Presented at the Association for Croatian Studies symposium “Croatian Diaspora in the U.S.A. on the Eve of the Third Millennium” held at St. Xavier University, Chicago, April 17, 1999.
Ante Cuvalo – Chicago, Illinois
Introduction
For the ancient Greeks, diaspora [The word diaspora is a compound of two Greek words, speirein (to scatter) and the preposition dia (over, apart)] meant migration and colonization. In time, however, Jews who scattered throughout the world became known as the Diaspora. Today, diaspora denotes a variety of communities whose members or their ancestors have been dispersed from their original homeland for various reasons. Scholars do, however, distinguish several types of diasporas. One such categorization divides diasporas into the victim, labor, trade, imperial, and cultural diaspora types.[Cohen, Robin. Global diaspora – An introduction. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997, p. x.] According to this division, Africans in the Americas, Armenians, and Jews typify the victim, the British the imperial, Indians the labor, Chinese and Lebanese the trading, and the Caribbean the cultural diaspora. This and similar generalizations, however, do not reflect the full complexity of why groups of people leave their native land. The Croatian diaspora is a good example of multi-causal reasons for leaving the homeland.
Today’s Croatian diaspora communities in Austria (Gradisce/Burgenland), western Hungary, Moravia, Slovakia, Romania, and Italy are descendants of the Croats who left their country as the victims of Turkish invasions 500 years ago. The ancestors of the Croat diaspora community in Kosovo (today on the verge of extinction), however, were mining and commercial entrepreneurs who settled in the region before the Turkish onslaught.
The Croatian immigrants to the so-called New World, especially during the last one hundred years, have been leaving their homeland in large numbers for two main reasons: economic and political. Sometimes, however, it is impossible to delineate the two because the lack of economic opportunities was often linked to political oppression. In general, Croats who came to the U.S.A. and Canada at the end of the last and the beginning of this century were primarily a labor diaspora. The immediate post-World War II emigrants, on the other hand, fall into the category of victim diaspora. Most of them were directly or indirectly forced out from Yugoslavia as political undesirables. Those who left the country on their own, or were encouraged to leave, in the mid-1960s and after, were mostly job seekers in Western Europe. After staying in Western Europe for a while, many of them settled overseas, including in the United States. During this period, an increasing number of professionals, seeking better economic opportunities in the West, also left the homeland.
An interesting phenomenon, however, did occur among the Croats who left the country after 1918, especially among those who left in the 1960s and after. Namely, although they might have left the homeland for economic reasons, in a relatively short time many of them became political emigrants, seeing themselves as victims of the Yugoslav state and its regime. Lack of freedom prevented them from becoming fully conscious of their individual or national predicaments. They realized, only after leaving the country, that their misfortunes were a reflection of the predicaments of the Croats as a nation within the multi-national state of Yugoslavia. This resulted in their politicization and many began to see themselves as a “victim diaspora.”
Recent world events and the revival of Croatian independence and statehood have pushed the Croatian diaspora in the U.S.A. and other parts of the world into a new phase of history. The Croat diaspora today is in a process of reconfiguration, redirecting its energies, looking for new forms to express its identity and culture, and new ways of securing its own future. Not only the Croats in the homeland, but also the Croats outside the country are going through a time of major change. Hopefully for the better.
The First Side Of The Triangle: Croatian Diaspora And The U.S.A.
The question of identity
Is there a “homo Americanus?” There was a popular belief (held by some even today) that there was a “genuine” all-American culture into which all Americans should melt. In reality, this usually meant to conform to the Anglo-Saxon cultural values. Ethnicity was valued by some, but only as a social sub-system temporarily supplementing the culture of the majority. Thanks to the rise of Black Pride and Power, ethnicity in America became popular in the 1970s. Politicians recognized its potential and President Gerald Ford established an office of ethnic affairs in 1974. During the 1980s and 1990s, however, ethnicity has been pushed aside and even suspected of being a sign of intolerance and bigotry. “Multiculturalism” and “diversity” became the politically correct slogans of the day. These terms imply open-mindedness, inclusiveness, tolerance, and celebration of differences. In practice, however, the American form of multiculturalism, instead of being all-inclusive, turned out to be intolerant of ethnicity. Its primary focus was on gender, race, and sexual preference, while ethnic diversity was out of its scope. All Americans of European origin, for example, are seen as belonging to a single dominant and exploitative culture and history. Similarly, multiculturalists pay little attention to the ethnic differences of peoples whose origins are Latin American or Asian. The fact is that in the age of “multiculturalism” and in the name of “diversity,” ethnicity is ignored or even thought of as undesirable.
On the other hand, most European ethnic groups, including Croatians, surrender relatively quickly to the dominant American cultural values. Although I am just beginning to do research on the history of the Croatians in the Chicago area, it seems that within two or three generations the dominant American core culture is totally assumed by American Croats and what is left of the Croatian subculture are possibly grandma’s favorite dishes, a few ethnic melodies, in some cases attendance at Christmas Midnight Mass in a Croatian Catholic church, or coming to an annual Croatian festival for a taste of roasted lamb. But a meaningful ethnic consciousness is practically non-existent.
Furthermore, it seems that ethnic groups melt much faster in America than, for example, in Canada, Australia, or Latin America. This can be seen from the fact that it is quite normal for an ethnic child in Canada to be bilingual (or even trilingual), while to teach a child a second language in the U.S. is a major struggle. Learning a second language is thought by many to be a useless form of torture. Besides the lack of governmental support for ethnic language schools, the cultural predisposition in this country is such that to be an American and to speak English is more than enough!
In contrast to an aggressive pressure on immigrants and their children to Americanize during the early decades of this century, today’s Americanization process is more subtle. For example, in order to become a “true” professional and to climb upwards into the elite strata of American culture, ethnic children are expected to cut off their ties with the “historical burdens” of their parents. They are pressured to believe that the ethnic part of their lives is irrelevant, which in turn encourages them to forget the culture of their ancestors. Such young ethnics, even if they are raised in an ethnically aware home, are often tempted to “put off” their ethnicity until they are accepted by the professional elite. But, by the time they enter the elite culture, they already have distanced themselves too far from their ethnic base or become afraid that their professional success might be hurt if they identify with an ethnic group (especially, a small ethnic group). There are, for example, a number of important media, business, and political personalities of Croatian heritage in this country, but very few of them acknowledge their ethnicity.
American academia, for example, sees itself as the bastion of multiculturalism, tolerance, and diversity, yet it is very annoyed by ethnicity and what is referred to as “ethnic scholarship.” To be an accepted scholar, the commanding heights of American cultural and scholarly establishment require one to look at the world from their well-entrenched world view and accept all the prerequisites that come with it. For example, anyone who had an “unorthodox” view on the former Yugoslavia simply could not be “anointed.” In the Croatian case, one had a chance to be accepted into higher circles only if he or she were willing (or pretended) to speak “Serbo-Croatian” or to teach “Yugoslav” literature, to praise self-management and the socialist market economy, or be willing to embrace the official belief that Tito had resolved the nationality problem and had created a model system where the best of socialism and capitalism converged. To argue that all of the above was built on faulty foundations virtually meant professional death.
Thus, whether we admit it or not, all who want to move upwards into the American cultural elite and to be closer to the centers of power are pressured to cut off their ethnic ties or at least to make their ethnicity meaningless.
One should keep in mind, however, that it is always interesting, fulfilling, and sometimes rewarding to challenge the establishment and the existing status quo. To be an ethnic American, a Croatian-American, might not “fit” the conventional expectations of today’s core culture. But to have deep ethnic roots, to cherish one’s positive family traditions and values, to love the land of one’s own ancestors, and to add ethnic (Croatian) “spice” to the American culture can only enrich people’s lives and America, too.
Diaspora and the Host Country
Diasporas are usually a factor and sometimes a tool in the relationship between the so-called host country and the homeland. Very often, diasporas contribute to the establishment, strengthening, and maintenance of good relations between the new and the old homelands. The role of a diaspora can also be disruptive to such relations. However, the nature of a diaspora’s role is defined not only by the diaspora itself but many times by the host country and the homeland.
The Croatian diaspora has played both a disruptive and a constructive role in the relations between the U.S. and those who ruled the Croatian homeland. During the Yugoslav period, for example, the anti-Yugoslav Croat diaspora was seen as a harmful factor while the pro-Yugoslav segment of the diaspora was considered a positive catalyst. However, U.S. policymakers used both groups as tools of their policies toward the former Yugoslavia.
In the post-World War II period, the U.S. used the Croatian diaspora to put pressure on socialist Yugoslavia any time it wanted. Any visible recognition of pro-independence Croats by some U.S. state or federal official had an unpleasant echo in Belgrade. Furthermore, Croatians were active members of the so-called “Captive Nations” organization, which was at least a symbolic instrument of the U.S. foreign policy within the framework of the Cold War. On the other hand, when Washington wanted to make a friendly gesture and strengthen the ties with Belgrade, the elements of the pro-Yugoslav diaspora were used as instruments in promoting good relations and an attempt was made to neutralize the pro-independence groups.
The Yugoslav government used the diaspora for its own purposes, most of all by promoting visits to the “stari kraj” (the old country), by invitations to the Yugoslav independence day, by organizing festivals, etc. It used the diaspora to project an image of being a “normal” country wanting to have “normal” relations with the U.S. and with the rest of the world. The Yugoslav regime, through its agents, sometimes disguised as Croatian nationalists, undertook activities that blackened the reputation of pro-independence movement in the eyes of the world.
Furthermore, the host country and the homeland sometimes encouraged and even actively promoted divisions and fragmentation within the diaspora if they felt that its potential unity might be dangerous to the friendly relations between the two countries. The Croatian diaspora in the U.S., for example, was disunified for a long time not only because it was divided over the question of the Yugoslav state, but also because it was manipulated by both the American and Yugoslav government agencies.
At the beginning of the decade of the nineties, the role of the Croatian diaspora in this country became radically different from that of the past. As socialist Yugoslavia began to break up and the war of Serbian aggression began, American Croatians became a visible witness in Washington to the fact that the Croatian people at home and abroad wanted a free, independent, and democratic state of Croatia. During those few crucial years, the diaspora knew instinctively what to ask of the U.S. government and the American people: to stop the Serb aggression, recognize Croatian independence, and help Croatia in its post-war and post-communist era reconstruction. It is probably impossible to measure how much the diaspora did influence the official Washington and the American public opinion, but one could say for certain that its activities did have a very positive effect on the fate of the homeland and its relations with America.
Today, however, the Croatian diaspora’s influence on the official Washington or on the public opinion in America does not correspond to its size and potential, or to its love for the homeland. It seems that, at the present time, the Croatian community in the U.S.A. neither has a clear or well-defined idea of what its role in Washington should be nor does it have the necessary structures for translating its energies and potential into an effective presence in the U.S. capital.
In order to remedy the present situation, the Croatian diaspora should ask itself: Should the diaspora be simply an extension, a transmission belt, of the policies and wishes of the (present or future) government in Zagreb? Is it desirable for the diaspora to speak in Washington in unison or is it better to have a variety of constructive approaches to promote U.S.- Croatian relations? Can the Croatian diaspora in this country serve as a type of non-governmental organization and act as an independent factor in relation to both Washington and Zagreb, promoting the long-term interests of both countries? Can a diaspora in general, and the Croatian diaspora in particular, be an effective movement on the international level? And finally, how and who will define the role of the Croatian diaspora and/or frame its organizational structures into an effective presence in the U.S.A.? Is this possible and even desirable?
Furthermore, when individuals or groups from the Croatian diaspora come to Washington to speak on behalf of the homeland, do they know what to ask for? Do they themselves recognize and understand the problems in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina or the issues dividing Zagreb, Washington, and the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Do they come to Washington with realistic and well-planned proposals or with a list of generalities and improbabilities? One of the most sensitive and most important issues among the Croatians today is the future of the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina; but does the Croatian diaspora have any realistic proposal to offer to the American power brokers or do they simply react to the problems of the moment?
Finally, the question should be asked: How effective is the Croatian diaspora in Washington today? The answer depends on its goals. If the goal is to get together once or twice a year to show official Washington that American Croatians love newly independent Croatia and, as a bonus, experience an emotional charge for doing a patriotic act, the answer is positive. But if the diaspora’s goal is to influence U.S. policies toward Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is apparent, the effectiveness of the Croatian diaspora is marginal at best.
Since the war of independence began, the Croatian diaspora has been focused on its relationship with official Washington, but the diaspora should not lose sight of the importance of its relations to the American community at large. Croatians have a proud tradition in America of being a hardworking, self-reliant, and family oriented community. However, Croatians are one of the “invisible” ethnic communities in the U.S.A.. There are no “Croatian towns” in our big cities, “Croatian pizza,” “Croatian bread”, or a “Croatian Riverdance” production. Croatians make the news only when something negative happens. But, much of the blame is due to American Croatians themselves. They must get more involved in various civic and community activities. Only those who are active become visible.
Today, with Croatia on the world map, the diaspora does not have to be preoccupied with national independence or with being a constant witness that Croatia does indeed exist. It can now direct part of its energies to becoming an organized, active, and more visible community in America. By getting involved as an ethnic group with other ethnics and the community at large, the Croatian diaspora can not only make itself a factor in American politics and culture, but also strengthen the life of the diaspora itself and reinvigorate ethnic pride in those who are on the way to losing their Croatian identity.
Second Side Of The Triangle: Croatian Diaspora And The Homeland
Pre-independence Era
In regard to relationships with the homeland, the Croatian diaspora in the U.S.A. was divided into two major camps throughout this century, especially since 1918. While one faction accepted the political status quo or actively supported the Yugoslav state, the others either had sympathies for, or actively promoted the idea of Croatian independence. The first group had amicable or at least working relations with Yugoslavia; the second advocated Yugoslavia’s dissolution. In turn, the Yugoslav regime not only abhorred the Croatian political emigrants but used all means, including assassinations, to curb their influence.
The political diaspora, although not well-organized or strong, served as witness to the truth in their belief “Jos Hrvatska ni propala dok mi zivimo!” (Croatia is not yet lost so long as we live!) and that was very disturbing to both the royalist and communist regimes in Belgrade. The pro-independence faction of the diaspora, however, did have an unofficial and invisible but vital relationship with the homeland. It was united with the homeland through the ideals of freedom and independence. It was this deep, and one might say, metaphysical unity that gave the Croatian diaspora legitimacy to speak on behalf of the Croatian people in the homeland.
Relations Since 1990
Since the declaration of Croatian independence, the diaspora’s relation with the homeland has been for the most part dynamic and strong, simultaneously it has also been going through some painful shifts and uncertainties.
At first, because of the war and newly realized freedom, relations were enthusiastic, idealistic, even euphoric. For the first time in many decades the homeland and diaspora were free to embrace one another.
In the last few years, however, working relations have been cooling off. Some of the reasons for this change are an “overheated” relationship during the war of independence and a realization that the decades of separation have resulted in different habits, outlooks, and cultures. While the diaspora’s loyalty to Croatia and its independence has not been shaken, there are increasing doubts about the political, economic, social, and cultural norms and practices in the “old country.” Common perceptions are that socialist work ethics, unprofessionalism, corruption, nepotism, cronyism and similar vices permeate the Croatian state system and that there is not much the diaspora can or is allowed to do about it. As a result, there are no significant efforts on the part of the diaspora to put pressure on the ruling elite in the homeland to steer the national ship in a different direction. Instead, there is growing silence and indifference, along with a gradually loosening of homeland-diaspora ties.
There are several official and semi-official channels between Croatia and the Croats in the world today. Besides the Catholic Church, which has been traditionally an important bridge between the homeland and the Croat immigrants, one should mention the following official diaspora-homeland links.
Presently, there are twelve members in the present Sabor (Parliament) in Zagreb who represent the diaspora. Two of them are from the United States. Unfortunately, those twelve neither reflect the general wishes or the will of the diaspora nor are they visible witnesses to the higher ideals of democracy and civil society within the present political system in Croatia. Although a certain percentage of Croatians in diaspora believe that there should be a direct link between the diaspora and the Sabor in Zagreb, they do not accept the present arrangements. They do not want such links to become a bone of contention or an instrument of party politics in Croatia. A constitutional formula must be found which will ensure that the genuine wishes and ideas of the diaspora are heard in the homeland, that those who represent the diaspora are accountable to the diaspora and not to a political party (or parties) in Croatia. Furthermore, those representing the diaspora, besides being a firm institutional bridge between the homeland and the diaspora, must promote the highest standards of freedom and democracy, stay above party politics, and promote long range interests of both the Croats in the diaspora and the homeland.
The second official bridge between Croatia and her diaspora, the Ministry of Return and Immigration, was recently abolished. Its main activities were concentrated on helping the returnees to cope with bureaucratic and other problems after coming back to Croatia. Such work was needed and praise-worthy, but the Ministry’s role was limited in regard to the life of the diaspora as a whole.
Hrvatska Matica Iseljenika/HMI (Croatian Emigrant Central Organization) has an established institutional tradition in linking Croatia and its diaspora. It was formed in 1951 as the Matica Iseljenika Hrvatske/MIH (Central Organization of the Emigrants from Croatia). Although it was under communist party patronage till 1990, through the decades of its existence it has created and kept formal contacts with many Croatian organizations and institutions throughout the world. Its most visible presence among the Croats in the diaspora today is through its two publications: a monthly Matica and an annual Iseljenicki Kalendar (Emigrant Almanac) Without minimizing its importance as an institution, it should be pointed out that from its inception the HMI has been oriented toward being a one-way street. For example, in the magazine Matica, which is very nicely edited, we regularly read about the past and present life and activities of the diaspora, that is to say, we read about ourselves. True, at times various views and opinions from the diaspora are published, as well as critical views from within Croatia about the homeland-diaspora relations. But a major shortfall of the HMI is that it promotes the presence of the homeland among the Croatians outside the country, but it remains an insignificant voice for the diaspora in the homeland.
During the Yugoslav socialist regime, the main role of the MIH was to promote and/or safeguard the ideals of socialism and Yugoslavism among the Croats in diaspora. MIH was not there to be an instrument through which the diaspora might influence the homeland or spread “dangerous” ideas in the country. Today, however, the situation is radically different; and, because it is different, the HMI and its publications would be better utilized to create the necessary strong and multi-directional bridge across which the various parts of the same people could freely communicate and enrich each other.
One of the most visible diaspora organizations in Croatia today, which claims to represent all Croatians scattered around the world, is the Croatian World Congress. With the blessing and the help of the present government in Zagreb and its media, it has been projecting itself as the linchpin between the homeland and the Croats outside the homeland.
The main weaknesses of the Congress, however, are that it is perceived (and with good reasons) as an extension of the ruling HDZ party, that its effectiveness is minimal (at least in the U.S.A.), and finally, that it is a form without much substance, because its legitimacy is derived from links to the ruling power structures in Croatia and not from the diaspora itself.
In order to become a genuine voice of the diaspora, the Congress must undergo a radical transformation, but it seems that this will not be the case in the near future. One might doubt if the present (and perhaps the future governments) in Croatia truly desire to see a unified and well-organized diaspora because if it did happen, the diaspora might be the wild card in Croatia’s domestic politics. Thus, the probability is that those in power and their allies are interested more in manipulating than in unifying the diaspora into a formidable force.
Croatia’s diplomatic missions in this country are the most immediate official links between the diaspora and the homeland. These missions are relatively new and both the diaspora and Croatia’s representatives are not used to such direct contacts. Too much ad hoc interference on the part of either side will be more disruptive than helpful. A problem exists also in the diplomatic staff: a significant number are former communist Yugoslav diplomats or at least those who viewed the diaspora as an enemy. For these reasons, major efforts are needed to create strong, rational, and well-planned foundations for good and lasting contacts that will be beneficial for Croatia, the diaspora, and the U.S.A.
In the relationship of the diaspora and Croatia, one should not neglect the role of those who have returned to the homeland. They are the living and most often positive links between the two worlds. But unfortunately some of the returnees are not helping homeland-diaspora relations. They often parade as the idealists, patriots, and “experts” who have returned to help Croatia. In reality, however, they are helping themselves and their large egos. Instead of being examples of higher political standards, they have often become, together with their likes in the country, political entrepreneurs without a sound ideology, without ideas, and without idealism. Such individuals often serve as negative examples for Croats at home and abroad. Through them, the diaspora sees the negative side of the situation in Croatia, and to the people in Croatia they represent all that is negative in the diaspora.
Finally, one of the most confusing issues among the Croats in the diasporas is their relationship with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Generally speaking, Bosnia and Herzegovina is not taken seriously as the homeland of the Croats, even by those born there, although the Croats have been inhabitants of that land since the early Middle Ages and are recognized as one of the three constituent peoples in the country. Instead of trying to make direct links with the Croatian political, cultural, educational, and other institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, both the self-proclaimed “leaders” of the diaspora and official Zagreb have been ignoring or even obstructing such ties. Preservation of national “unity” is the usual phrase one hears as a cover for ignoring this crucial issue, not only for the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina but also for the future of Croatia.
The Third Side Of The Triangle: Croatian Diaspora In The U.S.A.
Intra-community Relations
From the 16th century, Croatians have been present in this land. However, only since the end of the last century and the beginning of this one when more massive Croatian immigration began to take place, can we properly speak of a Croatian diaspora in the U.S. Although many immigrant Croats planned to return to their homeland after earning and saving a few dollars, their voyage to the New World was a one-way trip. Those pioneers, who were accepted as good laborers but expected to shed their “cultural baggage,” succeeded in establishing viable and functional Croatian ethnic communities in many American industrial and mining centers, despite enormous hardships. They built churches and clubs, published many newspapers and books, formed singing societies, folklore groups, and self-help organizations.
The intra-Croatian community life in this country, however, was not only creative and dynamic but also divisive. Suffice to mention just a few most visible divisions that persisted within the Croatian communities for many decades. Regional identities were quite strong. People came from various parts of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Burgenland Austria. Legally they were Austro-Hungarians, Italians, or later Yugoslavs while their primary identity still remained on a village or regional level. An interesting process did take place among the Croatians in America: many of them passed through the process of national homogenization not in Croatia but in the diaspora.
Ideological and political divisions and passions were strong, sometimes even violent, in the Croatian communities in this country, especially among the members of the first generation. Some accepted the ideals of socialism, Slavism, Yugoslavism, anti-clericalism, and atheism. Others cherished the national or religious identity, and for some the two were equally strong. Such divisions persisted even in the same organizations. The Croatian Fraternal Union, for example, was made up of various factions and it has passed through different stages of ideological shifts in its over a hundred years history.
In the last few years, the Croatian diaspora in the U.S. A. has been united more than ever before. Old regionalism and sharp ideological differences are diminishing. Support for the Croatian Spring in the late 1960s and frustrations with its brutal suppression at the end of 1971 served as a unifying factor among the Croats in the diaspora. And then came the war of Yugo-Communist-Serbian aggression and the emergence of Croatia as an independent country. These events of the early 1990s have solidified American Croatians in their ethnic identity and their support for the homeland. Furthermore, there are no significant ideological differences among the Croats in America today. The overwhelming majority of them believe that Croatia’s future can be secured only on the principles of the present norms of Western democracy and market economy. The underlining fact is, all factions, organizations, and generations within the active part of the diaspora are united in their love for the homeland and its freedom. But that unity and love may easily fade away if the present situation is not properly assessed, necessary adjustments made, and new visions and goals stimulated.
The Present Ambiguities
At the present time, however, the Croatian diaspora in this country is going through a major phase of uncertainty. The love for the homeland and Croatian pride is being undermined by growing indifference. What is happening is more than a cooling off period after an intensive activity during the war of independence. It seems there is a growing frustration with the unfulfilled ideals and goals that existed only a few years ago. It might be that the homeland is also frustrated with the diaspora. For the diaspora, the homeland was a beautiful dreamland, which many were not allowed even to visit. On the other hand, for many in the homeland, the Croats in the diaspora were either evil incarnated or selfless patriots and pure idealists. Now that the two sides are beginning to know each other, its seems neither one is happy with what they see. Hopefully this should not result in indifference or even resentment but in rational dialogue through which new and common goals might be found for the benefit of both the homeland and the diaspora.
While the older and more established institutions, like churches and fraternal unions are not shaken much by recent changes, a number of former organizations, mainly political ones, have disappeared or are fading away. (Hrvatsko Narodno Vijece, for example). There are no independent community oriented Croatian publications in this country any more. (“Danica” and “Hrvatski Glasnik”, for example died with the coming of Croatia’s independence). A number of new organizations (cultural, political, charitable…) have been started since 1990. Most of them began on an ad hoc basis. Some have already died out while a number of others are alive on paper only. Chapters of only one Croatian political party, namely the ruling HDZ, are still visible in a few Croatian communities in this country, but experience has shown that the existence of homeland political parties in the diaspora can not play a positive role but only a divisive one in the communities.
Two segments of Croatian diaspora in this country that are possibly the most confused at the present time are former politically active groups and individuals and the younger generation of Croats who have fallen in love with Croatia during her latest struggle for independence. Definitely, Croatia’s independence has exhilarated the first group because its life-long dreams were fulfilled. But there is now a sense of confusion regarding the role of the former political activists and their sense of purpose. There is a lack of desire and/or ability on their part to formulate and embrace new dreams and visions.
Many among the Croatian younger generation in America, on the other hand, are forward-looking, full of energy, enthusiasm, and love for their own ethnicity and for Croatia. They see themselves at the beginning of a new and great era for Croatians. Their main frustration stems from the lack of organizational structure and clearly formulated goals. These are college students and younger professionals, many of whom have gone through Croatian language schools and/or folk dancing and tamburitza groups, but now when they feel that they can actively participate in the community, their enthusiasm is stifled because simply there are no institutional structures through which they can express themselves and feel useful. This often results in disappointments, indifference, and quick abandonment of the Croatian identity.
Both the older, once politically active generation, and the younger American-Croatian enthusiasts have great potential. The first has economic potential and deeply rooted patriotism. The second have energy, education, and love for Croatian culture and the homeland. What is needed is finding a suitable framework for using these major potentials both for individual growth and for the greater good of the community. If the Croatian diaspora in the U.S.A. is to secure its future in the next millennium, either the old organizational structures have to be adapted to the present and future needs, or new ones established, or both.
If one takes a horizontal look at the Croatian diaspora in the U.S. today, it can be easily concluded that much of its energies are devoted to folk-oriented activities, like folk dancing, tamburitza music, and Croatian language for children. Then come sports, like soccer, bowling, and golf, along with annual festivals, fundraisers, and charitable activities. The parishes serve as the lasting and most popular gathering places and the activities are for the most part those of the older and established communities and organizations. But one should not forget that the newest Croat immigrants in the U.S.A. have been dispersed in small groups all over the country. They do not have organizations or parishes, and if something is not done, they will simply melt away.
If looked at vertically, however, we realize that the Croatian diaspora in this country never succeeded in reaching its goals of having lasting activities on a higher cultural and educational level. True, there is the Croatian Academy of America and the Association for Croatian Studies. But these are relatively small groups of self-motivated individuals who are trying to make a difference among American scholarly circles. But there is neither a Croatian college, nor a single Croatian chair at an American university, nor an independent institute for Croatian studies. What is even more disturbing is the fact that there is not even an appreciation for the need of such institutions. But only well-established scholarly institutions and hard-working professionals can bring about the desired results.
Furthermore, the Croatian presence in U.S. institutions of higher learning, especially in the field of humanities and social sciences, is minuscule. True, during the Yugoslav period, Croatian scholars were usually suspects of nationalism not only in Yugoslavia but in this country, too. The fact is that very few second-generation Croatians have interest or patience to pursue higher degrees in the above-mentioned fields. Croatian sons and daughters tend to follow the professions that are more financially rewarding rather than those in academia. Our young people are excellent high school and college students, but most of them do not find it rewarding to go to graduate schools, or if they do, they pursue “practical” and more materially rewarding professions.
Moreover, among the Croatians in the U.S. A. there are no established channels of cooperation among the bigger business entrepreneurs, professionals, and the community at large. A short-lived cooperation existed during the last war, but that is fading away. The class stratification among the Croats in this country is also more or less determined according to the above groups. The bigger entrepreneurs or those in well-paid professions are usually marginal to the community life. They are “occasional” Croatians. It seems that very few children from the upper-class are visible or active in Croatian communities or institutions. One of the major reasons for Croatian ineffectiveness and disfunctionalism as a community can be in this unbridged vertical stratification. But ways must be found to connect the various social, economic, and intellectual forces, if the Croatian community is to move forward into the next century, not only in preserving Croatian music, dances, and food recipes, but also in being present on a higher level of culture and education in this country.
Finally, an East European Jewish tale describes how a husband tells his wife that he has invested a million zloty and he is worried what will happen to his investment if the Messiah came. Everything would be lost. The wife answers: ” With God’s help, the Messiah will not come yet.”
The “Messiah has come,” an independent Croatia is here. The Croatians in the USA have invested much in the new homeland and, at the same time, many have worked for and dreamed about the freedom of Croatia. The question is can they save their life investments (not only material) in this country and still become a part of the “promised land”? Or is Croatia for most of the diaspora merely an imaginary homeland while America is the true “promised land”? We believe that question should not be asked in these terms. It seems that many American-Croats look at both countries as their true homelands. Many, if not most of them, believe that they do not have to abandon either one but embrace both.
The real practical questions for us today are: How can we become a part of the homeland although we are citizens of and live in this country? How can we find new ways to preserve and strengthen our ethnicity? How can we build wide and firm two-way bridges with the homeland and help Croatia and the Croatians in Bosnia and Herzegovina to live in security, freedom, prosperity, and a lasting peace? And how can we make a painless transition, if we decide to return to the homeland of our birth and our ancestors?
By raising the above issues and questions at this symposium, we hope to stimulate a constructive discussion among the Croatians in the USA and the homeland in pursuit of a better future for all the Croats in the next millennium.
prisoners in concentration camps near Banja Luka led to international condemnations and urgent calls 0for action. But international attention soon was diverted to other parts of Bosnia, especially Sarajavo, where the brutality of “ethnic cleansing” and siege warfare was there for the whole world to see. 
historical science is thus fumed into the arm of politics that we would call historical pseudo-science. 
which have recently been published in Croatia. 
book give an overview of the activities of the Croatian State Bank during the war and its role in transferring parts of the state treasury to the West toward the end of the war. Chapter one deals with a shipment of gold shipped to Switzerland during 1944 and its final fate. Second and third chapters give specific answers what happened to the national treasury at the end of the war, more specifically to the parts of the treasury that was taken out of the country in May 1945. 
facts. The privileged class could acquire legitimacy solely based upon their descent from ancient nobility, because in this way no newly rich men of common background could attain aristocratic status and political power. The Ragusan patricians believed itself to stem from four classical cultures: these of Epidaurus, Rome, Troy, and Salona. Their actual Slav and Roman origin was wrapped in a mythical story, which corroborated aristocratic ideology. 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999. xi 281 p. Paper US $22.95 Cloth US $60.00 
After an insightful introduction by the author, the letters and statements are aligned chronologically and they parallel the events that were taking place in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. An extensive index is included at the end of the volume.
events, and places in Bosnia. The entries cover more than 200 pages and provide an excellent background (especially for recent history), and include entries for Westerners who have made an impact on Bosnian history (e.g., Cyrus Vance, General MacKenzie). Entries for broad terms (economy, literature, political parties) are as much as seven pages in length. The bibliography, almost 100 pages long, is a well-organized collection of articles and monographs published in the last few decades; it is especially worthwhile for undergraduates who will rely on these primarily English-language sources. There is no comparable reference source. Highly recommended for all libraries. I. Tomlianovich, Dickinson College CHOICE, March 1998 Vol.35 No. 7 
Ante Čuvalo 