gornje Ladanje/Varazdin) to 5 months. Josip Petkovic freed. Milja Brodar (woman) freed.
Mar. 29 Josip Begovic (student in Zagreb) condemned to death by hanging. Petar Oreb (worker from Vela Luka/Korcula) condemned to death by hanging. Hung on May 12, 1934. Antun Podgorelec (masonary apprentice from Suhopolje/Vinkovci) condemned to death by hanging; later commuted to life. After spending three months in jail where they were tortured, a group of eighteen people were sentenced: Nikola Murkovic (lawyer from Gospic) to 2 years, Ante Vlajnic (merchant in Perusic) to 20 months, Martin, Dosen (Licki Osik) to 12 months, Dr. Fran Binicki (pastor in Licki Osik) to 10 months, Mile Butkovic (merchant from Perusic) to 10 months, Nikola Kolacevic (merchant from Kaniza) to 8 months, Mate Zalovic (peasant from village of Vuksice) jailed eight months, Nada Kolacevic (housewife from Gospic) to 6 months, Nikola Polic (pastor in Gospic) to 6 month, Andrija, Brkljacic (Gospic) to 5 months, Ante Brkljacic (Gospic) to 5 months, Mate, Brkljacic (peasant from Kaniza) to 5 months, Josip Matijevic (student from Kaniza) to 5 months, Nikola Matijevic (student) to 5 months, Ivan Stilinovic (peasant from Gopsic) to 4 moths, Marko Smolcic (student under age from Karlobag) sent to a home for delinquent youth, Ivica Murkovic (a retired military officer from Gospic) to ?, and Mime Rosandic (forestry engineer from Gospic) freed but kicked out from work.
Mar. 30 Mato Keselic – (peasant) ambushed and killed by gendarmes near Vrpolje.
Apr. Villagers in Sv. Kriz (Krapina) openly protested against terror of the local gendarmes. Repraisals followed and over 50 villagers were jailed and maltreted.
Apr. 12 About 100 Zagreb Croats arrested and maltreated.
Apr. 20 Two peasants in the village of Lanusa near the Italian border killed.
May 30 Trial of eight Croats began. They were sentenced on June 4, 1934: ? Zindric was aquited. Josip Katusic (permanent residence in the U.S.A.) to death. Ivan Barakovic (civil servant in Osijek) to 15 years of prison. Others received received from 6 month to 10 years jail terms, including Stjepan Crnicki (civil servant in Zagreb).
Aug. Valentin Rosulja – (peasant) killed by Chetnik brothers: Jovan, Milan and Nikola Djurcic.
Josip Sabov – killed by chetniks in Horgac, Backa.
Aug. 1 Ivan Kovacevic – (peasant) killed in Otocko near Bosanski Brod.
Sept. Four political trials: Two people condemnd to death, five received life sentences, and others received sentences from one to 15 years.
Ivan Lucic – (worker) died in Susak(Rijeka) jail while being tortured.
Sept. 11 The following were sentenced in Zagreb from 10 to 24 months of prison terms because of an “anti-state” leaflet: Vinko Begic, Juraj Horvat,Andrija Hrsak, Ljudevit Ivekovic, Dr. Ivan Pernar – lawyer (30 months), Andrija Raspor, Karlo Sejkot, Lenka Stimac (woman),
Sept. 20 The following were sentenced: Stjepan Sever (peasant from Podravina) to 12 years. Ivan Kraljic (people’s representative from Podravina till Jan. 6, 1929) to 8 years. Stjepan Prvcic (peasant from Podravina) to 8 years. Blaz Badalec (peasant from Podravina) to 6 years. Ivan Glavak (peasant from Podravina) to 3 years. Marija Glavak (peasant woman from Podravina) to 3 years. Ivan Ostriz to (peasant from Podravina) 2 years. Ivan Horvatinovic (peasant from Podravina) to 2 years. Marija Badalec (peasant from Podravina) to 1 year.
Oct. 9 King Aleksandar assassinated in Marseilles.
1935
From January 1935 to January 1936, 96 people were killed by gendarme forces.
Members of the “Catholic action” maltreated throughout Croatia just because they belonged to a Catholic organization.
A number of the members of the Catholic organization “Zrinski” in Djurdjevac were arrested. They were severely beaten in Pitomaca, on the way to prison, and again while investigated in jail. Teenage boys in the village of Djurdjevac had their hands beaten by gendarmes so hard that they were disabled for a lengthy period.
A number of villagers were hid in the nearby woods out of fear of the gendarmes and they were afraid to come back home. The whole village lived in fear.
A number of peasants beaten up by gendarmes in Mala Erpenja, the region of Krapinske Toplice. Among them were: Stjepan August, Florijan Belin (60 years old), Makso Golubic, Rudolf Golubic, Slavko Golubic, Juraj Juranic, Makso Juranic, Mirko Juranic, Andro Kordej,Franjo Kos (50 years old), Janko Mihel (20 years old), Josip Mihel (70 years old), Vilim Mihel (40 years old), Franjo Rusek (35 years old),Otokar Sostaric, Viktor Sostaric (merchant), Vjekoslav Stengl (25 years old), Makso Svecnjak, and Stjepan Svecnjak.
A “multitude of peasants” beaten up by gendarmes in Zabok. Among them: ? Sepec (beaten by five gendarmes while plowing his land), Marko Bivol, and Ivan Borovcak.
Peaceful peasants terrorized by gendarmes in Vojni Kriz near Cazma. Among the most severely beaten were: Franjo Ciglencki, Franjo Krivacic, and Danijel Magdic.
14 peasants beaten up by gendarmes in Sesvete near Ludbreg.
In Bizovac (Valpovo) gendarme supervisor Vasilije Dinic, arbitrarily arrested Stjepan Kis and beat him severely while in jail. The same officer beat Andrija Perosevic, who ended up in the hospital because of the severe beating.
In Adolfovac near Osijek workers, Luka Vukovic, Antun Gurdel, and Milan Grgic, were arrested, and beaten to unconsciousness. Vukovic’s teeth knocked out; had to be taken to Osijek hospital; Grgic’s breast bone was broken. From the local gendarme station they were dragged to Osijek prison and beaten severely.
Janko Simatic (peasant from Adolfovac) severely beaten by gendarmes.
Ivan Krelo (peasant from Kravice near Osijek) on the way home from work arrested, taken to gendarme station, and severely beaten. As a consequence he lost hearing on one ear.
Ilija Kereman and Josip Gorzan (peasants from Laslovo) severely beaten by gendarmes.
20 peasants beaten up by gendarmes in Korodje near Osijek. The most severely beaten were: Tobi Arpadz, Marko Mihalj, Mihalj Miskolic, Danijel Pozar, Feri Sabo, and Janos Sosaj.
200 people from Zitnik and Klanac/Lika walked to Gospic to protest the stealing of voting registration lists. They were ambushed by gendarmes using military rifles. Bozo Markovic (76 years old) was first seriously wounded and then a gendarme used a bayonet to finish him off. Martin Starcevic (38 years) was also killed; first shot and then his skull was smashed by a gendarme. Joso Lulic (58 years) was seriously wounded. Stipe Markovic (36 years) was hit by four shots in the back. Also were wounded: Nikola Milinkovic ( 28 years), Ivan Snjaric (40 years), Ivan Zupan (30 years), and 28 other people.
Gendarmes attacked peasants in the village of Dobranje near Metkovic, maltreated them and killed Ivan Devija.
Group of peasants returning from Starigrad (island of Hvar) to the village of Vrbanj were attacked by gendarmes and severely beaten. A day after, gendarmes beat up 39 villagers.
Rev. Blaz Tomljenovic (pastor in Smiljan/Lika) sentenced to pay 500 dinars because of a Sunday sermon.
Rev. Ivan Ilijic (pastor in Dubasnica/Krk) sentenced to pay 500 dinars for having another well known priest from nearby Krk, Rev. Milan Defar, help him during the Easter holidays. He is charged with sheltering an “unknown person”!
Rev. Milan Defar (priest from Krk) arrested on false charges and later banned from teaching catechism in the local highs chool.
Rev. Janko Medved (priest in Novalja/Pag) chained and taken by boat to the town of Rob, publically humiliated, and sentenced to 8 days jail term.
Rev. Ivan Condic (pastor in Rascani/ Imotski) arrested while in Sinj, led to Zagvozd. While there, the local gendarme commander, Ilija Gajic, cursed his “Catholic God,” called him swine, criminal, and other names, and knocked him to the floor and maltreated him physically over two hours. A day after, Condic was sentenced to 12 days of jail and to pay a 1000 dinars fine.
? Pavlinovic (a merchant from Imotski region) arrested together with Rev. Ivan Condic, maltreated by gendarme commander in Zagvozd and sentenced to 12 days of jail and a 1000 dinars fine.
Gendarmes killed “several people” and injured many others in Primosten near Sibenik.
Feb. 19-20 Gendarmes killed 15 and injureed many Croatian peasants in Sibinj and Slavonski Brod.
May 4 Msgr. Ivan Mrakovcic, chancellor of the Krk diocese, arrested. In order to humiliate him, he is led through town by a group of gendarmes as the worset criminal.
May 5 General elections held.
In the village of Vid, near Metkovic, gendarmes maltreated peasants including children on election day, and positioned two machine guns in the village threatening the population.
On election day, Rev. Mate Rahelic, pastor in Hreljina, arrested at 11 P.M., taken to Susak/Rijeka jail, and held without being charged.
May 11 Franjo Sostaric (peasant from Selnice/Zlatar) shot and killed by gendarmes.
May 19 Gendarmes opened fire on a crowd of local peasants in Kravarsko near Zagreb after a Church celebration. As a result: Djuro Virek and Antonija Jambris (woman) were killed, and Franjo Kanceljak, Stjepan Cekovic, and Franjo Virek (Djuro’s son) were seriously wounded. A number of other peasants were injured.
June 23 Chetniks attack Croatian guests in a well-known restaurant in Zagreb.
Aug. 23 After 11 months of imprisonment and torture, trieal of 37 Croats started in Sarajevo. They were: Antun Alaupovic, Ivan Brcic, Jelisaveta Car (woman), Josip Car, Mate Coric, Stefica Erbic (woman), Tugomir Gelic (Franciscan priest), Mijo Grgic, Antun Hladnik, Leopoldina Hladnik (woman), Marija Hladnik (woman), Tereza Hladnik (woman), Nikola Jarak, Dragutin Juric, Vjekoslav Juric, Vjekoslava Juric (woman), Ante Kacic, Franjo Kolumbic, Augustina Korac (woman), Filip Korac, Miron Kozinovic (Franciscan priest), Blaz Lorkovic,Ela Lorkovic (woman), Josip Milinkovic, Ana Pecek (woman), Emil Pecek, Franjo Pecek, Rafo Prusina (Franciscan priest), Petar Puljic, Ana Sef (woman), Donko Surjan, Petar Surjan, Augustin Tomic (Franciscan priest), Ivanka Trampus (woman), Augustina Ungerman (woman), Franjo Ungerman, and Jozefina Ungerman (woman). Sentences were given on September 17, 1995.
Dec. 11 A few gendarmes were forcfully entering many houses in the village of Djurdjanci/Djakovo and empting them of all posseasions. The official excuse was tax collection. After the peasnts’ resitence to this terror, over 20 more policmen arived at 2:00 A.M. next morning and a large number of peasnats were taken to the local gendarme station. Half-naked, cold, and hungry they were severly beaten and maltreated for a few days. Among other tortures, they were forced to hit each other. Even those who came to village as visitors were beaten and arrested. Men from the village that were not arrested were in hiding in the woods for days. The real cause of the terror: some of the villagers participated in the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the Croatian anthem in Djakovo on December 8, 1935.
The leading gendarme torturer was Avdo Kujundzic (stationed in Djakovo) and the local acuser was an ill-reputed Chetnik Andrija Separac.
Among the arrested and/or tortured were: Adam Begovic, Anka Begovic (maltreated) (woman), Antun Begovic, Bozo Bosnjakoic, Ana Bosnjakovic (woman on the run), Ilija Bosnjakovic (10 year olf boy), Ivan Bosnjakovic, Marko Carevic, Andrija Djakovic, Pavao Kovacevic,Andro Kusic, Nikola Lett (merchant), Mijo Lett (merchant), Pero Lovrenovic, Ivo Majanovic (the village elder), Ivo Majanovic, Damjan Marinovic, Kuzman Marinovic, Franjo Merc, Fabo Nikolic, Ivan Perkovic, Martin Prokopec (visiting the village), Pero Salic, Mate Saric, Pavo Saric, Pero Saric, Martin Sners (old man), Manda Spanjovic (attempt of rape) (woman), Marko Stojkovic (53 year old; visiting the village), Stipe Trepsic, and Marko Vrtaric.
ADDITIONAL PARTIAL LIST OF CROATS WHO WERE IMPRISONED DURING MONARCHIST YUGOSLAVIA.
Asancaic, Nikola (merchant from Gospic) Bacic, ? (shoemaker from Senj) Bakovic, Pero (student in Zagreb) Balan, Sime (student from Jablanac) Baradic, Jako (peasant from Banjevci/Benkovca) Bedekovic, Vjekoslav (merchant’s helper in Gospic) Begovic, Vaso (restaurant owner in Begovici) Bernobic, Pavle (lawyer in Virovitica) Bicanic, Rudolf (lawyer in Zagreb) Biljan, Marijan (sailor from Kuklica/Preko) Biljan, Tomo (type-setter in Kosinj) Bizik, Mijo (merchant’s helper in Koprivnica) Bosnjakovic, Marija (peasant from Andijevci) (woman) Bozjak, Mate (peasant from Kraljev Vir) Bradic, Ante (peasant from Starigrad) Brcko, Franjo (peasant from Kraljev Vir) Brkljacic, Zivo (peasant from Kaniza) Budak, Ante (student in Zagreb) Budrovac, Antun (tailor in Budrovici) Bulat, Krizan (peasant from Banjevci/Benkovac) Busljeta, Nikola (worker from Starigrad) Buterin, Sime (peasant from Starigrad) Buterin, Vicko (restaurant owner from Starigrad) Butorac, Ivan (forest guard from Pazariste Donje) Butorac, Zorka (secretary from Senj) (woman) Cacic, Ivan (peasant from Klanc) Cacic, Josip (state employee from Gospic) Cacic, Martin (peasant from Pazariste Donje) Cacic, Nikola (peasant from Pazariste Donje) Cacic, Nikola Jr. (peasant from Pazariste Donje) Cacic, Vice (shoemaker from Buzina) Carevic, Franjo (office clerk from Djakovo) Cerovski, Bozo (office clerk from Zagreb) Cilovic, Djuka (electritian from Zagreb) Cudina, Marko (peasant from Pridraga) Dasovic, Stipe Peasant from Lukovo Sugarje) Davidovski, Dragan (from Zagreb) Devcic, Dragica (peasant from Lukovo Sugarje) (woman) Devcic, Ivan 1 (peasant from Lukovo Sugarje) Devcic, Ivan 2 (peasant from Lukovo Sugarje) Devcic, Ivan (called Jovo) (peasant from Likovo Sugarje) Devcic, Manda (peasant from Lukovo Sugarje) (woman) Devcic, Marko (peasant from Lukovo Sugarje) Devcic, Martin (peasant from Lukovo Sugarje) Devcic, Nikola ((peasant from Lukovo Sugarje) Devcic, Nikolica (peasant from Lukovo Sugarje) Devcic, Pavao I. (peasant from Lukovo Sugarje) Devcic, Pavao S. (peasant from Lukovo Sugarje) Devcic, Zorka (peasant from Lukovo Sugarje) (woman) Dian, Drago (peasant from Sukosani) Dobrila, Ante (post-office clerk from Senj) Dosen, Ante (peasant from Rizvanusa) Dosen, Ivica (peasant from Lukovo Sugarje) Dosen, Jadre (restaurant owner from Gosipic) Dosen, Lovro (peasant from Lukovo Sugarje) Dosen, Martin (peasant from Licki Osik) Dosen, Martin M. (peasant from Lukovo Sugarje) Dosen, Milka (peasant from Rizvanusa) (woman) Dosen, Misko (peasant from Rizvanusa) Dosen, Stipo (peasant from Rizvanusa) Drazic, Ante (peasant from Sukosani) Ersetic, Feliks (merchant’s helper from Vukovar) Faber, Stjepan (locksmith from Zagreb) Fehervari, Stjepan (bookstore clerk in Osijek) Ficke, Nijo (peasant from Imrovac) Filipovic, Ivan (tailor from Vinkovci) Fiocic, Franjo (worker from Gosipic) Francetic, N. (peasant from Licki Novi) Frkovic, Juraj (merchants helper from Gospic) Frkovic, Marko (harness-maker) Frkovic, Martin (harness-maker from Benkovo) Frkovic, Pero (peasant from Gospic) Frlen, Franjo (worker from Susak/Rijeka) Frlen, Senta (from Susak/Rijeka) (woman)? Furjan, Djuro (locksmith from Martinec/Cazma) Gajer, Mile (peasant from Udbine) Galovic, Josip (peasant from Desinec) Galovic, Mate (peasant from Perusic) Gasparovic, Josip (from Brod na Kupi) Gasparovic, Stjepan (mason’s helper from Crikvenica) Glavak, Ivo (peasant from Fercec) Glojnaric, Mirko (newsman??) Vidi Gmaz, Milan (peasant from Oroslavlje) Goric, Jure (peasant from Novigrad) Gradicek, Matija (merchant from Oroslavlje) Gradicek, Mijo (peasant from Oroslavlje) Gross, Aleksandar (cabinet-maker’shelper from Djakovo) Gruhek, Gabrijel (clerk from Zagreb) Grzan, Ivan (cabinet-maker from Pazariste Donje) Gutic, dr. Viktor (lawyer from Banja Luka) Gvozdic, Ivan (cabinet-maker from Soljani) Harapinac, Miso (peasant from Spisic/Bukovica) Hecimovic, Luka (lawyer from Perusic) Herceg, Antun (newsman from Zagreb) Horvat, Franjo (harness-maker from Zagreb) Horvat, Jurica (printer from Zagreb) Horvat, Vlado (printer from Zagreb) Horvatic, Vid (clerk from Zagreb) Hronic, Franjo (peasant from Trnik) Hronic, Mijo (peasant from Trnik) Hronic, Stjepan (peasant from Trnik) Ivanovic, Josip (peasant from Markovci) Jandric, Imbre (peasant from Trnik) Japundzic, Josip (clerk from Gospic) Jedvaj, Stjepan (restaurant owner from Bistra) Jelic, Ivan (clerk from Brezine) Jelic, Pasko (merchant’s helper from Knin) Jelkovic, Mijo (peasant from Recica) Juretic, Filip (peasant from Sibinj) Jurisic, Ivan (Peasant from Perusic) Jurisic, Ivan 2(Peasant from Perusic) Jut, Vjekoslav (shoemaker from Perusic) Kapovic, Mira (from Visi?) (woman) Karcic, dr. ? (lawyer from Ruma) Karlic, Stipe (peasant from Slatnik) Kartela, Andrija (peasant from Puticani) Katalinic, Vlado (student from Senj) Kirhmajer, Mile (barrel-maker from Djakovo) Klanac, Juko (peasant from Posedarje) Klemen, dr. Zeljko (lawyer from Osijek) Knez, Ferdo (clerk from Srijemska Mitrovica) Kolacevic, Ivan (bookshop owner from Gospic) Kozarcanin, Ivo (writer and poet from Zagreb) Kraljevic, Andrija (peasant from Banjevci/Benkovac) Kraljic, Ante (restaurant owner from Zagreb) Krekovic, Dane (peasant from Perusic) Kruhak, Mirko (shoemaker from Konjscina) Kugler, Bojan (clerk from Zagreb) Lamesic, dr. Marko (lawyer from Ruma) Lanec, Juliusk (locksmith’s helper from Senj) Lenac, Franjo (house-painter from Senj) Levacic, Mijo (peasant from Merhatovec) Levaic, Tomo (merchant from Sibenik) Ljevakovic, Ivan (policman from Lipik) Ljevakovic, Ivan (peasant from Lipik) Lucic, Kazimir (merchant from Slavonski Brod) Magus, Mato (restaurant owner from Senj) Malbasa, Stjepan (clerk from Dugopolje) Mandusic, Sime (worker from Rupe) Marinac, Antun (cabinet-maker from Pazariste Donje) Marinkovic, Marko (peasant from Banjevci/ Benkovac) Markovic, Ivan (peasant from Perusic) Markulin, Mara (peasant from Odra) (woman) Markulin, Petar (peasant from Odra) Markulin, Stjepan Jr. (Peasant from Odra) Martinovic, Josip (sailor from Kuklica) Martinovic, Tomo (peasant from Kuklica) Matijas, Josip (clerk from Trogir) Matonicki, Djuro (student from Virje) Menjaka, Ivan (peasant from Kosut) Micek, Ivan (worker from Batin) Micurin, Tomo (peasant from Trnik) Mihovilic, Ivan (truck-driver from Senj) Mikic, Jure (mechanic from Djakovo) Mikic, Simun (merchant from Djakovo) Miklauzic, Josip (worker from Zagreb) Miler, Adolf (peasant from Sirac/Daruvar) Milinkovic, Vinko (merchant from Gospic) Milkovic, Mijo (shoemaker from Drenovci Brodski) Mirkovic, N. (Student from Gospic) Miskulin, Mate (merchant from Gospic) Mokrovic, Franjo (from Zagreb) Muhar, Ivo (peasant from Klanac) Muhar, N. (Peasant from Pazariste Donje) Murkovic, Ivan (peasant from Gospic) Nadinic, Fudrija (peasant from Sukoisani) Nemec, Blaz (mason from Merhatovec) Nemerschmidt, Albin (upholster from Gospic) Niksic, Tomo (merchants helper from Gospic) Novak, Vinko (peasant from Novacka) Nozaric, Petar (shoemaker from Breznik) Oljica, Josip (peasant from Sukosani) Ozanic, Marko (waiter from Vrgin Most) Papac, Stjepan (printer from Krasno) Papista, Ivan (tailor from Zabok) Paricic, Roko (peasant from Lukovo Sugarje) Pasaric, Pero (railroad clerk from Zagreb) Pavici, Roko (peasant from Lukovo Sugarje) Pavicic, Ivica (peasant from Lukovo Sugarje) Pavicic, Josip (peasant from Lukovo Sugarje) Pavicic, Lovro (peasant from Lukovo Sugarje) Pavicic, Marijan (sailor from Poljica) Pavicic, Martin (peasant from Lukovo Sugarje) Pavicic, Pavao (peasant from Lukovo Sugarje) Pavicic, Pavlica (peasant from Lukovo Sugarje) Pavicic, Vid (peasant from Lukovo Sugarje) Pavlic, Josip (peasant from Djelkovac) Perkovic, Pero (peasant from Brinje) Peter, Stjepan (carpenter from Djelkovac) Petrovic, Stjepan (merchant’s helper from Hlebine) Pill, Tomo (peasant from Ruma) Plese, Pavao (policeman from Ramljani) Pocrnic, Ivan (clerk from Perusic) Polegubic, Petar (peasant from Banjevci/ Benkovac) Polegubic, Tomo (peasant from Banjevci/ Benkovac) Poljak, Rok (peasant from Bistra) Prpic, Ivan (student from Senj) Prsa, Josip (post-office clerk from Oborovo Prvcic, Stjepan (peasant from Koprivnica) Pusic, Marija (h
ouse-maker from Zagreb) (woman) Radeljak, Stjepan (worker from Zagreb) Rajkovic, Nikola (clerk from Zagreb) Rancevic, N. (Court clerk from Senj) Reli, Franjo (barber from Osijek) Ribic, Ivan (sailor from Biograd) Rozman, Stjepan (peasant from Bistra) Rukavina, Juraj (retired officer from Perusic) Rupcic, Nikola (student from Licko Lesce) Ruskar, Ivan (merchant from Bernardovac) Rusko, Djuro (peasant from Gola) Sabic, Sime (mason from Sunja) Sabol, Stjepan (from Djelkovac) Saric, Karlo (peasant from Lukovo Sugarje) Saub, Ivan (merchant from Pakrac) Secke, Vlado (painter from Senj) Sepek, Franjo (butcher from Zagreb) Serzija, Marija (peasant from Banjevci/Benkovac) (woman) Sigecen, Misko (peasant from Martinec/Czama) Sijevic, Luka (peasant from Djakovo) Sikic, Mile Student from Jablanac) Siroki, Ivan (peasant from Novacka) Sjak, Rudolf (peasant from Grbasevac) Sjaus, Ivo (peasant from Tribalj) Sjaus, Mile (peasant from Tribalj) Skolic, Djuro (tailor from Zagreb) Skrlin, Josip (peasant from Bistra) Smolcic, Mato (peasant from Gospic) Smolic, Sime (peasant from Sukosani) Smolic, Slavo (peasant from Puticani) Sokac, Bartol (peasant from Stubica Donja) Sostaric, August (blacksmith from Zebovac) Spanic, Tom (peasant from Desinec) Spehanac, Ante (clerk from Karlovac) Starcevic, dr. Mile (professor from Zagreb) Starcevic, Ivan (peasant from Klanac) Starcevic, Josip (peasant from Pazariste Donje) Starcevic, M. (peasant from Klanac) Starcevic, Martin (peasant from Pazariste Donje) Starcevic, Mile (peasant from Pazariste Donje) Starcevic, N. (peasant from Pazariste Donje) Stilinovic, Milan (truck-driver from Kaniza) Stimac, Ivan (forest guardian from Perusic) Stimac, Lenka (peasant from Perusic) (woman) Stimac, Manda (peasant from Perusic) (woman) Strtan, Ivan (butcher from Zagreb) Subotinec, Babro (peasant from Novacka) Sucek, Djuro (peasant from Kraljev Vrh) Sucev, Valent (peasant from Kraljev Vrh) Sudar, Ljerko (peasant from Brusani) Suhan, Jakov (peasant from Knigora) Suletic, Grga (worker from Dubrovnik) Sultaj, Anka (secretary from Djakovo) (woman) Super, Dujo (peasant from Brusani) Svast, ? (clerk from Senj) Tomasic, Ivan (peasant from Djelkovac) Tomasic, Stjepan (peasant from Djelkovac) Tomljenovic, I. (from Novoselo) Tomljenovic, Ivan (student from Gospic) Tomljenovic, Stjepan (worker from Cavle) Tonkovic, Stjepan (peasant from Nebojane) Toret, Josip (merchant from Sisak) Troskat, Mate (peasant from Banjevci/Benkovac) Turk, Stjepan (peasant from Oroslavlje) Ujhari, Stjepan (worker from Sombor) Valic, Adam (merchant’s helpeer from Jelenje) Varga, Janko (peasant from Otocka) Vedric, Stjepan (peasant from Novacka) Vezmanovic, Stjepan (forest-guard from Busevac) Vidak, Sarlota (from Zagreb) Vlahovic, D. (proprietor from Senj) Vukic, Kuzman (sailor from Triblja) Vuljak, Antun (peasant from Djelkovac) Vuljak, Stjepan (peasant from Djelkovac) Vutuc, Rudolf (carpenter from Koprivnica) Zajec, Drago (truck-driver from Zagreb) Zalec, Djuro (peasant from Mokrice) Zarek, Jandre (peasant from Perusic) Zarek, Josip (harness-maker from Perusic) Zarek, Mile (peasant from Perusic) Zeleznik, Ivka (tailor from Zagreb) (woman) Zelnik, Ignac (from Nasice) Zignic, Ivan (tailor from Zabok) Zniderec, Mijo (mason from Cakovec)
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One of the most blatant terrorist acts of the Belgrade regime in Croatia took place in Senj on May 9, 1937. Gendarmes killed and wounded several young people just for displaying the Croatian flag and singing patriotic songs. The killed were: Katica Tonkovic (girl), Marko Smolcic, Franjo Jelaca, Nikola Bevandic, Tomo Niksic, and Petar Frkovic, and the wounded: Jakov Milkovic, Ante Dosen, Branko Milinkovic, Zlatko Vlahinic, Vladimir Nizija, and Mile Biljan. The above picture was taken during the funeral mass of the killed at St. John’s Church in Gospic.
The picture on the right is a photocopy of the bill received by the son of Ivan Varga to pay 13.15 dinars for the five bullets by which his father was killed on January 11, 1934.
Persecution of Croats in the First Yugoslavia and its Political Consequences – An Introductory Evaluation
An Introductory Evaluation
Ante Cuvalo
Also see the Appendix to this article
Also see: Letters of Protest
We [the Serbs] are masters of your [Croat] lives and your possessions. You have nothing but two choices: either to stay in this country and be obedient, or to move out of our state. We want to dominate. We want to rule. We want to control your body, your soul, and your possessions, because we are the guarantors and the foundation of this great Homeland of ours .1
High Hopes and Big Disappointments
Regardless of the social, economic, and political predicaments to be faced by individuals and peoples in Europe, the end of the First World War was greeted enthusiastically. It was seen as the beginning of a new and better future for the world. Peoples who lived under the oppressive and/or foreign rule of the collapsing empires were especially exhilarated: they thought that the bells of freedom were real. Their hopes and expectations were heightened by declarations such as those of the President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, that the war was fought to make the world “safe for democracy” and by promises that national self-determination would be one of the guiding principles of peacemaking. Furthermore, important social and political changes were taking place. Revolutions were in the making; kaisers and tzars were gone; the newborn countries were promulgating democratic or what looked like democratic constitutions; peasants were becoming an organized political force; in older democracies, women were gaining the right to vote; and new laws promoting higher social justice, including the eight-hour workday, were being passed. These and similar positive changes were signs of a hopeful future.
The Croatian people, despite all the post-war economic hardships, also were caught up in the wave of enthusiasm. Woodrow Wilson’s portrait hung on the walls of numerous homes in Croatia. He was the man of their hopes. They believed that on the ruins of the Habsburg Monarchy they, along with other nations, finally would be able to achieve their dream of national and personal freedom. Even the small minority of Croatian politicians who rushed to unite Croatia with Serbia and Montenegro thought that their decisions would secure freedom and democracy not only for the Croats but for all in the newly formed country. Unfortunately, Croats soon realized that the post-war exhilaration was baseless. The reality was cruel and bloody.
Soon after the war, grave disappointments began to be felt in Croatia and the rest of Europe. The war years had hatched two opposing totalitarian ideologies that threatened the entire continent. Many of those who doubted the virtues of liberal democracy looked to the extreme Left or Right for answers. The result was that out of twenty-seven countries in Europe that professed democracy during the immediate post-war era only ten were able to preserve even a modicum of democracy by the end of the 1930s. It became obvious that the Great War and the post-war peace treaties did not lay the foundation for a better future but for another cataclysmic cycle.
The Croatian people did not have to wait very long for the new state to show its true face. Persecutions began even before the official unification of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (known as Yugoslavia after 1929) took place on December 1, 1918. In some official Serbian documents, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and other former Habsburg regions united with Serbia were declared as “occupied lands” and the civilian population in these regions was subjected to Serbian military laws .2 Instead of a partnership an occupation began!
The persecution of the Croats in the period between the two World Wars has not been well- known or adequately researched. It was one of the taboo subjects in both monarchist and socialist Yugoslavia. Judicial, police, military, and other records in the country are still waiting for serious research on this important subject. This introductory survey and the partial list of persecutions that follow are based mainly on secondary sources and are intended to give the reader at least a taste of the bitter Croatian experience in monarchist Yugoslavia. However, for lack of available sources to the author, the survey is limited to persecutions from 1918 to 1936 only. We thought that a list and a short description of the main semi-official organizations involved in terrorizing all those who were considered enemies of the state would also be helpful; and, at the end, several political consequences of the persecutions will be mentioned.
Self-imposed Guardians of the State
The use of terror in monarchist Yugoslavia was applied against all those who were seen as enemies not only of the state but of the Serbian centralized and unitary regime. The real object of oppression, however, was not some aberrant individuals but an entire group, a political party, a whole people. In the old Byzantine tradition, the guardians of the state saw politics only as extremes: if one is not with us he must be against us. Politics of negotiations and compromises were not an option. For them that was seen as a defeat. Accordingly, there was no choice but to crush mercilessly all the “dark forces” in the country. Croats as a people were seen as the most dangerous state enemy, because they were not willing to give up their national identity and opposed the militant and Serbian-controlled state. It was necessary, therefore, to force the Croats into submission, to break their national will, to humiliate them, to prevent them from forming a unified, strong national political front, and to deprive their national struggle of sympathy support and legitimacy in the world.
The first anti-Croat terrorist acts were committed even before the official unification of the state took place. From October 29, when the Croatian Sabor (Parliament) severed Croatia’s ties with the Habsburg Monarchy till December 1, 1918, when the common state was proclaimed, all leading Croatian political, cultural, and religious persons who were seen as political opponents to the union, were either arrested, physically threatened, and/or lost their jobs. The man who assumed all powers in Croatia was Svetozar Pribicevic, the leading Serb politician in the land, and under his command all those who opposed unification with Serbia had to be silenced or crushed.
Only five days after the unification, a peaceful march at Zagreb’s main square was turned into a blood bath. Nine Croatian soldiers and five civilians were killed, and seventeen persons were wounded. A month later, the first post-war political trial in Zagreb was over and 23 Croats were sentenced from one and a half to ten years of prison. The harshest terror in the post-unification era, however, was exerted against the Croatian peasants, who made up the overwhelming majority of the people.
Towards the end and immediately after the war, the villages in Croatia, as in many other regions of Europe, were undergoing various political and social changes. The peasants had seen their sons sent off to the front from which many did not return. They were financially and physically exhaused by ever-increasing taxes and other war burdens, of war profiteering and the war itself. The Croatian peasants lost their traditional respect for state authority as well as monarchy. They became acutely aware of their precarious political, economic, social, and national position, and wanted change, some even a radical one.
In a number of places in Croatia the countryside was controlled by the “Green Cadres,” the rebellious bands of soldiers who had deserted and who were joined by various other social elements. Most of these were sons of peasants; and, it is estimated that the rebels’ numbers reached 200,000 at one point. The peasant population was, willingly or unwillingly, their main ally. This meant that many villages in Croatia were in near chaos toward the end of the war. Furthermore, the echoes of the revolutions in Russia and in neighboring Hungary were felt in Croatian villages too. Then, at the end of the war, they were pushed into a new state without being asked what they wanted. This new political arrangement did not ease the political, economic, and social tension in the villages. On the contrary, the new rulers and their harsh methods inflamed Croatian villages to the breaking point.
The peasants became well aware of political and social ideals, like personal and national freedoms, equality under the law, and social justice, but instead of getting closer to achieving such goals after 1918, they saw their situation in the new state getting worse. For example, Croatian peasants had to pay more kinds of taxes at higher rates than under the Habsburgs. Some taxes increased as much as eight hundred percent in comparison to the pre-1918 period. For example, the peasant had to pay tax on his home-made wine regardless if he sold it or had it only of his own use. The control over the tobacco production was so strict that persons had to pay fines, endure beatings, and even jail terms for smoking their own home- grown tobacco. Taxation easily turned into a national issue because a peasant in Croatia paid four times higher taxes than a peasant in Serbia. Even his vote was worth less than that of a citizen in Serbia. For example, the number of voters needed to elect a parliamentary representative were: Vojvodina 3,221; Montenegro 4,350; Serbia and Macedonia 5,657; Croatia and Slavonia 6,840; Bosnia and Herzegovina 7,478, and in Dalmatia (southern Croatia) 8,106 3 The peasant was especially offended by registration, stamping, and military mobilization of all large domestic animals (horses, mules, oxen). Most of the time, such animals and their owners were forced to participate in military maneuvers for long periods of time and quite often during planting or harvest seasons. These and similar pressures resulted in numerous peasant rebellions against the new regime in several parts of Croatia. Some independent peasant republics were proclaimed shortly after the new state was formed.
Among the most sensitive issues for the peasants in the immediate post-war era was the recruitment of their sons into military service. In many Croatian villages these efforts were marked by bloodshed. Everyone was weary and wary of war and militarism, especially the Croatian peasant who now had to serve a new state which behaved as a foreign power and oppressor from the outset. The problem of recruitment was also complicated by implementation of a Serbian law by which the village “zadrugas” (communes) and their leaders were responsible for bringing in the new recruits. But such village “zadrugas” did not exist in Croatia for very long. This resulted in military and gendarme expeditions into Croatian villages that apprehended, beat, and otherwise mistreated the recruits or, if they could not find them, their immediate family members, including mothers and sisters. Such raids would often result in killing, major destruction of property, and threats and insults of a national and religious nature. The relatives were kept in jail and most often maltreated till their sons or brothers surrendered to the military authorities.
Terror became the main means to pacify Croatia. In response, the peasants at first turned to rebellions and then accepted the political program of the brothers Antun and Stjepan Radic, who advocated a peaceful struggle for personal, national, and peasant rights. By embracing the program of the Croatian Republican Peasant Party, the peasantry became the backbone of the Croatian resistance during the 1920s. But peaceful politics did not bring desired results. On the contrary, the plan “to level off [Croatia] by the Serbian opanak [peasant footwear]” 4 continued. This culminated with the assassination of Stjepan Radic and his friends in Belgrade’s Parliament in 1928 and the King’s proclamation of a personal dictatorship a few months later. From that point on, more radical political forces in Croatia turned to violence as the only means of freeing themselves not only from the regime but from the Yugoslav state itself.
Statistical Indicators
Statistical data give a clear picture of the officially sanctioned bloodshed and oppression suffered by the Croats living in monarchist Yugoslavia. One source states that in the five years of 1929 to 1934, that is, from King Aleksandar’s assumption of dictatorial powers until his assassination in Marseilles, the following court sentences were imposed on the Croats for political “crimes” 5:
19 were condemned to death by hanging
16 were killed while serving a prison term
30 death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment
85 condemned to death but fled the country
146 were condemned to 20 years of hard labor
484 received penalties from 10 to 20 years jail terms
962 were condemned from 5 to 10 years
2,035 condemned from 1 to 5 years
15,000 condemned from one month to one year of prison
The evidence presented in the Appendix to this article, although partial and collected from secondary sources, strongly indicates the nature of the Yugoslav state and its predisposition toward the Croatian people. It includes over 4,700 cases that can be summarized in the following way.
Killings and imprisonments
231 killed by gendarmes and/or military forces
102 wounded
3,715 arrested
49 killed while in jail
40 condemned to death – out of that 22 executed
16 sentenced to life imprisonment
250 tried for verbal insult of the King’s name
14 condemned in absence
Beatings
642 beaten and maltreated – out of which 27 children 48 groups of people maltreated and beaten (individual names not known)
Other persecutions
493 lost jobs or forced to retire 26 newspapers and organizations banned
Women
7 killed
42 arrested
48 beaten and maltreated
Social and/or professional categories (if known)
1,445 peasants either jailed, tried and/or maltreated
472 students
450 workers
153 professionals
117 craftsmen and small business owners
68 state office holders
39 soldiers or policemen
According to regions (if known)
3,176 Northern Croatia
791 Dalmatia
355 Lika and the Littoral
203 Slavonija and Srijem
169 Bosnia and Herzegovina (the primary focus of this study was the Republic of Croatia and not Bosnia and Herzegovina)
Number of Cases according to years
1918 – 155
1919 – 36
1920 – 92
1921 – 209
1922 – 5
1923 – 60
1924 – 5
1925 – 705
1926 – 1
1927 – 8
1928 – 60
1929 – 110
1930 – 107
1931 – 205
1932 – 671
1933 – 1,529
1934 – 312
1935 – 466
The above numbers and categories clearly indicate that the harshness of the persecutions was directed against Croats, regardless of profession, age, gender, or place, and that the intensity of the persecutions reflects the political “moods” in the country at the time.
The Art of Torturing
Because the guardians of the state were guided by their hatred of real or imaginary enemies, they implemented a vast variety of tortures against their victims. The purposes of torture were not only to break the spirit of the victims and to send a message to others, but in many cases to show by sadistic measures, their absolute disdain for the “enemy.”
A common practice for gendarmes was to burst into a village and for a minor incident, or even for no reason at all, beat anyone they encountered, destroy property, and jail people without any legal stipulations. In order to humiliate a Croatian peasant, gendarmes would often force him to genuflect three times in reverence for the Serbian traditional military cap (sajkaca) and impel him to acknowledge that “the Serb was his master and god.” It was also a common practice for the police to beat or even execute their victims in broad daylight on a city street. Verbal insults, swearing vulgarities, and blaspheming everything holy to the Croatians were a common practice. The gun-butt was a favorite weapon in beating the common people. Its use was so prevalent that one of the Ministers of the Interior was nicknamed “Kundak” (gun-butt).
Those who ended up in prison endured all sorts of humiliations and tortures, from being cursed to being tortured to death. The following were some of the more common means of torturing political prisoners: merciless beatings over the entire body especially the kidney area; pounding the soles till they crack; knocking out teeth, breaking ribs, finger joints, and other bones of the body; jumping on the stomach and groin; sticking needles under nails; crushing testes; tying one’s hands to hooks on the walls, so he could not sit down and then hanging bricks on the testes; sleep deprivation for a week at a time; and even placing live coals in the armpits and then tying the arms to the body until the coals cooled. Numerous prisoners were tortured to death and some were simply shot. The official explanations were that they committed suicide or were shot while trying to escape.
Those working in prisons were proud of their inventiveness in torturing inmates. One such ill-famed tormentor was Dragomir (Dragi) Jovanovic in Belgrade’s prison. He even received a state patent for “inventing” new and more horrific means of torture. One of his “inventions” was driving wooden pegs soaked in gasoline under the nails of an inmate and then setting the pegs on fire. (This same Jovanovic was one of the chief officials and executioners in Belgrade during the Second World War.) The Belgrade jail, Glavnjaca, became a symbol of the Karadjordjevic regime and of the Yugoslav state. (An emigrant paper named Protiv Glavanjace/Against the Glavnjaca was published in Belgium at that time.) The persecutions and humiliations went so far that the families of the victims would receive a bill to pay for the bullets by which their close relatives were shot.
Besides using visible means of torture all oppressive regimes have other ways to persecute their opponents. These are more silent and perfidious. For example, losing or fear of losing one’s job is often used as a major instrument of political punishment. The insecurity of one’s own and/or his family’s material existence can often be harder than physical punishment. This type of persecution was overwhelmingly used by the Yugoslav regime and it is hard to measure its impact on society, and on the Croatian national life in particular. State Watchdogs
The official guardians of the state and the main instruments of the Belgrade regime were the armed forces, gendarmes, police, and the state revenue police. Among them, the gendarmes were the main “sword of the regime.” This semi-military force was formed in January of 1919 to impose “order” in the country. But “order” was never achieved and the number of gendarmes increased from 10,000 to 60,000 by the early 1930s. The gendarmes were also often augmented by military forces on raiding missions. Besides the above mentioned forces, there were 15.000 secret police agents, plus military intelligence, and king’s “special agents.”6 In addition to the above official guardians, there were a number of semi-official watchdogs of the state who were more than eager to help the regime to crash, what they labeled, the “anti-state elements,” “dark forces,” and “defeatists”! The following were the best known such organizations.
Unification or Death ( The Black Hand)
This terrorist organization was officially established in 1911, with help and under the protection of Serbian miliary forces, but its real beginnings go back to 1903. A group of officers belonging to this organization assassinated King Aleksandar Obrenovic of Serbia and his wife Dara and secured the royal throne to the Karadjordjevic dynasty in 1903. It also attempted to assassinate King Nikola of Montenegro and his family in 1907. The Black Hand became the “unseen government” of Serbia. The organization modeled itself after the Italian Mafia, and the use of terror was the primary means to achieve its goal of Greater Serbia which, according to the Constitution of the organization consisted (besides of the Kingdom of Serbia) of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Old Serbia and Macedonia, Croatia, Srijem, Vojvodina, and the Sea-coast. By 1914 the Black Hand had close to 150,000 members according to some estimates. Although the Black Hand was officially eliminated during World War I (1917), because King Aleksandar out of fear and/or personal revenge turned against the organization, its sympathizers, goals, and methods were still very much alive during the inter-war period.
The White Hand
It is believed that because Prince Aleksandar was prevented from taking full charge of the Black Hand, he founded his own conspiracy organization within the Serbian military forces and named it the White Hand. Lieutenant-Colonel Petar Zivkovic, who became Prime Minister and the symbol of royalist oppression in the early 1930s, became head of the new organization. The White Hand was an army within the army. Its purpose was to eliminate the Black Hand and to be a semi-official protector of the state and Karadjordjevic’s regime. Most of the political, judicial, economic, as well as military state decisions were made by such shadow forces in the country, first the Black Hand and then the White Hand.
The Chetniks (cheta means a cohort or a group)
The first written rules of Chetnik guerrilla type warfare were a translation of a Polish manual published in Belgrade in 1848.7 But the real beginning of the present-day Chetnik movement dates from 1903, when Serbian military officers organized a special training “school” for volunteers for the purpose of undertaking terrorist actions in Macedonia. At the time, Macedonia was a part of the ailing Ottoman empire and the main target of Serbian expansionism. The Chetniks became a useful instrument in executing special assignments (ethnic cleansing) of all who were not either Serbs nor ready to become Serbs in the regions that Serbia wanted to acquire. The Chetnik played a similar role during the two Balkan Wars and World War I, when they “cleared the land” of Turks, Albanians, Bulgarians, Macedonians and, toward the end of World War I, of Muslims in Sandzak and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Between the two world wars, although the Chetniks were split among themselves, they were united in guarding the state and in the struggle against “dark forces.” The Union of Chetniks for Freedom and Dignity of the Homeland became close to the Serbian Democratic Party, which was seen by many as not tough enough on the enemies of the state. This resulted into a split in 1924, when the Union of Serbian Chetniks – For the King and the Homeland was founded. This group became the tool of the Serbian Radical Party; the leader of this Chetnik faction, Punisa Racic, assassinated two and wounded three members of the Croatian political leadership in Belgrade’s Parliament in 1928. The regime rewarded the Chetniks by giving them arms and permission to use them, land grants, and money: in fact, they were not required to obey many state laws. Also in 1924, the Union of Serbian Chetniks – Petar Mrkonjic (Named after king Peter) was formed in Sarajevo. The last two Chetnik organizations were especially aggressive in establishing their chapters in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, with an openly expressed goal of establishing a Greater Serbia.
Organization of Yugoslav Nationalists (Organizacija Jugoslavenskih Nacionalista/ORJUNA)
The ORJUNA was formed in Split by the royal regional administrator in Croatia in 1921. Its roots are in an organization named Yugoslav Progressive Nationalist Youth (Jugoslavenska Napredna Nacionalisticka Omladina/JNNO). Its “heroic” baptism of fire came when its members burnt the first issue of a newly founded Croatian newspaper in Split, “Hrvatski List” (Croatian Gazette). The ORJUNA was under the patronage of the Serb Democratic Party in Croatia. It gathered militant youth who supported the unitary Yugoslav state. Its chapters were formed first in Dalmatia, then in other parts of former Habsburg regions. The real reason for its formation was to have a terrorist organization for “special assignments.” As such ORJUNA became the leading instrument of terror against Croatian “separatists,” “communists,” “defeatists,” and all other “dark elements” in the country.
In that spirit ORJUNA gave instructions to its members in Croatia (August 1921) that “in these days of our activities, develop as much energy and action as possible. Our organization has to be firm and disciplined and stand firmly and resolutely against the separatists. After the assassination of Minister Draskovic [July 21, 1921], there is a need to start a struggle till the elimination not only of the communists, but of all those who are sowing hate against unitarism, the state, and Yugoslavism.” 8
ORJUNA terrorist activities were committed quite openly and often with great pride. Its leadership emphasized that “its terrorist actions contributed more than anything else to its own legitimization in the entire country….In practice, ORJUNA will propagate its goals by all possible means. It does not renounce the use of force. On the contrary it emphasizes the need for such type of actions.”9
ORJUNA had special units known as Action Groups, which were organized in military fashion. According to one estimate, by 1925 the Action Groups had about 10.000 members.10 They had military style maneuvers on a regular basis, used military equipment, and usually the leading Chetnik figures were heading such Action Groups. Their holy principle “Victory or Death” was accompanied by yet another sacred declaration: “Whoever is not with us, is against us!” 11
Serbian National Youth (Srpska Nacionalna Omladina/SRNAO)
The SRNAO was formed in 1922 at Belgrade University as the antitheses of ORJUNA, which was seen as too much Yugoslav-oriented and as such was polluting the true Serbian spirit and watering down their political goals. The ideology and political program of the SRNAO was formulated in a slogan: “All the Serbs to Serbia, Serbia to all the Serbs!” The goals of its existence, therefore, were “guarding of the Homeland and the king, the spread of [Serbian] nationalism, and defense of Serbian accomplishments to the extermination of all anti-state and anti-national elements.”12
The SRNAO was very close to the royal regime, to the Radical Party, to Punisa Racic’s Chetniks and to the Union of Serbian Chetniks “Petar Mrkonjic” in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For example, on the occasion of the consecration of the SRNAO flag in Sarajevo, there was a personal delegate of the king, the government representatives, and a Serbian Church delegation. Leading men from all centers of power in Serbia were members of SRNAO. Nikola Pasic, the prime mover of Greater Serbian policies and the symbol of Serbian unitarism, was SRNAO’s honorary president and its main financial supporter .13 The biggest obstacle to SRNAO’s expansion in Croatia was the split between Svetozar Pribicevic, the main Serb politician in Croatia, and his former allies in Belgrade. Real confusion entered the SRNAO ranks, however, when Stjepan Radic, the leading Croat politician, made a deal with Pasic and entered the Belgrade government in 1925. The SRNAO did recover to some extent after the assassination of Radic(1928). After the King assumed all the power in the country and proclaimed Yugoslavism as the state national ideology (1929), SRNAO continued to work for its well defined goals but now under the Yugoslav name.
Some other semi-official terrorist organizations Organization of the Reserve Officers and War Veterans – It emphasized its “readiness and availability” to defend the state and vowed to fight “against all anti-state elements.” 14
The Alliance of Volunteers – It constantly reminded the public that the state was not secure, its foundations were not firm, and that it was threatened by outside and inside enemies. It expressed readiness to continue the struggle for the security and stability of the state .15
Organized Youth – Its main mission was to destroy the Montenegrin Federalists and the followers of the exiled King Nikola of Montenegro.
People’s Defense – Its main purpose was “to defend the newly established state by organized actions” against all external and internal “anti-state destructive activities and defeatist elements.” 16
People’s Guard – It was organized in April of 1920. Its members proved themselves to be worthy of the regime’s support during the violent suppression of the railroad workers’ and miners’ strikes in 1920. The Guard members served as shock troopers against the workers and their families. After the proclamation of the ill-famed “Obznana” banning the Communist party (December 29, 1920), the Guard numbers increased rapidly. They put themselves in the “service of the state” in order to eliminate the “destructive elements which in these days [1920s] were ready to attack the state.” 17 These formations were armed by the military authorities and were tools in the hands of the regime to do its “dirty work.”
Patriotic Youth Front – This was a terrorist organization of the Bogoljub Jeftic’s fascist party.
Young Yugoslavia – This was an ORJUNA militant organization for secondary school students who because of their age could not become full members of political parties.
All of the above groups followed the fascist model of organization, or at least they tried to. Fascists in Italy and Germany were hailed for their zeal and organizing capabilities. Such admiration is expressed, for example, by “Jugoslovenska straza” (Yugoslav Guard) (June 23, 1935): “…[While] the fascist Italy is able to mobilize so many fascist formations and while Hitler’s Germany resounds by the marches of the German youth, the Yugoslav youth can and must steel its soul and its muscles by joining the Chetnik organizations, where it will prepare itself for tomorrow’s obligations that it must accept.”
But these groups admired not only the fascist organizational model, they admired also Hitler for his anti-Semitism. The paper “Jugoslovenska straza” (Yugoslav Guard) clearly expresses such feelings when on October 6, 1935 wrote: “Hitler was right when he went so far as to banish all of those who had even the smallest amount of Hebrew blood in their veins. Hitler was right when he pushed out such a vile sect from Germany.”
Propaganda
The Yugoslav regime and its official and unofficial guardians always looked at their opponents as mortal enemies that had to be no less than totally obliterated. Not only did they themselves believe this, they were also very active in promoting public acceptance of this malevolent belief and the means of implementing it. It is sufficient to quote just a few examples of Serbian national propaganda that express this fanatical hatred.
After a Communist sympathizer assassinated interior Minister Milorad Draskovic on July 21, 1921 (believed to be a setup by the regime), use of terror was legitimized by the Belgrade Parliament a few days later. A new wave of persecutions began. The Serb paper “Straza” (The Guard) (July 23, 1921) in the Croatian city of Osijek exhorted its readers: “Let us learn from the ill-reputed Horthy! [Miklos Horthy, the last commander of the Habsburg navy and the man who crushed in blood the Communist regime in post-World War I Hungary.] Under the knife all those who think Bolshevik thoughts! Under the knife even women and children so that even their names do not remain! The final encounter with the anti-state elements must start right now. Serb villages and all who are nationally aware must be constantly ready. In order to stop the Bolsheviks, we must organize National Guards everywhere. An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. We all must get ready in order to settle the score with them [Bolsheviks] once and for all. Anyone who is not with us, is their ally, and he should be dealt with accordingly. Let us sharpen our knives, load our guns, the enemy has declared war against us. Either we or they [must perish].”
This total struggle not only was meant to be waged against the Communists but also against all who were perceived as enemies. The paper “Pobeda” (Victory), the voice of ORJUNA urged on August 4, 1921 that “a struggle must be undertaken till the total elimination not only of the Communists, but also of all those who are sowing hatred against unitarism, the state, and Yugoslavism.” An ORJUNA leader in Vojvodina was even more explicit: “Communists, those who advocate the republic, and the Habsburg black sympathizers [Croatians], have found themselves at the same camp. Those heterogenous elements are united by the abominable hatred of our state” and therefore have to be eliminated.18 On December 14, 1924, the newspaper “Srbadija” expressed the deeply held, uncompromising principle of either we or they: “If we [Serbs] want to preserve ourselves we must struggle using all available means in order to crash and destroy every opponent because the Croat Bolsheviks, Magyars, Germans, and Turks will destroy us if we re not quicker than they. Forget the stupidity that we are one people with three names. Scorn the ‘brothers’ who are after our existence and our head. Deal with them quickly and decisively.”
Stjepan Radic, the leading Croat politician at the time, was a constant target of Serbian nationalist forces. A day after he was arrested in Zagreb and a month before national elections, the SRNAO voice in Novi Sad, “Srbadija”(January 7, 1925) stated: “The gallows must crackle under the weight of the infamy of Stjepan Radic. Mehmed Spaho [leading Bosnian Muslim politician] must be forced to feel the pains of a man impaled alive on the stake… The moment has to be utilized to finish up all important chores before the elections, so that afterwards it can be crystal clear who we are, what we are, what is our name, and who is the master in this Serbia of ours.” According to the Serbian nationalists “one can only master over people like Croats, but never cooperate and work with them in a common effort.” 19
Political consequences
Persecutions of Croats in the newly formed South Slavic state had the opposite effect from what the guardians of the state and of the regime intended. Instead of preserving the state, it undermined its very existence. The fact is that most of the Croats could not identify with the Yugoslav state from its beginning because the state itself and the Serbian centralist regime was imposed upon them. The persecutions that followed simply alienated them even further from the Serbs and the state. Those Croats (and even some Serbs from Croatia) who once worked for the unification of the South Slavs became quicky disillusioned with the state and joined the anti-centralists and even anti-Yugoslav elements. Influential individuals outside the country who promoted unification of the South Slavs before and during the First World War and used to raise their voices against mistreatment of the Serbs and others in the Habsburg empire suddenly fell silent. Instead of condemning the use of terror and pressuring the regime to reform the country, they often blamed the victims. As a result, Croats increasingly felt more isolated in their desperate need for human and national rights.
The persecutions also helped to politicize and homogenize the Croatian nation, especially the rural population. Terror became a catalyst in crystalizing Croatian goals for nationhood. If there was confusion toward the end of World War I about which road to take, it became clear that Yugoslavia was not the answer. Elections clearly indicated that the Croats wanted a federalist republic as a minimum and an independent state of their own as maximum. As the terror against Croats increased, so did their demands escalate along with increasingly radical means to achieve them.
Another important consequence of the terror was a break with Croatian political traditions and pluralism. The old institutions of Sabor (parliament) and Ban (viceroy) were abolished. The traditions of personal liberties, rule of law, and tolerance of religious and ethnic differences were greatly undermined. Reserves of national energy were used up in inevitably resisting the attempts at Serbianization. According to Serb expansionists, their need to crush any move toward Croatian national identity was necessary because Croats did not have a history or culture of their own, besides being of a servile nature meant to be obedient to others.
Croatians are usually depicted as the destroyers of both Yugoslavias. As a result, historians who would like to believe that Yugoslavia was a natural and positive historical development and the Serbs its true makers and defenders, ignore the persecutions of Croats and others,20 which in reality sealed the fate of the country from its very beginning. It is Serbian centralism, messianism, expansionism, and terrorism that eliminated even the possibility of a successful unification of the South Slavs.
The Yugoslav experiment tragically interrupted the historical continuity of the Croatian people. Experiences in that state had major negative effects on Croat political, economic, social, and cultural developments. The 1918-1990 period was another long and often bloody intermission in the centuries-long history of Croatia. However, the gap is bridged now, and the future of the Croats is in their own hands. It is up to them not to dwell in the past but to live up to the challenges of the present and the future.
NOTES
1 Srbadija. The official organ of the Novi Sad Regional Committee of the SRNAO. February 7, 1925.
2 Narodne Novine. April 28, 1919. See also Rudolf Horvat, Hrvatska na mucilistu. Zagreb: Kulturno-Historijsko Drustvo “Hrvatski Rodoljub,” 1942, 81.
3 Vladimir Radic, Zlocin od 20. Lipnja i Medjunarodna Stampa. Paris: n.p., 1931, 22.
4 Dragoljub Jovanovic, Ljudi. Ljudi… Medaljoni 46 umrlih savremenika. Belgrade: D. Jovanovic, 1975, 65.
5 John I. Pintar, Four Years in Tito’s Hell. Buenos Aires: H.P.K.: 1954, 17.
6 Struggle. Translated by Louis Adamic with a Preface by the Translator. Los Angeles: Arthur Whipple, 1934,7.
7 Pravilo o cetnickoj vojni. Protolmacio iz’ pol’skoj sa n’kim prom’nama, izmetcima i dodasima Matija Ban. Belgrade, 1848.
8 Pobeda. August 4, 1921.
9 Vidovdan. May 30, 1925.
10 Politika. June 3, 1925.
11 Dobroslav Jevdjevic, Izabrani clanci. Novi Sad: Jovanovic & Bogdanov, 1925, 5.
12 Srpska rijec. December 13, 1924.
13 See Nusret Sehic, Cetnistvo u Bosni i Hercegovini (1918-1941). Sarajevo: ANUBiH, 1971, 68.
14 Ratnicki glasnik. 1922, 69. As in Berislav Gligorijevic, “Organizacija jugoslovenskih nacionalista (Orjuna).” Istorija XX veka. Vol. 5. Belgrade: Institute drustvenih nauka, 1963, 318.
15 Jugoslavija (Almanac of the Veterans’ Alliance). 1922, 153.
16 Narodna obrana. 1926, 10; Gligorijevic, Orjuna, 318.
17 T. Kazlerovic, Obznana. Beograd, 1952, 13; Statist. Beleske Ust. Skupstine, 1920-1921, I, 20; Gligorijevic, Orjuna, 320.
18 Jevdjevic, Izabrani clanci, 42.
19 Balkan. March 28, 1922.
20 See, for example, Alex N. Dragnich, The First Yugoslavia, Search for a Viable Political System. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983.
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Hrvatinic, Matijas. Srpska nacionalna i vjerska nastranost . Buenos Aires, 1973.
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Croatian Nationalism
Croatian Nationalism And The Croatian National Movement (1966-1972) In Anglo-American Publications – A Critical Assessment
Ante Cuvalo
On Nationalism in General
Nationalism is one of the greatest forces in modem history. It seems that no political, economic, psychological, ideological, or any other drive can match its compulsion and its impact on our world. Furthermore, nationalism continues to defy scholarly analysis, prognosis, and even logic itself.1 One of the major reasons for this defiance is that nationalism has a chameleonic nature, has a number of contingencies, and can be expressed in multiple ways. A strong indication of the complexity of the subject is the fact that a good study of nationalism must include a host of interdisciplinary fields, such as history, geography, language, religion, economy, political science, international relations, sociology, literature, ethnography, and art, just to name a few. No wonder, then, that among numerous definitions of nationalism one can not find an adequate one.
Although nationalism can be linked to imperialism of one kind or another, most nationalisms strive to gain, maintain or increase a certain national group’s self-awareness, cohesion, individuality and self-rule. Nationalisms, however, differ in their formation, goals, expression, degree of self-consciousness, mobilization, and in a number of other features. Even the same nationalism can be expressed differently and in various degrees of intensity at particular times. Furthermore, different individuals, social elements, and regions of the same nation express their nationalism in distinct ways and measures of passion at different times and situations. Thus, it is very hazardous to bring a generalized judgment about nationalism as a phenomenon, or even about the nationalism of a particular nation.
The purpose of this paper is not to examine nationalism in general, but to explore how the latest surge of Croatian nationalism has been viewed in contemporary Anglo-American publications. Nevertheless, I will mention just a few more difficulties with which a student of nationalism is faced. For example, is nationalism something “primordial” and “irrational,” or is it a historical phenomenon? Is nationalism simply an invention of modem intellectuals and politicians for the purpose of harvesting political legitimacy in the name of the people, or does it go deeper?
Who can tell precisely when did people begin to have “national feelings”? Was it after the French Revolution, during the Reformation, the Renaissance, or the Middle Ages? Or did such feelings already exist in ancient times when the Jews considered themselves the “chosen people” and, therefore, different from the rest, or when the Greeks saw themselves as civilized and all others as barbarians? What were the feelings, for example, of Croatians like Grgur Ninski (10th century) and his followers when they fought for the use of the Croatian language in church liturgy, or of Joan of Arc (1412-1431) when she gave her life for, the cause of her people? Were such feelings “national” or simply “tribal,” “parochial” or “religious”? Were those feelings something “primordial” and “irrational”; were they already a politically mobilizing force, or possibly a little of everything? One can say with some certainty that nationalism gained its full political force only after the people’s sovereignty replaced “divine right,” hereditary principles, and similar claims of government legitimization. But how far the roots of national consciousness go, even the roots of political nationalism, is still an open question. Had not the concept of the “chosen people” been already used at biblical times for the political purpose of conquering the “promised land”?
Is nationalism just a phase in history which will disappear from the face of the earth? For those who consider nations as a natural division of mankind, certainly, nationalism is not just a passing phenomenon. True, nations are born and die, but national divisions are here to stay. On the other hand, according to Marxist ideology, nationalism cannot be considered “primordial” but a product of bourgeois capitalism. For both the Marxist and non-Marxist “assimilationists, ” the age of nationalism has been over for some time and, therefore, nationalism is on the way out. What is left of it is merely a negative force which is being misused by those who wish, for one reason or another, to disrupt the integration process of the world into a global community brought about by modernization and/or revolution.
The empirical evidence, however, clearly indicates that nationalism is not subsiding. On the contrary, nationalism is alive and doing well in all parts of the world. Predictions that modernization (industrialization, transportation, communications, literacy, education, etc.) would bring about a unification and homogenization of the world and that nationalism would become irrelevant did not come true. We see that the world is becoming smaller and smaller; states and nations are becoming more and more interdependent economically, environmentally; and much of the world is united in fear of nuclear annihilation. At the same time, membership in the United Nations has been growing steadily and national liberation-movements are not decreasing but increasing. Not to mention a growing gap between the rich and the poor which is contrary to the process of a meaningful world unification.
Even in Western Europe, where it was believed that the question of nationalism had been resolved by unification (Germany, Italy) or by assimilation (Britain, France, Spain), nationalism is very much present. Presence of nationalism can be seen in Spain, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Belgium, South Tyrol, France, as well as in the animosity toward the “guest-workers” in Germany, Austria and other West European countries.2
Nationalism in the communist countries is doing even better than in the capitalist societies. Suffice it to mention the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.3 Thus, neither the proletarian revolution nor the capitalist modernization theory brought an end to nationalism.
It is very possible that the effects of the revolution and modernization were just the opposite of what the internationalists hoped for. More and more people became aware of their oppressed positions and of their human and group rights. Thus, the demonstration effect has been stronger than the willingness to sacrifice one’s own national identity and rights for the sake of some eschatological vision of a nation-less world.
Leaving aside all predictions and theories, the fact is that nationalisms do exists, and should be taken as a fact of the historical and political panorama. Historical evidence also indicates that nationalism can be imperialistic and anti-imperialistic, oppressive and liberating, a unifying and disunifying force, offensive and defensive, backward-looking and future-looking; it can be economic, political, cultural and so on. Thus, it is pointless to argue that nationalism is good or evil in itself. The virtue of nationalism as such, or more often of a particular nationalism, most of the time, depends on the ideological view or, very often, on the political or economic interest of the observer’s nation at the time of the evaluation.
Croatian Nationalism Before 1960s
Historical evidence indicates that the roots of Croatian national self-awareness go deep into Croatian national history. Despite a centuries-old struggle for mere existence, national identity and the nucleus of national statehood were kept alive. Thus, Croatian nationalism and the idea of statehood were not a product of some accident in the nation’s modem history, nor of geographic position, nor of an outside action of some bigger power(s). Neither is the Croatian nation a product of religion, as some would suggest.4 The foundations of modem Croatian nationalism are based mainly on two principles: historical memory and rights, and on popular sovereignty.
The Croatian “Illyrians” began (1830s) the national reawakening, but it was Ante Starcevic (1823-1896) who, in the spirit of the French Revolution, articulated most clearly the historical rights and peoples’ sovereignty. He transformed these two principles into a national ideology and a political action in the middle of the last century. Today’s main streams of Croatian nationalism are based on these two fundamental components: that Croatians are a nation with a long history and centuries-old statehood and culture, and that they have every right to determine their own fate. It is on this principle of self-rule that their nationalism had been frustrated for a very long time. The common feeling among the Croatians is that their individual and national destiny has persistently been in someone else’s hands. Thus, the essence of their nationalism is a struggle for self-preservation and national sovereignty.
Since the middle of the nineteenth century, there have been two main political streams in Croatian nationalism: one envisioned an independent Croatian state as the only guarantee for the national future; and the other sought a wider Slavic, specifically South-Slavic, federated political framework in which Croatia would be autonomous. Both of these streams played an important role among the Croatians. However, the pro-Yugoslav version of Croatian national ideology tended to be elitist and it played a disproportionately important role in Croatian politics. At critical moments, such as the end of World War I and the end of World War II, the pro- Yugoslavs had a decisive role in determining the fate of the Croatian nation. But one should not forget that, in both cases, external factors were more decisive in the political settlement of the Croatian question than the will of the people.5 The second brand of Croatian nationalism, promoted by the advocates of Croatian independence, had much less understanding in the international community, although the Peasant Party, which advocated an independent peasant republic, represented most of the people in Croatia in the inter-war period.
Generally speaking, Croatian nationalisms never gained much sympathy in the West, more specifically in the Anglo-American world. This can be said of the nationalism of the Croatian liberals in the Habsburg empire, of the pacifist nationalism of Stjepan Radic and his Peasant Party, the revolutionary nationalism of the Ustasha movement (1929-1945), and of the socialist nationalism of the 1960s and 1970s.
Already in the middle of the nineteenth century, Marx and Engels condemned Croatian nationalism as reactionary because it did not fit into their revolutionary theory.6 Similarly, C.A. Macartney, a historian of nineteenth-century Hungary, stated that Croatians were “a people which had, indeed developed the habit of opposition for opposition’s sake further than any [other nation] in Europe”7 This subjective judgment has been often quoted by contemporary observers of Croatian affairs as if to suggest that it is deep in the Croatian nature to be troublemakers for no reason at all. Interestingly, while Croatians were encountering the full force of the reinvigorated Magyar nationalism and were faced with the policy of Magyarization, they were considered as unreasonable obstructionists; on the other hand Hungarian nationalism was seen as progressive and not oppressive. Clearly, the two nationalisms were defined differently.
In the inter-war period, Croatians found themselves in a state which was, for all practical purposes, a Greater Serbia. Croatia was treated as an occupied land and Serbian terror ran rampant. Although Stjepan Radic, and the Croatian Peasant Party, which in reality was more a national movement than a political party, responded with pacifism and then with parliamentary struggle, Croatians were seen by many, especially in England, as unreasonable, as a poison in Yugoslav politics, and later on as wreckers of the state. Some experts on Yugoslavia’s politics even accepted Belgrade’s propaganda that Radic was emotionally unstable and his assassination was simply a violent response to his unbearable insults of the Serbian carsija. Or, at best, Radic and the Serbian Radical leader, Pasic, were put on the same level of fanaticism and stubbornness.8 It was believed that the two were the main stumbling block of a “normal” development of the Yugoslav state.
One American social scientist wrote recently that Serbian nationalism of the 1920s was modern and of the “Jacobin type, intolerant of particularism and regionalism.” On the other hand, Croatian nationalism for him has been “legitimist” in nature, stressing only historical rights.9 However, he does not point out that Serbian nationalism could afford to be anti-particularist, because the Serbs were the ruling nation in the state. It would more correct to say that Serbian nationalism was “intolerant of particularism” because it was imperialistic, not because it was progressive. It is an absurdity to conclude that every “state-making” nationalism is progressive, and every “state-breaking” nationalism is retrogressive.
World War II Croatian nationalism has been seen as an “evil incarnate,” and every expression not only of Croatian nationalism but of Croatian consciousness itself, ever since the war, has been labeled as reactionary, Ustashism, fascism, and the like. But those who write about Croatian’ nationalism of the period do not even try to distinguish between state legitimacy and government legitimacy. It seems that very few are interested in finding out whether the Croatians did have a legitimate claim to have a state or not.
The fact is that the vast majority of Croatians accepted the state in 1941 as an expression of their wishes. Even most of those who opposed Pavelic and the Ustashe, wanted a Croatian state, in one form or another, as the realization of their national dreams and rights.10 Furthermore, those who identify Croatian nationalism only with Ustashism seldom mention that Croatians fought on both sides in World War II. However, even the nationalism of those who were on Tito’s side, or the nationalism of their children has been labeled as “extremism,” “chauvinism,” “fanaticism,” “terrorism,” “neo-fascism,” and so on.11 This is a weapon constantly used to disarm the Croatian quest for human and national dignity of all moral values.
It seems that the most often condemned aspect of Croatian nationalism is its quest for statehood. All Croatians, Marxists or non-Marxists, who stand for a Croatian statehood in any shape or form are condemned as chauvinists and even neo-fascists. This labeling tactic has been practiced in Yugoslavia, as well as by many outside the country, since World War II. Thus, one should keep in mind that the issue is not alleged Croatian chauvinism, or an ideology, but the integrity of the Yugoslav state and a potential Croatian statehood, which are mutually exclusive.
Croatian Nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s
The Croatian socialist nationalism, or national Communism, of the late Sixties did not fare much better than the past Croatian nationalism in the Anglo-American press. I will touch upon only a few of the categories and labels which have been attributed to the Croatian national movement and to its leaders of the late Sixties and early Seventies.
First, in newspapers, magazines, and even scholarly periodicals in English, one can find most often that Croatians are a “nationality” (or sometimes “a major nationality”), an “ethnic group, ” a “minority, ” or a similar social-group category; but very seldom are they considered as a nation. Is this just an indication of sloppy writing, or can we conclude that it is up to the individual author and his or her whim to decide when a certain people become a nation or when they lose that prerogative. There is the usual interchangeability of the terms “nation” and “state” in English. Thus very often multi-national states, like Yugoslavia, or the Soviet Union, are identified and treated as “nation-states”.12 For many journalists, politicians, and even scholars, it is the state which determines nationhood. If this is so, it is not clear what happens to the nationhood of those people who once had a state and lost it, or those nations that had been divided into two states? Do the first simply turn into an ethnic group, or the latter become two distinct nations? Ironically, Croatians have been recognized as a nation, at least on paper, in Communist Yugoslavia, while outside the country they often are not granted even that basic recognition.
One should keep in mind that there is a political effect of such misuse of terminology. For example, an uninformed American reader imagines that Yugoslavia, the USSR or other multi- national states, are in nature the same as the United States. No wonder, then, that many average Americans or Australians are quick to compare their multi-ethnic country with multi-national Yugoslavia. Although the multi-ethnic model differs from the multi-national as apples differ from oranges, the differences remain obscure to such readers who, seeing terms such as “self- determination,” “self- rule, ” or ” independence, ” imagine a region or an ethnic group in their own country demanding autonomy or independence. But the news media or the experts in the field seldom even attempt to clarify such issues and differences.
There are some authors who simply do not see any serious flaw in the Yugoslav state, in its legitimacy, its regime, in its politics, economy or the inter-national relations (inter-national here means relations among different nations within the country). For an American scholar, Bogdan Denitch, for example, Yugoslavia has been by “far the most open of the societies ruled by communist parties”; its “intellectuals are far more outspoken than any in Eastern Europe”; its “public and press [are] outspoken”; “more American social scientists and journalists wander around Yugoslavia than in any East European country”; its economic emigration is a “temporary solution … and not as massive exodus “; that Yugoslavia does not need to build a Berlin wall to keep the people in or out the country, etc. These are supposedly proofs that the system is stable and that both the state and the regime are legitimate; that its military and secret police forces have no sympathy for the East; that its economy is being integrated with Western Europe rather than with the East European bloc; that the Belgrade regime is “the most open and progressive of regimes ruled by a Communist party”; that religious toleration in Yugoslavia “is the norm, and the decentralization of political and economic power has gone further not only than in any other Communist regime but probably further than in many of the West European politics”; that multi- national problems are more “acute in Spain, Belgium, Canada and Great Britain, and the problem of the social order is posed far more sharply in Italy, Turkey and Portugal” than in Yugoslavia.13 If this is one’s scientific conclusion of the national, social, political, and economic situation in Yugoslavia, then there is no choice but to see in the Croatian national movement of the late Sixties and early Seventies, as well as in Croatian nationalism in general, a negative and destructive force which disrupts a presumably normal and progressive development of a very “normal” country. It cannot, however, be concluded from the above praises that Croatians should be happy and legitimize the Yugoslav state and its regime because they enjoy freedom and prosperity, but they should not rock the boat because there are peoples who are worse off than they are.
Some other authors are not so generous in praising the Yugoslav regime; they are critical of the Communist monopoly of power and of its economic policies. They even recognize some of the injustices and grievances raised by Croatians and other non-Serbian nations and nationalities in the country, but for them the unity and integrity of the Yugoslav state, and for some even its centralism, become an indispensable value, an untouchable good in itself.14
In their eyes, the latest Croatian national movement was either purely separatist, or its leaders had gone too far in their decentralizing demands. Although the Party leaders themselves might have been moderate, supposedly they were not able to control their “extremist” allies. Or the movement was a mix of various forces which really got out of hand, and there was no choice but nip it in the bud. The proofs of “extremism” are usually found in Croatian demands not only for more personal freedom or decentralization of economy, but in the fact that the leaders of the movement dared to raise the question in national terms. Moreover, they indicated that the time had come for an ideological reconciliation, or at least a truce, between the Croatians themselves. To speak, however, in terms of Croatian national rights and grievances has been an anathema in the eyes of the Belgrade regime (as well as in the eyes of some of the foreign observers) not only since 1945 but since 1918. Any united Croatian voice, no matter how democratic or reactionary, how humanistic or oppressive it might be, has been perceived as threatening, and, therefore, condemned.
Interestingly, the observers are almost repetitious in pointing out that some Croatians suggested that Croatia, as well as other nations in Yugoslavia, should be members in the United Nations and that most of the army recruits should serve in their own republics. While these were peripheral issues that came up during public debates, where anybody could express his or her opinions, the real Croatian grievances for example economy, emigration, foreign currency, import-export firms, education, language, freedom of speech, independence of the courts, free market economy, and similar basic national issues were barely mentioned or simply papered over. And these and such issues were not of romantic but of down-to-earth nature.
Although some observers considered the national problem in Yugoslavia to be “the most basic of all” and that “for many Croatians, Yugoslavia and Serbia are virtually synonymous”15, according to them, the solutions to the national and other questions of the country have to be found within the existing state and even under the same system. To think otherwise, or even to ask for further decentralization and democratization of the system, was nothing less than Croatian “inherent” oppositionism and national hard-headedness.
The following are some of the views and judgments passed about Croatians and the Croatian national movement one can find in some of Anglo-American publications: “Continental Europe has no more volatile and troublesome minority than the Croats.” They are described as “dour and resentful,” as well as “having a case of permanent national paranoia”.16 Some also talked about “chronic Croat animosity” and the “Serb frustration” with them.17 For others Croatians are incapable of “genuine politics of give and take”.18 Although Croatians did have some reasonable grievances they were carried by “ancient passions” .19 For some, Croatian nationalism of the 1960s and the 1970s was a nationalism in the classic tradition of East Europe20, which, in the West, means everybody hates everybody else. Thus, for some, there has been nothing, or very little, positive in the Croatian national movement. One author stated that “it would be a prime mistake to equate either Croat of Slovak nationalism with liberalism”.21 Similarly, another observer concluded that “the Croatian crisis did not represent … a temporary upsurge of modern liberal humanism.” According to her, the centralist forces, “because they were defending a precarious socialist status quo against the resurgence of historically dangerous politics of romantic nationalism, were in the right in 1971”.22 But is humanism possible only in stepping out from the national framework? Is every nationalism devoid of humanism? If not, who decides whose nationalism is and whose is not humanistic? What are the objective criteria for such judgments?
There is also something contradictory in the evaluation of nationalism in Yugoslavia. According to the research of an American scholar, which was done in the early 1970s, 45% of the Serbs, 52% of the Croatians, 60% of the Slovenes and 73% of the Macedonians rank as particularistic.23 The Slovenes also “stray from the common ‘Yugoslav’ pattern in socialist patriotism”.24 But it is also concluded that while Slovenes were “considerably more particularistic than Croats,” they “at the same time possessed a very modern system of beliefs”.25 Interestingly, while the Slovenes could be progressive and most particularistic (nationalistic) in Yugoslavia, Croatian nationalism has been constantly seen as reactionary and retrogressive. We can guess that the reason for such views is that Slovene nationalism, at least up to recent times, was not seen as dangerous to the Yugoslav state, while Croatian nationalism always carried at least such a potential. Thus, the measuring stick of the progressiveness of nationalisms in Yugoslavia is not, it seems, a particular nationalism itself or its ideology but its position on the integrity of the Yugoslav state and its centralism.
Dennis Rusinow, who wrote a four-part report on the Croatian national movement and whom some consider to be a leading expert on the subject, argues that the “movement was evolving in the direction of separatism” and therefore it “represented destructive and dangerous forces. ” For him, “the Croatian Party leaders … were in fact creating a political system that had more in common with fascism than with either democracy or socialism.” Naturally, he was “glad that the whistle was blown,” meaning that he was pleased to see that the central powers crushed the Croatian evil spirit that got out of the bottle.26
Leadership of the Croatian National Movement
While some considered Savka Dapcevic-Kucar, the Party chief in Croatia in the early 1970s, to be “the first genuinely popular Croat leader since World War II” 27, Rusinow, for example, in order to prove his hypothesis that the movement was reactionary, backward looking, and destructive, tried to discredit its leaders by his own method of psychoanalysis. According to him, the leaders of the movement were “individual neurotics, people with special personal problems or chapters in their lives to live down” or “those with political ambitions who ‘never made it’. ” He stressed that the leading Croatian Communists of the time came from “old and distinguished Dalmatian bourgeois families”; we can conclude, therefore, that they were of a suspicious background and could not be true proletarians. Rusinow also tried hard to discredit the student leaders by using their religious affiliation, or the regions they come from, as indications that they, and the movement as a whole, were linked, at least spiritually, if not organizationally, with Ustashism .28 To anyone who is familiar with the Croatian scene, this approach of Rusinow’s is a clear reminder of the methods used by the Yugoslav regime, especially during the Rankovic era. Those who came from certain regions of Croatia were then always looked upon with suspicion. They were the first to end up in jail for political reasons, or they had to serve in special army camps because the UDBA could “see in their eyes” that they were an anti-Yugoslav element. Thus, according to Rusinow, Drazen Budisa, for example, became one of the student leaders, not because he was, as Rusinow himself admits, “handsome, articulate, highly intelligent and respected by his contemporaries,” but because he was from Drnis. And to be from Dalmatian hinterland or from Hercegovina one has to be “Ustasha” by birth. It seems for the same reason Rusinow tendentiously stated that Zvonimir Cicak, another student leader, was from Hercegovina, although he was from Zagreb .29
The young Communist leadership of the time has been accused of mere “careerism”30 and of “manipulating the hitherto dampened fires of ethnic and cultural nationalism” as “a means of protecting and extending their influence. Ambition drove them to push ‘Croatianness’. ” Savka and Tripalo are identified as the “Croatian Bonnie and Clyde”.31 It is said that Tripalo and Savka “played upon the underlying fears and insecurities of the Croatian populace” for personal gains.32 However, authors do not explain why Croatians were in fear and insecure. What were the reasons for such feelings in an entire nation? One should also have in mind, that Savka, Tripalo and Pirker had been already at the top of the Party hierarchy, and surely they did not get there because they were good nationalists. One does not climb the Communist Party ladder on the basis of popular sentiments! National Communism is nothing new in the world; why would one not allow at least a possibility that the Party leadership in Croatia was genuinely interested in the fate of their nation.
It seems that one of the major “faults” of the Croatian leadership, Party and intellectuals, was that they raised too much expectation and optimism among their people. And when they could not deliver, it is stated, the frustrations were turned into nationalism.33 In most countries optimism and enthusiasm of the people is considered as a positive and not a negative indicator. Stock markets and sales go up or down because of the mood of the people. Politicians and economists love optimism. But it seems that if there is calm and gloom in Croatia, it is seen as “deceptive quiet”34; if there is some enthusiasm, it is perceived as dangerous. Thus it should be clear that the Croatian issue is much deeper than the particular mood of the people at a certain time, and a serious observer should go beyond those moods in order to understand the true nature of Croatian grievances and Croatian nationalism.
The leading “troika” (Tripalo, Savka and Pirker) have also been accused of being intolerant of other opinions in the party. One observer claimed the “the struggle was ruthless on both sides [conservative and liberal], and the methods used [by the liberals] did not inspire confidence that nationalism would usher in a new period of socialist democracy”.35 However, no one compared the methods used against the opposition during the national movement and the way the Croatians, those in and out of the Party, were treated before and after the movement. In order to condemn “both sides,” one should see how many people were jailed for so-called political offenses, or were kicked out of the Party; how much freedom there was for individuals, groups, and institutions; or how much the state interfered in the economy, education, press, and judicial system before, during and after the movement. The methods and goals of the conservatives and liberals were entirely different. While the Croatian liberals fought for socialist humanism, their opponents were defending socialist centralism. While the first brought the politics to an open forum, the later clung to the Party’s monopoly of power and mere force.
A few authors did consider the Party leadership in Croatia as being “essentially moderate, looking for peaceful methods to reform the system and meet the basic demands of the Croatian population .36 However, generally speaking, the Anglo-American observers have passed a negative judgment on the movement and on its leadership. Although most of them praised Tito for ending the Croatian spring, some. did regret the way the movement was crushed.
Nature of the Movement
At this point one should probably ask, what was so terrible about the Croatian national movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s to deserve such condemnation? In a wider context of Croatian history, the movement represented a continuous Croatian national quest for political, economic, and cultural autonomy and national emancipation. That struggle began under the Habsburgs and it continued under the Karadjordjevics after 1918. In the new state (after 1918) the Croatian nation was completely dominated by the Serbian army, police, and bureaucracy, and Croatians were treated as an occupied nation. A similar Croatian subordination continued within Tito’s Yugoslavia. Although Communist Yugoslavia claimed to have solved the national question in the country and was organized on a federalist basis, that federalism was on paper only till the mid-1960s. The policy of cultural unitarism was implemented in all aspects of life in the country. In practice, Yugoslav unitarism meant first of all suppression of everything that was Croatian. Croatians were pressured to become “Yugoslavs,” while others could remain what they were. (New nations in the country were even invented.) A number of Croatian historical figures were thrown out from history books and other publications, the Croatian language officially lost the status of a national language, Croatian culture was suppressed, its economy exploited, and anyone who raised questions about this kind of national oppression was hit hard. In many cases, just being Croatian was enough to be considered an enemy of the state.
It was only in the late Sixties that a new Croatian national revival took place. The prime movers of the national renaissance were the intellectuals, first of all the Left intelligentsia. The regime itself realized that unitarism and centralism did not work, thus they introduced decentralizing reforms in the mid-1960s. These reformers in turn provided room for more and more national expression. Croatians began to demand the implementation of the constitutional stipulations, meaning that federalism in words be realized in practice.
The main issues that were raised during the Croatian national revival were of very practical nature. First of all, there was a demand to halt the economic exploitation of Croatia which had been taking place in a number of forms for a long time. Skimming off Croatian economy in the name of “brotherhood and unity” for nothing in return was done through the central banks, export-import firms, investment policies, foreign currency collection and exchange by the federal government, remittance of the close to a million Croatian “guest workers” in the West, and so on. For example, while Croatia earned more than 50% of all foreign currency entering the country, it could keep only 7% of it for its needs. The federal investment policy had a similar discrepancy. While 46.6% of all federal investment funds, from 1965-1970, went to Serbia, only 16.5% went to Croatia.
The problem of emigration was another major issue. While Croatians were making most of the money and supposedly were a richer region, they had a tremendous outflow of population to foreign countries. Besides the brain drain caused by the emigration, this phenomenon was loaded with a number of negative effects for Croatia and the Croatians for generations to come. Croatians were for a long time not able to learn about their own past or their cultural heritage. Their language was Serbianized, the Army, police and other federal, and even republican institutions were controlled by Serbs. Thus, demands were made by the Croatians to take control of their economy, to rehabilitate their culture and national history by lifting the official “curse” from everything that was Croatian. They also advocated greater freedom of expression, separation of the judicial system from the Party’s tutelage, greater pluralism, equal rights for religious believers, and market economy. In order to assure the implementation of these and similar demands, there was a strong quest for decentralization of the federal power and greater republican autonomy. In fact, it was the question of the federal power (Party, military, and economic institutions) that the struggle was all about, and not the issue of a Croatian “romantic,” “reactionary,” “counter-revolutionary,” or “neo-fascist” nationalism. These and similar labels were merely weapons of the centralist forces to disarm their opponents and defend the privileges and powers that they enjoyed.
The question of the Serbian minority in Croatia usually came up as one more useful weapon for the centralists and unitarists in their preservation of the monopoly of power. It has been constantly projected that the movement was a threat to the Serbs in Croatia. But Croatia is one of the rare places in the world where a minority has been privileged and not oppressed. What the movement was in fact trying to achieve was equal rights for the Croatians in their own home. An indicator that the movement had not been a threat to any of the minorities in Croatia is the fact that most of the minorities supported the movement; even some leading Serbs in the republic were part of it.
It seems that a major objection outside and inside the country to the Croatian national revival has been that its leaders presented the issues in national terms, which made them instantly old- fashioned, romantic, reactionary etc. However, if a whole nation has been oppressed and exploited, how can one present the issues in class or some other terms? One thing that all Croatian classes and social elements had in common is their Croatianism, and all of them had experienced the negative effects of being Croatian. It is, then, reasonable to expect that Croatianism would unite them in defending their human and national rights.
Ever since the time of Humanism, Croatian intellectuals tended to be internationalist in their world view, without giving up their own identity and heritage (Pribojevic, Krizanic, the Illyrians, Strossmayer, Radic, etc). But they were also among the first ones to question internationalist ideologies which tended to crush personal freedom and individuality in the name of the greater good (Strossmayer’s fight against Papal infallibility and Croatian Marxist revisionism in the 1930s are good examples). Leading intellectuals in the latest Croatian national movement also were world visionaries, on one side, and on the other, defenders of personal and national freedoms. This was clearly expressed by the leading ideologue of the latest Croatian movement, Vlado Gotovac, who stated “I have never understood those who think that the rainbow should be of one color! A uniform world means a homogenized emptiness! The existence of different ‘homelands’can only retain the beauty of the world when the dedication to the world’s future transforms its colors into a harmony . . .”.37 Clearly, his vision is one of a peaceful world, where every color, every culture, social element, national group, and every individual is seen as a blessing and not as a curse. What is needed, therefore, is not a forced unification of mankind into a monotonous and enslaving mechanical world, but creative human freedom, freedom to be responsible, freedom to be different and a harmonization of those differences into a rainbow of humanity. Certainly this is a humanist and an internationalist vision, but it is not an internationalism of forced assimilation, imperialism or a totalitarian ideology. It is an internationalism through freedom.
Why a Negative View?
It is clear that there is sharp dichotomy between the perceptions of the Croatian national movement among the Croatians themselves and in the Anglo-American world. While Croatians saw their struggle as part of a human quest for freedom, human dignity, and self-rule, and even expected much understanding in pluralistic societies, many Anglo-American observers portrayed them as nothing more than passionate reactionaries who could not get rid of their backward looking mentality. It is legitimate to ask what were the reasons for such a negative judgment of the latest Croatian national movement. There are numerous answers to this question, including personal likes and dislikes, political pragmatism, and visions of the world. I will attempt to give here at least some probable causes for this Western view of Croatia and the Croatians in the recent past.
There has been very little written in English that deals with the Croatian national movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. And among those who did write on the subject, very few attempted to analyze the movement in itself: its origins, ideology, goals, visions, methods, its claims, etc. The main interest of the observers has been how Croatian nationalism effected, or might effect, East-West relations. Thus, although the observers slightly differed in their views of the movement, they all had the same approach to the problem and the same basic assumptions, which can be summarized as follows: Yugoslavia might have an oppressive Communist system, Serbs might be hegemonistic, Croatians might have some legitimate grievances; though we salute freedom, pluralism, market economy, etc., a unified “Yugoslavia is the healthiest for the West at this time” .38 Anyone who even comes close to rocking the foundations of Yugoslavia is dangerous to peace in the world, and, therefore, a villain. Furthermore, the Communist party is the only trans-national force in Yugoslavia which holds the country together, therefore, our support of the Party should be also unconditional .39
Major reasons for such thinking rise mostly from a vision that the world should remain as it has been the last few decades, that international society should be dominated by two superpowers. The Croatian national movement, or other similar movements in the world, are relevant only in so far as they interfere with the balance of power. It has been evident for some time that the Soviet Union has been “domesticated,” that it has given up its early revolutionary ambitions, and it has become merely a traditional great power. To the people with this world view, the ideas of equality of nations, or even of the states, freedom of the oppressed peoples, etc., are minor problems, or wishful thinking and of the idealists or of the weak. According to them, an emancipated world would result in an international anarchy. Thus, it is the duty and responsibility of the great powers to save the world from itself. They are the only ones that can coordinate economic interdependence and retain the political status quo (out of altruism, of course!). In a sense, this model is similar to the trickle-down theory in domestic economic and social policies in some countries or the Party’s role in others. For those in power, the world is a chess board on which, they hope, two super-powers play the game. This old European concept of power politics has been transferred to the world-wide arena. Rights, freedoms, and equality, are nice words, but without political reality.
On the other hand, there are the bourgeois and socialist internationalists who in the name of their world view tend to crush all individual freedoms. These are mostly intellectuals who believe that modernization and/or revolution will erase all our differences. It means that in an assimilated and uniform world we will live in peace and happiness. For such believers “those who wrap themselves up in the skirts of nationalism are living in the dangerous past .40
Interestingly, such internationalist voices most often come from within the nations which have “made it.” This kind of “internationalism” also often comes from those who have economic or political interest in being internationalist. One may call this a “Coca-cola” internationalism, and not a humanist vision of the future. Internationalists of this kind usually “love” the whole world standing on the backs of someone near to them.
It seems that most of the Anglo-American observers of Croatia see Croatian nationalism from the pragmatic political, bipolar world perspective. No wonder, then, they come with negative conclusions about the Croatian national movement and its leaders. At least one of the observers writing in a British journal was honest enough to admit that,”not one self-respecting Western intellectual raised voice in defense of the [Croatian] students and intellectuals in prison, nor on behalf of the professors and the judges who were summarily dismissed … It is no wonder that, with the worst seemingly over, Western diplomats sighed with audible relief and vied with each other in assuring both their Chanceries and visiting foreign correspondents about Tito, that ‘the old man has once again saved Yugoslav unity after all this is what matters for us all’ .41
Ideologies, human and national rights, justice, humanism, trials, prisons, life or death have very little to do with such a pragmatic approach. The essential question for them was what would happen if Yugoslavia would collapse, or of its foundations were shaken. Again, the issue is not Yugoslavia itself but its geopolitical importance.
There has been a constant preoccupation with the Soviet enigma. What would they do in the Balkans? One effect of the Soviet question has been that the Croatians have been suspected, or directly accused, of being in touch with the Soviets. The “Russians are coming!” has been the Yugoslav regime’s tactic for a long time. A message of the West to the nations in Yugoslavia also has been “stay together or hang separately”.42 Supposedly, Yugoslavia and its “defense system and the determination behind it are the gold in the bank that American strategists count on”.43 But the historical indicators do not give any assurances for such a belief. On the contrary, one should keep in mind that what happened with Yugoslavia’s defense system in 1941 might happen again tomorrow.
To conclude, historical evidence shows that nationalism has been a very fluid ideology. It has been used by the extreme left and the extreme right, as well as by the liberals; every kind of government has appealed to it: tyrannical (left and right), authoritarian, royal and democratic; it has been imperialistic, oppressive, and liberating. It could be bad or good. But many times its moral quality is relative to the perspective from which it is viewed.
The Croatian national movement of the late Sixties and early Seventies has been looked by most of the Anglo-American observers in a negative light. However, the reasons for such interpretation of the events in Croatia have been predetermined by the observers’ initial belief that the Yugoslav state is indispensable for the balance of power in Europe. Furthermore, evidence points out that inter- national problems have been the primary cause of Yugoslavia’s internal instability; therefore, any sign of Croatian nationalism is perceived as unhealthy because it can cause the disintegration of the country. Moreover, the primary function of moral judgments and the labeling of the Croatian movement and its leaders is to disarm them of any moral value in the eyes of potential sympathizers outside the country.
Some also think that what Yugoslavia needs is more time, and that then the various nations and nationalities will melt and become one nation. One student of nationalism wrote not so long ago about such new multi-national and multi-ethnic states the following. “Put into the pot of physical proximity, covered by the lid of a common political system, exposed to the heat of cultural and social interchange, the various elements will change after a fairly long time . . . into a brew. The brew will not be quite homogeneous. You can still point to grain of rice, to a leaf of onion, to a chunk of meat, to a splinter of bone. But it will manifestly be one brew, with its distinct flavor and taste.”44 However, those who are fanning the fires under the pot known as Yugoslavia and are eager to cook “a Yugoslav brew” should be careful, because the latest indications are that pot and the brew may blow up into their faces.
NOTES
1 Jayant Lele, “Two Forces of Nationalism: On the Revolutionary Potential of Tradition.” In Jacques Dofney and Akinsola Akiwowo, eds., National and Ethnic Movements (Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE, 1980), p. 201.
2 See Milton J. Esman, ed. Ethnic Conflict in the Western World (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977).
3 Quite often there is a double standard on nationalism. For example the Yugoslav regime on one hand suppressed Croatian nationalism while on the other encouraged Macedonian and the so called “Moslem” nationalism. The U.S.S.R. and other governments have done similar things.
4 Many popular writers, even some scholars, state that Croatian and Serbian nations came as a result of the split between the Orthodox and Catholic churches. See for example Eugene Kamenka ed. Nationalism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976), p. 13. Their national identity developed much earlier than the split in the Christian church and their conflict is not religious in nature at all. Contrary to popular opinion in the West, religious toleration has been much better in that part of the world than in Western Europe.
5 Although many authors stress that “most Croats opted to join a common State with the Serbs” the fact is that Croatians as a people never had a chance to express their political will in freedom. See Stephen Clissold, Conflict Studies No.103, January 1979, p. 3.
6 One should, however, keep in mind that they also considered all of the South-East European nations as the trash of humanity, and the sooner they disappear the better.
7 C. A. Macartney, Hungary – A Short History (Chicago: Aldine, 1962), p. 189.
8 See for example Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), p. 212 and 232.
9 Bogdan Denitch, “The Evolution of Yugoslav Federalism” Publius Vol. 7, No. 4, 1977, p. 109.
10 On some aspects of legitimacy, see Walker Connor “Nationalism and Political Illegitimacy” Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism Vol. 8, No. 2, 1981, pp. 201-228.
11 Interestingly, some scholars label Croatian nationalism simply as “neo-fascism,” although it is evident from their writings that they have little knowledge about Croatian nationalism or Yugoslavia as a whole. See, for example, T. V. Sathyamurthy, Nationalism in the Contemporary World (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), pp. 90-92.
12 On the confusing terminology of nation, state, nation-state, etc, see Conner “Nationalism,” p. 201.
13 See Bogdan Denitch, “Succession and Stability in Yugoslavia,” Journal of International Affairs Vol. 32, No. 2, 1978, pp. 223-238 and Bogdan Denitch, “The Tito legacy,” Commonweal Vol. 107, No. 5, March 14, 1980, pp.143-146.
14 For some the solution to Yugoslav problems is in a “democratization” of the country (Aleksa Djilas, Nora Beloff, Mihajlo Mihajlov, Oskar Gruenwald). Others advocate a status quo, Dennison 1. Rusinow and Fred Singleton for example.
15 J. F. Brown, “The Balkan: Soviet ambitions and opportunities,” The World Today Vol. 40, No. 6, 1984, pp. 245-246.
16 Time June 5, 1972; “The most troublesome . . . nationality . . .” Ibid. Feb. 7, 1972.
17 Brown, “The Balkan,” p. 246.
18 Oskar Gruenwald, “The Croatian Spring, 1971: Socialism in One Republic,” Nationality Papers Vol. 10, No. 2, 1982, p. 225. Interestingly, similar opinions were expressed about Stjepan Radic in the 1920s.
19 The Times (London) Jan 24, 1972.
20 George Schopflin, “The Ideology of Croatian Nationalism” Survey Vol. 19, No. 1, 1973, p. 142.
21 George Klein, “The Role of Ethnic Politics in the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968 and the Yugoslav Crisis of 1971,” Studies in Comparative Communism Vol. 8, No. 4, 1975, p. 356.
22 Cynthia W. Frey, “Yugoslav Nationalisms and the Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty,” (Part II) East European Quarterly Vol. 11, No. 1, 1977, p. 102.
23 Gary Bertsch, “A Cross-National Analysis of the Community-Buildings Process in Yugoslavia,” Comparative Political Studies Vol. 4, No. 4, 1972, pp. 450-451; f.n. 24, p. 459.
24 Gary Bertsch and M. George Zaninovich, “A Factor-Analytic Method of Identifying Different Political Cultures,” Comparative Politics Vol. 6, No. 2, 1974, p. 235.
25 Bertsch, “A Cross-National Analysis,” p. 450.
26 Dennison 1. Rusinow, Crisis in Croatia (Part I) Southeast Europe Series, Vol 19, No. 4, 1972, p. 19.
27 Paul Lendvai, “Yugoslavia in Crisis,” Encounter Vol. 39, No. 2, 1972, p. 68.
28 Rusinow, Crisis (Part I), pp. 18-19.
29 Ibid., p. 18.
30 Frey, “Yugoslav Nationalisms,” (Part 1) East European Quarterly Vol. 10, No. 4, 1976, p. 439.
31 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, “Whither Yugoslavia?” Current Histor Vol. 64, No. 381, 1973, p. 204 and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, “The Yugoslav Succession Crisis in Perspective” World Affairs Vol. 135, No. 2, 1972, p. 103.
32 Gary K. Bertsch, “The Revival of Nationalisms” Problems of Communism Vol. 22, No. 6, 1973, p. 8.
33 Ibid., p. 11.
34 Brown, “The Role of Ethnic Politics,” p. 357.
35 Klein, “The Role of Ethnic Politics,” p. 357.
36 Pedro Ramet, “Yugoslavia and the Threat of Internal and External Discontents” Orbis Vol. 28, No. 1, 1984, p. 113.
37 Vlado Gotovac, “Autsaiderski fragmenti” (Part III) Kritika Vol. 2, No. 8, 1969, p. 538.
38 Ramet, “Yugoslavia,” p. 120.
39 Klein, “The Role of Ethnic Politics,” p. 362.
40 George Macesich, Economic Nationalism and Stability (Now York: Praeger, 1985), p. 3.
41 Lendvai, “Yugoslavia in Crisis,” p. 69.
42 Robin Remington, “Yugoslavia-the Strains of Cohesion” Survival May-June, 1972, p. 116.
43 Sterling, Clair, “Tito’s New Balancing Act” Atlantic Vol. 231, No. 6, 1973, p. 50.
44 Benjamin Akzin, State and Nation (London: Hatchinson University Library, 1964), pp. 83-84.
Published in Journal of Croatian Studies, Vol. XXX, 1989. A shorter version of this paper was presented at the International Symposium “Croatia and Croatians in the 20th Century” held at the Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia, October 2-7, 1988.
Croatia Rediviva
Mladen Klemencic
Taken from F. W. Carter and H. T. Norris, eds. The Changing Shape of the Balkans London: UCL Press, 1996, pp.97-117.
Introduction
In 1700 the Croatian scholar Pavao Ritter Vitezovic (1652-1713) published in Zagreb his work Croatia rediviva (Resurrected Croatia). He was encouraged by a recent anti-Ottoman campaign at the end of the seventeenth century, when large areas were liberated from the Turks and reincorporated into Croatia. The title of his study expressed then his vision of the integrity of the Croatian lands, but it can also be applied symbolically to present-day Croatia. In 1992 Croatia reappeared on the political map of Europe as a sovereign state; before that it existed as a country but not as a state. Throughout many centuries it survived always in a semi-independent status within larger empires, unions or states, but Croatian memories have to reach far back in history for the country’s real independence. “Croatia rediviva” is therefore an illustrative phrase for the new position and status of Croatia.
What makes the reappearance of Croatia more interesting from the perspective of political geography is the current problem of the country’s integrity. Starting in 1991, certain areas of Croatia became “de facto” beyond the control of legal authority. This came as a consequence of the aggression that followed the break-up of Yugoslavia. Moreover, UN peace forces have had to be deployed in those areas since 1992 in order to encourage the peace process, but after two and a half years there are still no signs of progress.
Historical foundations
The Croats are one of the Slavonic nations, who established themselves in the region between the Kupa, Sutla, Mura, Drava, Danube and Drina rivers and the Adriatic Sea during the complex ethnogenetic process lasting from the Middle Ages up to modern national integration in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Macan and Sentija 1992). The area inhabited by the Croats occupies a favourable communication position as a contact zone between the central Danubian basin and the Mediterranean. But from the perspective of stability, the location of Croatian territory within a zone of confrontation between central European Catholicism, East European Orthodoxy and Near East Islam appeared to be more important. Too often the area was a stage of confrontation and rivalry between neighbouring powers. Because of this, the Croats did not enjoy favourable conditions for the creation of their own state. Limited sovereignty or autonomy, as well as territorial disunity, are therefore frequent and frustrating elements of Croatian history.
The Croatian name was initially associated with territory in the hinterland of the Byzantine thema of Dalmatia. The region began to be called Regnum Chroatonun (“the state of the Croats”) in the mid-ninth century. It became strong, expanded its territory and even gained papal recognition. Its core area was the triangle formed by the towns of Knin, Sibenik and Nin. Since it was formed on the territory of the former Roman province of Dalmatia, it is usually known under the name of Dalmatian Croatia. The geographic borders of Dalmatian Croatia were on the Rasa and Cetina rivers in the coastal area, whereas inland the border followed the Sava and Una rivers towards the mouth of the Sana river and from there to the source of the Kupa river. North of it, on the territory of the former Roman province of Panonnia Savia, a northern Croatian principality was established. It was originally called Slovinje and later Slavonia. In the tenth centuries, with the unification of both principalities, a united Kingdom of Croatia wag established. Under its native dynasty until the end of the eleventh century, Croatia became an influential maritime power. According to monuments preserved from that time, it appeared to be a flourishing period of Croatian culture and history. Generally, it was also a rather stable period from a territorial viewpoint. Only the eastern border of the Croatian Kingdom was changeable, depending on its power. During favourable times, Croatian rulers controlled the area up to the Drina river in the east, which also encompassed the original territory of Bosnia around the spring of the river of the same name, so the surface area of Croatia totalled around 100,000km2. The Principality of Zahumlje in the southeast, which together with Travunia and Dukla (Doclea) was known under the name of Red Croatia, from time to time also acknowledged Croatian authority. The Principality of Neretva or Pagania had even closer ties with Croatia. At the time, the Byzantine thema of Dalmatia encompassed only a few islands and towns along the coast, which, from time to time, recognized Croatian authority and were annexed to the country in the twelfth century.
After the last king from the Trpimirovic dynasty died, the nobility recognized the Arpad dynasty as their rulers in 1102 and entered a personal union with Hungary. Croatia did not lose its state individuality by this union. The unity of the Croatian lands was manifested in the person of a ban (viceroy), as the king’s governor, and in a separate diet (sabor). But personal union with Hungary was the beginning of a long- lasting period in which Croatia was tied with either Hungary or later Austria. The constant struggle to keep sovereignty or at least certain autonomy throughout that period was an essential trait of Croatian history and a source of national awareness. One can argue about the degree of Croatian “de facto” individuality at certain stages of history, but cannot deny that Croatia always existed de jure. Real Croatian sovereignty was certainly as high and wide as the balance of power allowed, but the Croats have always been specially keen on the juridical foundation of their statehood. The territory gradually became smaller after personal union with Hungary was established in 1102. Some parts came under the influence of foreign authorities to a lesser or greater degree (battles with Venice for Dalmatia, Hungarian royal rule in Slavonia), thus breaking Croatia’s administrative integrity. From the twelfth to the fourteenth century, Bosnia became independent and extended to the former Croatian territory. Along the coast, Venetian authority and influence became stronger, whereas from 1358 in the southernmost part Dubrovnik started to develop as an independent republic.
Threatened by the Ottomans from the east, the Croatian diet elected the Habsburgs as Croatian rulers in 1527 in order to strengthen the country’s defence. On the one hand, that election ensured a powerful ally for Croatia, but on the other hand it faced Vienna’s tendencies for centralization. After the Ottoman Empire laid siege to the Balkan peninsula at the end of the sixteenth century, Croatia was reduced to its smallest territory in history (around 16,800 km2). Apart from Reliquiae reliquiarum (“remnants of the remnants”) of Croatia, only the Republic of Dubrovnik and some Venetian-controlled Adriatic islands and towns remained outside Ottoman authority. The whole of Bosnia and all other parts of Croatia fell under Ottoman rule. The Turks organized that territory in 1580 as the Bosnian pashelic .1 From that period the name of Croatia Turcica (Turkish Croatia) was preserved for the last conquered part of Croatia between the rivers Vrbas and Una (today part of Bosnia-Herzegovina) .2
The liberation of Croatian lands started at the end of the seventeenth century and was carried out gradually. By the Treaty of Karlowitz (Srijemski Karlovci) in 1699, the northern state territory, that is, the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia, regained regions of Baniya, larger parts of Lika and Slavonia as well as part of Srijem. The rest of Srijem was annexed to Croatia after the Treaty of Pozarevac in 1718 and the remaining part of Lika once again became part of Croatia after the Treaty of Svishtov in 1791. Along the boundary with the Ottoman Empire, Austrian authorities in the sixteenth century organized a defence system known as the Militargrenze or Vojna krajina (Military Frontier). Although the authority in the Military Frontier gradually came into the hands of the military command in Vienna, it was never formally accepted by the Croatian state. The far-reaching consequences of the new Military Frontier led to demographic changes (Kocsis 1993/94). The area was devastated and deserted. Many Croats were forced to leave it because of the instability and destruction of war, so that the military authorities settled a new population from the Balkan interior there, among whom were significant numbers of Vlachs of Orthodox religion. Later, in the ethnogenetic process under the influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church and propaganda, they became a part of the Serbian nation. On the basis of their existence within Croatia, and in fact manipulated by them, Serbia started in the nineteenth century to develop Greater Serbian pretensions on Croatian lands deep to the west.
Venetian Dalmatia to the south also started to extend gradually during the anti-Ottoman wars. With the territorial changes of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the characteristic shape of the Croatian lands was formed. Boundaries established then were later used as a basis for all future delineations. The area around the Bay of Kotor and Budva (today part of Montenegro) was also under the Venetian Republic. At that time it was known as Albania Veneta (Venetian Albania). National revival in the nineteenth century strengthened the awareness of Croatian togetherness and instigated a tendency towards the territorial unification of Croatian lands and independence. This is the origin of the name for the Triune Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia. In 1848 Josip Jelacic was ban of Croatia and Slavonia. He was also nominated governor of Dalmatia and Rijeka, as well as commander of the Military Frontier, and he regained Medimurje from the Hungarians. In this way, during his rule he gathered the Croatian lands formally together for a short time. But the problem of disintegration was still actual until the break-up of the Habsburg Empire. The Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia remained divided into civilian and military parts. In the mid-eighteenth century the Military Frontier was reorganized into regiments, whereas Civil Croatia was organized into zupanijas (counties). Finally, in 1881 the Military Frontier was completely reincorporated within Civil Croatia.
After the fall of the Venetian Republic (1797) and the Republic of Dubrovnik (1808), southern Croatia came into the possession of the Habsburgs. Austria united former Venetian Dalmatia, the Dubrovnik area and the former Venetian Albania into the Kingdom of Dalmatia in 1815. After the Berlin Congress in 1878, Dalmatia was extended to include the narrow coastal strip southeast of the Bay of Kotor. Istria and the Kvarner Islands, also predominantly Croatian areas in ethnic terms, were under Austrian rule too, but organized as an independently governed province. Therefore, during the nineteenth century all Croatian lands were under Habsburg rule, but administratively separated. Division was especially stressed after the reorganization of the Monarchy in 1867 and its division into Austrian and Hungarian parts. On the basis of the 1868 Compromise, the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia had special status within the Hungarian half, but Dalmatia and Istria remained in the Austrian part. After the demise of Austria-Hungary in the First World War, the South Slavonic provinces of the former monarchy proclaimed the independent state of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs on 29 October 1918. Representatives of the Triune Kingdom, along with representatives from Istria, the Slovene lands, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Vojvodina, participated in the National Council in Zagreb, which represented supreme state authority. This state entered into association with the Kingdom of Serbia, which had been joined earlier by the Kingdom of Montenegro as well as Vojvodina. Thus, establishment of a common state – the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – was proclaimed on 1 December 1918 and confirmed during the Paris Peace Conference. In 1929 it was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
For the Croats at that time Yugoslavia seemed a reasonable solution. They were happy to quit their long-lasting association with Hungary and Austria. Moreover, union with Serbia seemed promising as protection against Italian claims on the Adriatic coast (in 1915, by the secret Treaty of London, Italy was promised large parts of the Croatian coast if they entered the war on the Entente’s side).
For the first time in history a common Yugoslav state was formed, encompassing constituent parts that underwent completely separate politogenetic development. The nations that formed a common state had already been established as separate political and territorial entities, and therefore the union could exist only under tolerant government that would recognize the autonomy of its constituent parts. Serbian politicians were opposed to that conception and they attempted to enforce the idea of a unitarian state. From the very beginning they considered Yugoslavia as a Serbian war gain, that is, a Greater Serbia. Therefore, Yugoslavia was a great disappointment for the Croats, as well as for other non-Serbs .3 Instead of creating a federal state, Croatia lost its autonomous status, which it had enjoyed up to 1918. Nevertheless, on the eve of the Second World War an autonomous Croatian unit, the Banate (Banovina) of Croatia, was established in 1939 (Boban 1993). It was composed of two former banates: the Sava and Primorje banates, and Croat-dominated districts from neighbouring banates. The Banate of Croatia had an area of 65,465km2. It included former Croatia-Slavonia (excluding eastern Srijem) and Dalmatia (without the Bay of Kotor area) and also some parts of Bosnia- Herzegovina. The idea and intention was to reorganize the state into three federal units: Croatian, Slovenian and Serbian (other nations were not then recognized!). The Banate of Croatia was seen as the beginning of a process that was soon to be stopped by German aggression and the break-up of Yugoslavia. But even before the war broke out, Croatian autonomy was rejected by a vociferous and strong Serbian opposition; also it was not welcomed by Croatian Serbs.
After the fall of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1941, the Ustasha4 regime, under the tutorship of the Axis Forces, established an Independent State of Croatia, which apart from the Croatian lands also included Bosnia and Herzegovina. Territorial concessions were the price the regime was forced to pay. Since 1920 Italy already had the Istrian peninsula, some islands and the town of Zadar. Additionally, it annexed large parts of the Croatian coast. However, a strong anti-fascist movement developed within the territory of the Independent State of Croatia, which after capitulation to Italy in 1943 proclaimed annexation to all parts of Croatia that came under Italian occupation after the First World War and during the Second World War. After the fall of the Independent State of Croatia, two republics were established in its area: Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, both as federal units of the re- established Yugoslavia.
Delimitation between Yugoslav republics was carried out in 1945. Only a few details were discussed afterwards. The Croatian boundaries were mostly defined according to its historical lines, established during the anti-Ottoman wars. After the Trieste crises had been solved in 1954, Croatia was awarded an additional district in Istria, after which the surface area of the Croatian Republic within Yugoslavia totalled 56,538km2. Within the same territory, the Republic of Croatia declared its independence in 1991 and became an internationally recognized state and member of the UN in 1992.
Boundaries
The historical basis The present-day boundaries of Croatia are for the most part defined by the lines of division established long before the formation of the Yugoslav state in 1918 (Klemencic 1991, Englefield 1992). Croatia’s boundaries have a long historical continuity that is the consequence of the fact that Croatia managed to maintain elements of statehood throughout its history. Only some 250 km out of the total length of Croatia’s land boundaries, extending for 2,028 km, were boundaries delimited for the first time within Yugoslavia. For most of its length the Croatia/Hungary boundary is one of the oldest in Europe. This is particularly true of the sections marked by the Drava river, which has always separated the Croatian and Hungarianstates. In the Medimurje region only, where it is defined naturally by the Mura river, the boundary is in a sense more recent. It was finally defined after the First World War, when Medimurje was transferred from Hungary to the State of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. Hungary’s possession of Medimurje was questionable, since the region formerly belonged to Croatia and was always settled by the Croats. The Baranya boundary is the most recent section of the Croatia/Hungary boundary. It was first established in 1920 without reference to any earlier line. In this way, the southern part of the former Hungarian province of Baranya was joined to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Ethnically it was a highly mixed area in which Hungarians lived side by side with considerable numbers of Croats, Germans and, to a lesser extent, Serbs, but functionally depended on the town of Osijek (Bognar 1991).
The Croatia/Slovenia boundary is also a very old one. Its sections are part of an historical line that had for centuries separated Croatia from the Slovene lands of Carniola (Kranjska) and Styria (Stajerska). The Medimurje boundary also largely coincides with the earlier boundary of that part of the Croatian region, except for a few villages in the Strigova municipality, which were joined to Slovenia in the twentieth century. In contrast to the greater long-established section, the western part of the Croatia/Slovenia boundary is recent. The Istrian boundary was drawn after the Second World War, and after the temporary Free Zone of Trieste was divided between Italy and Yugoslavia. The delimitation between Croatia and Slovenia was carried out along ethnic lines.
The boundary with Bosnia-Herzegovina is the longest. Its present-day course is the result of centuries of Ottoman rule over Bosnia. The boundary section marked by the rivers Sava and Una reflects the historical boundary of Croatia towards the Ottoman Empire. Sections of the Sava and the lower course of the Una river were fixed by the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699. The Treaty of Pozarevac in 1718 altered it by extending Croatian territory farther east, thus bringing the whole of Srijem under Croatian authority. The same line was confirmed by the Treaty of Svishtov in 1791, which was particularly important for establishing the boundary along the upper Una river. Having won back the greater part of the Lika region in 1699, Croatia then extended its sovereignty over Kordun and the rest of Lika. Thus, in 1791 that boundary section was fixed almost completely as it is today. The same line was confirmed as a boundary between Croatia and Bosnia after the Second World War, except for a couple of former Croatian villages near Bihac, which were transferred to Bosnia. The southern section of the boundary towards Bosnia-Herzegovina is inherited from delimitations between Venetian-controlled Dalmatia and the Ottoman Empire, carried out in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The present-day boundary is the same as the so-called Linea Mocenigo, which gave Venetian Dalmatia its final shape in 1718. In the extreme southeast, the frontier coincides with the boundary of the Republic of Dubrovnik. There, Croatian territory is interrupted at Neum, giving Bosnia- Herzegovina an outlet to the sea. That was part of a diplomatic scheme by Dubrovnik in 1700, which gave the Ottomans a small stretch of coast in order to avoid direct territorial contact with Venice’s Dalmatia territory. This historical boundary was respected by delimitation between the Yugoslav republics after the Second World War.
The short Croatia/Montenegro boundary corresponds to the boundary of the Republic of Dubrovnik, but not that of Austrian Dalmatia. The former Dalmatian coastal strip comprises the Bay of Kotor, Budva and Spic and was given to Montenegro after the Second World War, although it had never been part of it before. The former Bosnia- Herzegovinia exit to the sea in the Bay of Kotor, known as Sutorina, was also allocated to Montenegro. The origin of that outlet is the same as that of Neum. It was another buffer that separated the Republic of Dubrovnik from Venetian possessions, but contrary to Neum was not given to Bosnia-Herzegovina after the Second World War.
The oldest section of the Croatia/Serbia boundary is the central one on the river Danube, down stream of the Drava river mouth. This has been Croatia’s boundary since 1699, when the Ottomans were driven out of Slavonia. The northern section, also on the Danube, was defined in 1945 after a special boundary commission decided that Baranja should be part of Croatia. The southern section was also defined for the first time in 1945, splitting the historical Croatian province of Srijem. Eastern Srijem, with a predominantly Serbian population, was transferred to Serbia, whereas the western part, with its predominantly Croat population, stayed within Croatia.
Thus, it can be concluded that the greatest part of Croatia’s current boundaries is the legacy of earlier periods. Recent historical boundary revisions, carried out within Yugoslavia, are rather rare, but they were carried out at the expense of Croatia. Such revisions are to be found on the Croatia/ Montenegro and Croatia/Serbia boundaries. Generally, the northern and western boundaries are old and more stable. The eastern boundaries are the result of continuing contraction and loss of territory generating from Ottoman conquest in the Balkans, and ending with the interrepublican delimitation within Yugoslavia.
Legal basis
As was known in the late 1980s, the existing boundaries of the Yugoslav republics were questioned by Serbia. For Serbia, only the international Yugoslav boundaries were legitimate, whereas republican boundaries were referred to as “administrative” and “invented by the communist regime” and as such were subject to change. When Croatia and Slovenia proclaimed independence on the basis of referenda in which all citizens of the respective republics were invited to participate, Serbia accused the two republics of “secession”. Since “secession” was illegal, the boundaries of “secessionist” republics should have been proposed by the rest of Yugoslavia. As the basis for a “new” delimitation, the principle of self-determination of peoples who wished to remain in Yugoslavia had to be applied. Since the Serbs were the only people advocating the preservation of Yugoslavia, this meant in reality that they would fix all other boundaries.
The Croatian counter-thesis considered that boundaries were based on both the historical background and constitutional provisions. Croatia pointed out, calling on the historical background of delimitations, that boundaries had deep and long-standing roots. Moreover, according to provisions of the 1974 Federal Constitution, the republic boundaries were inviolable and since republics were defined as states in themselves, Croatia called for their international protection. Boundaries were the subject of Article 5 of the Federal Constitution: “The territory of a republic cannot be changed without the agreement of the republic, and the territory of an autonomous province without the agreement of the autonomous province … The boundary between republics can only be changed on the basis of their mutual agreement. . .” Similar provisions were included in the constitutions of all republics, including Serbia.
As boundary issues were not solved by negotiation, the international community tried to mediate in the conflict (Cvrtila 1993). At the peace conference on (former) Yugoslavia, which began in the autumn of 1991 under the auspices of the European Community (EC), a special arbitration commission of experts from EC countries was formed. On the basis of presented requests and documentation from all the republics, the appointed commissioners answered all questions through several (Degan 1992). Opinion 1 stated that “Yugoslavia is in the process of dissolution” because four out of its six republics expressed their desire for independence. The main principles for delimitation before the former republics were explained in Opinion 3. Four main principles were to be followed: all external boundaries of former Yugoslavia “must be respected” boundaries between republics “can only be changed on the basis of free and mutual agreement” in the absence of such an agreement “the former boundaries become boundaries protected by international law”, following the principle of uti possidetis iuris; the “alteration of existing boundaries by force is not capable of producing legal effects”.
Opinion 2 is also of importance, in which the arbitration commission answered the question put forward by Serbia about the status of the Serbian ethnic community in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The right to self-determination for Serbs outside Serbia “must not involve changes to existing boundaries”. Serbian communities in the two republics were therefore given directions on how to regulate their rights within them. In January 1992 as a result of the views and opinions made by the arbitration commission, all EC members, as well as other countries, recognized the republics of Slovenia and Croatia, and later Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia “within the boundaries that existed before the beginning of confrontation in June last year”.
National identity
Throughout history the Croats did not have many chances to establish their own state, but their national identity has deep and longstanding roots (Fernandez-Armesto 1994). Memories of their medieval kingdom were kept alive among Croats for centuries long after its fall, but an even stronger source of national self-awareness was the continuity of unbroken statehood that Croatia enjoyed within its unions with Hungary and Austria. Indeed, in both unions Croatia was nominally recognized as a separate unit. The Croatian diet (and parliament since 1848) always persistently insisted m that fact. The struggle put up by the Croats for their state and national individuality is therefore essential if one wants to understand Croatian identity (Macan and Sentija 1992). On the basis of that juridical tradition, one of the two strongest political parties formed by the Croats in the nineteenth century was significantly called the Party of (Croat State) Right. It stood firmly on the position of Croatian individuality and sovereignty. Even Croatian politicians who aspired to wider (South) Slavonic integration, saw an eventual common state as a union in which Croats would be able to keep their national and historic particularities. Therefore, when Croatia finally entered the South Slavonic common state in 1918, it was far too late to change or deny Croatian national identity. Moreover, Serbian attempts to impose the concept of “one nation consisting of three tribes” were too crude and violent to attract the Croats. Somewhat different was the concept promoted by the Yugoslav communist regime after the Second World War. Tito’s regime promoted “Yugoslavism”, but was also repressive towards the Croats. Croatian national expression was considered as a direct threat to “brotherhood and unity”. Steady persecution of Croats in both royalist and communist Yugoslavia caused deep distrust towards a South Slavonic union among Croats, strengthened Croatian national sentiments and deepened their desire to establish an independent state. Resurrection of Serbian imperialism in the late 1980s and aggression in the early 1990s were therefore only final impulses for Croatia’s striving for independence.
One of the most complex questions in the former Yugoslavia was a linguistic one .5 There are certainly close linguistic ties between Croats and Serbs as well as Montenegrins and Bosnian Muslims. Very often, the standard variants they speak are considered to be one language. However, reality is much more complex. Traditionally, Croats used dialects belonging to three distinct dialect groups (A concise atlas … 1993). The so-called Kajkavian and Cakavian dialects have always been used exceptionally by the Croats and there is a rich vernacular literature written in those dialects. Only dialects belonging to the third dialect group are spoken by both Croats and Serbs. In the nineteenth century a dialect belonging to that (Stokavian) group was accepted as the standard language variant, partly in order to bring Croats and Serbs closer together. Soon afterwards, the Serbs developed a theory by which all speakers of Stokavian were Serbs. That falsified theory became one of the footholds of Greater Serbian policy and territorial claims. On the other side it forced Croatian linguistic scholars into an arduous struggle for Croatian language individuality (Banac 1990). Now, as the Croats and Serbs have their own separate states, the language issue is no more. Each side will develop its own variant language freely and independently, and will be able to name it in accordance with national sentiment or any other heart’s desire.
Differences are greater concerning writing. Although the Serbs traditionally use the Cyrillic script, the Croats exclusively use the Latin alphabet (twenty-five consonants and five vowels). In the past the Croats also used the Glagolitic script and the Bosancica script, which had been a Croatian form of the Cyrillic script.
Catholicism is also an important element of Croatian national identity. It has played a significant role in Croatian history because of the outlying position of Croatia within a Catholic-dominated part of Europe. This position more often appears to have been a hindrance than fruitful, since contacts with Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam were often conflicting. Catholicism is therefore highly positioned in the national consciousness of the Croats as a mode of their defence, and can be compared with the Irish and the Polish experiences. The feelings of Croats towards the Holy See were transparently manifested during the visit of John Paul II to Croatia in September 1994. Almost a million Croatian citizens, and Croats from the diaspora, gathered in Zagreb and took part in public worship led by the Pope in the Croatian language.
Naturally, there are also Croats who are not Catholics. Some of them are Protestants too, and there are also Muslims by religion who consider themselves as Croats in both Croatia and Bosnia, although that combination of ethnic and religious identity was more frequent in the past (Banac 1984).
Since Croatia experienced all its trouble coming from the position on or beside historical dividing lines, the Croats are especially keen to consider themselves part of what is usually called the “West”. Most of them see themselves as “defenders of the eastern frontier of Western culture and values”. When Croatia claimed its independence from Yugoslavia, “return to Europe” was among its main slogans. Unfortunately for the Croats, they are rarely recognized by the West as such. Croatia is more often considered to be part of the Balkans, whereas Croats tend to see their own country as a part of central Europe or the Mediterranean. In the mental map of most Croats, the Balkans is an everlasting source of threats for Croatia’s bare existence. Deep frustration is the only consequence that can come out of that misunderstanding.
Croatia is quite often considered to be an old-fashioned and conservative country by the West. There is not much understanding of Croatia’s openly expressed national feelings and historicism, the Catholicism of substantial numbers of Croats, their insistence on language purity and other expressions of national feeling. All that is, in the eyes of Westerners, really old-fashioned, because the national state is not a favourite model in Europe any more. It must also be stressed that the poor image of Croats has been steadily mediated for the international public by the Serb-dominated diplomacy of former Yugoslavia. Quite often the Croats really appear to be living in the past, whereas modem Europe is orientated to the future. The problem is in the late politogenetic process. The fact that Croatia reached international recognition as late as the 1990s is not the fault of the Croats. They wanted a state in the nineteenth century and after both world wars when the map was changing, but at that time there was no understanding for a small Croatian nation among the Great Powers. Croatia now needs more understanding and patience. As soon as the problem of the country’s integrity is solved, national feelings will not be important any more, and Croats will turn from history to the present and the future.
In spite of the fact that present-day Croatia consists of several historic provinces that had been separated for a long time, national integration is not questioned. Regionalist tendencies are not strong, although there are many typical characteristics particularly for Dalmatia, Slavonia or other regions; most Croats, regardless of their regional origin, sincerely feel Croatia has a main political-territorial framework. The only exception is Istria, where regionalism surfaced in recent times on the basis of the region’s position, history and cultural heritage. Yet, even Istrian regionalism cannot be considered as a threat to the country’s integrity and national togetherness.
Ethnic structure6
The ethnic structural pattern of Croatia is similar to the patterns of the majority of states lying in the central European belt between the Baltic and the Adriatic. One ethnic group, in particular the Croats, represents the majority, whereas the rest of the population consists of ethnic communities or minorities that are represented on a much smaller scale. According to the 1991 census, which was carried out on the eve of the war and of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, the total population was 4,784,265 inhabitants, of whom 3,736,356 (78.1% were Croats. Among the republics of former Yugoslavia, Croatia was second according to the share of its titular nation to total population. Only Slovenia was ethnically more homogenous .7
The second largest ethnic community in Croatia are the Serbs. There were 581,663 Serbs (12.2%) registered in the 1991 census. Approximately one third of the Serbs lived within the regions of Baniya, Kordun, eastern Lika and around Knin in northern Dalmatia, and were a majority there. The Serbs in the eastern and western parts of Slavonia constituted an additional sixth of their total, whereas the rest of them (i.e. roughly a half of the total number) were dispersed throughout other parts of Croatia, mostly in large towns. In the context of the recent Croat/Serb conflict, it is important to stress that Serb-dominated areas lie along the Croatia/Bosnia boundary, hundreds of kilometres away from Serbia. Eastern Slavonia, or more precisely the regions of Baranya and Srijem, which since the 1991 war have been occupied by the Serbs, was not a Serb-dominated area due to its pre-war situation.
As a consequence of migration waves during Habsburg rule, there are several other ethnic communities that have been living within Croatia for at least a century or more. The most homogenous Hungarian community is in Baranya, the majority of Czechs live in western Slavonia, the majority of Italians inhabit the western part of Istria and Rijeka, whereas Slovaks and Ruthenians are concentrated in several villages in Slavonia. The Jews, who were more numerous before the Second World War, live mostly in Zagreb. All ethnic communities mentioned are small, but they are a very important part of society because they give Croatia a specific flavour of central European mixture.
Bosnian Muslims (43,469 or 0.9%) were the third largest community according to the 1991 census, but their relatively large number is a result of recent economic immigration from Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Generally, all non-Croat communities do accept Croatia as their homeland. They supported Croatia’s independence in 1991 and many their members were even part of the Croatian Army and fought for freedom together with Croats. Only the Serbs, and then not all of them, are either ambivalent or hostile towards Croatia.
Croat/Serb conflict
War between Croatia and the former Yugoslav Army ended more or less at the beginning of January 1992. During some five months of war operations the Yugoslav army together with volunteers from Serbia backed local Serb irregulars and they seized about one quarter of Croatian territory (Klemencic 1993). On that territory the so-called ‘Republic of Serbian Krajina” was self-proclaimed by rebelling Serbs (Vego 1993).
The occupied area of Croatia comprises the regions of Baranya, the eastern part of Slavonia including the Croatian part of Srijem, parts of western Slavonia, Baniya, Kordun, eastern Lika and part of northern Dalmatia. Before the hostilities, according to the 1991 census, 549,083 inhabitants lived within the presently occupied areas, among them 287,830 Serbs (52.4%), 203,656 Croats (37.1%) and 57,597 (10.5% of citizens) declaring other ethnic affiliation (Sterc and Pokos 1993). As a consequence of hostilities, the ethnic composition of those areas has changed drastically. Almost all the Croats were killed or have been forced to leave, and no one has returned.8 The same happened to most of the other non-Serbs living in the area. In March 1992, UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) were deployed in the occupied areas of Croatia in accordance with a plan usually known as the “Vance plan” after Cyrus Vance, the personal envoy of the UN Secretary General, who mediated in the conflict (Baletic 1993). After more than three years of UNPROFOR’S presence it can be said that the peace-keeping forces have effectively guaranteed Serbian gains, since the situation on the ground has not changed and no political resolution of the conflict has been reached.
The rebellion of the Serbs in Croatia effectively started in August 1990 with the so-called “tree-trunk revolution”, but it was part of a wider scenario conducted from Belgrade, in order to destabilize former Yugoslavia and to reorganize it according to Serbia’s desire. Moreover, the whole scenario was just one more attempt to realize the two- centuries old Greater Serbian expansionist program and territorial claims (Brandt et al. 1991; Klemencic 1993/4b).
The Serbs living in Croatia, or Croatian Serbs, protested against Croatia as early as 1988, when the communist regime was still in power. At that time there was no excuse for their anti-Croat feelings since the Croatian communist regime was more than generous towards Serbs and it enabled them to have privileged status (Cviic 1991: 73). After the free elections held in spring 1990, Croatian Serbs openly rejected the more independent status of Croatia and totally alienated themselves from the rest of Croatian society. They did not even try to accommodate themselves to a new multi-party situation. Under the influence of Greater Serbian propaganda from Belgrade they equated the newly elected Croatian government with the Ustasha regime. It is true that a Ustasha regime during the Second World War committed war crimes against the Serbs, but historical memories and fears could not be a reason for justifying Serbian armed rebellion and a move towards secession in the 1990s.
After heavy and brutal fighting and several years of total separation, there is an extremely deep division between ‘Krajina”9 10 and the rest of Croatia. Formally, integrity of Croatia is guaranteed by the UN, and its international boundaries should be protected by international law. Because of this the Serbs are not allowed to secede and join Serbia, which is their final aim. On the other hand, the situation on the ground is actually favourable for the Serbs. As long as they keep the territorial “status quo”, they consider themselves to be beyond the legal Croatian framework. Negotiations between the two sides have been started several times under the auspices of international mediators, but so far there has not been a single accord acceptable as a starting point for both sides. The only wish for peace can be pointed out as a joint one, but Croatia wants to reach peaceful reintegration and the Serbs want peaceful secession. From the Croatian viewpoint a resolution of the “Serbian question” should be reached within the framework of the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Liberties and the Rights of Ethnic and National Communities or Minorities, which was voted in the Croatian Parliament in 1991. A high degree of cultural autonomy for the Serbs is provided by the Constitutional Law, including territorial autonomy in two districts (Glina and Knin) covering most of the area that was Serb- dominated according to the 1991 and previous censuses. Due to personal judgment, it seems that the Croatian government would be ready to give more concessions to the Serbs. Effective partition of the country has caused deep divisions in society. The problem of displaced persons is getting deeper daily. There is steady international suspicion about Croatia’s stability and credibility The most important transportation corridors are out of use and alternative routes do not satisfy needs. Without resolution of the country’s integrity, the chances for economic recovery are poor. Therefore, resolution of the Serbian question appears to be of vital interest for Croatia, and that fact forces the Croatian side to open more doors to Serbian claims. The only thing that Croatia certainly could not negotiate is the secession of “Krajina”.
The Serbs are expected to recognize the sovereignty and integrity of Croatia and to abolish secessionistic claims. Within that framework they can probably negotiate more autonomy that they have been offered so far, especially if they get international backing for such a status. Apart from Baranya and eastern Slavonia, other Serb-occupied areas are traditionally underdeveloped and sparsely populated. Functionally, they depend on Croatia. They have always been economically integrated into Croatia. Moreover, being supplied directly from Serbia proper, self- proclaimed Krajina is not economically viable at all. A direct link is at present possible only across another Serbian “statelet” in Bosnia- Herzegovina. That fact explains why the Serbs so desperately need a land corridor in northern Bosnia. On the other hand, especially from a military viewpoint, the most effective impact on the Greater Serbian project would be to break that corridor.
The are two ways to resolve the Croat/Serb conflict. A military solution means a new war between Croats and Serbs, or more realistically between Croatia and Serbia. Croatia’s victory would resolve the question of the country’s integrity, but it would probably cause a huge emigration of the Serbs from presently occupied parts of Croatia. However, the military balance is not favourable for Croatia, since Serbia controls most of former Federal Army potential and still has an advantage, especially when considering aircraft and heavy artillery. Moreover, Croatia has been steadily warned by the international community that there would be no sympathy for eventual Croatian military actions. Eventual defeat of the Croatian army would probably mean a final loss of territory. It might also open the door for legalizing boundary changes at the expense of Croatia. The resolution of conflict without a new war is also possible, no matter how deep the conflict seems to be. But the political key for that resolution is not within Croatia. It is held by Serbia. If Serbia abolishes its expansionistic claims and recognizes Croatia within international boundaries, the rebelling Croatian Serbs have to negotiate its future status with the Croatian government. In spite of weaknesses demonstrated so far, international mediators can certainly influence that solution profoundly.
Relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina
Relations between Croatia and Serbia can be characterized as conflicting, but the most complex is the relationship between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is a special and outstanding interaction between the two countries concerning geographical complementarity (Klemencic 1993/4a). There are also many elements of mutually considering economic, historical and ethnic relations (Klemencic and Topalovic 1993).
Bosnia has traditionally been considered as one of the historic Croatian lands. An important part of that viewpoint has been a theory that Bosnian Muslims were of Croat ethnic origin. On the other hand, the Serbs from their perspective viewpoint claim the predominantly Serbian origin of Bosnian Muslims and they consider Bosnia to be one of Serbia’s lands. But there has always been an essential difference between Croatian and Serbian claims. The Croatian side was always likely to respect Islamic culture and be ready to accept Bosnian Muslims within its Croatian circle as “Croats of Muslim religion”. On the contrary, the Serbian approach has always been extremely exclusive. There was no understanding and no respect for the Islamic tradition of Bosnian Muslims. They have always been contemptuously considered as once Islamized Serbs who should be either re-Serbianized by whatever means or simply exterminated. Such a Serbian attitude has been widely demonstrated during the current war in Bosnia.
On the grounds of recent events in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatian policy needs new approaches and attitudes. It has become obvious that Bosnian Muslims should be treated as a separate cultural and political entity.11 Consequently, Bosnia-Herzegovina can no longer be treated as “Croatian land”. An old slogan of the Croatian nationalists, “Croatian boundary on the Drina river” has changed into “Serbian boundary must not extend over the Drina river”. That means support for a sovereign and integral Bosnia-Herzegovina, which should be a buffer state between Croatia and Serbia.
Naturally, Croatia will carry on its care for the Croatian community within Bosnia-Herzegovina but only to help them to ensure a satisfactory status. Such an approach provides fertile grounds for close relations between the two countries in future, not on the basis of nostalgic historical or consanguinic links but on the more promising basis of real interests. As soon as Croatia accepts that approach completely and integrates it into its strategy, it will also be better treated and more widely accepted on the international stage.
However, a much more complicated situation will develop if Bosnia- Herzegovina does not survive as an integral state. Eventual secession of the Serbs and partition of Bosnia are a real threat for Croatia because of a possible merger of Serb-dominated areas in both Croatia and Bosnia into one unit (so-called Western Serbia). When the spatial integrity of Bosnia is ever violated by the Serbs, it automatically lays claims for revision of the Croatian boundaries. Thus, Croatia will always be very much dependent on the situation in Bosnia, even without wishing that on its own. What is important for Croatia is to be unequivocal towards Bosnian integrity. Fortunately, the Washington agreement12 signed by the Croatian and Bosnian governments (in the latter case, this is more or less a euphemism for “leadership of the Bosnian Muslims”) in March 1994 has made the Croatian position towards Bosnia clearer.
Relations toward other neighbouring states
Apart from Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia’s other neighbouring states are Slovenia and Hungary, as well as Italy on the Adriatic Sea. Since the break-up of Yugoslavia there has been a demarcation dispute between Croatia and Slovenia. The two countries proclaimed mutual recognition “within existing boundaries” in 1991, but they have to demarcate the boundary line. A mutual state commission was formed. Several disputed points emerged, but any problems are small and they should be treated as technical. The greatest dispute is maritime delimitation in the Bay of Piran, where there was no dividing line during the Yugoslav period. In contrast with land boundaries, there are no maritime boundaries between republics in former Yugoslavia. Since Croatia is fortunate in terms of the length of its coastline13, Slovenia is probably a more interested partner in that maritime delimitation.
Apart from the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, a median line should be adopted as a fair solution, but Slovenia seems to be more ambitious in order to secure broader territorial waters and probably direct access to international waters. The problem is that such a claim encompasses changes of the land boundary at the expense of Croatia, which is advocated openly by some marginal groups in Slovenia. Moreover, the dispute over the Bay of Piran is sometimes overestimated by the media on both sides. Yet, it is a dispute likely to become more sever. Two young countries should finally manage to find a mutually acceptable solution.
With regard to its maritime boundary, Croatia is likely to continue to apply the delimitation agreements reached by Italy and the former Yugoslavia (Blake 1993/94). The way Italy and Yugoslavia settled their straight baselines, territorial sea limits and delimitation of the continental shelf in the Adriatic was widely accepted as reasonable, modest and mutually satisfactory. As a successor state of the former Yugoslavia, Croatia sees no reason to change already-existing solutions.
Apart from the dispute between Croatia and Slovenia, another maritime dispute is the delimitation of the Bay of Kotor between Croatia and Montenegro. First, it should be made clear who is Croatia’s partner: Montenegro or the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, proclaimed by Serbia and Montenegro after the break-up of former Yugoslavia. Secondly, that case is clear since the Prevlaka peninsula on the western side of the bay’s mouth belongs to Croatia and the rest of the bay is part of Montenegro. The dispute exists only because Montenegro (or FR Yugoslavia) claims a boundary revision in order to gain the whole bay. Apart from that unilateral claim, the maritime delimitation should be easy because the equidistant line provides a fair and only logical solution (Blake 1993/94).
There are no disputes at all concerning boundary lines between Hungary and Croatia. The old international boundary seems to be satisfactory for both sides, so they can renew their historic links under new circumstances and without boundary disputes.
Conclusion
Although Croatia finally reappeared on the political map of Europe, creation of the state has not yet been completed. The aspirations of the Croats over centuries became a reality, but the new state needs to consolidate its integrity and stability. Without the reintegration of currently Serb-controlled areas, Croatia’s unique shape would be seriously handicapped. Under the present circumstances of partial occupation, the country’s economic viability is endangered too. Croatia’s primary course of action is therefore to find a way to its integrity.
Theoretically, the approach Croatia had towards a territorial resolution of the post-Yugoslav crises was confirmed as a right and legitimate one. Former republican boundaries were recognized as international, which was exactly what Croatia advocated. Unfortunately, the country was faced with aggression and it was forced to defend its legal rights with arms. Since military imbalance was more than obvious, Croatia succeeded only partially. Now, there is a gap between the legal rights and effective occupation in reality. To resolve that frustrating situation, Croatia looks for efficient international support and help.
Once integrated within internationally recognized boundaries, Croatia will have to find a solution for the status of its Serbian minority in order to strengthen the country’s internal stability. Certainly, a solution, or modus vivendi as once interpreted by EC representatives, will not be easily reached, because Croat/Serb relations in Croatia and in general have reached their lowest level in history.
On attaining its current aims it can be concluded that Croatia’s territorial aspirations will be satisfied and it can soon become a place of stability and progress in a transitional part of the continent where central Europe, the Mediterranean and the Balkans are in contact. Croatia rediviva is therefore still a challenging project for the present generation of the Croats.
Notes
1 The only Ottoman province solely of countries populated with south Slavonic nations. Smaller units were sanjaks.
2 For simplicity, the formal title “Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” is reduced to “Bosnia-Herzegovina” or sometimes simply “Bosnia” throughout the text.
3 An excellent insight into the first few years of Yugoslavia is provided by 1. Banac (1984).
4 Ustasha – the Croatian Revolutionary Movement – founded in 1929 after dictatorship was introduced in Yugoslavia by the Serbian monarch. In 1941 the movement’s leader Ante Pavelic was sponsored by Italy and Germany to take a leading position in Croatia. The 1941-5 activity of the Ustasha regime compromised an idea of future Croatian independence, including the 1991 declaration of independence.
5 More about language can be found in Banac (1990).
6 A collection of more detailed studies on the ethnic structure of Croatia, and particularly of Serb-dominated areas, is provided by Croatian geographers in Geopolitical and demographical issues of Croatia (1991).
7 In 1991, according to respected censuses, the percentage of Slovenians in Slovenia was 87.8, Serbs in Serbia, 65.8, Macedonians in Macedonia, 64.6, and Montenegrins in Montenegro, 61.8. The participation of ethnic communities within Bosnia-Herzegovinia was: Muslims 43.7 per cent, Serbs 31.3 per cent and Croats 17.3 per cent.
8 In December 1993 there were in Croatia 250,396 displaced persons from occupied areas registered by the government office for displaced persons and refugees, and 59,959 refugees from Croatia in other countries. Also, Croatia provided accommodation for 282,728 refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina.
9 The term “Krajina” or “Serbian Krajina” has recently been used to determine the self-proclaimed Serbian “statelet” in Croatia. The word “Krajina” in the Croatian language has the same meaning as the word “frontier” in English. It used to be a general term, written with a lower case initial letter, usually to denote smaller regions that were historically borderlands. The Austrian defensive belt known as the Military Frontier (or Vojna krajina in Croatian) did not correspond fully to the territory of so-called Serbian Krajina. For example, the town of Knin was not within the Military Frontier. It is also important that the Military Frontier did not have special status because of the Serbs living there (totalling 40 per cent of the population), but for completely different reasons. The inhabitants of the Military Frontier enjoyed immunity from feudal obligations in return for military service guarding the frontier against the Turks, irrespective of their ethnic origin or religious affiliation. The continuity between the historic Military Frontier and present-day “Krajina”, which the Serbs claim, simply does not exist (Szajkovski 1993).
10 Since this chapter was written, Krajina has been reincorporated within Croatia, and few of its Serb population are in residence there.
11 In order to stress their identity, Bosnian Muslims in 1994 started to call themselves “Bosniaks”, which is a traditional term for citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially those spread among Muslims and Croats.
12 Agreement between Croats and Bosnian Muslims, which proposed a Croat-Bosnian federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition, a confederation between the Bosnian federation and Republic of Croatia is proposed for the future, but it is not a realistic project, at least until both countries have overcome problems of integrity.
13 Excluding the islands the coastline of Croatia is 1778km long, and that of Slovenia, 32km long.
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The History Of Boka Kotorska From Antiquity Until 1918
American Croatian Review, Year IV, No. 3 and 4, 1997, pp. 15-16.
The sound of Boka Kotorska is the biggest and most beautiful bay in the Adriatic Sea, as well as the southernmost fjord in the world. Its important geographic position, favorable topography, plentiful water and sunlight, along with its pleasant climate, have been attracting people to settle there since prehistoric times.
The oldest archeological findings in Boka date back to the late neolithic period, around 3500 B.C. Unique graveyards and cliff paintings can be traced back to the second millennium B.C. The Greeks are known to have built their colonies in Boka as early as the fourth century B.C. The Romans called the sound Sinus Rbisonicus. The present name of the sound is derived from the Roman word bocca, which means mouth, or opening. Thus, the name Boka Kotorska (Kotor being, of course, Boka’s most important town).
The first recognizable long-term inhabitants of Boka were the Illyrians (intermingled with the Celts to a certain degree). By 250 B.C., Boka was part of the Illyrian state under King Agron, its capital was Skadar which is in modern-day Albania. The Illyrians were sea-pirates known to have attacked Greek shipping, providing a pretense for Roman invasion of the region. In the third and last Illyric-Roman war (168 B.C.) the Romans destroyed the Illyrian state and took control of Boka. Their rule lasted until the fall of the Western Roman Empire, around A. D. 476.
During Roman rule, primarily due to Roman immigration and assimilation of the indigenous population, Latin influences in Boka became ingrained and have remained deeply rooted in the area even several centuries after the fall of Rome. (Indeed, one could argue that they can be easily found even today).
Following the implosion of the great Western Roman Empire and 60 years of Gothic rule in the area, Boka came under the increasing influence of the Eastern Roman Empire, later known as Byzantium. The Early medieval period in Boka, as in the rest of Europe, is characterized by the mass migration of largely nomadic tribes, first the Goths, followed by the Avars, and then the Slavs.
During the Slavic migration in the sixth and seventh centuries, Croats settled regions along the Adriatic coast from Istria to Albania, regions as far north as the Drava River, as far west as Sutla, and as far east as the Drina. The oldest historical account from those times, written by a priest of Duclea (Pop Dukljanin), mentions Red Croatia, or Upper Dalmatia, a region which included Boka. Red Croatia united with Western or White Croatia into a single Croatian state as early as the middle of the tenth century.
From the mid-ninth until the end of the twelfth century, Boka was repeatedly under pressure, even periodic rule, from the Byzantine Empire on the one hand, and the states of Duklja-Zeta and Travunja on the other, states which had been formed in Boka’s hinterland. By mid-twelfth century, the town of Kotor started to thrive as a maritime trade center, establishing ties with nearby Dubrovnik. The Catholic cathedral of St. Triphon (Sv. Trifun) dates back to 1166 and was built with the help of maritime traders.
From 1185 until 1371, Boka was part of a medieval Serbian state under the Nemanjic dynasty. Even during these times, however, Boka maintained broad autonomy and retained its overwhelmingly Catholic character. Many new towns were springing up along the shores of the sound. The town of Kotor continued to grow in size and influence, and it increasingly attracted various tradesmen like goldsmiths, blacksmiths, and tailors, among others. Kotor’s ship building industry was also well known.
During this period, several guilds and fraternities were founded. The oldest and most famous of these fraternities, all of which had religious origins, was the fraternity of sea-farers from Boka or in Croatian, Bokeljska mornarica. It may have been founded as early as the beginning of the ninth century, but definitely existed by mid-twelfth century.
After the death of the last of the Nemanjics, Kotor came (1371) under the protection of the Croatian-Hungarian king, Ljudevit the Great. Ljudevit was the most powerful ruler of the Adriatic region at the time, forcing out Venice from the eastern side of the Adriatic region. After his death, Bosnian king Stjepan Tvrtko I. Kotormanic attempted to impose his rule on Kotor. He succeeded to gain only parts of the bay including the town of Kotor. However, his rule did not leave a lasting impact in the town or the region. The Bosnian rulers are remembered mostly for founding the town of Herceg Novi on the western side of Boka. After Tvrtko’s death in 1391, and until 1420, Kotor was, like Dubrovnik, an independent city-state.
The period of Venetian rule over Kotor and Boka started in 1420 and lasted, with a few interruptions, until 1797. It was a period of numerous wars and permanent insecurity on both land and the sea. By the end of the fifteenth century, Turks had conquered the lands of Boka’s hinterland, including some lands on the north west side of Boka. For the ensuing 200 years, the sound was thus divided between the Venetians and the Turks. During that time, the population, power, and significance of Kotor decreased dramatically, turning Kotor into one of the most devastated and most pillaged cities in the bay. After the Austro-Venetian war against the Turkish Empire (1715-1718), Venice was able to expand its territories into Dalmatia even further. She took complete control over Boka sound once again, and her rule lasted until the fall of Venice in 1797.
On August 24th, 1798 a Croatian from Lika, general Matija Rukavina, marched alongside Austrian troops into Kotor. Rukavina entered Kotor in the name of the Croatian-Hungarian king, convincing the citizens of Boka to accept the Habsburg rule.
In the midst of the Napoleonic wars, after the Austrian defeat at Austerlitz, Austria was supposed to turn over Boka to the French. However, the Russians, who were not obliged to honor this agreement, in the vain hope of stopping Napoleon’s eastward advance, took possession of Boka in 1806. After the Russian defeat at Friedland and after little over a year of Russian rule, Russia was forced to accede Boka to the French. With the fall of Dubrovnik republic in 1808, Boka became territorially connected with the rest of Dalmatia.
In their six years of rule, the French introduced an array of innovations. The most important of these probably being democratization and the abolishment of all aristocratic privileges.
In 1807, the Croatian parliament (Sabor) again requested that Dalmatia, of which Boka was now a part, must be reunited with Croatia and Slavonia. This request would constantly resurface until unification in the latter part of the century.
After the fall of Napoleon in 1813 and while awaiting the final peace settlement, Boka was temporarily united with Montenegro for several months. Two strong factions had emerged in Boka at this time. The pro-Austrian and pro-Montenegrin one favored a union of Boka with Montenegro. This faction was supported mostly by Orthodox villagers living in the hills above the sound who had settled there during Turkish rule. A numerically greater, pro-Austrian faction enjoyed support from predominantl
y Croatian Catholic coastal cities, as well as some villages. The final decision came at the all-important Vienna Congress of 1814, in which Austria was confirmed as the successor of all the territories of the Venetian and Dubrovnik republics. The Kingdom of Dalmatia was formed, with its capital in Zadar, and Boka became part of the Austrian state. The second Austrian rule was to last for 104 years, until 1918.
In the 1830’s, the so called Illyrian Renewal, or the Croatian national revival movement, swept Boka as well. Long after the national homogenization of Boka’s minority Serbs, Boka’s Croats finally started to unite under their Croatian national identity. The appointment of count Josip Jelacic to the governorship of Dalmatia and the rest of Croatia had finally come. Many songs and poems were written in Jelacic’s honor. Croatian tricolors were displayed on all ships as well as in all of Boka’s towns alongside the official Austrian flag. However, unification was still some decades away.
At the assembly in 1861, it had been decided that all citizens of Boka, Croats and Serbs alike, unconditionally support the unification of Boka and all of Dalmatia with Croatia proper. Representatives of Boka in Dalmatia’s Sabor at the time, three Croats and a Serb, and all members of the People’s Party, supported unification with Croatia. Responding to greater-Serbian tendencies, the People’s Party gradually shifted its ideological orientation from South-Slavism to Croatianism in the 1870’s, when it became the majority party in Dalmatia’s Sabor. The final break between the Croatians and the Serbs came after the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Austro-Hungarian empire in 1878. The Croatians supported occupation because it reunited Bosnian-Herzegovinian Croats with the rest of the Croatian nation, while the Serbs vehemently opposed it, because it ran counter to greater-Serbian claims to Bosnia.
In the second half of the nineteenth century Boka experienced an economic revival. The number of affluent Croatian families increased quite dramatically. Maritime trade regained much of its former glory by 1870. However, the rapid development of the steam ship dealt a fatal blow to Boka’s trade – one from which it was never able to recover.
Sharing the fate of the rest of Croatia, Boka became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes after World War I. Thus started the most difficult period in Boka’s history – the period in which the greater-Serbian politicians would attempt, and largely succeed, to assume full control of one of Croatia’s most beautiful regions.
Based on the text “Boka Kotorska od najstarijih vremena do 1918” by Ankica and Josip Pecaric. Summarized and translated by Ivica Kresic, University of Chicago.
Interesting, if sad, statistics:
In 1910, Catholics of mostly Croat nationality made up 69 percent of the total population of the town of Kotor, 70 percent in Herceg Novi, and 95 percent in Tivat. In 1991, Croat share in the total population in the same towns was only 7, 2, and 23 percent respectively.
The Future of America's Croatian Youth
The Need for Modernization of the National and Grassroots Infrastructure of the Croatian-American Community
Luka Misetic
The future of the Croatian-American community lies, obviously, in its youth. The concept of the term “Croatian-American Youth,” however, encompasses a broad range of people who come from diverse backgrounds. They come from all class levels, they range in different ages, they come from various educational backgrounds, and they come from different upbringings depending upon the strength of the Croatian community from which they come. Despite this diversity, however, the “Croatian-American Youth” are remarkably consistent in their answers and views of the Croatian American community, and their vision of our community in the 21st Century.
In an informal, unscientific internet survey of Croatian-American youth, ten questions were posed. These questions were as follows:
1. How do you see the present general situation among Croatians in the USA?
2. How do you see the future of the Croatian American Community in the USA?
3. How do you see the role of your generation in the present/future Croatian community in the USA?
4. How much is your generation really interested in preserving the Croatian identity in this country?
5. How did the independence of Croatia affect your generation?
6. What forces have had the greatest impact upon your Croatianism?
7. How do you perceive the leading figures among the Croatians in the USA at the present time?
8. If you visited Croatia in recent times, how do you perceive the general situation in Croatia?
9. Would you consider going to Croatia to live and work permanently?
10. What do you think, as an American Croatian, are the greatest strengths and weaknesses of the Croatians in general?
The results of this survey reveal that, in general, younger Croatian Americans have a strong attachment to their native land and wish to maintain as close a link as possible to their Croatian heritage. However, they also believe that our community is generally divided and lacks a sense of direction or purpose, especially with the achievement of Croatian independence and the end of the war. Almost all respondents felt that the community was filled with talented, educated and ambitious individuals who were dedicated to the strengthening of the Croatian American community, as well as to the development of an independent, democratic, free market Republic of Croatia. These resources, however, are being wasted because of the lack of organization within our community.
This paper will provide an overview of the results of the unscientific Internet poll. We received 36 completed responses, ranging from each coast of the United States and points scattered in between. The following answers were provided to our questioning:
What is the general state of the Croatian American Community?
Respondents generally feel that the community is less proactive than it was in the early 1990’s. They describe the situation as “fragmented and unorganized,” “lacking unity,” and lacking leadership. Overall, there is a sense that the community is slowly deteriorating, and to make matters worse, this mood is combined with an overall sense of resignation that nothing much will change in the future. There is a consensus that our community lacks leadership and organization. Respondents describe a once vibrant community that is now experiencing a broad sense of apathy and malaise. On the positive side, some respondents believe that the community is vibrant, and that the future is bright because of the increasing numbers of educated professionals in our ranks.
How does the youth see the future of the Croatian Community?
The overall majority of respondents felt that the Croatian community would become (or would continue to remain) fragmented, unorganized, and assimilated. Others said that it was too difficult to tell, and a minority felt that the community would “remain strong and tight-knit.” The view of most was that there was a distinct lack of leadership and impetus to bring about long term unity and build a solid foundation for the Croatian-American community. A minority of respondents felt that the future of the Croatian-American community involved a return to Croatia, either on a permanent basis or through some other direct involvement with the home country.
How do you see the role of your generation in the present/future Croatian community in the USA?
Responses ranged from the positive: “we are the cross-roads generation that will transform our community as a result of our education and job opportunities;” to the negative: “the Croatian- American youth will assimilate into American culture, and it will be up to new immigrants to continue the Croatian culture in the United States.” Most responses were in between those two extremes. There is a certain level of anxiety among the respondents because most do not know what the future holds for the Croatian-American community. A level of frustration underlies their views of the future. This frustration appears to be born of a combination of factors, but mostly because there is a sense that there is interest and passion for Croatia and all things Croatian among the youth, but there is also a certain resignation to the notion that Croatian-Americans are too disorganized, too divergent, and lacking in leadership to capitalize on the interest and passion that certainly exists in their respective communities.
How much is your generation really interested in preserving the Croatian identity in this country?
A significant majority of respondents answered that there is a strong interest in preserving Croatian identity in this country. Our respondents, however, were unable to determine exactly which elements within the Croatian community were most interested in preserving culture, nor were they able to determine why this interest was prevalent. Nevertheless, almost all of the respondents felt that there is an interest within the younger Croatian generations for maintaining their cultural identity. It is interesting to note, however, the observations of some respondents who felt that this interest is developed on an individual by individual or family by family basis, and not as a result of the efforts of the Croatian community as a whole.
How did the independence of Croatia affect your generation?
This question evoked the most passionate answers among our respondents. All of the respondents felt that the achievement of Croatian independence was a turning point in their lives. A significant number, for example, recalled childhood days when classmates and others had no idea what Croatia or a Croatian was. Thus, these respondents felt that when Croatian independence was achieved, it was not only a national turning point, but a personal vindication which granted them co-equal standing with other ethnic groups and individuals. The essence of the responses was that Croatian independence increased their personal pride and self-esteem.
Other positive views were that the drive for Croatia’s independence was a tremendous unifying force that served as a catalyst for social c
ohesion within our community. All of the respondents report with pride at the efforts of their own local Croatian community during 1991-95, when their communities provided material, financial and political support to Croatia in its struggle for independence.
The negative, however, of this period of social cohesion is that the spirit of cohesion and progress deflated like a balloon after the struggle for independence was completed. The aftermath of the achievement of independence is that the community is left without a unifying goal. The energy of the early 90’s has dissipated.
An interesting trend was the conclusion by some respondents that Croatian independence would have long term benefits for the maintenance of Croatian culture because more and more people would be traveling to or working in Croatia. The ties with the mother country will be stronger than in the pre-independence period, and as a result the Croatian-American community will be stronger and our culture more likely to be preserved.
What forces have had the greatest impact upon your Croatianism?
Our respondents offered both positive and negative influences on their “Croatianism.” Most, if not all, mentioned their parents as the primary source of their Croatian identity. The Church was a close second in terms of Croatian influence. Other positive influences on Croatian identity included: Croatian independence, the war for independence, more travel to Croatia, cultural/folklore groups.
There were not many “negative influences” on our respondents’ Croatianism. Some negatives, however, included: disharmony with the Croatian community, too much politics associated with being Croatian, and disappointment with the Croatians in Croatia.
How do you perceive the leading figures among the Croatians in the USA at the present time?
Unfortunately, most of our respondents could not name a single leader within the Croatian- American community. Those that were mentioned included Melchior Masina, President of the Croatian Catholic Union; Anthony Peraica, former President of the Croatian American Association; Bernard Luketich, President of the Croatian Fraternal Union; and Dr. Ante Cuvalo, professor at Joliet Community College. Many respondents simply stated that the leadership of the Croatian-American community was comprised exclusively of older men, mostly first generation, and that there were no leaders within the younger generation.
The inability to provide answers to this question reveals the fundamental frustration of the Croatian youth: the desire to capitalize on the passion for Croatia, but the lack of any recognizable leadership or institutions through which to organize.
If you visited Croatia in recent times, how do you perceive the general situation in Croatia?
Our respondents provided their answers in 1999, before the recent election and change in government in Croatia. Nevertheless, their answers provide insight into the perception of the Croatian-American youth regarding the situation in Croatia.
All of our respondents feel that Croatia is a country of significant beauty and natural resources and that it has all the elements necessary to be a successful and prosperous nation. This includes the people, whom our respondents view as warm and friendly and the backbone of Croatia.
Our respondents, however, view the overall situation in Croatia as bleak. Politically in 1999, our respondents felt that too much power had been concentrated in too few people and that this was not healthy for Croatia. The economic situation was viewed as depressing and bleak, and many commented that their relatives are struggling under these difficult economic conditions.
Would you consider going to Croatia to live and work permanently?
On the positive side, almost all of our respondents indicated that they would consider returning to Croatia to live and work permanently. The reason for this is summed up by one person: “When I am in Croatia, I just get the sense that this is where I belong.” Most indicated that they love Croatia, its natural beauty and the way of life.
On the negative side, however, most respondents indicated that they would in fact not return to Croatia, even though they would consider it. The reason boils down to one reason only: the economy and the lack of opportunity. Our respondents reasoned that they did not believe that opportunities existed for them. They believed that even if they could obtain employment, they were not sure that they would receive paychecks. The standard of living is much lower than here in the United States, and our respondents were unwilling to lower their standard of living significantly.
Most of the respondents perceived the situation in Croatia in 1999 as politically and economically bleak, and therefore did not believe that they would return permanently to Croatia in the near future.
What do you think, as an American Croatian, are the greatest strengths and weaknesses of the Croatians in general?
The greatest strengths of the Croatian community, according to our respondents, were: hard- working people, united, proud, strong family bonds, determined, intelligent, honest.
The greatest weaknesses of Croatians in general were: disunited, unmotivated (due to the end of the war), stubborn, impatient, lack of professional role models and leaders, too political. Others complained that Croatians in Croatia had become too lazy as a result of the communist system.
It is interesting to note that our respondents were divided almost evenly as to whether the trait of “unity” was a strength or a weakness of Croatians in general.
Conclusion
The informal internet survey reveals that the Croatian American youth generally is very interested in maintaining its cultural identity and in helping Croatia prosper. Nevertheless, there is an overall frustration with the lack of leadership and organization within the Croatian-American community. The younger generation is crying out for the establishment of a new “social infrastructure,” that will unite the younger generation and the community as a whole.
Much of the social infrastructure established over the last 50 years was designed to cater to the needs of either the post-World War II generation or of the immigrant generations of the 50’s, 60’s and 70’s. Thus, churches, cultural centers and fraternal organizations were built for, and are currently dominated by, the over-40 age group. Needless to say, this has left many in the under- 40 crowd feeling left out, or alternatively feeling that the existing social infrastructure does not address the needs of a generation which is not blue collar, like their parents, but more likely employed in a profession. This younger generation feels that their talents are underutilized in the current social infrastructure. Furthermore, the current social infrastructure has built into it political and social divisiveness that is a remnant of earlier decades, and which often has nothing to do with the younger generation. The fact that these feuds continue serves to drive away a younger generation which wishes to help, but does not wish to immerse itself in the squabbles of the past.
What is needed is a new, dynamic leadership that will capitalize on the energy, edu
cation and skill of the younger generation and provide new clubs or organizations (or new leadership in existing clubs or organizations) to modernize our community and take advantage of the tremendous resources that exist in the Croatian Youth, as well as the tremendous love for Croatia that our Croatian Youth possesses.
Miscellaneous Books
Carmichael, Cathie, compiler. Croatia (Bibliography). World Bibliographical Series Volume 216. Oxford, England, Santa Barbara, California, Denver, Colorado: Clio Press, 1999. xxv 194 p.
Cultural policy in Croatia . Strasburg: Counc. Cult. Coop., 1999. p. xiv, 275.
The Donald W. Treadgold Papers
A publication series The Donald W. Treadgold Papers in Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies, created in honor of Prof. D. W. Treadgold, is published by the School of International Studies at the University of Washington. Sabrina P. Ramet is the Editor. Twenty one issues have been published up to date, and three new issues are forthcoming soon. Several of them deal directly about Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the former Yugoslavia. Subscription for 10 issues is $45 US. Back issues can be ordered. For further information contact the editorial office: (206) 543-4852 Fax (206) 685-0668 e-mail: treadgld@u.washington.edu or visit the Treadgold Papers at: http://weber.u.washington.edu/~reecasf/treadgol/html
You might be interested in the following issues: Cushman, Thomas. Critical Theory and the War in Croatia and Bosnia. 50p. (July 1997); Conversi, Daniele. German-Bashing and the Breakup of Yugoslavia . 81 p. (March 1998); Maimark, Norman M. Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe 54 p. (October 1998); Hodge, Carole. The Serb Lobby in the United Kingdom. 97 p. (September 1999).
Krokar, James. Liberal Reform in Croatia, 1872-1875. New York: P. Lang, 1996.
Kunovich, Robert.Conflict, Religious Identity, and Ethnic Intolerance in Croatia. Washington, D.C.: The National Council for Euroasian and East European Research, NCEER, 1999. p.21.
Sonje, Velimir. Croatia in the Second Stage of Transition, 1994-1999. [?]: 1999. p. 62.
Sunic, Tomislav. Cool Croatia . Glastonbury, England: Vineyard Books, 1999, 60 p.
Tomizza, Fluvio. Materada . Evanston, Ill, London: North Western University Press; Turnaround, 2000. p. 168.
Vego, Milan N. Austro-Hungarian Naval Policy: 1904-14. Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass, 1996. xviii, 213 pp. $ 47.50, hard bound. $22.50, paper. Reviewed in Slavic Review, vol. 58, no.4, Winter 1999, pp.900-901.
Zimmermann, Warren – Origins of a Catastrophe
Origins of a Catastrophe. Yugoslavia and its Destroyers. America’s Last Ambassador Tells What Happened and Why (New York: Time Books/Random House, 1996)
In his introduction, America’s last ambassador to Yugoslavia says that he will tell the story of the “villains” who destroyed Yugoslavia those “nationalist leaders who coopted, intimidated, circumvented, or eliminated all opposition to their demagogic designs.” (vii) Instead, he weaves a disingenuous tale of anecdote and assertion that continually links Tudjman and Milosevic — the “Tweedledum and Tweedledee of destructive nationalism” — and inculpates them, as proponents of “communist” nationalism, for the slaughter that took place in the former Yugoslavia. (pp.40, 153). He exonerates the United States and NATO of all responsibility, noting that the mistakes he and his colleagues made “never seem(ed) like mistakes when we (made) them.”(viii) In effect, Zimmermann uses denial and demonology to preserve the myths of American innocence and Balkan perfidy. (p.142) In many ways, his is a classic example of what William Blanchard called “the cynical pretense of inadvertence,”(x) a tendency to self- deception that justifies unjustifiable actions by admitting their reality, but denying their significance and finding fault in the application of technique, not in its practitioners.
Like Rebecca West, whose “beautifully written classic” he admires, Zimmermann approaches Yugoslavia as a tourist. Before 1991, rugs were a bargain and the atmosphere “enchanting.” (pp. 3-4, 9-10, 168) Yugoslavia “stood for civility and tolerance”and provided ex Soviet satellites a “model.” But it was “caught between the poles of Serbian and Croatian nationalist extremism,” so “dwarfs” could lead gullible masses “susceptible to ethnically based appeals” though “a landscape of monsters and midgets” into the slaughterhouse of ethnic cleansing. (pp.9-10, 42, 68-9, 78, 111) Zimmermann condemns the 1974 Constitution perhaps the most liberal in Yugoslavia’s sad history for having “stimulated nationalism.” (pp. 40-1) Zimmermann’s opinion of Yugoslavia’s leaders is low. (p.138) Kucan was “squat,” a “human AK-47 whose lack of responsibility triggered the crisis in 1991. (pp.30-32, 142) Janez Jansa was “ascetic” and “driven.”(p.144) Their party was an “extreme faction in a coalition that had itself won only 54 percent of the popular vote,” “provoked a war by stealth.” and then made a deal with Belgrade. (p.144-5)
Sympathetic to Bosnians, Zimmermann was singularly unimpressed with their leaders. “Mild-mannered to a fault,” Izetbegovic, was overly deferential and perpetually anxious. Like Tudjman and Seselj, he was also a nationalist who had been “convicted of sowing ethnic hatred.” (pp.39, 114-115)
Zimmermann disliked most Serbian leaders. Borislav Jovic was a “small man,” a “pit bull,” but better than Vojislav Seselj, a “psychopathic racist,” or Karadzic, a Serbian Himmler with a “friendly manner” who oversaw “the massacres in the Muslim villages.” (pp.97-9, 119, 175-6) The baby-faced Milosevic impressed Zimmermann with his “competent” English, forceful speech, “steady” eye contact, attentiveness, and “clubby” vices (small faults that would appeal to an Ivy Leaguer like Zimmermann). But despite his “cherubic” cheeks, the Serbian leader was a cold “master of media manipulation,” dominated by his “dark side” and vaguely “schizoid” — an opportunistic “bully on a grand scale,” but at least not an “ethnic exclusivist,” like Tudjman and Karadzic. (pp. 20-7)
Yet Zimmermann’s book is essentially Serbo-centric. He was stationed in Belgrade, his driver was Serbian, and his circle of “Yugoslav” friends seems to have been largely Serbian. He was particularly fond of Serbian journalists Slobodan Pavlovic, “Borba’s first-rate DC correspondent”; the “western” Srdja Popovic, editor of Vreme, “the most distinguished” magazine in Yugoslavia; and Sasa Nenadovic of Politika (pp.18-19, 38, 108). His list of heroes and heroines included few Croats or Bosnians, but was replete with Serbians from Popovic and Vesna Pesic (a wise professor and peace activist) to Vuk Draskovic. (pp.105-6, 108)
Zimmermann sees Serbs as a “normal people” — “a product of their history, as we all are.”(p.10) He depicts the Serbs as “heirs to a great medieval civilization” and the “only people I know who celebrate a defeat.”(pp.11-14) Like the U.S. media, he sees Croats and Bosnians as blindly following their leaders, while “many Serbs” opposed Milosevic. (p.108) He claims that “Serbs in Bosnia had an understandable grievance” in Bosnia, and feared a “Muslim-dominated” state. (p.196) He laments human rights violations in Kosovo, but he considers the region “the heartland of Serbian statehood and culture,” its Jerusalem, delivered to the Albanians by the 1974 constitution. (pp.8, 11-14, 130) So he criticizes both Albanians and Slovenes for shattering the League of Communists in 1990 by their rigid insistence on human rights in the region. (pp.54-6)
Zimmermann implies that all South Slavs — not merely a handful of prewar politicians — wanted a Yugoslav state in 1918, and he insists that the JNA had “won” territory for the Slovenes in 1945. (pp.5-6, 28) So he did not think the Slovenes, as “an original party to the voluntary compact creating Yugoslavia,” had a right to leave and “bring a firestorm of violence down on the rest of Yugoslavia.”(p.146) He claimed that Yugoslavia’s constitution was first rewritten in 1991 by the Croats and Slovenes, even though he knows that the Serbians had earlier destroyed the constitution by their takeovers of Kosovo and Vojvodina. (p.70) Zimmermann had little use for most Croats. Budimir Loncar was “a canny Croatian veteran of the Tito era” with a “catlike tread” and a “feline smile.”(pp.15-16) Josip Manolic had links to the secret police, Gojko Susak (“a Darth- Vader-like individual”) to the Ustase, and Martin Spegelj to arms dealers. (pp.154, 181) Glavas was a Croatian Arkan.(p.152) Tudjman was intolerant, impulsive, and dim — an authoritarian “martinet” with the characteristics of “an inflexible schoolteacher” who could manage only “a nervous chuckle or a mirthless laugh.”(pp.71-5) Zimmermann chides Tudjman for ignoring his advice to apologize to the Serbs at Jasenovac, and he blames the war on the Croatian leader’s rejection of “any gesture that smacked of reconciliation, cooperation, or healing,” his “precipitate declaration of independence,” and his failure to “assure Croatia’s Serbian citizens that they would be safe in an independent Croatia.”(pp.71-7, 151-2)
Zimmermann also dislikes Croatia “a republic of lackluster politicians” run by the “emigrant-financed HDZ.”(pp.44, 71-5) Listing firings, personal attacks, and an oath of loyalty, he concluded that in “Croatia, unlike Bosnia, Serbs were in fact being abused.” (pp.75, 139-40) By creating an army and defending itself from the JNA, Croatia had become a “national security state” with an armed force “larger than the armies of Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Portugal, Austria, or Sweden.” (pp.132,151, 154)
Zimmermann uses the passive voice to describe the Serbian assault on Croatia, and ignores events before 1991, “a time of growing violence” in Croatia until 7 July, when “fighting broke out” in the Krajina, “a rebellion within a rebellion.” (pp.94-5,122, 148-9) Of course, he knows that the JNA and Milosevic had armed and incited the Serb “militants”there, but he focused on Tudjman’s efforts to “install Croatian police” as triggering the war. Yet he claims that it was “nearly impossible” to assign responsibility “for each instance of violence” in Croatia, because reports from Zagreb and Belgrade were diametrically opposed But “it didn’t matter,” becaus
e Tudjman and Milosevic wanted violence. (p.120)
For Zimmermann, the war in Croatia was a tawdry affair, “a throwback to the ancient bandit tradition of the Balkans.” While the JNA “secured all areas in Croatia that had significant Serbian populations,” the “dregs of society…rose from the slime to become…national heroes, exalted by their respective propaganda machines.” (pp.160,152) Even-handed and fair — unlike the pro- Serbian UN commanders, Rose and MacKenzie — Zimmermann was careful to note that both Serbs and Croats suffered in Vukovar, and if the Serbs shelled Dubrovnik “both sides” “breached the rules of war.” (pp.154-8)
Zimmermann disapproves of Croatia’s “blitzkrieg” in the Krajina, although it preceded NATO air strikes and effectively ended the war, because it was illegal and ruthless (pp.231-2), not comparable to the “master stroke” mounted in Bosnia by the JNA in 1992. (p.196) It says a good deal about Zimmermann that he criticized the JNA’s leaders, Veljko Kadijevic and Blagoje Adzic, but saw the Yugoslav army as a conflicted institution with a “proud” and “heroic military tradition that Croatians and Slovenes had tried to “humiliate” by adopting a “not very heroic tactic” of besieging the army in its barracks. (pp.85-9, 100-102, 142, 158- 60,186)
Yet Zimmermann notes that the “Serbian strategy” in Croatia was repeated in Bosnia first the creation of Serbian “autonomous regions,” then the arming of local Serbs by the JNA, and finally JNA military action to “protect” the Serbs and secure their hold on towns throughout Croatia and Bosnia. (p.174) He also cites Izetbegovic on the Serbian strategy in Bosnia, “They’re creating a new situation by force, then they’re trying to negotiate on the basis of that situation.” (p.197) He even saw “a Croatian pattern emerging” in Bosnia. (p.198) But he ties none of this together, so his treatment of the war in Croatia is accusatory the Croats had it coming while his depiction of the war in Bosnia is sympathetic the Serbs were to blame. Zimmermann’s dislikes extend beyond Yugoslav leaders. He is not fond of intellectuals and their “crackpot” ideas, and censures Dobrisa Cosic for “a frequent failing of intellectuals” self-confident messianism. (pp.17, 93-4) He disliked TV, which, like Tito, was to blame for everything. (pp.120, 138) He dismissed EC monitors in 1991 as too “timid” and “pro-Croatian.” (pp.158-9) He disliked the CIA’s fatalist, 1990 report, and he was dismayed with ignorant US Congressmen, swayed by a “strong and active Croatian lobby” and oblivious to “the fate of the Serbian minority,” despite his efforts to convince them to pursue a “rational” policy. (pp.84,126-7, 130-1)
Zimmermann also dislikes democratic elections that do not elect candidates he favors. He was particularly distressed at the lack of “curbs on the potentially nondemocratic behavior of those elected” in the 1990 elections, which swept nationalists to power. (pp.68, 130) In general, Zimmermann finds nationalism, self- determination, and sovereignty dangerous concepts. (pp.277-78) Not even “bestial crimes” justify secessions for Chechnyans or Kurds, because that would break up existing states. So Zimmermann insists that self-determination be allowed only when it “won’t adversely affect the interests of other states [sic] or peoples.” (p.278) He praises Spain, whose confederal system he confuses with democracy, the US, Switzerland, Holland, Belgium, Austria, and Malaysia as models of ethnic “power- sharing.”.(p.240)
Although he seemed to embrace sovereignty in his rejection of self-determination, Zimmermann dismisses it as “the last refuge of dictators.”(pp.238- 9) He ridicules Yugoslavia’s successor states as “unstable ministates”and advocates using human rights “more intrusively” to promote democracy, preferably by an “international enforcer” that can only be the United States, because we are a repository of virtue, owing to our optimistic striving toward the future and our ability to put the past behind us. (pp.4, 241-2, 229) Zimmermann does have heroes. Ante Markovic the most ineffectual of all Yugoslav politicians struck the ambassador as “admirable,” if “too liberal and Western” for his undeserving countrymen, who gave him high approval ratings, but hated his policies and dumped him in 1991. (pp.42-4, 66, 112- 113) He also liked Markovic’s economic adviser, Kilo Gligorov, “a wise old communist.”(p.116) Milovan Djilas impressed him as a saint, and Vuk Draskovic as “an electrifying speaker” whose comments were “perceptive and interesting.”(pp.104-105, 119, 171) Stipe Mesic and Janez Drnovsek were good tennis partners (pp.33, 123-4), and Vasil Tupurkovski and Ibrahim Rugova “came through the Yugoslav crisis with honor.”(pp.81, 126) Zimmermann even liked Croatia’s Chief of Staff, Antun Tus, “an outstanding officer with democratic views.”(p.141) In short, Zimmermann liked those “courtly, articulate, generous, and wise” Yugoslavs who represented “the best of the Central European tradition.” (p.33) Zimmermann insists that the U.S. made honest mistakes, but its goals were noble “unity, independence, and territorial integrity,” with “progress toward democracy” and “a straight line toward capitalism.” (pp.8, 51) But peace, unity, and democracy were merely instrumental the real goal was a “straight line toward capitalism.” Markovic’s economic reforms, not the man, counted, and Zimmermann favored “shock therapy” that would force the spoiled Yugoslavs to take that “straight line to capitalism.” (pp.17, 50-51) Unity and democracy were tactics to avoid violence during a tricky transition. What really counted was converting the dinar and finding “reasonable solutions short of war.” (pp.41-2, 46-9, 62, 64-5, 111) Washington was indifferent to the form a Yugoslav state might adopt (centralized or confederated), although it insisted that Serbia maintain control of Kosovo. (pp.64-5, 78-81).
But Washington did not act, ostensibly because policymakers feared repeating the mistakes of Vietnam and Lebanon and were paralyzed by Powell’s cautious doctrine. (pp.214-215, 219) Instead, Americans talked. Bush twice told Markovic he wanted democracy and reforms, Zimmermann told Kadijevic not to use of force, and Eagleburger promoted “reconciliation,” as Washington took a “clear public line” blaming the JNA for events in Croatia and urging the JNA and Tudjman “to settle their differences.” (pp.164, 122-3) Baker’s mistake was not to “deal with the irascible and complex protagonists of the Yugoslav drama” before 21 June 1991. But only Izetbegovic and Gligorov were “sensible” then, and the American’s warnings to Milosevic in March 1992 were ineffectual. So, at worst, Baker was six months too late. (pp.133-7, 193)
A year later, Washington informed Belgrade that it would only work for Serbia’s “political and economic isolation,” urged Karadzic to be democratic, and warned both Milosevic and Tudjman not to interfere in Bosnia. (pp.174-6, 194, 198) But Clinton lacked resolve, determination, and consistency, so Washington merely recalled Zimmermann after Serbia’s attack on Bosnia, a “modest” action, but “the right thing to do.”(pp.204, 223)
While generally exonerating American diplomacy, Zimmermann condemns European diplomacy as “cynical theater, a pretense of useful activity…disguising a lack of will.” He thought the Germans rushed recognition and the EC encouraged partition, and he regretted the arms embargo in Bosnia. But he praises Cyrus Vance for his success in securing a cease-fire in Croatia, even though it benefitted the Serbs, and he thought the Vance-Owen plan “acceptable,” even though it gave 43% of Bosnia to the Serbs. He credits NATO with ending the war; and he effectively exonerates the West of all blame, because Yugoslavia’s “congenital effects” (it was a state, not a nation), its Orthodox and Catholic churches, its selfis
h Slovenes, insensitive Croats, greedy Serbs, ideologically rigid army, and nationalists condemned it to death. (pp.xii, 155, 161-2, 177, 181, 184, 189-90, 192, 209-212, 222, 231-3)
Unhappy with Rose and MacKenzie for not condemning all sides for the atrocities they committed, Zimmermann admires Carrington’s defense of Serbian rights. (pp.161-2, 224) He considers humanitarian relief a “triumph,” especially since lifting the arms embargo and Western military intervention were not options. (pp.140, 219-20,225) He defends Eagleburger against charges of conflict of interest, and blames the Slovenes for misunderstanding him when he said that Washington could live with a fragmented Yugoslavia. (pp.5, 58, 219). He praises all Foreign Service Officers, especially Charles Redman, who created the Croat-Bosnian federation in 1994 (pp.49,165-6, 231).
Zimmermann is a bit upset with Dayton, not because the Serbs in Bosnia, who made up 30% of the population, got 49% of the territory, but because Tudjman was the “big winner.” He saw the inequitable distribution of territory as a Western success, because the Serbs did not get the 64% they had demanded. (pp.232- 3) He claims, rather disingenuously, that sanctions on Serbia were intended to “Saddamize” Milosevic and serve as a bargaining chip at Dayton. (pp.213-4) Zimmermann’s views reflect his reading and his admiration for George Kennan, the father of containment. (p.53) His list of basic sources includes West’s travelogue; the journalistic, Serbo-centric account by Laura Silber and Allen Little (and its BBC adaptation); the book by the Serbian diplomat, Mihailo Crnobrnja; the tendentious work by Susan Woodward, one-time adviser to Akashi, dubbed the Mitsubishi Chetnik by the Bosnians; and the outdated and poorly researched study by Lenard J. Cohen. (pp.255-7) Zimmermann completed his memoirs at RAND, with help from Dennison Rusinow, whose writing is marked by sympathy for Serbia and hostility to Croatia, and David Calleo of Johns Hopkins. So this is not an insider’s memoir; it is a work by an insider whose circle has repeatedly rationalized the West’s failures, excused Serbian excesses, condemned Croat and Slovene actions, and preferred humanitarian aid to military action. Perhaps it is not surprising that so many people in Yugoslavia hated Zimmermann. What is surprising is that this made him proud. (p.110) JAMES SADKOVICH
NOTES
1 William H. Blanchard, Aggression American Style (Santa Monica, CA: Goodyear Publishing Cpy., 1978), pp. x, 1-11, dubbed this tendency “aggression American style” and saw a trend toward the use of such methods of coercion and persuasion in Europe and the USSR.
Ante Čuvalo 