Croatian Nationalism And The Croatian National Movement (1966-1972) In Anglo-American Publications – A Critical Assessment

Ante Cuvalo
On Nationalism in General
Nationalism is one of the greatest forces in modem history. It seems that no political, economic, psychological, ideological, or any other drive can match its compulsion and its impact on our world. Furthermore, nationalism continues to defy scholarly analysis, prognosis, and even logic itself.¹ One of the major reasons for this defiance is that nationalism has a chameleonic nature, has a number of contingencies, and can be expressed in multiple ways. A strong indication of the complexity of the subject is the fact that a good study of nationalism must include a host of interdisciplinary fields, such as history, geography, language, religion, economy, political science, international relations, sociology, literature, ethnography, and art, just to name a few. No wonder, then, that among numerous definitions of nationalism one can not find an adequate one.
Although nationalism can be linked to imperialism of one kind or another, most nationalisms strive to gain, maintain or increase a certain national group’s self-awareness, cohesion, individuality and self-rule. Nationalisms, however, differ in their formation, goals, expression, degree of self-consciousness, mobilization, and in a number of other features. Even the same nationalism can be expressed differently and in various degrees of intensity at particular times. Furthermore, different individuals, social elements, and regions of the same nation express their nationalism in distinct ways and measures of passion at different times and situations. Thus, it is very hazardous to bring a generalized judgment about nationalism as a phenomenon, or even about the nationalism of a particular nation.
The purpose of this paper is not to examine nationalism in general, but to explore how the latest surge of Croatian nationalism has been viewed in contemporary Anglo-American publications. Nevertheless, I will mention just a few more difficulties with which a student of nationalism is faced. For example, is nationalism something “primordial” and “irrational,” or is it a historical phenomenon? Is nationalism simply an invention of modem intellectuals and politicians for the purpose of harvesting political legitimacy in the name of the people, or does it go deeper?
Who can tell precisely when did people begin to have “national feelings”? Was it after the French Revolution, during the Reformation, the Renaissance, or the Middle Ages? Or did such feelings already exist in ancient times when the Jews considered themselves the “chosen people” and, therefore, different from the rest, or when the Greeks saw themselves as civilized and all others as barbarians? What were the feelings, for example, of Croatians like Grgur Ninski (10th century) and his followers when they fought for the use of the Croatian language in church liturgy, or of Joan of Arc (1412-1431) when she gave her life for, the cause of her people? Were such feelings “national” or simply “tribal,” “parochial” or “religious”? Were those feelings something “primordial” and “irrational”; were they already a politically mobilizing force, or possibly a little of everything? One can say with some certainty that nationalism gained its full political force only after the people’s sovereignty replaced “divine right,” hereditary principles, and similar claims of government legitimization. But how far the roots of national consciousness go, even the roots of political nationalism, is still an open question. Had not the concept of the “chosen people” been already used at biblical times for the political purpose of conquering the “promised land”?
Is nationalism just a phase in history which will disappear from the face of the earth? For those who consider nations as a natural division of mankind, certainly, nationalism is not just a passing phenomenon. True, nations are born and die, but national divisions are here to stay. On the other hand, according to Marxist ideology, nationalism cannot be considered “primordial” but a product of bourgeois capitalism. For both the Marxist and non-Marxist “assimilationists, ” the age of nationalism has been over for some time and, therefore, nationalism is on the way out. What is left of it is merely a negative force which is being misused by those who wish, for one reason or another, to disrupt the integration process of the world into a global community brought about by modernization and/or revolution.
The empirical evidence, however, clearly indicates that nationalism is not subsiding. On the contrary, nationalism is alive and doing well in all parts of the world. Predictions that modernization (industrialization, transportation, communications, literacy, education, etc.) would bring about a unification and homogenization of the world and that nationalism would become irrelevant did not come true. We see that the world is becoming smaller and smaller; states and nations are becoming more and more interdependent economically, environmentally; and much of the world is united in fear of nuclear annihilation. At the same time, membership in the United Nations has been growing steadily and national liberation-movements are not decreasing but increasing. Not to mention a growing gap between the rich and the poor which is contrary to the process of a meaningful world unification.
Even in Western Europe, where it was believed that the question of nationalism had been resolved by unification (Germany, Italy) or by assimilation (Britain, France, Spain), nationalism is very much present. Presence of nationalism can be seen in Spain, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Belgium, South Tyrol, France, as well as in the animosity toward the “guest-workers” in Germany, Austria and other West European countries.²
Nationalism in the communist countries is doing even better than in the capitalist societies. Suffice it to mention the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.³ Thus, neither the proletarian revolution nor the capitalist modernization theory brought an end to nationalism.
It is very possible that the effects of the revolution and modernization were just the opposite of what the internationalists hoped for. More and more people became aware of their oppressed positions and of their human and group rights. Thus, the demonstration effect has been stronger than the willingness to sacrifice one’s own national identity and rights for the sake of some eschatological vision of a nation-less world.
Leaving aside all predictions and theories, the fact is that nationalisms do exists, and should be taken as a fact of the historical and political panorama. Historical evidence also indicates that nationalism can be imperialistic and anti-imperialistic, oppressive and liberating, a unifying and disunifying force, offensive and defensive, backward-looking and future-looking; it can be economic, political, cultural and so on. Thus, it is pointless to argue that nationalism is good or evil in itself. The virtue of nationalism as such, or more often of a particular nationalism, most of the time, depends on the ideological view or, very often, on the political or economic interest of the observer’s nation at the time of the evaluation.
Croatian Nationalism Before 1960s
Historical evidence indicates that the roots of Croatian national self-awareness go deep into Croatian national history. Despite a centuries-old struggle for mere existence, national identity and the nucleus of national statehood were kept alive. Thus, Croatian nationalism and the idea of statehood were not a product of some accident in the nation’s modem history, nor of geographic position, nor of an outside action of some bigger power(s). Neither is the Croatian nation a product of religion, as some would suggest.⁴ The foundations of modem Croatian nationalism are based mainly on two principles: historical memory and rights, and on popular sovereignty.
The Croatian “Illyrians” began (1830s) the national reawakening, but it was Ante Starcevic (1823-1896) who, in the spirit of the French Revolution, articulated most clearly the historical rights and peoples’ sovereignty. He transformed these two principles into a national ideology and a political action in the middle of the last century. Today’s main streams of Croatian nationalism are based on these two fundamental components: that Croatians are a nation with a long history and centuries-old statehood and culture, and that they have every right to determine their own fate. It is on this principle of self-rule that their nationalism had been frustrated for a very long time. The common feeling among the Croatians is that their individual and national destiny has persistently been in someone else’s hands. Thus, the essence of their nationalism is a struggle for self-preservation and national sovereignty.
Since the middle of the nineteenth century, there have been two main political streams in Croatian nationalism: one envisioned an independent Croatian state as the only guarantee for the national future; and the other sought a wider Slavic, specifically South-Slavic, federated political framework in which Croatia would be autonomous. Both of these streams played an important role among the Croatians. However, the pro-Yugoslav version of Croatian national ideology tended to be elitist and it played a disproportionately important role in Croatian politics. At critical moments, such as the end of World War I and the end of World War II, the pro- Yugoslavs had a decisive role in determining the fate of the Croatian nation. But one should not forget that, in both cases, external factors were more decisive in the political settlement of the Croatian question than the will of the people.⁵ The second brand of Croatian nationalism, promoted by the advocates of Croatian independence, had much less understanding in the international community, although the Peasant Party, which advocated an independent peasant republic, represented most of the people in Croatia in the inter-war period.
Generally speaking, Croatian nationalisms never gained much sympathy in the West, more specifically in the Anglo-American world. This can be said of the nationalism of the Croatian liberals in the Habsburg empire, of the pacifist nationalism of Stjepan Radic and his Peasant Party, the revolutionary nationalism of the Ustasha movement (1929-1945), and of the socialist nationalism of the 1960s and 1970s.
Already in the middle of the nineteenth century, Marx and Engels condemned Croatian nationalism as reactionary because it did not fit into their revolutionary theory.⁶ Similarly, C.A. Macartney, a historian of nineteenth-century Hungary, stated that Croatians were “a people which had, indeed developed the habit of opposition for opposition’s sake further than any [other nation] in Europe”⁷ This subjective judgment has been often quoted by contemporary observers of Croatian affairs as if to suggest that it is deep in the Croatian nature to be troublemakers for no reason at all. Interestingly, while Croatians were encountering the full force of the reinvigorated Magyar nationalism and were faced with the policy of Magyarization, they were considered as unreasonable obstructionists; on the other hand Hungarian nationalism was seen as progressive and not oppressive. Clearly, the two nationalisms were defined differently.
In the inter-war period, Croatians found themselves in a state which was, for all practical purposes, a Greater Serbia. Croatia was treated as an occupied land and Serbian terror ran rampant. Although Stjepan Radic, and the Croatian Peasant Party, which in reality was more a national movement than a political party, responded with pacifism and then with parliamentary struggle, Croatians were seen by many, especially in England, as unreasonable, as a poison in Yugoslav politics, and later on as wreckers of the state. Some experts on Yugoslavia’s politics even accepted Belgrade’s propaganda that Radic was emotionally unstable and his assassination was simply a violent response to his unbearable insults of the Serbian carsija. Or, at best, Radic and the Serbian Radical leader, Pasic, were put on the same level of fanaticism and stubbornness.⁸ It was believed that the two were the main stumbling block of a “normal” development of the Yugoslav state.
One American social scientist wrote recently that Serbian nationalism of the 1920s was modern and of the “Jacobin type, intolerant of particularism and regionalism.” On the other hand, Croatian nationalism for him has been “legitimist” in nature, stressing only historical rights.⁹ However, he does not point out that Serbian nationalism could afford to be anti-particularist, because the Serbs were the ruling nation in the state. It would more correct to say that Serbian nationalism was “intolerant of particularism” because it was imperialistic, not because it was progressive. It is an absurdity to conclude that every “state-making” nationalism is progressive, and every “state-breaking” nationalism is retrogressive.
World War II Croatian nationalism has been seen as an “evil incarnate,” and every expression not only of Croatian nationalism but of Croatian consciousness itself, ever since the war, has been labeled as reactionary, Ustashism, fascism, and the like. But those who write about Croatian’ nationalism of the period do not even try to distinguish between state legitimacy and government legitimacy. It seems that very few are interested in finding out whether the Croatians did have a legitimate claim to have a state or not.
The fact is that the vast majority of Croatians accepted the state in 1941 as an expression of their wishes. Even most of those who opposed Pavelic and the Ustashe, wanted a Croatian state, in one form or another, as the realization of their national dreams and rights.¹⁰ Furthermore, those who identify Croatian nationalism only with Ustashism seldom mention that Croatians fought on both sides in World War II. However, even the nationalism of those who were on Tito’s side, or the nationalism of their children has been labeled as “extremism,” “chauvinism,” “fanaticism,” “terrorism,” “neo-fascism,” and so on.¹¹ This is a weapon constantly used to disarm the Croatian quest for human and national dignity of all moral values.
It seems that the most often condemned aspect of Croatian nationalism is its quest for statehood. All Croatians, Marxists or non-Marxists, who stand for a Croatian statehood in any shape or form are condemned as chauvinists and even neo-fascists. This labeling tactic has been practiced in Yugoslavia, as well as by many outside the country, since World War II. Thus, one should keep in mind that the issue is not alleged Croatian chauvinism, or an ideology, but the integrity of the Yugoslav state and a potential Croatian statehood, which are mutually exclusive.
Croatian Nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s
The Croatian socialist nationalism, or national Communism, of the late Sixties did not fare much better than the past Croatian nationalism in the Anglo-American press. I will touch upon only a few of the categories and labels which have been attributed to the Croatian national movement and to its leaders of the late Sixties and early Seventies.
First, in newspapers, magazines, and even scholarly periodicals in English, one can find most often that Croatians are a “nationality” (or sometimes “a major nationality”), an “ethnic group, ” a “minority, ” or a similar social-group category; but very seldom are they considered as a nation. Is this just an indication of sloppy writing, or can we conclude that it is up to the individual author and his or her whim to decide when a certain people become a nation or when they lose that prerogative. There is the usual interchangeability of the terms “nation” and “state” in English. Thus very often multi-national states, like Yugoslavia, or the Soviet Union, are identified and treated as “nation-states”.¹² For many journalists, politicians, and even scholars, it is the state which determines nationhood. If this is so, it is not clear what happens to the nationhood of those people who once had a state and lost it, or those nations that had been divided into two states? Do the first simply turn into an ethnic group, or the latter become two distinct nations? Ironically, Croatians have been recognized as a nation, at least on paper, in Communist Yugoslavia, while outside the country they often are not granted even that basic recognition.
One should keep in mind that there is a political effect of such misuse of terminology. For example, an uninformed American reader imagines that Yugoslavia, the USSR or other multi- national states, are in nature the same as the United States. No wonder, then, that many average Americans or Australians are quick to compare their multi-ethnic country with multi-national Yugoslavia. Although the multi-ethnic model differs from the multi-national as apples differ from oranges, the differences remain obscure to such readers who, seeing terms such as “self- determination,” “self- rule, ” or ” independence, ” imagine a region or an ethnic group in their own country demanding autonomy or independence. But the news media or the experts in the field seldom even attempt to clarify such issues and differences.
There are some authors who simply do not see any serious flaw in the Yugoslav state, in its legitimacy, its regime, in its politics, economy or the inter-national relations (inter-national here means relations among different nations within the country). For an American scholar, Bogdan Denitch, for example, Yugoslavia has been by “far the most open of the societies ruled by communist parties”; its “intellectuals are far more outspoken than any in Eastern Europe”; its “public and press [are] outspoken”; “more American social scientists and journalists wander around Yugoslavia than in any East European country”; its economic emigration is a “temporary solution … and not as massive exodus “; that Yugoslavia does not need to build a Berlin wall to keep the people in or out the country, etc. These are supposedly proofs that the system is stable and that both the state and the regime are legitimate; that its military and secret police forces have no sympathy for the East; that its economy is being integrated with Western Europe rather than with the East European bloc; that the Belgrade regime is “the most open and progressive of regimes ruled by a Communist party”; that religious toleration in Yugoslavia “is the norm, and the decentralization of political and economic power has gone further not only than in any other Communist regime but probably further than in many of the West European politics”; that multi- national problems are more “acute in Spain, Belgium, Canada and Great Britain, and the problem of the social order is posed far more sharply in Italy, Turkey and Portugal” than in Yugoslavia.¹³ If this is one’s scientific conclusion of the national, social, political, and economic situation in Yugoslavia, then there is no choice but to see in the Croatian national movement of the late Sixties and early Seventies, as well as in Croatian nationalism in general, a negative and destructive force which disrupts a presumably normal and progressive development of a very “normal” country. It cannot, however, be concluded from the above praises that Croatians should be happy and legitimize the Yugoslav state and its regime because they enjoy freedom and prosperity, but they should not rock the boat because there are peoples who are worse off than they are.
Some other authors are not so generous in praising the Yugoslav regime; they are critical of the Communist monopoly of power and of its economic policies. They even recognize some of the injustices and grievances raised by Croatians and other non-Serbian nations and nationalities in the country, but for them the unity and integrity of the Yugoslav state, and for some even its centralism, become an indispensable value, an untouchable good in itself.¹⁴
In their eyes, the latest Croatian national movement was either purely separatist, or its leaders had gone too far in their decentralizing demands. Although the Party leaders themselves might have been moderate, supposedly they were not able to control their “extremist” allies. Or the movement was a mix of various forces which really got out of hand, and there was no choice but nip it in the bud. The proofs of “extremism” are usually found in Croatian demands not only for more personal freedom or decentralization of economy, but in the fact that the leaders of the movement dared to raise the question in national terms. Moreover, they indicated that the time had come for an ideological reconciliation, or at least a truce, between the Croatians themselves. To speak, however, in terms of Croatian national rights and grievances has been an anathema in the eyes of the Belgrade regime (as well as in the eyes of some of the foreign observers) not only since 1945 but since 1918. Any united Croatian voice, no matter how democratic or reactionary, how humanistic or oppressive it might be, has been perceived as threatening, and, therefore, condemned.
Interestingly, the observers are almost repetitious in pointing out that some Croatians suggested that Croatia, as well as other nations in Yugoslavia, should be members in the United Nations and that most of the army recruits should serve in their own republics. While these were peripheral issues that came up during public debates, where anybody could express his or her opinions, the real Croatian grievances for example economy, emigration, foreign currency, import-export firms, education, language, freedom of speech, independence of the courts, free market economy, and similar basic national issues were barely mentioned or simply papered over. And these and such issues were not of romantic but of down-to-earth nature.
Although some observers considered the national problem in Yugoslavia to be “the most basic of all” and that “for many Croatians, Yugoslavia and Serbia are virtually synonymous”¹⁵, according to them, the solutions to the national and other questions of the country have to be found within the existing state and even under the same system. To think otherwise, or even to ask for further decentralization and democratization of the system, was nothing less than Croatian “inherent” oppositionism and national hard-headedness.
The following are some of the views and judgments passed about Croatians and the Croatian national movement one can find in some of Anglo-American publications: “Continental Europe has no more volatile and troublesome minority than the Croats.” They are described as “dour and resentful,” as well as “having a case of permanent national paranoia”.¹⁶ Some also talked about “chronic Croat animosity” and the “Serb frustration” with them.¹⁷ For others Croatians are incapable of “genuine politics of give and take”.¹⁸ Although Croatians did have some reasonable grievances they were carried by “ancient passions” .¹⁹ For some, Croatian nationalism of the 1960s and the 1970s was a nationalism in the classic tradition of East Europe²⁰, which, in the West, means everybody hates everybody else. Thus, for some, there has been nothing, or very little, positive in the Croatian national movement. One author stated that “it would be a prime mistake to equate either Croat of Slovak nationalism with liberalism”.²¹ Similarly, another observer concluded that “the Croatian crisis did not represent … a temporary upsurge of modern liberal humanism.” According to her, the centralist forces, “because they were defending a precarious socialist status quo against the resurgence of historically dangerous politics of romantic nationalism, were in the right in 1971”.²² But is humanism possible only in stepping out from the national framework? Is every nationalism devoid of humanism? If not, who decides whose nationalism is and whose is not humanistic? What are the objective criteria for such judgments?
There is also something contradictory in the evaluation of nationalism in Yugoslavia. According to the research of an American scholar, which was done in the early 1970s, 45% of the Serbs, 52% of the Croatians, 60% of the Slovenes and 73% of the Macedonians rank as particularistic.²³ The Slovenes also “stray from the common ‘Yugoslav’ pattern in socialist patriotism”.²⁴ But it is also concluded that while Slovenes were “considerably more particularistic than Croats,” they “at the same time possessed a very modern system of beliefs”.²⁵ Interestingly, while the Slovenes could be progressive and most particularistic (nationalistic) in Yugoslavia, Croatian nationalism has been constantly seen as reactionary and retrogressive. We can guess that the reason for such views is that Slovene nationalism, at least up to recent times, was not seen as dangerous to the Yugoslav state, while Croatian nationalism always carried at least such a potential. Thus, the measuring stick of the progressiveness of nationalisms in Yugoslavia is not, it seems, a particular nationalism itself or its ideology but its position on the integrity of the Yugoslav state and its centralism.
Dennis Rusinow, who wrote a four-part report on the Croatian national movement and whom some consider to be a leading expert on the subject, argues that the “movement was evolving in the direction of separatism” and therefore it “represented destructive and dangerous forces. ” For him, “the Croatian Party leaders … were in fact creating a political system that had more in common with fascism than with either democracy or socialism.” Naturally, he was “glad that the whistle was blown,” meaning that he was pleased to see that the central powers crushed the Croatian evil spirit that got out of the bottle.²⁶
Leadership of the Croatian National Movement
While some considered Savka Dapcevic-Kucar, the Party chief in Croatia in the early 1970s, to be “the first genuinely popular Croat leader since World War II” ²⁷, Rusinow, for example, in order to prove his hypothesis that the movement was reactionary, backward looking, and destructive, tried to discredit its leaders by his own method of psychoanalysis. According to him, the leaders of the movement were “individual neurotics, people with special personal problems or chapters in their lives to live down” or “those with political ambitions who ‘never made it’. ” He stressed that the leading Croatian Communists of the time came from “old and distinguished Dalmatian bourgeois families”; we can conclude, therefore, that they were of a suspicious background and could not be true proletarians. Rusinow also tried hard to discredit the student leaders by using their religious affiliation, or the regions they come from, as indications that they, and the movement as a whole, were linked, at least spiritually, if not organizationally, with Ustashism .²⁸ To anyone who is familiar with the Croatian scene, this approach of Rusinow’s is a clear reminder of the methods used by the Yugoslav regime, especially during the Rankovic era. Those who came from certain regions of Croatia were then always looked upon with suspicion. They were the first to end up in jail for political reasons, or they had to serve in special army camps because the UDBA could “see in their eyes” that they were an anti-Yugoslav element. Thus, according to Rusinow, Drazen Budisa, for example, became one of the student leaders, not because he was, as Rusinow himself admits, “handsome, articulate, highly intelligent and respected by his contemporaries,” but because he was from Drnis. And to be from Dalmatian hinterland or from Hercegovina one has to be “Ustasha” by birth. It seems for the same reason Rusinow tendentiously stated that Zvonimir Cicak, another student leader, was from Hercegovina, although he was from Zagreb .²⁹
The young Communist leadership of the time has been accused of mere “careerism”³⁰ and of “manipulating the hitherto dampened fires of ethnic and cultural nationalism” as “a means of protecting and extending their influence. Ambition drove them to push ‘Croatianness’. ” Savka and Tripalo are identified as the “Croatian Bonnie and Clyde”.³¹ It is said that Tripalo and Savka “played upon the underlying fears and insecurities of the Croatian populace” for personal gains.³² However, authors do not explain why Croatians were in fear and insecure. What were the reasons for such feelings in an entire nation? One should also have in mind, that Savka, Tripalo and Pirker had been already at the top of the Party hierarchy, and surely they did not get there because they were good nationalists. One does not climb the Communist Party ladder on the basis of popular sentiments! National Communism is nothing new in the world; why would one not allow at least a possibility that the Party leadership in Croatia was genuinely interested in the fate of their nation.
It seems that one of the major “faults” of the Croatian leadership, Party and intellectuals, was that they raised too much expectation and optimism among their people. And when they could not deliver, it is stated, the frustrations were turned into nationalism.³³ In most countries optimism and enthusiasm of the people is considered as a positive and not a negative indicator. Stock markets and sales go up or down because of the mood of the people. Politicians and economists love optimism. But it seems that if there is calm and gloom in Croatia, it is seen as “deceptive quiet”³⁴; if there is some enthusiasm, it is perceived as dangerous. Thus it should be clear that the Croatian issue is much deeper than the particular mood of the people at a certain time, and a serious observer should go beyond those moods in order to understand the true nature of Croatian grievances and Croatian nationalism.
The leading “troika” (Tripalo, Savka and Pirker) have also been accused of being intolerant of other opinions in the party. One observer claimed the “the struggle was ruthless on both sides [conservative and liberal], and the methods used [by the liberals] did not inspire confidence that nationalism would usher in a new period of socialist democracy”.³⁵ However, no one compared the methods used against the opposition during the national movement and the way the Croatians, those in and out of the Party, were treated before and after the movement. In order to condemn “both sides,” one should see how many people were jailed for so-called political offenses, or were kicked out of the Party; how much freedom there was for individuals, groups, and institutions; or how much the state interfered in the economy, education, press, and judicial system before, during and after the movement. The methods and goals of the conservatives and liberals were entirely different. While the Croatian liberals fought for socialist humanism, their opponents were defending socialist centralism. While the first brought the politics to an open forum, the later clung to the Party’s monopoly of power and mere force.
A few authors did consider the Party leadership in Croatia as being “essentially moderate, looking for peaceful methods to reform the system and meet the basic demands of the Croatian population .³⁶ However, generally speaking, the Anglo-American observers have passed a negative judgment on the movement and on its leadership. Although most of them praised Tito for ending the Croatian spring, some. did regret the way the movement was crushed.
Nature of the Movement
At this point one should probably ask, what was so terrible about the Croatian national movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s to deserve such condemnation? In a wider context of Croatian history, the movement represented a continuous Croatian national quest for political, economic, and cultural autonomy and national emancipation. That struggle began under the Habsburgs and it continued under the Karadjordjevics after 1918. In the new state (after 1918) the Croatian nation was completely dominated by the Serbian army, police, and bureaucracy, and Croatians were treated as an occupied nation. A similar Croatian subordination continued within Tito’s Yugoslavia. Although Communist Yugoslavia claimed to have solved the national question in the country and was organized on a federalist basis, that federalism was on paper only till the mid-1960s. The policy of cultural unitarism was implemented in all aspects of life in the country. In practice, Yugoslav unitarism meant first of all suppression of everything that was Croatian. Croatians were pressured to become “Yugoslavs,” while others could remain what they were. (New nations in the country were even invented.) A number of Croatian historical figures were thrown out from history books and other publications, the Croatian language officially lost the status of a national language, Croatian culture was suppressed, its economy exploited, and anyone who raised questions about this kind of national oppression was hit hard. In many cases, just being Croatian was enough to be considered an enemy of the state.
It was only in the late Sixties that a new Croatian national revival took place. The prime movers of the national renaissance were the intellectuals, first of all the Left intelligentsia. The regime itself realized that unitarism and centralism did not work, thus they introduced decentralizing reforms in the mid-1960s. These reformers in turn provided room for more and more national expression. Croatians began to demand the implementation of the constitutional stipulations, meaning that federalism in words be realized in practice.
The main issues that were raised during the Croatian national revival were of very practical nature. First of all, there was a demand to halt the economic exploitation of Croatia which had been taking place in a number of forms for a long time. Skimming off Croatian economy in the name of “brotherhood and unity” for nothing in return was done through the central banks, export-import firms, investment policies, foreign currency collection and exchange by the federal government, remittance of the close to a million Croatian “guest workers” in the West, and so on. For example, while Croatia earned more than 50% of all foreign currency entering the country, it could keep only 7% of it for its needs. The federal investment policy had a similar discrepancy. While 46.6% of all federal investment funds, from 1965-1970, went to Serbia, only 16.5% went to Croatia.
The problem of emigration was another major issue. While Croatians were making most of the money and supposedly were a richer region, they had a tremendous outflow of population to foreign countries. Besides the brain drain caused by the emigration, this phenomenon was loaded with a number of negative effects for Croatia and the Croatians for generations to come. Croatians were for a long time not able to learn about their own past or their cultural heritage. Their language was Serbianized, the Army, police and other federal, and even republican institutions were controlled by Serbs. Thus, demands were made by the Croatians to take control of their economy, to rehabilitate their culture and national history by lifting the official “curse” from everything that was Croatian. They also advocated greater freedom of expression, separation of the judicial system from the Party’s tutelage, greater pluralism, equal rights for religious believers, and market economy. In order to assure the implementation of these and similar demands, there was a strong quest for decentralization of the federal power and greater republican autonomy. In fact, it was the question of the federal power (Party, military, and economic institutions) that the struggle was all about, and not the issue of a Croatian “romantic,” “reactionary,” “counter-revolutionary,” or “neo-fascist” nationalism. These and similar labels were merely weapons of the centralist forces to disarm their opponents and defend the privileges and powers that they enjoyed.
The question of the Serbian minority in Croatia usually came up as one more useful weapon for the centralists and unitarists in their preservation of the monopoly of power. It has been constantly projected that the movement was a threat to the Serbs in Croatia. But Croatia is one of the rare places in the world where a minority has been privileged and not oppressed. What the movement was in fact trying to achieve was equal rights for the Croatians in their own home. An indicator that the movement had not been a threat to any of the minorities in Croatia is the fact that most of the minorities supported the movement; even some leading Serbs in the republic were part of it.
It seems that a major objection outside and inside the country to the Croatian national revival has been that its leaders presented the issues in national terms, which made them instantly old- fashioned, romantic, reactionary etc. However, if a whole nation has been oppressed and exploited, how can one present the issues in class or some other terms? One thing that all Croatian classes and social elements had in common is their Croatianism, and all of them had experienced the negative effects of being Croatian. It is, then, reasonable to expect that Croatianism would unite them in defending their human and national rights.
Ever since the time of Humanism, Croatian intellectuals tended to be internationalist in their world view, without giving up their own identity and heritage (Pribojevic, Krizanic, the Illyrians, Strossmayer, Radic, etc). But they were also among the first ones to question internationalist ideologies which tended to crush personal freedom and individuality in the name of the greater good (Strossmayer’s fight against Papal infallibility and Croatian Marxist revisionism in the 1930s are good examples). Leading intellectuals in the latest Croatian national movement also were world visionaries, on one side, and on the other, defenders of personal and national freedoms. This was clearly expressed by the leading ideologue of the latest Croatian movement, Vlado Gotovac, who stated “I have never understood those who think that the rainbow should be of one color! A uniform world means a homogenized emptiness! The existence of different ‘homelands’can only retain the beauty of the world when the dedication to the world’s future transforms its colors into a harmony . . .”.³⁷ Clearly, his vision is one of a peaceful world, where every color, every culture, social element, national group, and every individual is seen as a blessing and not as a curse. What is needed, therefore, is not a forced unification of mankind into a monotonous and enslaving mechanical world, but creative human freedom, freedom to be responsible, freedom to be different and a harmonization of those differences into a rainbow of humanity. Certainly this is a humanist and an internationalist vision, but it is not an internationalism of forced assimilation, imperialism or a totalitarian ideology. It is an internationalism through freedom.
Why a Negative View?
It is clear that there is sharp dichotomy between the perceptions of the Croatian national movement among the Croatians themselves and in the Anglo-American world. While Croatians saw their struggle as part of a human quest for freedom, human dignity, and self-rule, and even expected much understanding in pluralistic societies, many Anglo-American observers portrayed them as nothing more than passionate reactionaries who could not get rid of their backward looking mentality. It is legitimate to ask what were the reasons for such a negative judgment of the latest Croatian national movement. There are numerous answers to this question, including personal likes and dislikes, political pragmatism, and visions of the world. I will attempt to give here at least some probable causes for this Western view of Croatia and the Croatians in the recent past.
There has been very little written in English that deals with the Croatian national movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. And among those who did write on the subject, very few attempted to analyze the movement in itself: its origins, ideology, goals, visions, methods, its claims, etc. The main interest of the observers has been how Croatian nationalism effected, or might effect, East-West relations. Thus, although the observers slightly differed in their views of the movement, they all had the same approach to the problem and the same basic assumptions, which can be summarized as follows: Yugoslavia might have an oppressive Communist system, Serbs might be hegemonistic, Croatians might have some legitimate grievances; though we salute freedom, pluralism, market economy, etc., a unified “Yugoslavia is the healthiest for the West at this time” .³⁸ Anyone who even comes close to rocking the foundations of Yugoslavia is dangerous to peace in the world, and, therefore, a villain. Furthermore, the Communist party is the only trans-national force in Yugoslavia which holds the country together, therefore, our support of the Party should be also unconditional .³⁹
Major reasons for such thinking rise mostly from a vision that the world should remain as it has been the last few decades, that international society should be dominated by two superpowers. The Croatian national movement, or other similar movements in the world, are relevant only in so far as they interfere with the balance of power. It has been evident for some time that the Soviet Union has been “domesticated,” that it has given up its early revolutionary ambitions, and it has become merely a traditional great power. To the people with this world view, the ideas of equality of nations, or even of the states, freedom of the oppressed peoples, etc., are minor problems, or wishful thinking and of the idealists or of the weak. According to them, an emancipated world would result in an international anarchy. Thus, it is the duty and responsibility of the great powers to save the world from itself. They are the only ones that can coordinate economic interdependence and retain the political status quo (out of altruism, of course!). In a sense, this model is similar to the trickle-down theory in domestic economic and social policies in some countries or the Party’s role in others. For those in power, the world is a chess board on which, they hope, two super-powers play the game. This old European concept of power politics has been transferred to the world-wide arena. Rights, freedoms, and equality, are nice words, but without political reality.
On the other hand, there are the bourgeois and socialist internationalists who in the name of their world view tend to crush all individual freedoms. These are mostly intellectuals who believe that modernization and/or revolution will erase all our differences. It means that in an assimilated and uniform world we will live in peace and happiness. For such believers “those who wrap themselves up in the skirts of nationalism are living in the dangerous past .⁴⁰
Interestingly, such internationalist voices most often come from within the nations which have “made it.” This kind of “internationalism” also often comes from those who have economic or political interest in being internationalist. One may call this a “Coca-cola” internationalism, and not a humanist vision of the future. Internationalists of this kind usually “love” the whole world standing on the backs of someone near to them.
It seems that most of the Anglo-American observers of Croatia see Croatian nationalism from the pragmatic political, bipolar world perspective. No wonder, then, they come with negative conclusions about the Croatian national movement and its leaders. At least one of the observers writing in a British journal was honest enough to admit that,”not one self-respecting Western intellectual raised voice in defense of the [Croatian] students and intellectuals in prison, nor on behalf of the professors and the judges who were summarily dismissed … It is no wonder that, with the worst seemingly over, Western diplomats sighed with audible relief and vied with each other in assuring both their Chanceries and visiting foreign correspondents about Tito, that ‘the old man has once again saved Yugoslav unity after all this is what matters for us all’ .⁴¹
Ideologies, human and national rights, justice, humanism, trials, prisons, life or death have very little to do with such a pragmatic approach. The essential question for them was what would happen if Yugoslavia would collapse, or of its foundations were shaken. Again, the issue is not Yugoslavia itself but its geopolitical importance.
There has been a constant preoccupation with the Soviet enigma. What would they do in the Balkans? One effect of the Soviet question has been that the Croatians have been suspected, or directly accused, of being in touch with the Soviets. The “Russians are coming!” has been the Yugoslav regime’s tactic for a long time. A message of the West to the nations in Yugoslavia also has been “stay together or hang separately”.⁴² Supposedly, Yugoslavia and its “defense system and the determination behind it are the gold in the bank that American strategists count on”.⁴³ But the historical indicators do not give any assurances for such a belief. On the contrary, one should keep in mind that what happened with Yugoslavia’s defense system in 1941 might happen again tomorrow.
To conclude, historical evidence shows that nationalism has been a very fluid ideology. It has been used by the extreme left and the extreme right, as well as by the liberals; every kind of government has appealed to it: tyrannical (left and right), authoritarian, royal and democratic; it has been imperialistic, oppressive, and liberating. It could be bad or good. But many times its moral quality is relative to the perspective from which it is viewed.
The Croatian national movement of the late Sixties and early Seventies has been looked by most of the Anglo-American observers in a negative light. However, the reasons for such interpretation of the events in Croatia have been predetermined by the observers’ initial belief that the Yugoslav state is indispensable for the balance of power in Europe. Furthermore, evidence points out that inter- national problems have been the primary cause of Yugoslavia’s internal instability; therefore, any sign of Croatian nationalism is perceived as unhealthy because it can cause the disintegration of the country. Moreover, the primary function of moral judgments and the labeling of the Croatian movement and its leaders is to disarm them of any moral value in the eyes of potential sympathizers outside the country.
Some also think that what Yugoslavia needs is more time, and that then the various nations and nationalities will melt and become one nation. One student of nationalism wrote not so long ago about such new multi-national and multi-ethnic states the following. “Put into the pot of physical proximity, covered by the lid of a common political system, exposed to the heat of cultural and social interchange, the various elements will change after a fairly long time . . . into a brew. The brew will not be quite homogeneous. You can still point to grain of rice, to a leaf of onion, to a chunk of meat, to a splinter of bone. But it will manifestly be one brew, with its distinct flavor and taste.”⁴⁴ However, those who are fanning the fires under the pot known as Yugoslavia and are eager to cook “a Yugoslav brew” should be careful, because the latest indications are that pot and the brew may blow up into their faces.
NOTES
¹ Jayant Lele, “Two Forces of Nationalism: On the Revolutionary Potential of Tradition.” In Jacques Dofney and Akinsola Akiwowo, eds., National and Ethnic Movements (Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE, 1980), p. 201.
² See Milton J. Esman, ed. Ethnic Conflict in the Western World (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977).
³ Quite often there is a double standard on nationalism. For example the Yugoslav regime on one hand suppressed Croatian nationalism while on the other encouraged Macedonian and the so called “Moslem” nationalism. The U.S.S.R. and other governments have done similar things.
⁴ Many popular writers, even some scholars, state that Croatian and Serbian nations came as a result of the split between the Orthodox and Catholic churches. See for example Eugene Kamenka ed. Nationalism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976), p. 13. Their national identity developed much earlier than the split in the Christian church and their conflict is not religious in nature at all. Contrary to popular opinion in the West, religious toleration has been much better in that part of the world than in Western Europe.
⁵ Although many authors stress that “most Croats opted to join a common State with the Serbs” the fact is that Croatians as a people never had a chance to express their political will in freedom. See Stephen Clissold, Conflict Studies No.103, January 1979, p. 3.
⁶ One should, however, keep in mind that they also considered all of the South-East European nations as the trash of humanity, and the sooner they disappear the better.
⁷ C. A. Macartney, Hungary – A Short History (Chicago: Aldine, 1962), p. 189.
⁸ See for example Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), p. 212 and 232.
⁹ Bogdan Denitch, “The Evolution of Yugoslav Federalism” Publius Vol. 7, No. 4, 1977, p. 109.
¹⁰ On some aspects of legitimacy, see Walker Connor “Nationalism and Political Illegitimacy” Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism Vol. 8, No. 2, 1981, pp. 201-228.
¹¹ Interestingly, some scholars label Croatian nationalism simply as “neo-fascism,” although it is evident from their writings that they have little knowledge about Croatian nationalism or Yugoslavia as a whole. See, for example, T. V. Sathyamurthy, Nationalism in the Contemporary World (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), pp. 90-92.
¹² On the confusing terminology of nation, state, nation-state, etc, see Conner “Nationalism,” p. 201.
¹³ See Bogdan Denitch, “Succession and Stability in Yugoslavia,” Journal of International Affairs Vol. 32, No. 2, 1978, pp. 223-238 and Bogdan Denitch, “The Tito legacy,” Commonweal Vol. 107, No. 5, March 14, 1980, pp.143-146.
¹⁴ For some the solution to Yugoslav problems is in a “democratization” of the country (Aleksa Djilas, Nora Beloff, Mihajlo Mihajlov, Oskar Gruenwald). Others advocate a status quo, Dennison 1. Rusinow and Fred Singleton for example.
¹⁵ J. F. Brown, “The Balkan: Soviet ambitions and opportunities,” The World Today Vol. 40, No. 6, 1984, pp. 245-246.
¹⁶ Time June 5, 1972; “The most troublesome . . . nationality . . .” Ibid. Feb. 7, 1972.
¹⁷ Brown, “The Balkan,” p. 246.
¹⁸ Oskar Gruenwald, “The Croatian Spring, 1971: Socialism in One Republic,” Nationality Papers Vol. 10, No. 2, 1982, p. 225. Interestingly, similar opinions were expressed about Stjepan Radic in the 1920s.
¹⁹ The Times (London) Jan 24, 1972.
²⁰ George Schopflin, “The Ideology of Croatian Nationalism” Survey Vol. 19, No. 1, 1973, p. 142.
²¹ George Klein, “The Role of Ethnic Politics in the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968 and the Yugoslav Crisis of 1971,” Studies in Comparative Communism Vol. 8, No. 4, 1975, p. 356.
²² Cynthia W. Frey, “Yugoslav Nationalisms and the Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty,” (Part II) East European Quarterly Vol. 11, No. 1, 1977, p. 102.
²³ Gary Bertsch, “A Cross-National Analysis of the Community-Buildings Process in Yugoslavia,” Comparative Political Studies Vol. 4, No. 4, 1972, pp. 450-451; f.n. 24, p. 459.
²⁴ Gary Bertsch and M. George Zaninovich, “A Factor-Analytic Method of Identifying Different Political Cultures,” Comparative Politics Vol. 6, No. 2, 1974, p. 235.
²⁵ Bertsch, “A Cross-National Analysis,” p. 450.
²⁶ Dennison 1. Rusinow, Crisis in Croatia (Part I) Southeast Europe Series, Vol 19, No. 4, 1972, p. 19.
²⁷ Paul Lendvai, “Yugoslavia in Crisis,” Encounter Vol. 39, No. 2, 1972, p. 68.
²⁸ Rusinow, Crisis (Part I), pp. 18-19.
²⁹ Ibid., p. 18.
³⁰ Frey, “Yugoslav Nationalisms,” (Part 1) East European Quarterly Vol. 10, No. 4, 1976, p. 439.
³¹ Alvin Z. Rubinstein, “Whither Yugoslavia?” Current Histor Vol. 64, No. 381, 1973, p. 204 and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, “The Yugoslav Succession Crisis in Perspective” World Affairs Vol. 135, No. 2, 1972, p. 103.
³² Gary K. Bertsch, “The Revival of Nationalisms” Problems of Communism Vol. 22, No. 6, 1973, p. 8.
³³ Ibid., p. 11.
³⁴ Brown, “The Role of Ethnic Politics,” p. 357.
³⁵ Klein, “The Role of Ethnic Politics,” p. 357.
³⁶ Pedro Ramet, “Yugoslavia and the Threat of Internal and External Discontents” Orbis Vol. 28, No. 1, 1984, p. 113.
³⁷ Vlado Gotovac, “Autsaiderski fragmenti” (Part III) Kritika Vol. 2, No. 8, 1969, p. 538.
³⁸ Ramet, “Yugoslavia,” p. 120.
³⁹ Klein, “The Role of Ethnic Politics,” p. 362.
⁴⁰ George Macesich, Economic Nationalism and Stability (Now York: Praeger, 1985), p. 3.
⁴¹ Lendvai, “Yugoslavia in Crisis,” p. 69.
⁴² Robin Remington, “Yugoslavia-the Strains of Cohesion” Survival May-June, 1972, p. 116.
⁴³ Sterling, Clair, “Tito’s New Balancing Act” Atlantic Vol. 231, No. 6, 1973, p. 50.
⁴⁴ Benjamin Akzin, State and Nation (London: Hatchinson University Library, 1964), pp. 83-84.
Published in Journal of Croatian Studies, Vol. XXX, 1989. A shorter version of this paper was presented at the International Symposium “Croatia and Croatians in the 20th Century” held at the Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia, October 2-7, 1988.

Mladen Klemencic
Taken from F. W. Carter and H. T. Norris, eds. The Changing Shape of the Balkans London: UCL Press, 1996, pp.97-117.
Introduction
In 1700 the Croatian scholar Pavao Ritter Vitezovic (1652-1713) published in Zagreb his work Croatia rediviva (Resurrected Croatia). He was encouraged by a recent anti-Ottoman campaign at the end of the seventeenth century, when large areas were liberated from the Turks and reincorporated into Croatia. The title of his study expressed then his vision of the integrity of the Croatian lands, but it can also be applied symbolically to present-day Croatia. In 1992 Croatia reappeared on the political map of Europe as a sovereign state; before that it existed as a country but not as a state. Throughout many centuries it survived always in a semi-independent status within larger empires, unions or states, but Croatian memories have to reach far back in history for the country’s real independence. “Croatia rediviva” is therefore an illustrative phrase for the new position and status of Croatia.
What makes the reappearance of Croatia more interesting from the perspective of political geography is the current problem of the country’s integrity. Starting in 1991, certain areas of Croatia became “de facto” beyond the control of legal authority. This came as a consequence of the aggression that followed the break-up of Yugoslavia. Moreover, UN peace forces have had to be deployed in those areas since 1992 in order to encourage the peace process, but after two and a half years there are still no signs of progress.
Historical foundations
The Croats are one of the Slavonic nations, who established themselves in the region between the Kupa, Sutla, Mura, Drava, Danube and Drina rivers and the Adriatic Sea during the complex ethnogenetic process lasting from the Middle Ages up to modern national integration in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Macan and Sentija 1992). The area inhabited by the Croats occupies a favourable communication position as a contact zone between the central Danubian basin and the Mediterranean. But from the perspective of stability, the location of Croatian territory within a zone of confrontation between central European Catholicism, East European Orthodoxy and Near East Islam appeared to be more important. Too often the area was a stage of confrontation and rivalry between neighbouring powers. Because of this, the Croats did not enjoy favourable conditions for the creation of their own state. Limited sovereignty or autonomy, as well as territorial disunity, are therefore frequent and frustrating elements of Croatian history.
The Croatian name was initially associated with territory in the hinterland of the Byzantine thema of Dalmatia. The region began to be called Regnum Chroatonun (“the state of the Croats”) in the mid-ninth century. It became strong, expanded its territory and even gained papal recognition. Its core area was the triangle formed by the towns of Knin, Sibenik and Nin. Since it was formed on the territory of the former Roman province of Dalmatia, it is usually known under the name of Dalmatian Croatia. The geographic borders of Dalmatian Croatia were on the Rasa and Cetina rivers in the coastal area, whereas inland the border followed the Sava and Una rivers towards the mouth of the Sana river and from there to the source of the Kupa river. North of it, on the territory of the former Roman province of Panonnia Savia, a northern Croatian principality was established. It was originally called Slovinje and later Slavonia. In the tenth centuries, with the unification of both principalities, a united Kingdom of Croatia wag established. Under its native dynasty until the end of the eleventh century, Croatia became an influential maritime power. According to monuments preserved from that time, it appeared to be a flourishing period of Croatian culture and history. Generally, it was also a rather stable period from a territorial viewpoint. Only the eastern border of the Croatian Kingdom was changeable, depending on its power. During favourable times, Croatian rulers controlled the area up to the Drina river in the east, which also encompassed the original territory of Bosnia around the spring of the river of the same name, so the surface area of Croatia totalled around 100,000km2. The Principality of Zahumlje in the southeast, which together with Travunia and Dukla (Doclea) was known under the name of Red Croatia, from time to time also acknowledged Croatian authority. The Principality of Neretva or Pagania had even closer ties with Croatia. At the time, the Byzantine thema of Dalmatia encompassed only a few islands and towns along the coast, which, from time to time, recognized Croatian authority and were annexed to the country in the twelfth century.
After the last king from the Trpimirovic dynasty died, the nobility recognized the Arpad dynasty as their rulers in 1102 and entered a personal union with Hungary. Croatia did not lose its state individuality by this union. The unity of the Croatian lands was manifested in the person of a ban (viceroy), as the king’s governor, and in a separate diet (sabor). But personal union with Hungary was the beginning of a long- lasting period in which Croatia was tied with either Hungary or later Austria. The constant struggle to keep sovereignty or at least certain autonomy throughout that period was an essential trait of Croatian history and a source of national awareness. One can argue about the degree of Croatian “de facto” individuality at certain stages of history, but cannot deny that Croatia always existed de jure. Real Croatian sovereignty was certainly as high and wide as the balance of power allowed, but the Croats have always been specially keen on the juridical foundation of their statehood. The territory gradually became smaller after personal union with Hungary was established in 1102. Some parts came under the influence of foreign authorities to a lesser or greater degree (battles with Venice for Dalmatia, Hungarian royal rule in Slavonia), thus breaking Croatia’s administrative integrity. From the twelfth to the fourteenth century, Bosnia became independent and extended to the former Croatian territory. Along the coast, Venetian authority and influence became stronger, whereas from 1358 in the southernmost part Dubrovnik started to develop as an independent republic.
Threatened by the Ottomans from the east, the Croatian diet elected the Habsburgs as Croatian rulers in 1527 in order to strengthen the country’s defence. On the one hand, that election ensured a powerful ally for Croatia, but on the other hand it faced Vienna’s tendencies for centralization. After the Ottoman Empire laid siege to the Balkan peninsula at the end of the sixteenth century, Croatia was reduced to its smallest territory in history (around 16,800 km2). Apart from Reliquiae reliquiarum (“remnants of the remnants”) of Croatia, only the Republic of Dubrovnik and some Venetian-controlled Adriatic islands and towns remained outside Ottoman authority. The whole of Bosnia and all other parts of Croatia fell under Ottoman rule. The Turks organized that territory in 1580 as the Bosnian pashelic .¹ From that period the name of Croatia Turcica (Turkish Croatia) was preserved for the last conquered part of Croatia between the rivers Vrbas and Una (today part of Bosnia-Herzegovina) .²
The liberation of Croatian lands started at the end of the seventeenth century and was carried out gradually. By the Treaty of Karlowitz (Srijemski Karlovci) in 1699, the northern state territory, that is, the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia, regained regions of Baniya, larger parts of Lika and Slavonia as well as part of Srijem. The rest of Srijem was annexed to Croatia after the Treaty of Pozarevac in 1718 and the remaining part of Lika once again became part of Croatia after the Treaty of Svishtov in 1791. Along the boundary with the Ottoman Empire, Austrian authorities in the sixteenth century organized a defence system known as the Militargrenze or Vojna krajina (Military Frontier). Although the authority in the Military Frontier gradually came into the hands of the military command in Vienna, it was never formally accepted by the Croatian state. The far-reaching consequences of the new Military Frontier led to demographic changes (Kocsis 1993/94). The area was devastated and deserted. Many Croats were forced to leave it because of the instability and destruction of war, so that the military authorities settled a new population from the Balkan interior there, among whom were significant numbers of Vlachs of Orthodox religion. Later, in the ethnogenetic process under the influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church and propaganda, they became a part of the Serbian nation. On the basis of their existence within Croatia, and in fact manipulated by them, Serbia started in the nineteenth century to develop Greater Serbian pretensions on Croatian lands deep to the west.
Venetian Dalmatia to the south also started to extend gradually during the anti-Ottoman wars. With the territorial changes of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the characteristic shape of the Croatian lands was formed. Boundaries established then were later used as a basis for all future delineations. The area around the Bay of Kotor and Budva (today part of Montenegro) was also under the Venetian Republic. At that time it was known as Albania Veneta (Venetian Albania). National revival in the nineteenth century strengthened the awareness of Croatian togetherness and instigated a tendency towards the territorial unification of Croatian lands and independence. This is the origin of the name for the Triune Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia. In 1848 Josip Jelacic was ban of Croatia and Slavonia. He was also nominated governor of Dalmatia and Rijeka, as well as commander of the Military Frontier, and he regained Medimurje from the Hungarians. In this way, during his rule he gathered the Croatian lands formally together for a short time. But the problem of disintegration was still actual until the break-up of the Habsburg Empire. The Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia remained divided into civilian and military parts. In the mid-eighteenth century the Military Frontier was reorganized into regiments, whereas Civil Croatia was organized into zupanijas (counties). Finally, in 1881 the Military Frontier was completely reincorporated within Civil Croatia.
After the fall of the Venetian Republic (1797) and the Republic of Dubrovnik (1808), southern Croatia came into the possession of the Habsburgs. Austria united former Venetian Dalmatia, the Dubrovnik area and the former Venetian Albania into the Kingdom of Dalmatia in 1815. After the Berlin Congress in 1878, Dalmatia was extended to include the narrow coastal strip southeast of the Bay of Kotor. Istria and the Kvarner Islands, also predominantly Croatian areas in ethnic terms, were under Austrian rule too, but organized as an independently governed province. Therefore, during the nineteenth century all Croatian lands were under Habsburg rule, but administratively separated. Division was especially stressed after the reorganization of the Monarchy in 1867 and its division into Austrian and Hungarian parts. On the basis of the 1868 Compromise, the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia had special status within the Hungarian half, but Dalmatia and Istria remained in the Austrian part. After the demise of Austria-Hungary in the First World War, the South Slavonic provinces of the former monarchy proclaimed the independent state of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs on 29 October 1918. Representatives of the Triune Kingdom, along with representatives from Istria, the Slovene lands, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Vojvodina, participated in the National Council in Zagreb, which represented supreme state authority. This state entered into association with the Kingdom of Serbia, which had been joined earlier by the Kingdom of Montenegro as well as Vojvodina. Thus, establishment of a common state – the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – was proclaimed on 1 December 1918 and confirmed during the Paris Peace Conference. In 1929 it was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
For the Croats at that time Yugoslavia seemed a reasonable solution. They were happy to quit their long-lasting association with Hungary and Austria. Moreover, union with Serbia seemed promising as protection against Italian claims on the Adriatic coast (in 1915, by the secret Treaty of London, Italy was promised large parts of the Croatian coast if they entered the war on the Entente’s side).
For the first time in history a common Yugoslav state was formed, encompassing constituent parts that underwent completely separate politogenetic development. The nations that formed a common state had already been established as separate political and territorial entities, and therefore the union could exist only under tolerant government that would recognize the autonomy of its constituent parts. Serbian politicians were opposed to that conception and they attempted to enforce the idea of a unitarian state. From the very beginning they considered Yugoslavia as a Serbian war gain, that is, a Greater Serbia. Therefore, Yugoslavia was a great disappointment for the Croats, as well as for other non-Serbs .³ Instead of creating a federal state, Croatia lost its autonomous status, which it had enjoyed up to 1918. Nevertheless, on the eve of the Second World War an autonomous Croatian unit, the Banate (Banovina) of Croatia, was established in 1939 (Boban 1993). It was composed of two former banates: the Sava and Primorje banates, and Croat-dominated districts from neighbouring banates. The Banate of Croatia had an area of 65,465km2. It included former Croatia-Slavonia (excluding eastern Srijem) and Dalmatia (without the Bay of Kotor area) and also some parts of Bosnia- Herzegovina. The idea and intention was to reorganize the state into three federal units: Croatian, Slovenian and Serbian (other nations were not then recognized!). The Banate of Croatia was seen as the beginning of a process that was soon to be stopped by German aggression and the break-up of Yugoslavia. But even before the war broke out, Croatian autonomy was rejected by a vociferous and strong Serbian opposition; also it was not welcomed by Croatian Serbs.
After the fall of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1941, the Ustasha⁴ regime, under the tutorship of the Axis Forces, established an Independent State of Croatia, which apart from the Croatian lands also included Bosnia and Herzegovina. Territorial concessions were the price the regime was forced to pay. Since 1920 Italy already had the Istrian peninsula, some islands and the town of Zadar. Additionally, it annexed large parts of the Croatian coast. However, a strong anti-fascist movement developed within the territory of the Independent State of Croatia, which after capitulation to Italy in 1943 proclaimed annexation to all parts of Croatia that came under Italian occupation after the First World War and during the Second World War. After the fall of the Independent State of Croatia, two republics were established in its area: Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, both as federal units of the re- established Yugoslavia.
Delimitation between Yugoslav republics was carried out in 1945. Only a few details were discussed afterwards. The Croatian boundaries were mostly defined according to its historical lines, established during the anti-Ottoman wars. After the Trieste crises had been solved in 1954, Croatia was awarded an additional district in Istria, after which the surface area of the Croatian Republic within Yugoslavia totalled 56,538km2. Within the same territory, the Republic of Croatia declared its independence in 1991 and became an internationally recognized state and member of the UN in 1992.
Boundaries
The historical basis The present-day boundaries of Croatia are for the most part defined by the lines of division established long before the formation of the Yugoslav state in 1918 (Klemencic 1991, Englefield 1992). Croatia’s boundaries have a long historical continuity that is the consequence of the fact that Croatia managed to maintain elements of statehood throughout its history. Only some 250 km out of the total length of Croatia’s land boundaries, extending for 2,028 km, were boundaries delimited for the first time within Yugoslavia. For most of its length the Croatia/Hungary boundary is one of the oldest in Europe. This is particularly true of the sections marked by the Drava river, which has always separated the Croatian and Hungarianstates. In the Medimurje region only, where it is defined naturally by the Mura river, the boundary is in a sense more recent. It was finally defined after the First World War, when Medimurje was transferred from Hungary to the State of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. Hungary’s possession of Medimurje was questionable, since the region formerly belonged to Croatia and was always settled by the Croats. The Baranya boundary is the most recent section of the Croatia/Hungary boundary. It was first established in 1920 without reference to any earlier line. In this way, the southern part of the former Hungarian province of Baranya was joined to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Ethnically it was a highly mixed area in which Hungarians lived side by side with considerable numbers of Croats, Germans and, to a lesser extent, Serbs, but functionally depended on the town of Osijek (Bognar 1991).
The Croatia/Slovenia boundary is also a very old one. Its sections are part of an historical line that had for centuries separated Croatia from the Slovene lands of Carniola (Kranjska) and Styria (Stajerska). The Medimurje boundary also largely coincides with the earlier boundary of that part of the Croatian region, except for a few villages in the Strigova municipality, which were joined to Slovenia in the twentieth century. In contrast to the greater long-established section, the western part of the Croatia/Slovenia boundary is recent. The Istrian boundary was drawn after the Second World War, and after the temporary Free Zone of Trieste was divided between Italy and Yugoslavia. The delimitation between Croatia and Slovenia was carried out along ethnic lines.
The boundary with Bosnia-Herzegovina is the longest. Its present-day course is the result of centuries of Ottoman rule over Bosnia. The boundary section marked by the rivers Sava and Una reflects the historical boundary of Croatia towards the Ottoman Empire. Sections of the Sava and the lower course of the Una river were fixed by the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699. The Treaty of Pozarevac in 1718 altered it by extending Croatian territory farther east, thus bringing the whole of Srijem under Croatian authority. The same line was confirmed by the Treaty of Svishtov in 1791, which was particularly important for establishing the boundary along the upper Una river. Having won back the greater part of the Lika region in 1699, Croatia then extended its sovereignty over Kordun and the rest of Lika. Thus, in 1791 that boundary section was fixed almost completely as it is today. The same line was confirmed as a boundary between Croatia and Bosnia after the Second World War, except for a couple of former Croatian villages near Bihac, which were transferred to Bosnia. The southern section of the boundary towards Bosnia-Herzegovina is inherited from delimitations between Venetian-controlled Dalmatia and the Ottoman Empire, carried out in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The present-day boundary is the same as the so-called Linea Mocenigo, which gave Venetian Dalmatia its final shape in 1718. In the extreme southeast, the frontier coincides with the boundary of the Republic of Dubrovnik. There, Croatian territory is interrupted at Neum, giving Bosnia- Herzegovina an outlet to the sea. That was part of a diplomatic scheme by Dubrovnik in 1700, which gave the Ottomans a small stretch of coast in order to avoid direct territorial contact with Venice’s Dalmatia territory. This historical boundary was respected by delimitation between the Yugoslav republics after the Second World War.
The short Croatia/Montenegro boundary corresponds to the boundary of the Republic of Dubrovnik, but not that of Austrian Dalmatia. The former Dalmatian coastal strip comprises the Bay of Kotor, Budva and Spic and was given to Montenegro after the Second World War, although it had never been part of it before. The former Bosnia- Herzegovinia exit to the sea in the Bay of Kotor, known as Sutorina, was also allocated to Montenegro. The origin of that outlet is the same as that of Neum. It was another buffer that separated the Republic of Dubrovnik from Venetian possessions, but contrary to Neum was not given to Bosnia-Herzegovina after the Second World War.
The oldest section of the Croatia/Serbia boundary is the central one on the river Danube, down stream of the Drava river mouth. This has been Croatia’s boundary since 1699, when the Ottomans were driven out of Slavonia. The northern section, also on the Danube, was defined in 1945 after a special boundary commission decided that Baranja should be part of Croatia. The southern section was also defined for the first time in 1945, splitting the historical Croatian province of Srijem. Eastern Srijem, with a predominantly Serbian population, was transferred to Serbia, whereas the western part, with its predominantly Croat population, stayed within Croatia.
Thus, it can be concluded that the greatest part of Croatia’s current boundaries is the legacy of earlier periods. Recent historical boundary revisions, carried out within Yugoslavia, are rather rare, but they were carried out at the expense of Croatia. Such revisions are to be found on the Croatia/ Montenegro and Croatia/Serbia boundaries. Generally, the northern and western boundaries are old and more stable. The eastern boundaries are the result of continuing contraction and loss of territory generating from Ottoman conquest in the Balkans, and ending with the interrepublican delimitation within Yugoslavia.
Legal basis
As was known in the late 1980s, the existing boundaries of the Yugoslav republics were questioned by Serbia. For Serbia, only the international Yugoslav boundaries were legitimate, whereas republican boundaries were referred to as “administrative” and “invented by the communist regime” and as such were subject to change. When Croatia and Slovenia proclaimed independence on the basis of referenda in which all citizens of the respective republics were invited to participate, Serbia accused the two republics of “secession”. Since “secession” was illegal, the boundaries of “secessionist” republics should have been proposed by the rest of Yugoslavia. As the basis for a “new” delimitation, the principle of self-determination of peoples who wished to remain in Yugoslavia had to be applied. Since the Serbs were the only people advocating the preservation of Yugoslavia, this meant in reality that they would fix all other boundaries.
The Croatian counter-thesis considered that boundaries were based on both the historical background and constitutional provisions. Croatia pointed out, calling on the historical background of delimitations, that boundaries had deep and long-standing roots. Moreover, according to provisions of the 1974 Federal Constitution, the republic boundaries were inviolable and since republics were defined as states in themselves, Croatia called for their international protection. Boundaries were the subject of Article 5 of the Federal Constitution: “The territory of a republic cannot be changed without the agreement of the republic, and the territory of an autonomous province without the agreement of the autonomous province … The boundary between republics can only be changed on the basis of their mutual agreement. . .” Similar provisions were included in the constitutions of all republics, including Serbia.
As boundary issues were not solved by negotiation, the international community tried to mediate in the conflict (Cvrtila 1993). At the peace conference on (former) Yugoslavia, which began in the autumn of 1991 under the auspices of the European Community (EC), a special arbitration commission of experts from EC countries was formed. On the basis of presented requests and documentation from all the republics, the appointed commissioners answered all questions through several (Degan 1992). Opinion 1 stated that “Yugoslavia is in the process of dissolution” because four out of its six republics expressed their desire for independence. The main principles for delimitation before the former republics were explained in Opinion 3. Four main principles were to be followed: all external boundaries of former Yugoslavia “must be respected” boundaries between republics “can only be changed on the basis of free and mutual agreement” in the absence of such an agreement “the former boundaries become boundaries protected by international law”, following the principle of uti possidetis iuris; the “alteration of existing boundaries by force is not capable of producing legal effects”.
Opinion 2 is also of importance, in which the arbitration commission answered the question put forward by Serbia about the status of the Serbian ethnic community in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The right to self-determination for Serbs outside Serbia “must not involve changes to existing boundaries”. Serbian communities in the two republics were therefore given directions on how to regulate their rights within them. In January 1992 as a result of the views and opinions made by the arbitration commission, all EC members, as well as other countries, recognized the republics of Slovenia and Croatia, and later Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia “within the boundaries that existed before the beginning of confrontation in June last year”.
National identity
Throughout history the Croats did not have many chances to establish their own state, but their national identity has deep and longstanding roots (Fernandez-Armesto 1994). Memories of their medieval kingdom were kept alive among Croats for centuries long after its fall, but an even stronger source of national self-awareness was the continuity of unbroken statehood that Croatia enjoyed within its unions with Hungary and Austria. Indeed, in both unions Croatia was nominally recognized as a separate unit. The Croatian diet (and parliament since 1848) always persistently insisted m that fact. The struggle put up by the Croats for their state and national individuality is therefore essential if one wants to understand Croatian identity (Macan and Sentija 1992). On the basis of that juridical tradition, one of the two strongest political parties formed by the Croats in the nineteenth century was significantly called the Party of (Croat State) Right. It stood firmly on the position of Croatian individuality and sovereignty. Even Croatian politicians who aspired to wider (South) Slavonic integration, saw an eventual common state as a union in which Croats would be able to keep their national and historic particularities. Therefore, when Croatia finally entered the South Slavonic common state in 1918, it was far too late to change or deny Croatian national identity. Moreover, Serbian attempts to impose the concept of “one nation consisting of three tribes” were too crude and violent to attract the Croats. Somewhat different was the concept promoted by the Yugoslav communist regime after the Second World War. Tito’s regime promoted “Yugoslavism”, but was also repressive towards the Croats. Croatian national expression was considered as a direct threat to “brotherhood and unity”. Steady persecution of Croats in both royalist and communist Yugoslavia caused deep distrust towards a South Slavonic union among Croats, strengthened Croatian national sentiments and deepened their desire to establish an independent state. Resurrection of Serbian imperialism in the late 1980s and aggression in the early 1990s were therefore only final impulses for Croatia’s striving for independence.
One of the most complex questions in the former Yugoslavia was a linguistic one .⁵ There are certainly close linguistic ties between Croats and Serbs as well as Montenegrins and Bosnian Muslims. Very often, the standard variants they speak are considered to be one language. However, reality is much more complex. Traditionally, Croats used dialects belonging to three distinct dialect groups (A concise atlas … 1993). The so-called Kajkavian and Cakavian dialects have always been used exceptionally by the Croats and there is a rich vernacular literature written in those dialects. Only dialects belonging to the third dialect group are spoken by both Croats and Serbs. In the nineteenth century a dialect belonging to that (Stokavian) group was accepted as the standard language variant, partly in order to bring Croats and Serbs closer together. Soon afterwards, the Serbs developed a theory by which all speakers of Stokavian were Serbs. That falsified theory became one of the footholds of Greater Serbian policy and territorial claims. On the other side it forced Croatian linguistic scholars into an arduous struggle for Croatian language individuality (Banac 1990). Now, as the Croats and Serbs have their own separate states, the language issue is no more. Each side will develop its own variant language freely and independently, and will be able to name it in accordance with national sentiment or any other heart’s desire.
Differences are greater concerning writing. Although the Serbs traditionally use the Cyrillic script, the Croats exclusively use the Latin alphabet (twenty-five consonants and five vowels). In the past the Croats also used the Glagolitic script and the Bosancica script, which had been a Croatian form of the Cyrillic script.
Catholicism is also an important element of Croatian national identity. It has played a significant role in Croatian history because of the outlying position of Croatia within a Catholic-dominated part of Europe. This position more often appears to have been a hindrance than fruitful, since contacts with Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam were often conflicting. Catholicism is therefore highly positioned in the national consciousness of the Croats as a mode of their defence, and can be compared with the Irish and the Polish experiences. The feelings of Croats towards the Holy See were transparently manifested during the visit of John Paul II to Croatia in September 1994. Almost a million Croatian citizens, and Croats from the diaspora, gathered in Zagreb and took part in public worship led by the Pope in the Croatian language.
Naturally, there are also Croats who are not Catholics. Some of them are Protestants too, and there are also Muslims by religion who consider themselves as Croats in both Croatia and Bosnia, although that combination of ethnic and religious identity was more frequent in the past (Banac 1984).
Since Croatia experienced all its trouble coming from the position on or beside historical dividing lines, the Croats are especially keen to consider themselves part of what is usually called the “West”. Most of them see themselves as “defenders of the eastern frontier of Western culture and values”. When Croatia claimed its independence from Yugoslavia, “return to Europe” was among its main slogans. Unfortunately for the Croats, they are rarely recognized by the West as such. Croatia is more often considered to be part of the Balkans, whereas Croats tend to see their own country as a part of central Europe or the Mediterranean. In the mental map of most Croats, the Balkans is an everlasting source of threats for Croatia’s bare existence. Deep frustration is the only consequence that can come out of that misunderstanding.
Croatia is quite often considered to be an old-fashioned and conservative country by the West. There is not much understanding of Croatia’s openly expressed national feelings and historicism, the Catholicism of substantial numbers of Croats, their insistence on language purity and other expressions of national feeling. All that is, in the eyes of Westerners, really old-fashioned, because the national state is not a favourite model in Europe any more. It must also be stressed that the poor image of Croats has been steadily mediated for the international public by the Serb-dominated diplomacy of former Yugoslavia. Quite often the Croats really appear to be living in the past, whereas modem Europe is orientated to the future. The problem is in the late politogenetic process. The fact that Croatia reached international recognition as late as the 1990s is not the fault of the Croats. They wanted a state in the nineteenth century and after both world wars when the map was changing, but at that time there was no understanding for a small Croatian nation among the Great Powers. Croatia now needs more understanding and patience. As soon as the problem of the country’s integrity is solved, national feelings will not be important any more, and Croats will turn from history to the present and the future.
In spite of the fact that present-day Croatia consists of several historic provinces that had been separated for a long time, national integration is not questioned. Regionalist tendencies are not strong, although there are many typical characteristics particularly for Dalmatia, Slavonia or other regions; most Croats, regardless of their regional origin, sincerely feel Croatia has a main political-territorial framework. The only exception is Istria, where regionalism surfaced in recent times on the basis of the region’s position, history and cultural heritage. Yet, even Istrian regionalism cannot be considered as a threat to the country’s integrity and national togetherness.
Ethnic structure⁶
The ethnic structural pattern of Croatia is similar to the patterns of the majority of states lying in the central European belt between the Baltic and the Adriatic. One ethnic group, in particular the Croats, represents the majority, whereas the rest of the population consists of ethnic communities or minorities that are represented on a much smaller scale. According to the 1991 census, which was carried out on the eve of the war and of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, the total population was 4,784,265 inhabitants, of whom 3,736,356 (78.1% were Croats. Among the republics of former Yugoslavia, Croatia was second according to the share of its titular nation to total population. Only Slovenia was ethnically more homogenous .⁷
The second largest ethnic community in Croatia are the Serbs. There were 581,663 Serbs (12.2%) registered in the 1991 census. Approximately one third of the Serbs lived within the regions of Baniya, Kordun, eastern Lika and around Knin in northern Dalmatia, and were a majority there. The Serbs in the eastern and western parts of Slavonia constituted an additional sixth of their total, whereas the rest of them (i.e. roughly a half of the total number) were dispersed throughout other parts of Croatia, mostly in large towns. In the context of the recent Croat/Serb conflict, it is important to stress that Serb-dominated areas lie along the Croatia/Bosnia boundary, hundreds of kilometres away from Serbia. Eastern Slavonia, or more precisely the regions of Baranya and Srijem, which since the 1991 war have been occupied by the Serbs, was not a Serb-dominated area due to its pre-war situation.
As a consequence of migration waves during Habsburg rule, there are several other ethnic communities that have been living within Croatia for at least a century or more. The most homogenous Hungarian community is in Baranya, the majority of Czechs live in western Slavonia, the majority of Italians inhabit the western part of Istria and Rijeka, whereas Slovaks and Ruthenians are concentrated in several villages in Slavonia. The Jews, who were more numerous before the Second World War, live mostly in Zagreb. All ethnic communities mentioned are small, but they are a very important part of society because they give Croatia a specific flavour of central European mixture.
Bosnian Muslims (43,469 or 0.9%) were the third largest community according to the 1991 census, but their relatively large number is a result of recent economic immigration from Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Generally, all non-Croat communities do accept Croatia as their homeland. They supported Croatia’s independence in 1991 and many their members were even part of the Croatian Army and fought for freedom together with Croats. Only the Serbs, and then not all of them, are either ambivalent or hostile towards Croatia.
Croat/Serb conflict
War between Croatia and the former Yugoslav Army ended more or less at the beginning of January 1992. During some five months of war operations the Yugoslav army together with volunteers from Serbia backed local Serb irregulars and they seized about one quarter of Croatian territory (Klemencic 1993). On that territory the so-called ‘Republic of Serbian Krajina” was self-proclaimed by rebelling Serbs (Vego 1993).
The occupied area of Croatia comprises the regions of Baranya, the eastern part of Slavonia including the Croatian part of Srijem, parts of western Slavonia, Baniya, Kordun, eastern Lika and part of northern Dalmatia. Before the hostilities, according to the 1991 census, 549,083 inhabitants lived within the presently occupied areas, among them 287,830 Serbs (52.4%), 203,656 Croats (37.1%) and 57,597 (10.5% of citizens) declaring other ethnic affiliation (Sterc and Pokos 1993). As a consequence of hostilities, the ethnic composition of those areas has changed drastically. Almost all the Croats were killed or have been forced to leave, and no one has returned.⁸ The same happened to most of the other non-Serbs living in the area. In March 1992, UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) were deployed in the occupied areas of Croatia in accordance with a plan usually known as the “Vance plan” after Cyrus Vance, the personal envoy of the UN Secretary General, who mediated in the conflict (Baletic 1993). After more than three years of UNPROFOR’S presence it can be said that the peace-keeping forces have effectively guaranteed Serbian gains, since the situation on the ground has not changed and no political resolution of the conflict has been reached.
The rebellion of the Serbs in Croatia effectively started in August 1990 with the so-called “tree-trunk revolution”, but it was part of a wider scenario conducted from Belgrade, in order to destabilize former Yugoslavia and to reorganize it according to Serbia’s desire. Moreover, the whole scenario was just one more attempt to realize the two- centuries old Greater Serbian expansionist program and territorial claims (Brandt et al. 1991; Klemencic 1993/4b).
The Serbs living in Croatia, or Croatian Serbs, protested against Croatia as early as 1988, when the communist regime was still in power. At that time there was no excuse for their anti-Croat feelings since the Croatian communist regime was more than generous towards Serbs and it enabled them to have privileged status (Cviic 1991: 73). After the free elections held in spring 1990, Croatian Serbs openly rejected the more independent status of Croatia and totally alienated themselves from the rest of Croatian society. They did not even try to accommodate themselves to a new multi-party situation. Under the influence of Greater Serbian propaganda from Belgrade they equated the newly elected Croatian government with the Ustasha regime. It is true that a Ustasha regime during the Second World War committed war crimes against the Serbs, but historical memories and fears could not be a reason for justifying Serbian armed rebellion and a move towards secession in the 1990s.
After heavy and brutal fighting and several years of total separation, there is an extremely deep division between ‘Krajina”^{9 10} and the rest of Croatia. Formally, integrity of Croatia is guaranteed by the UN, and its international boundaries should be protected by international law. Because of this the Serbs are not allowed to secede and join Serbia, which is their final aim. On the other hand, the situation on the ground is actually favourable for the Serbs. As long as they keep the territorial “status quo”, they consider themselves to be beyond the legal Croatian framework. Negotiations between the two sides have been started several times under the auspices of international mediators, but so far there has not been a single accord acceptable as a starting point for both sides. The only wish for peace can be pointed out as a joint one, but Croatia wants to reach peaceful reintegration and the Serbs want peaceful secession. From the Croatian viewpoint a resolution of the “Serbian question” should be reached within the framework of the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Liberties and the Rights of Ethnic and National Communities or Minorities, which was voted in the Croatian Parliament in 1991. A high degree of cultural autonomy for the Serbs is provided by the Constitutional Law, including territorial autonomy in two districts (Glina and Knin) covering most of the area that was Serb- dominated according to the 1991 and previous censuses. Due to personal judgment, it seems that the Croatian government would be ready to give more concessions to the Serbs. Effective partition of the country has caused deep divisions in society. The problem of displaced persons is getting deeper daily. There is steady international suspicion about Croatia’s stability and credibility The most important transportation corridors are out of use and alternative routes do not satisfy needs. Without resolution of the country’s integrity, the chances for economic recovery are poor. Therefore, resolution of the Serbian question appears to be of vital interest for Croatia, and that fact forces the Croatian side to open more doors to Serbian claims. The only thing that Croatia certainly could not negotiate is the secession of “Krajina”.
The Serbs are expected to recognize the sovereignty and integrity of Croatia and to abolish secessionistic claims. Within that framework they can probably negotiate more autonomy that they have been offered so far, especially if they get international backing for such a status. Apart from Baranya and eastern Slavonia, other Serb-occupied areas are traditionally underdeveloped and sparsely populated. Functionally, they depend on Croatia. They have always been economically integrated into Croatia. Moreover, being supplied directly from Serbia proper, self- proclaimed Krajina is not economically viable at all. A direct link is at present possible only across another Serbian “statelet” in Bosnia- Herzegovina. That fact explains why the Serbs so desperately need a land corridor in northern Bosnia. On the other hand, especially from a military viewpoint, the most effective impact on the Greater Serbian project would be to break that corridor.
The are two ways to resolve the Croat/Serb conflict. A military solution means a new war between Croats and Serbs, or more realistically between Croatia and Serbia. Croatia’s victory would resolve the question of the country’s integrity, but it would probably cause a huge emigration of the Serbs from presently occupied parts of Croatia. However, the military balance is not favourable for Croatia, since Serbia controls most of former Federal Army potential and still has an advantage, especially when considering aircraft and heavy artillery. Moreover, Croatia has been steadily warned by the international community that there would be no sympathy for eventual Croatian military actions. Eventual defeat of the Croatian army would probably mean a final loss of territory. It might also open the door for legalizing boundary changes at the expense of Croatia. The resolution of conflict without a new war is also possible, no matter how deep the conflict seems to be. But the political key for that resolution is not within Croatia. It is held by Serbia. If Serbia abolishes its expansionistic claims and recognizes Croatia within international boundaries, the rebelling Croatian Serbs have to negotiate its future status with the Croatian government. In spite of weaknesses demonstrated so far, international mediators can certainly influence that solution profoundly.
Relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina
Relations between Croatia and Serbia can be characterized as conflicting, but the most complex is the relationship between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is a special and outstanding interaction between the two countries concerning geographical complementarity (Klemencic 1993/4a). There are also many elements of mutually considering economic, historical and ethnic relations (Klemencic and Topalovic 1993).
Bosnia has traditionally been considered as one of the historic Croatian lands. An important part of that viewpoint has been a theory that Bosnian Muslims were of Croat ethnic origin. On the other hand, the Serbs from their perspective viewpoint claim the predominantly Serbian origin of Bosnian Muslims and they consider Bosnia to be one of Serbia’s lands. But there has always been an essential difference between Croatian and Serbian claims. The Croatian side was always likely to respect Islamic culture and be ready to accept Bosnian Muslims within its Croatian circle as “Croats of Muslim religion”. On the contrary, the Serbian approach has always been extremely exclusive. There was no understanding and no respect for the Islamic tradition of Bosnian Muslims. They have always been contemptuously considered as once Islamized Serbs who should be either re-Serbianized by whatever means or simply exterminated. Such a Serbian attitude has been widely demonstrated during the current war in Bosnia.
On the grounds of recent events in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatian policy needs new approaches and attitudes. It has become obvious that Bosnian Muslims should be treated as a separate cultural and political entity.¹¹ Consequently, Bosnia-Herzegovina can no longer be treated as “Croatian land”. An old slogan of the Croatian nationalists, “Croatian boundary on the Drina river” has changed into “Serbian boundary must not extend over the Drina river”. That means support for a sovereign and integral Bosnia-Herzegovina, which should be a buffer state between Croatia and Serbia.
Naturally, Croatia will carry on its care for the Croatian community within Bosnia-Herzegovina but only to help them to ensure a satisfactory status. Such an approach provides fertile grounds for close relations between the two countries in future, not on the basis of nostalgic historical or consanguinic links but on the more promising basis of real interests. As soon as Croatia accepts that approach completely and integrates it into its strategy, it will also be better treated and more widely accepted on the international stage.
However, a much more complicated situation will develop if Bosnia- Herzegovina does not survive as an integral state. Eventual secession of the Serbs and partition of Bosnia are a real threat for Croatia because of a possible merger of Serb-dominated areas in both Croatia and Bosnia into one unit (so-called Western Serbia). When the spatial integrity of Bosnia is ever violated by the Serbs, it automatically lays claims for revision of the Croatian boundaries. Thus, Croatia will always be very much dependent on the situation in Bosnia, even without wishing that on its own. What is important for Croatia is to be unequivocal towards Bosnian integrity. Fortunately, the Washington agreement¹² signed by the Croatian and Bosnian governments (in the latter case, this is more or less a euphemism for “leadership of the Bosnian Muslims”) in March 1994 has made the Croatian position towards Bosnia clearer.
Relations toward other neighbouring states
Apart from Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia’s other neighbouring states are Slovenia and Hungary, as well as Italy on the Adriatic Sea. Since the break-up of Yugoslavia there has been a demarcation dispute between Croatia and Slovenia. The two countries proclaimed mutual recognition “within existing boundaries” in 1991, but they have to demarcate the boundary line. A mutual state commission was formed. Several disputed points emerged, but any problems are small and they should be treated as technical. The greatest dispute is maritime delimitation in the Bay of Piran, where there was no dividing line during the Yugoslav period. In contrast with land boundaries, there are no maritime boundaries between republics in former Yugoslavia. Since Croatia is fortunate in terms of the length of its coastline¹³, Slovenia is probably a more interested partner in that maritime delimitation.
Apart from the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, a median line should be adopted as a fair solution, but Slovenia seems to be more ambitious in order to secure broader territorial waters and probably direct access to international waters. The problem is that such a claim encompasses changes of the land boundary at the expense of Croatia, which is advocated openly by some marginal groups in Slovenia. Moreover, the dispute over the Bay of Piran is sometimes overestimated by the media on both sides. Yet, it is a dispute likely to become more sever. Two young countries should finally manage to find a mutually acceptable solution.
With regard to its maritime boundary, Croatia is likely to continue to apply the delimitation agreements reached by Italy and the former Yugoslavia (Blake 1993/94). The way Italy and Yugoslavia settled their straight baselines, territorial sea limits and delimitation of the continental shelf in the Adriatic was widely accepted as reasonable, modest and mutually satisfactory. As a successor state of the former Yugoslavia, Croatia sees no reason to change already-existing solutions.
Apart from the dispute between Croatia and Slovenia, another maritime dispute is the delimitation of the Bay of Kotor between Croatia and Montenegro. First, it should be made clear who is Croatia’s partner: Montenegro or the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, proclaimed by Serbia and Montenegro after the break-up of former Yugoslavia. Secondly, that case is clear since the Prevlaka peninsula on the western side of the bay’s mouth belongs to Croatia and the rest of the bay is part of Montenegro. The dispute exists only because Montenegro (or FR Yugoslavia) claims a boundary revision in order to gain the whole bay. Apart from that unilateral claim, the maritime delimitation should be easy because the equidistant line provides a fair and only logical solution (Blake 1993/94).
There are no disputes at all concerning boundary lines between Hungary and Croatia. The old international boundary seems to be satisfactory for both sides, so they can renew their historic links under new circumstances and without boundary disputes.
Conclusion
Although Croatia finally reappeared on the political map of Europe, creation of the state has not yet been completed. The aspirations of the Croats over centuries became a reality, but the new state needs to consolidate its integrity and stability. Without the reintegration of currently Serb-controlled areas, Croatia’s unique shape would be seriously handicapped. Under the present circumstances of partial occupation, the country’s economic viability is endangered too. Croatia’s primary course of action is therefore to find a way to its integrity.
Theoretically, the approach Croatia had towards a territorial resolution of the post-Yugoslav crises was confirmed as a right and legitimate one. Former republican boundaries were recognized as international, which was exactly what Croatia advocated. Unfortunately, the country was faced with aggression and it was forced to defend its legal rights with arms. Since military imbalance was more than obvious, Croatia succeeded only partially. Now, there is a gap between the legal rights and effective occupation in reality. To resolve that frustrating situation, Croatia looks for efficient international support and help.
Once integrated within internationally recognized boundaries, Croatia will have to find a solution for the status of its Serbian minority in order to strengthen the country’s internal stability. Certainly, a solution, or modus vivendi as once interpreted by EC representatives, will not be easily reached, because Croat/Serb relations in Croatia and in general have reached their lowest level in history.
On attaining its current aims it can be concluded that Croatia’s territorial aspirations will be satisfied and it can soon become a place of stability and progress in a transitional part of the continent where central Europe, the Mediterranean and the Balkans are in contact. Croatia rediviva is therefore still a challenging project for the present generation of the Croats.
Notes
¹ The only Ottoman province solely of countries populated with south Slavonic nations. Smaller units were sanjaks.
² For simplicity, the formal title “Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” is reduced to “Bosnia-Herzegovina” or sometimes simply “Bosnia” throughout the text.
³ An excellent insight into the first few years of Yugoslavia is provided by 1. Banac (1984).
⁴ Ustasha – the Croatian Revolutionary Movement – founded in 1929 after dictatorship was introduced in Yugoslavia by the Serbian monarch. In 1941 the movement’s leader Ante Pavelic was sponsored by Italy and Germany to take a leading position in Croatia. The 1941-5 activity of the Ustasha regime compromised an idea of future Croatian independence, including the 1991 declaration of independence.
⁵ More about language can be found in Banac (1990).
⁶ A collection of more detailed studies on the ethnic structure of Croatia, and particularly of Serb-dominated areas, is provided by Croatian geographers in Geopolitical and demographical issues of Croatia (1991).
⁷ In 1991, according to respected censuses, the percentage of Slovenians in Slovenia was 87.8, Serbs in Serbia, 65.8, Macedonians in Macedonia, 64.6, and Montenegrins in Montenegro, 61.8. The participation of ethnic communities within Bosnia-Herzegovinia was: Muslims 43.7 per cent, Serbs 31.3 per cent and Croats 17.3 per cent.
⁸ In December 1993 there were in Croatia 250,396 displaced persons from occupied areas registered by the government office for displaced persons and refugees, and 59,959 refugees from Croatia in other countries. Also, Croatia provided accommodation for 282,728 refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina.
⁹ The term “Krajina” or “Serbian Krajina” has recently been used to determine the self-proclaimed Serbian “statelet” in Croatia. The word “Krajina” in the Croatian language has the same meaning as the word “frontier” in English. It used to be a general term, written with a lower case initial letter, usually to denote smaller regions that were historically borderlands. The Austrian defensive belt known as the Military Frontier (or Vojna krajina in Croatian) did not correspond fully to the territory of so-called Serbian Krajina. For example, the town of Knin was not within the Military Frontier. It is also important that the Military Frontier did not have special status because of the Serbs living there (totalling 40 per cent of the population), but for completely different reasons. The inhabitants of the Military Frontier enjoyed immunity from feudal obligations in return for military service guarding the frontier against the Turks, irrespective of their ethnic origin or religious affiliation. The continuity between the historic Military Frontier and present-day “Krajina”, which the Serbs claim, simply does not exist (Szajkovski 1993).
¹⁰ Since this chapter was written, Krajina has been reincorporated within Croatia, and few of its Serb population are in residence there.
¹¹ In order to stress their identity, Bosnian Muslims in 1994 started to call themselves “Bosniaks”, which is a traditional term for citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially those spread among Muslims and Croats.
¹² Agreement between Croats and Bosnian Muslims, which proposed a Croat-Bosnian federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition, a confederation between the Bosnian federation and Republic of Croatia is proposed for the future, but it is not a realistic project, at least until both countries have overcome problems of integrity.
¹³ Excluding the islands the coastline of Croatia is 1778km long, and that of Slovenia, 32km long.
References
A concise atlas of the Republic of Croatia (and of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina) 1993. Zagreb: Miroslav Krleza Lexicographic Institute.
Baletic, Z. 1993. “UNPROFOR in Croatia.” Politicka Misao (Croatian Political Science Review) vol. xxx, no. 2, 44-54.
Banac, I. 1990. “Main trends in the Croatian language question.” In Most/The Bridge , Collection of Croatian Literature, vol. I. Zagreb: Croatian Writers’ Association.
-1984. The national question in Yugoslavia. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
Blake, G. 1993/4. “Croatia’s maritime boundaries.” In Croatia – A new European state . Department for Geography and Spatial Planning.
Boban, LJ. 1993. Croatian borders 1918-1993 , Zagreb: Skolska knjiga/Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts.
Bognar, A. 1991. “Changes in ethnic composition in Baranja.” In Geopolitical and demographic issues of Croatia . Department of Geography, University of Zagreb.
Brandt, M. et al. 1991. lzvori velikosrpske agresije , Zagreb: Skolska knjiga/AugustCesarec.
Cviic, C. 1991. Remaking the Balkans . London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Crkvencic, I. and M. Klemencic 1993. Aggression against Croatia . Zagreb: Central Bureau of Statistics.
Cvrtila, V. 1993. “The boundaries of the Republic of Croatia.” Politicka Misao (Croatian Political Science Review) vol. xxx, no. 2, 35-43.
Degan, V. D. 1992. “Samoodredjenje naroda i teritorijalna cjelovitost drzava u uvjetima raspada Jugoslavije.” Zakonitost vol. XLVI, no. 4, 543-69.
Englefield, C. 1992. “Yugoslavia, Croatia, Slovenia: re-emerging boundaries.” Territory Briefing 3, International Boundaries Research Unit, University of Durham.
Fernandez-Armesto, F. (ed.) 1994. The Times guide to the peoples of Europe . London: Times Books.
Klemencic, M. 1991. “A recent historico-geographical basis of the Yugoslav outer and inner borders with special to Croatian borders.” In Geopolitical and demographical issues of Croatia . Department of Geography, University of Zagreb.
-1993. “Causes and dynamics of the war in Croatia.” Acta Geographica Croatica XXVIII, 187-94.
-1993/4a. “Four theses about Croatia and Bosnia.” In Croatia – A new European state . Department for Geography and Spatial Planning, University of Zagreb.
-1993/4b. “Greater Serbian territorial claims.” In Croatia – A new European state . Department for Geography and Spatial Planning, University of Zagreb.
-1994. “Territorial proposals for the settlement of the war in Bosnia- Hercegovina.” Boundary and Territory Briefing (vol. 1) 3, International Boundaries Research Unit, University of Durham.
Klemencic,M. and D.Topalovic 1993. “Geopolitische Verflechtungen von Kroatien und Bosnien-Hercegowina.” Sudosteuropa Mitteilungen XXXIII(l), 50-60.
Kocsis, K. 1993/4. “The changing of the Croatian ethnic territory during the last half of the millennium.” In Croatia – A new European state. Department for Geography and Spatial Planning, University of Zagreb.
Macan, T. and J. Sentija 1992. A short history of Croatia [The Bridge, special edition). Zagreb: Croatian Writers’ Association.
Szajkovski, B. (ed.) 1993. Encyclopedia of conflicts, disputes and flashpoints in eastern Europe, Russia and the successor states . Harlow, England: Longman.
Sterc, S. and N. Pokos 1993. “Demografski uzroci i posljedice rata protiv Hrvatske.” Drustvena Istrazivanja 4-5, 305-34.
Vego, M. 1992. “The army of Serbian Krajina.” Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. V, no. 10, 438-45. Coulsdon: Jane’s Information Group.

American Croatian Review, Year IV, No. 3 and 4, 1997, pp. 15-16.

     The sound of Boka Kotorska is the biggest and most beautiful bay in the Adriatic Sea, as well as the southernmost fjord in the world. Its important geographic position, favorable topography, plentiful water and sunlight, along with its pleasant climate, have been attracting people to settle there since prehistoric times.

     The oldest archeological findings in Boka date back to the late neolithic period, around 3500 B.C. Unique graveyards and cliff paintings can be traced back to the second millennium B.C. The Greeks are known to have built their colonies in Boka as early as the fourth century B.C. The Romans called the sound Sinus Rbisonicus. The present name of the sound is derived from the Roman word bocca, which means mouth, or opening. Thus, the name Boka Kotorska (Kotor being, of course, Boka’s most important town).

     The first recognizable long-term inhabitants of Boka were the Illyrians (intermingled with the Celts to a certain degree). By 250 B.C., Boka was part of the Illyrian state under King Agron, its capital was Skadar which is in modern-day Albania. The Illyrians were sea-pirates known to have attacked Greek shipping, providing a pretense for Roman invasion of the region. In the third and last Illyric-Roman war (168 B.C.) the Romans destroyed the Illyrian state and took control of Boka. Their rule lasted until the fall of the Western Roman Empire, around A. D. 476.

     During Roman rule, primarily due to Roman immigration and assimilation of the indigenous population, Latin influences in Boka became ingrained and have remained deeply rooted in the area even several centuries after the fall of Rome. (Indeed, one could argue that they can be easily found even today).

     Following the implosion of the great Western Roman Empire and 60 years of Gothic rule in the area, Boka came under the increasing influence of the Eastern Roman Empire, later known as Byzantium. The Early medieval period in Boka, as in the rest of Europe, is characterized by the mass migration of largely nomadic tribes, first the Goths, followed by the Avars, and then the Slavs.

     During the Slavic migration in the sixth and seventh centuries, Croats settled regions along the Adriatic coast from Istria to Albania, regions as far north as the Drava River, as far west as Sutla, and as far east as the Drina. The oldest historical account from those times, written by a priest of Duclea (Pop Dukljanin), mentions Red Croatia, or Upper Dalmatia, a region which included Boka. Red Croatia united with Western or White Croatia into a single Croatian state as early as the middle of the tenth century.

     From the mid-ninth until the end of the twelfth century, Boka was repeatedly under pressure, even periodic rule, from the Byzantine Empire on the one hand, and the states of Duklja-Zeta and Travunja on the other, states which had been formed in Boka’s hinterland. By mid-twelfth century, the town of Kotor started to thrive as a maritime trade center, establishing ties with nearby Dubrovnik. The Catholic cathedral of St. Triphon (Sv. Trifun) dates back to 1166 and was built with the help of maritime traders.

     From 1185 until 1371, Boka was part of a medieval Serbian state under the Nemanjic dynasty. Even during these times, however, Boka maintained broad autonomy and retained its overwhelmingly Catholic character. Many new towns were springing up along the shores of the sound. The town of Kotor continued to grow in size and influence, and it increasingly attracted various tradesmen like goldsmiths, blacksmiths, and tailors, among others. Kotor’s ship building industry was also well known.

     During this period, several guilds and fraternities were founded. The oldest and most famous of these fraternities, all of which had religious origins, was the fraternity of sea-farers from Boka or in Croatian, Bokeljska mornarica. It may have been founded as early as the beginning of the ninth century, but definitely existed by mid-twelfth century.

     After the death of the last of the Nemanjics, Kotor came (1371) under the protection of the Croatian-Hungarian king, Ljudevit the Great. Ljudevit was the most powerful ruler of the Adriatic region at the time, forcing out Venice from the eastern side of the Adriatic region. After his death, Bosnian king Stjepan Tvrtko I. Kotormanic attempted to impose his rule on Kotor. He succeeded to gain only parts of the bay including the town of Kotor. However, his rule did not leave a lasting impact in the town or the region. The Bosnian rulers are remembered mostly for founding the town of Herceg Novi on the western side of Boka. After Tvrtko’s death in 1391, and until 1420, Kotor was, like Dubrovnik, an independent city-state.

     The period of Venetian rule over Kotor and Boka started in 1420 and lasted, with a few interruptions, until 1797. It was a period of numerous wars and permanent insecurity on both land and the sea. By the end of the fifteenth century, Turks had conquered the lands of Boka’s hinterland, including some lands on the north west side of Boka. For the ensuing 200 years, the sound was thus divided between the Venetians and the Turks. During that time, the population, power, and significance of Kotor decreased dramatically, turning Kotor into one of the most devastated and most pillaged cities in the bay. After the Austro-Venetian war against the Turkish Empire (1715-1718), Venice was able to expand its territories into Dalmatia even further. She took complete control over Boka sound once again, and her rule lasted until the fall of Venice in 1797.

     On August 24th, 1798 a Croatian from Lika, general Matija Rukavina, marched alongside Austrian troops into Kotor. Rukavina entered Kotor in the name of the Croatian-Hungarian king, convincing the citizens of Boka to accept the Habsburg rule.

     In the midst of the Napoleonic wars, after the Austrian defeat at Austerlitz, Austria was supposed to turn over Boka to the French. However, the Russians, who were not obliged to honor this agreement, in the vain hope of stopping Napoleon’s eastward advance, took possession of Boka in 1806. After the Russian defeat at Friedland and after little over a year of Russian rule, Russia was forced to accede Boka to the French. With the fall of Dubrovnik republic in 1808, Boka became territorially connected with the rest of Dalmatia.

     In their six years of rule, the French introduced an array of innovations. The most important of these probably being democratization and the abolishment of all aristocratic privileges.

     In 1807, the Croatian parliament (Sabor) again requested that Dalmatia, of which Boka was now a part, must be reunited with Croatia and Slavonia. This request would constantly resurface until unification in the latter part of the century.

     After the fall of Napoleon in 1813 and while awaiting the final peace settlement, Boka was temporarily united with Montenegro for several months. Two strong factions had emerged in Boka at this time. The pro-Austrian and pro-Montenegrin one favored a union of Boka with Montenegro. This faction was supported mostly by Orthodox villagers living in the hills above the sound who had settled there during Turkish rule. A numerically greater, pro-Austrian faction enjoyed support from predominantl
y Croatian Catholic coastal cities, as well as some villages. The final decision came at the all-important Vienna Congress of 1814, in which Austria was confirmed as the successor of all the territories of the Venetian and Dubrovnik republics. The Kingdom of Dalmatia was formed, with its capital in Zadar, and Boka became part of the Austrian state. The second Austrian rule was to last for 104 years, until 1918.

     In the 1830’s, the so called Illyrian Renewal, or the Croatian national revival movement, swept Boka as well. Long after the national homogenization of Boka’s minority Serbs, Boka’s Croats finally started to unite under their Croatian national identity. The appointment of count Josip Jelacic to the governorship of Dalmatia and the rest of Croatia had finally come. Many songs and poems were written in Jelacic’s honor. Croatian tricolors were displayed on all ships as well as in all of Boka’s towns alongside the official Austrian flag. However, unification was still some decades away.

     At the assembly in 1861, it had been decided that all citizens of Boka, Croats and Serbs alike, unconditionally support the unification of Boka and all of Dalmatia with Croatia proper. Representatives of Boka in Dalmatia’s Sabor at the time, three Croats and a Serb, and all members of the People’s Party, supported unification with Croatia. Responding to greater-Serbian tendencies, the People’s Party gradually shifted its ideological orientation from South-Slavism to Croatianism in the 1870’s, when it became the majority party in Dalmatia’s Sabor. The final break between the Croatians and the Serbs came after the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Austro-Hungarian empire in 1878. The Croatians supported occupation because it reunited Bosnian-Herzegovinian Croats with the rest of the Croatian nation, while the Serbs vehemently opposed it, because it ran counter to greater-Serbian claims to Bosnia.

     In the second half of the nineteenth century Boka experienced an economic revival. The number of affluent Croatian families increased quite dramatically. Maritime trade regained much of its former glory by 1870. However, the rapid development of the steam ship dealt a fatal blow to Boka’s trade – one from which it was never able to recover.

     Sharing the fate of the rest of Croatia, Boka became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes after World War I. Thus started the most difficult period in Boka’s history – the period in which the greater-Serbian politicians would attempt, and largely succeed, to assume full control of one of Croatia’s most beautiful regions.

Based on the text “Boka Kotorska od najstarijih vremena do 1918” by Ankica and Josip Pecaric. Summarized and translated by Ivica Kresic, University of Chicago.

Interesting, if sad, statistics:

In 1910, Catholics of mostly Croat nationality made up 69 percent of the total population of the town of Kotor, 70 percent in Herceg Novi, and 95 percent in Tivat. In 1991, Croat share in the total population in the same towns was only 7, 2, and 23 percent respectively.